in the year since then that number has grown to 138 battalions that have grown independent with advisers -- >> so we're tracking you went from 101 to 138 in the year? >> that is correct. >> great. >> it went from 155 battalion sized formations to 168 battalion sized formations. so the force has grown significantly in just a year, but it has also grown in its capabilities in just a year. we have seen that not just in the army but also in the afghan national police as well. we have seen the emergence of the afghan special operations capabilities also dramatically enhanced over the period of the last two years but in the period of last year as well, the nine commandos, the 72 special forces operational detachment alphas, the a-teams if you will, the emergence of the special police units within the general

directorate of the special units in the ministry of the interior. those units with advisers or partners continue to make progress and, as i said earlier, 89% of our operations are partnered operations today. there are operations on the ground, as we speak, right now, in afghanistan where afghan unit are in the lead with partnership, partnered operations with isaf forces. so we have seen that progress. we intend to continue to pursue that progress. among the four priorities that i gave to my commanders the day i took command, and those priorities i believe are operative, while we will continue with my first priority, pressure the insurgency in a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, the second priority, which is only slightly behind it, it to do all we can do accelerate the movement of the ansf into the fore and we're go fog continue to pursue that aggressively, mr. smith.

>> one more question. president karzai made a number of comments, you know, being concerned about the u.s. troops, talking about returning us to our bases, ending night raids. by and large it seems to me those comments reflect domestic pressure, reflect the afghan constituents that president karzai is responsible to being concerned about the foreign military presence. while president karzai's aware of the importance of us being there he's aware most of the people in afghanistan look forward to the day when we're not. so number one, is that an accurate reflection in your view of what president karzai and some other domestic politicians in afghanistan are reflecting? number two this is for both dr. miller and general allen, how do you work that relationship? how do you make sure the transition continues to happen in a responsible way, not in a

rushed way given that domestic political pressure? i will point out that domestic political pressure that president karzai and others in the afghan government are feeling reflects the flaw and the strategy that says if things aren't going well, let's just stay there forever. there is the reality of dealing with the afghan population. how are you managing that relationship given those pressures? >> i think, if i may, there is no part of our strategy which intends to stay in afghanistan forever. in fact our strategy, part of the larger isaf strategy, agreed to ultimately with nato isaf and afghanistan in the lisbon conference of november of 2010 called for us to work through the business of transition moving the ansf gradually into the lead for security across the country in a process that will be completed by the end of 2014. the campaign accounts for that. and the campaign accounts for the drawdown of u.s. and isaf forces as the ansf moves to the fore, fully fielded in the

battlefield and that process is on track. and in fact, the reduction of u.s. numbers and the reduction of isaf forces in direct support of our isaf and lisbon transition goals of 31 december 2014. with regard to the voices that we hear in the afghan government, the afghan government is on a path towards sovereignty. this is the whole process that we're talking about with respect to the lisbon convention of -- anticipating security leave by 2014. we should encourage the voices of sovereignty, he courage actions within the afghan government that seeks sovereignty, the m.o.u. that i recently signed with the minister wardac was one of the greatest acknowledgements where they partner increasingly with us in a counterinsurgency, they

will take responsibility for the administrative detention of insurgents in the battle spacing, and american forces will cease detaining afghans for long periods of time and afghans will pick up that responsibility. that is appropriate. it is a great indicator of sovereignty, for example. with respect to night operations, we have been in a long-term conversation with the afghan government in that regard. i believe that just in the last three months we have come a very long way in creating greater capacity amongst the afghans to conduct night operations in a very credible way. we're still heavily partnered with them and will be for some period of time. but not only do our operations now, all of our night operations, are partnered with afghan partner unit forces, their own commandos, which are very good commandos, but we're in the process now of building 12 afghan stryke forces of their own. as you know, sir, i have a number of stryke forces that are detailed to me that operate under the control ultimately of jsoc and those are the stryke forces famous for the success of

the night operations, which have been enormously successful in shredding the enemy's met network of command and control. another step towards sovereignty. these are all steps towards a strategic partnership with afghanistan, which we hope ultimately to have completed before very shortly the heads of state of the 50 isaf nations meet in chicago hosted by the president of the united states. so i think we're on track, sir. and i think even though that there has been some domestic rhetoric from the president on departing the villages early, et cetera, i will say both our president and the president karzai had an extended conversation the other day, in fact they have spoken three times just recently where both of them were in full agreement that the lisbon-based process and formulation of transition is on track and they both support it, which calls for the complete ansf lead by close of business on the 31st of december 2014, sir. >> thank you very much. just something quickly. got over time go ahead. >> let me say that obviously general allen said it all. i wanted to reiterate three points. the first is, commitment to continue the transition process across the elements that the

