the decision made earlier this month by afghan president mr. karzai to endorse a code of conduct that forbids women to travel alone in public, permits husbands to beat their wives is an outrageous affront to the afghan women and significantly undermines the progress that this brave group has made in the last decade. his decision to align to the the council of clerics and their code really does cause great concern about the same value -- since the same values we have sought and fought so hard to displace are being put forward as the future of afghanistan. during a bipartisan delegation, i visited along with a number of colleagues who hoped to become doctors, teachers and entrepreneurs and with afghan women training to become helicopter pilots in the afghan

military. it really was an extraordinary trip. it highlighted so well the advances made for women. they wanted nothing more than to help provide for their families and contribute to the future success of their country. in consigning these women to the status of second class citizens, mr. karzai has turned his back on those who are still emerging from decades of abuse by the taliban. and i think threatens the future ability of afghanistan to function as a stable democracy and an american ally. i'm pleased the administration has taken steps to deter the egregious abuses by the afghan government, such as temporarily cutting off funding for the prison at the edge of kabul which has female visitors to invasive body cavity searches as was recently reported in "the new york times." however, this is an issue not yet resolved. so, my question is, as we draw down from afghanistan over the

next several years, what can we do to make sure we don't lose the hard-fought gains for the rights of afghan women, 50% of the population and what, if any, leverage will we have as we go through this process and after the withdrawal is complete. how do you see congress being able to help the administration preserve the gains which have been made? it seems to me, if we are seen as walking away from the gains, we have done not just the afghan women, but ourselves, a great disservice. so i ask both. dr. miller? >> thank you. ma'am, let me answer in three parts, if i can. the first is to acknowledge that the government of afghanistan will not always do exactly what we prefer and what we wish. at the same time, we have and we continue to make clear our view that this is an important issue.

just as you said, we have that has been a consistent message from this administration. it is often, in our view, more effective to do that less visibly. sometimes it has been more visibly. second, as you noted, over the course of this campaign and, in fact, over the course of this surge as we are seen improved security, there are substantial gains that occurred for women including education. when i was in command south a couple weeks ago, just one relatively, in a sense small, but incredibly important fact. that is 40,000 women are receiving an education they were not a few years ago in that -- in kandahar. and, third, i would say that while our fundamental national

interest is to prevent the re-emergence of safe havens for al qaeda, and to prevent the taliban from coming back and displacing the afghanistan government, over the -- over the long-term and indeed in intervening period, part of the basis of our relationship with the afghan government will include how it treats its citizens and so this will remain a continuing conversation. >> and do you express a bright line in your conversations around some of these issues so that it becomes very clear? >> the gentle lady's time has expired. if you'll take that one for the record, please. >> i'll take it for the record. >> mr. turner? >> thank you, mr. chairman, dr. miller, general allen, thank you for being here. in 2006, general james jones, then the supreme allied commander of europe stated, quote, the achilles heel of

afghanistan is the narcotics problem. he went on to say i think the uncontrolled rise, uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency. the criminal elements anything to bring chaos and disorder. in the 2010, the united nations office of drugs and crime published a study showing opium production rapidly increased from the period of 2006 to 2010 and i have a chart from crs that summarizes that report. i'm fond of holding up this report and folding it in half because if you fold it in half, you can see that the period -- during the period of the surge, if you will, of production, it nearly doubled over what the historical levels were prior. in a recent correspondence, you told me the quote, the narcotics trade and its linkage to the insurgency contribute to regional insecurity, corruption,

volatility in the rule of law and stagnation of economic development. general petraeus has agreed that it was a serious problem noting that the trade finance roughly one-third of the taliban's funding. general mattis confirmed this number two weeks ago before this committee. in an attempt to confront this issue, i discussed this with you, general petraeus, general mattis and the dea just to name a few. in response to my question, general mattis stated, quote, the u.s. government and other international partners including the afghans are reducing a poppy cultivation and opium production in afghanistan, our strategy supports a comprehensive set of actions to reduce opium production. the strategy includes numerous initiatives, campaigns and joint collaborative efforts that took years to create and implement. i want to compliment you and your leadership on these efforts and on the apparent success. the united nations office of drugs and crime winter poppy