general talked about, the second is the relationships. we have one of our finest commanders and finest diplomats in the country with general allen and with ambassador crocker. in addition to that, secretary of defense and the president have been in contact with president karzai multiple times even in the last couple of weeks. i want to emphasize also that the contacts at the next level down if you will, with the defense minister, with interior, the national security adviser getting the depth is the resilience of the relationship. third and finally, let me say that long-term strategic partnership is going to be vital, not just 2015 forward, but an understanding of us having that commitment is important to sustaining this relationship in the meantime. >> thank you. appreciate that. i know neither of you have an easy job.

i think you're doing it well. there are no guarantees, but we have to transition to afghan sovereignty as quickly as we responsibly can. thank you. >> thank you. mr. bartlett? >> thank you both very much for your service to our country. i know that everything we read and hear is not necessarily true and stories get warped. but there is a series of events that give me some pause if they're true. i would like for the moment for you to imagine that you're a taliban fighter and this is what you have heard.

a number of months ago the president of the united states says that we're pulling out of afghanistan in 2014, we're gone. several months ago the secretary of defense says that in 2013 we're going to stop combat operations and just continue with security and training of the afghan forces. and that position is corroborated by the white house. and then just a few weeks ago i hear of a program that will give me 125 to $150 a week if i stop fighting and i can still keep my gun. now i'm a rational taliban fighter, what do you think might be a rational position that i would take with those facts in mind? >> mr. bartlett, let me answer in two parts.

first, i want to be absolutely clear that the lisbon transition strategy is still this administration's policy and still the direction in which we are headed. and that included a transition to afghan leadership throughout afghanistan by the end of 2014 and afghan responsibility for security throughout the country by the end of 2014. the u.s. and coalition at that time, we would expect would still provide some support, including train, advise, assist, and including the capacity for counterterrorism operations at that point in time. when secretary of defense and others have talked about the 2013 time frame, it is a milestone on the path and in

2013 we expect that each of the tranches of transition that are to afghan lead that were announced at lisbon will have begun so the final tranche will have begun in '13, in 2013. at that time there will be afghans in the lead for security throughout the country. but in 2014 it will be very much a mixed model. in some cases, partnered units as occurring today. in some cases trade advice and assist. in some cases maybe strategic overwatch. other cases there will be a more significant role for that period. this is part of that transition process and sometime in 2013, we'll see that milestone with the final tranche. that begins just as an additional round of transition we expect to occur by the end of 2014. >> if in the meantime we are

offering the taliban fighter $125 to $150 a month to just stop fighting, he can keep his gun, do you think he might stop fighting and keep his gun knowing that we are leaving in 2014 and then he can pick up and fight, we won't be there? >> i don't reject that possibility but i want to offer two contrary points, if you will. the first is, if a fighter wants to pick up his gun at any point and time in afghanistan, that is -- that is likely to be a possibility. if you look at the availability of ak-47s, they have had weapons for a long period f of time. second, critically important, what we stipulated, secretary clinton stipulated for fighter that is come off taliban come

off the field as an outcome, they need to sever ties with al qaeda and agree to the constitution. if they do those things, the gun is silent and may come to fight on the other side and become part of the national security forces over time. so, sir, i think what i would hope and expect of a taliban fighter today is a commitment not just between now and 2013 or now and 2014 but during commitment to see ansf that general allen talked in detail about and what they are seeing is they are going to lose. if they care to -- if they want to come across reconciliation, they have the opportunity to be a part of the solution, not a part of the problem that the nsf will solve. >> time expired.