assessment for april 2011 demonstrated an actual decrease in 2011 opium production. further in correspondence with general petraeus last year, he told me his forces have seen a 48% decrease in opium production and in the first quarter of 2011 we saw 341% increase in drug seizures nationwide compared to the same period ago. i want to continue with the charts and the folding over. this is the one that has been updated to show the fall. and if you fold off the surge, you can see you're back down to levels that once again represent historical level. and while i find these trends reassuring, i am concerned that the premature withdrawal of u.s. and isaf forces in afghanistan might reverse this trend and allow the insurgents to regain this lucrative source of funding. in fact, just two weeks ago general mattis stated that, quote, we'll create an afghan national army, afghan national police that has this capacity if we continue on the track that we

are on right now, closed quote. your testimony before this committee today, serving your -- in your capacity as commander, you stated the progress in afghanistan is real, sustainable and we have severely degraded the insurgency. general allen, are we still pushing the programs to the degree that you stated in the earlier response received in september and receiving similar positive responses in the decrease levels of opium productions, do you anticipate that these positive results will continue as we draw down our forces? and does the afghan army have the capacity to address these counternarcotic efforts? and if the administration ignores the advice of its combat commanders and decides to accelerate withdrawal, what do you anticipate happening to the counternarcotics efforts in afghanistan in the future? one last question, it is my understanding that this issue of narcotics in afghanistan will not be on the nato summit agenda, though the nato summit agenda is described as an afghanistan agenda, it would seem to me with all of the

references and understanding of how this contributes to the insurgency to the taliban instability that it would be high on the list. general? >> it is my intention to preserve to the maximum extent that we can the gains that we have made in both the interagency approach to counternarcotics, both on the u.s. side, but also the interagency capabilities that have been built into the afghan side as well. the counternarcotics police of afghanistan, the vetted and investigative units, the high end special police units within the general directorate of police special units. there are a variety of units that are gaining both in capabilities and in skills that have grown as a direct result of our advisory capacity and our partnership capacity with them

as well. operations such as kafa cardin, a comprehensive counterdrug operation last year, we intend to undertake a similar operation this year. it is my intention to remain committed to use the -- both the interagency resources that we have in country and in close partnership with the u.s. embassy and with other international partners there to continue to develop the capabilities of the afghans themselves, both to interdict the cultivation of narcotics, but also the production of drug products and the shipment and the movement of those. it is my intention to remain on track in that regard. there is no signal to me that there is going to be an accelerated drawdown of the forces necessary to continue to support those processes as well. and i will have to check into the nato summit agenda to see if

there might be subpoints which could, in fact, be the opportunity to discuss this issue, sir. >> thank you very much. >> mr. johnson? >> thank you. mr. chairman, and thank you gentlemen for being here today. in the aftermath of the mistaken burning of books followed by the massacre of 16 innocent civilians, nine of whom were children, apparently at the hands of an american soldier, americans, as well as afghan citizens are outraged. this climate of hostility can lead to bad things happening. insofar as the american soldier accused of committing this massacre is concerned, it should be kept in mind that america has asked much from our american

soldiers in the field. this particular gentleman who stands accused, i understand has been deployed four times to afghanistan and also to iraq, and i would imagine that his state of mind would be a question that will have to be answered by the fact-finders when the trial comes up. and so i would just simply ask that we not yield to the instinct to throw the soldier under the bus, and -- and wash our hands of the fact that he has been put in a situation that many people would snap under. so that would be my statement as far as that is concerned. i think he deserves the presumption of innocence that

the constitution entitles he as well as us to. general, we're in the process of gradually drawing down u.s. forces and transitioning responsibility to afghan forces, and you have stated that -- progress is being made in terms of the development of the afghan security forces, the security gains that have been made, economic development occurring on the ground, largely due to u.s. aid. governance is improving, and you also commented that the acts that i just talked about, the two recent acts, are really

not -- they do not accurately characterize the impact of the united states involvement. now, it's also been alleged that president obama made a key blunder, for lack of a better word, in setting forth a date that american troops would -- american combat troops would be withdrawn. the last of them. so we've got about 18 months before that happens. do you think that that's been a good thing, the announcement? has that been a good thing or a bad thing in terms of on the ground in afghanistan?

>> well, thank you for that question, and thank you for your comment on staff sergeant bales, and i assure you, the investigation will be thorough, and we do operate from a presumption of innocence. it is the nature of who we are and it's the nature of out of constitution and thank you for that comment, congressman. we are going to have combat forces in afghanistan to the end of our deployment. to the end of 2014. we fully anticipate, though, that in 2013, as the ansf continues to move to the lead and as the fifth tranche of transition occurs, which, according to the lisbon conference, technically means that the ansf are in security lead across the country, our forces will move into a support roll to continue to accelerate and to support the ansf as it completes the security

transition after the end of 2014. so we will still have combat forces in afghanistan all the way to the end. they'll be fewer in number, and the nature of the forces will be in many respects advisory in nature, but we can anticipate that the u.s. will be engamed in combat operations in support of the ansf right to the end of 2014. >> has it hurt us or helped us? >> i think it's -- i think it has helped us to focus on the mission. i think it has helped the afghans to focus on their need to become proficient and to move into the fore and on the whole, in the end, i think it has been beneficial. it's not just been a unilateral u.s. decision. it's been an isaf decision. 40 other countries have joined us in this. >> thank you. >> thank you for being here. i think my colleague from georgia left off the outrage we all feel of the 13 men killed

in the green on blue incident as a result of the litany of things that went wrong, including the specialist of payton jones, laid to rest in texas. general allen, there are those in this community and on both sides of these buildings that are openly calling for a re-assessment now and a quicker drawdown of troops out of afghanistan, that's quicker than what's currently planned under all the other agreements, and also i'd like to parenthetically mention, i've never heard anybody say us staying in afghanistan forever was even a remote option. i'm not sure where my colleagues earlier got that idea. but back to my point. i understand after october 1 you handle the 68,000 there and the mission all the way to the end of 2014. if suddenly the administration announces without your input they're going to change the

parameters with of people you're working with or the capacity you'll have in place during this transition, what impact will that have on our ability to be successful with those reduced resources and/or a different model that it's remarkably different than what you're planning to use? >> i, first, there's no indication that the administration is -- >> well, there are those in the legislative branch pushing that, and sometimes that has some impact. not often. >> it would ultimately be a function of what the number would be. but the nature of the relationship that we have right now is that the conversation about what combat power is necessary, what the force structure ought to look like, is a strategic conversation. i've been given no indications that there is a number that will ultimately be detailed to me to build a strategy around, so while i -- >> a number different than the

lisbon agreement? >> that's correct. so at the end of the recovery of the phase two surge forces, as i mentioned, and as you correctly stated a moment ago, i'll give the president my best military advice. with regard to the combat power we'll need to accomplish this mission, probably in 2013, i'm not sure that i would be able to see out to '14 at that point, but i probably have a pretty good feel for it. but it isn't just a function of u.s. forces because i'll be giving a similar recommendation up the nato chain to the supreme allied commander in europe, but also to the secretary-general of nato. it will be a combined recommendation. >> the proposed budget for 2013 drops financial support and training from some $11 billion to $5 billion. is that a reflect of the fact that we're coming to the end of that, we need less resources, is that budget driving the train as opposed to what's happening on the ground, meaning you need less resources?

>> much has already been purchased by them, so we're really fielding the equipment more so than buying the equipment at that point. >> dr. miller, can you give us some indication what the impact us some indication of what the impact of the afghan economy has been and what is going to replace that in their economy when that number is dramatically less after 2014? >> sir, let me first add to general allen's comments on the assf funding. in addition to us having reached a certain point with purchase of equipment general allen's team supported by joint staff and the office of secretary of defense has looked at as we transition what is the number but size and type of equipment that is necessary as the afghans begin

to take it. it is a fund and credit to general allen and his staff to leading that effort. with respect to the specific impact of the economy. i don't have a good number. >> broader than just u.s. president. this is an international effort. really the forces in total that will be leaving at some point in time. obviously this ten year plan to strengthen or to support afghan after this transition is going to be really important because i don't think that the current level of funding for whatever reason is going beyond the near future.