mrs. davis. >> thank you very much. dr. miller, in general, i want to thank you for your dedicated service. i want to follow up on numbers for a minute and sustaining the effort on the part of the afghan army. it's my understanding as you are speaking about the size of the battalions, we are looking at a force of 352,000. after that, due to budgetary reasons and our own investment in that, we are looking at 230,000. is that a correct number that we are downsizing to that level? looking to anticipating, you know, going to that level? >> at this time, the only figure that is taken as given is that 352,000 as the target for the size, the combined size of the afghan national army and the afghan national police for the ansf overall. we expect, at some point and time, the time is not determined, it's a topic of conversation both in the united states and with coalition with the afghans, at some point and time, it will make sense to

reduce that level to a long term sustainable level. the point of time that makes sense will depend fundamentally on conditions on the ground. some of the calculations that you have heard that some of which have been in the press, frankly some accurately and some not so accurately are looking at a point and time the taliban is significantly reduced and the scale of the afghan security forces cope with that would be lower. that is neither the end number or any point in time is determined at this point. people have talked about numbers. none of that is decided. we have not heard recommendations. >> thank you dr. miller. i wanted to clarify that. if it's downsized to that level,

the budget plays a role, but we have a lot of former afghan soldiers in the country perhaps without a job. is that something that we are looking at, that transition and what happens after that? >> general allen may wish to add to this as well. a sign of success down the road, it's not immediate but down the road would be the taliban was smaller, the afghan national security forces could be smaller and the challenge associated with that is reintroducing the

forces back into the economy. the good news is that because of what they would have gone through to become part of the nsf, they would be trained with respect to literacy and more capable of contributing to the economy. that demobilization process is something that needs to unfold over time and we need to have an explicit plan. >> yes. thank you. certainly literacy is a big thing here. we are talking first grade level for many, many of the troops and whether or not that is sustainable to have them continue to be able to develop that economy. general allen? >> we have continued to emphasize literacy and the soldiers that go through the police that go through basic training that obtain a first grade level is given the opportunity to continue that literacy training. certain leaders have a minimum standard of literacy. as you correctly point out, should there be and there will be a draw down at some point from ansf to some number in the post 2014 period, there are

options now for those soldiers that there wouldn't have been before. i imagine in a managed forced reduction, the plan remains to be developed. pretty soon we're going to have to start to think about it. there will be such aspects of the plan such as vocational training. >> all important, i agree. general, could i just very quickly in the remaining time, general, just ask about morale. you conveyed, i think, quite eloquently the feelings of troops, i think and, you know, how they see their mission. clearly, these kinds of setbacks can be devastating. i wondered if you could speak more to that and whether or not we are doing anything differently as we redeploy troops in looking at records and number of deployments. this obviously is something that

bears on everybody's responsibility. >> general, the lady's time is expired. can you please answer that question for the record? >> i will, sir. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. general, my understanding from people who should know and it's been written about in the press was the original surge. the military commanders ask for a floor of 40,000 troops for the original surge in afghanistan. they said the best would be if we could get 80,000. they got approved 30,000, a 25% cut from what they said the floor should be. there are some people who believe that it has cost us added lives and time because that request was not agreed to. that was before your time. i notice in yesterday's wall street journal, it says the plan and the result of that 25% cut was that the campaigns had to be done sequentially. you had to do is south, then move to the east. yesterday, wall street journal says that it is delayed to make that transition from the south to the east because things are not wrapping up in the south as was planned and i take it from

your answer to the chairman's question that is true. we are going to have to stay in the south longer than anticipated before we make the move to the east to deal with that region. is that right? you couldn't do the east and the south at the same time. you had to do the south, then move to the east. yesterday, wall street journal says that it is delayed to make that transition from the south to the east because things are not wrapping up in the south as was planned and i take it from your answer to the chairman's question that is true. we are going to have to stay in the south longer than anticipated before we make the move to the east to deal with that region. is that right? >> we have to consolidate the hold on the population centers in the south. it is the spiritual heartland of the taliban. >> yep. >> that surge, those forces we had in conjunction with the ansf and the development of the local

afghan local police has, in many respects permitted us to be successful in ejecting the taliban from the key terrain, down there, which is the human terrain. so we're going to need to ensure that as we develop the ansf that those forces are able to consolidate the hold on the population to prevent the re-entry by the taliban into those forces, and to into those areas. that's essential. we intend to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgencies in the east. the east will be well resourced. we will do them simultaneously. any suggestion we are going to hold in the east while we conduct operations in the south is, in fact, not correct. the potential difference is whether i ultimately declare that the east will be the main effort, which permits me to shift other resources and rotary wing assets to the east. i will tell you the rc east

commander is fully capable of conducting aggressive operations against the insurgency and is well resourced to do so. my number one goal will be to continue to deny the enemy access back into the key terrain of this insurgency, which is the pashtun population, the pashtun population in the south, sir. >> let me real briefly, success in the east is going to be essential for success in the mission, ultimately, isn't it, because of the proximity with pakistan. >> success in the south is crucial. >> i agree with you in the south. i'm asking about the east. >> in the east, we have to conduct comprehensive operations for some period of time there. by virtue of the proximity of the pakistan border. the lines of movement are much closer to kabul. we will anticipate continued operations there for some time. >> you talked a lot about the growth and afghan security forces. i, among others, have been