>> mr. chris. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for being here and for your service. i missed the point mr. turner had asked about poppy growth. can you give me a specific as to how much less poppy growth is going on in afghanistan now as compared to when it was at its peak? >> let me take that question and i'll get you a definitive answer on that which gives you history and where we are today and incorporates the sense of where we think we will be going in terms of afghan security development that supports counter narcotics. >> what has replaced poppy growth in the places we know it has been eradicated? >> wheat, pomegranatet, what we would consider to be normal agricultural cash crops. >> i understand there is a lot of infrastructure needed.

is the infrastructure in place? >> it is going to be a long-term development for them. >> long-term meaning? >> years. >> five, ten. >> i can't tell you. i'll add that into the question i take. >> i also will contribute to adding more detail to the record but it's absolutely a very long-term prospect. it's expected to be ten years plus. if i could i want to while i've got the floor on this issue thank the committee for its support on the task force on businesses. that's $150 million this year of department of defense money that is going to help economic development in afghanistan in close partnership with usaid but looking at long term prospects for minerals that can help improve their posture long term but looking at agricultural

enterprises and how to encourage them to move forward and how to bring in capital to help them be sustainable over time. >> talking about sustainability that brings me to my next question. i noticed in the reporting that the ansf is going to be at 152,000 people at some point. general in your expert analysis the growth and the development of noncommissioned officers within the nsf and the growth and expertise that is growing within the junior officer corps is the numbers strong enough to support a foors. first i want to know about what you see within the military itself, the expertise and capabilities and then from an economic standpoint.

>> it's an important question. the answer is at this juncture we are still building the ncos and general officers. the good news is that the schools are in place now, the curricula are coming online and we are building a noncommissioned officer and a junior officer that is steeped in the kinds of capabilities that we need for the ansf to have. and i believe that we all recognize that the afghan economy is going to for some period of time require assistance, international community assistance to sustain. there is as we all know and the task force civility operation has done a great job, there are substantial resources underground in afghanistan. it is going to take a number of years of the process of the industry to produce the revenues to support an ansf with capabilities. and so at this point, no. but the international community

has indicated the desire to continue to support over the long term. >> that builds to my next question which is 2014 is the next presidential election. we have been talking about corruption, patronage networks. is the central government of afghanistan at a point now as we begin this draw down towards 2014 or as we set up the process, is the central government strong enough to sustain the infrastructure needed? obviously, we are doing a coin operation throughout afghanistan. so this is not one big army that marches across the country. this is a series of different feedms that feeds to the patronage model. is the central government strong enough cohesively to hold it all? i see i'm almost out of time if you want to answer it for the

record that will be fine. >> we'll take it for the record. >> mr. whitman. >> thank you for joining us today. thank you for your service to our nation and for your leadership. general allen, i want to go to you and pick up some of the words from your testimony. you stated that throughout history insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign forces instead defeated by indigenous forces and insecured by the forces in the country. in the long run our goals can only be achieved and secured by afghan forces. transition is the lynch pen of our strategy. how do you make sure that the linchpin doesn't break? as you stated this has been a long and difficult and costly campaign. how do we make sure in the transition that there is enough time and space for the ansf, the

afghan local police, the government, in fact, to make sure that they can actually have a chance of being successful in pushing things forward. and then as a follow on to that, as you are looking at conditions on the ground, what will you be considering as far as capabilities of the afghan national security force, the kabts of the enemy as you plan for the draw down of our troops? >> referee: t . >> the process of transition occurs against different traunchs. each of those we go through significant levels of detail of planning on the isf side and in partnership with the afghan coordinator for transition who has done frankly magnificent work in the process of leading

transitions. but also very significantly we spent a great deal of time with the director of national security, with the minister of defense and with the minister of interior. we look very, very carefully at those areas that are transitioning to ensure that the ansf elements within those areas have the capacity to handle the security environment that they'll ultimately have to face as that particular area transitions. in traunch one it was the very first one. we chose areas that were relatively secure at the time where the ansf seemed to be in pretty good shape because this was the first one. this was all new. what we have discovered is in fact all of those areas are actually in very good shape right now. traunch two is in the process of transition now and we're in