impressed by operations and afghan local police. it's also my understanding that that takes time. there is a clear time line, say 18 months to two years during which is special operations team has to live this that village in order to conduct the training and get those afghan local police off on the right path. to stabilize the area, as you have just been describing. i am a little concerned that we're too focused on numbers here, particularly tremendous growth that will make it hard to stick. how are you ensuring that the quality stays there as we have had these tremendous increase in numbers? >> may i get a clarification? quality of the alp? >> yeah, quality of the troops and ability for them to stabilize as you were just describing in the south how they have to hold their own to

prevent the taliban from coming back, so it is more than just a numbers game. >> it's important that we continue as you have correctly pointed out, the deliberate process of creating the village stability platform, which ultimately creates a community mobilization for the development of the afghan local police. we have 99 sites that have been approved ultimately for the location of the afghan local police, and we're well on the way, we're over 50% of that in terms of the creation of those afghan local police garrisons. and most of those, vast majority of those, actually support the campaign. many of those village stability locations we began operations in them months ago. that progress is continuing. we are using our special operators now to be the core element for the creation of the village stability platform to create the community mobilization, to ultimately embrace their own security, to

be the trainers and ultimately the mentors for the afghan local police. as time goes on, it is our intention to use afghan special operators ultimately to, just as we are in other areas, to transition our special operators out of those garrisons, and move them on to other areas where they will -- where they will continue the mission. >> thank you. mr. larson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. miller, probably couldn't have been in that chair, in that position, i was sitting down here at that time, 2002 and '03 and the military at the time was telling us in afghanistan we needed to train 70,000 folks in afghanistan. we were going to do 10,000 a year for seven years or 7,000 a year for ten years. something along those lines.

that number clearly increased over time, it is now up to 352,000. what can you tell me that's going to assure me that in july you aren't going to come back or even say after may in chicago, you aren't going to come back and say we meant 400,000. we went 450,000 security forces? >> mr. larson, there's in-depth analysis behind the number 352,000. i can't tell you it shouldn't be 351,000 or 353,000. very good analysis in terms of the requirement for the afghan national army and the afghan national police. and corresponding also about the afghan local police and other elements that could provide security. now, sir, i guess i would turn

it around and say if we had a recommendation from general allen saying the numbers should be different, i would want to hear that from general allen and would want to bring that forward to the secretary of defense and then forward to the whousz. we have a lot of analysis behind the current assessment. it's based on not just an assessment of what the situation is in afghanistan and where it may go, but on a pretty good in-depth analysis of past counterinsurgency efforts. so, i don't expect there's going to be a large delta. if there were, i would feel obligated to ask general allen for his assessment and take it forward. >> i hope you would feel obligated to come to us as well? general allen, do you have a comment? >> i am satisfied with the 352 number. as we have seen, this year's campaign unfold, we believe that the partnership relationship that we have now with isaf and

the emerging ansf, ultimately our drawdown as they continue to grow to their full surge strength of 352, i think that's an adequate number. the issue isn't the number. the issue will be the disposition of the force on the ground. and it goes back to mr. thornberry's comments about operations in the south versus operations in the east. we may well see we'll have to thicken the defenses in the east over the long term if the safe haven situation doesn't change. it's less about the number than it is probably about the longer term disposition of those forces on the ground to defend key population centers. >> general allen, i'm not asking the next question to get too much into the weeds on the sergeant bales incident, because that's going to be adjudicated elsewhere, but with regards to the investigation related to command in afghanistan, the

situation on the ground that he was operating in, that situation, the command structure in afghanistan, is there -- are there separate investigations going on, separate from the criminal case in afghanistan? >> yes. we'll conduct and administrative investigation and criminal cession. >> can you explain what administrative investigation is. >> it looks at the entire command and control process. how he was assigned, why he was assigned. it will look at command relationships associated with his involvement in that combat outpost. >> has that been assigned then, someone assigned to do that? >> through u.s. forces, afghanistan. >> thank you. finally, general allen, or -- yeah, general allen, can you discuss the attrition rate for the afghan national army? it is noted the goal is 1.4. the current is 2% attrition rate. it sounds like a lot, but when