process of formulating traunch three. we are looking very carefully to ensure we don't overburden the ansf command with too many regional areas in one particular area. we are looking very closely to see that there is coherent partnership to be a safety net if necessary to ensure there is no regression when the time comes for the transition. so we watch it very closely and then we monitor those areas once we have begun transition to ensure it is a irreversible process. we are going to do that throughout all traunchs. with regard to the conditions on the ground i am in constant contact with our intelligence organizations. wree watching very carefully the state of insurgency inside afghanistan and pakistan. i think we have had very important indicators just this year on one january of 2011.

there were only 600 taliban. on 1 january of 2012 well over 3,000 had reintegrated. today there is 3,600 with another 400 in the pipeline. that says something about the insurgency at the grass roots level. because so much of the insurgency is not an idealistic as much as it is an insurgency that reflects dissatisfaction locally that tells us that the foot soldiers are just tired of the fight and they want to go home and they are assim lting back into their communities. it tells us the nature of who it is they have to oppose which is a capable afghan national security force is the force that don't want to have to fight. now they have opportunities with improved local governance and

improved activity. there have been setbacks in some places of the country. but many of the grievances that ultimately sent many of these to join the taliban and the insurgency i think we can take some positive indicators away that the conditions have changed in some respects that prompts the advent of the afghan local police very quickly and also the large numbers of insurgeants who have reintegrated. >> thank you. >> mr. kauffman. >> thank you mr. chairman. first of all, dr. miller, when you look at the in state in terms of our conventional ground units are gone. from the country i suspect we have after 2014 some advisory presence, some special operations personnel to do counter terrorism operations,

what would you estimate the cost of that to be? >> your sense of the likely mission appears to me to be counter terrorism. >> to the afghan government to sustain their security forces and what's the point that they would expect after 2014? >> we have had discussion about the appropriate and necessary sustained level of contribution is for the afghan national security forces over time. as we discussed earlier you can think of it in a sense as what is the approximate cost 352,000

which is where 330,000 today and growing to 352,000 for nsf. there is a cost associated with that and we are looking towards the international community to begin to pay a portion of that at least starting in -- >> $4 billion? >> to sustain $352,000 we suspect would be more than that. to sustain at a lower number it would be further down the road at a point in time when the insurgency had been further degraded and smaller the number of $4 billion or over has been part of the conversation. i don't believe that that is certainly at this point either the final answer for the cost of a given force or nor do i think it reflects a final answer on the implicit size of a force

required at a given point in time. so i would say the number that we know today is that we are growing to $352,000 for the afghan national security forces that at some point we expect that that will come down. we don't know the timing of that. because we don't know the timing of that nor the levels that we'll go to beyond 2014 i can't give you a good estimate of cost although people are certainly making various estimates and some of those estimates have accurately and inaccurately appeared in the press. >> general allen, would you define our security objectives in afghanistan as keeping al qaeda out, keeping taliban from taking over the country and having operations whereby we can launch counter terrorism strikes such as the one recently in

taking out osama bin laden. >> i would be very careful about the third as an articulation. at this juncture there has been no discussion about with the afghan government a u.s. enduring presence. we anticipate concluding a strategic partnership accord and in conjunction with that conversation we'll begin to have the discussions with the afghans about what an enduring u.s. force might look like. at this juncture the conversation is largely about roles and functions that might be undertaken. there will probably be a counter terrorism presence but it will not be to operate in the region. it will be a counter terrorism presence to prevent al qaeda within afghanistan from finding itself operationally relevant safe haven.

>> let me say i'm torn on this mission having served in iraq in united states marine corps i have been in meetings where we have had to convince tribal leaders to cooperate with us knowing that if we let them down that they would be dead, that al qaeda would come back and would kill them. and so i believe that we have moral obligation here even though i believe it was the wrong path for america that we could have achieved our security objectives without this heavy conventional foot print on the ground, without giving them structure of governance that doesn't fit the political culture of the country and without changing their culture and without given the economy that they never had at the u.s. taxpayer's expense. with that i yield back. >> mr. scott. >> thank you mr. chairman.

at the start of the meeting one of the statements that you made was our goal was to keep the taliban was to deny a safe haven. those are two different goals. i would like to focus if you will on the overthrowing of the afghanistan government and the ties that the afghanistan government is making with china. >> china has supported between the government. if you look at the foreign aid the u.s. government sent to afghanistan is somewhere around 58 million, there $58 million, approximately a trillion worth of natural resources in afghanistan. the contract seemed to be signed

with china for china to receive the contracts and the benefits, the financial benefits of quite honestly a lot of loss of life and blood and money from the u.s. taxpayer. and my question is if china is the one that has set themselves up to reap the wind fall and the rewards from the natural resources of afghanistan and the united states is not going to have trade tides for anything besides trinkets and rugs, why shouldn't china bear the cost of insuring the cost that they overflow the government instead of the u.s. taxpayer?

>> well, it's an important question. i would not disagree with you that china ought to be asked to provide some of that support in the long term. but, of course, there are other countries that are involved ultimately in afghanistan's future and afghanistan is choosing to have relationships with them, as well. the eindian government and a strong economic interest in afghanistan but has long term ties healthy and friendly tiewise afghanistan and is offering to support the development of the afghan national security forces. i think it is not just a matter of china.

i think there are other international factors in play. >> you said india as offered. i assume there is a number that india has offered. has chined offered a significant dollar figure or is it -- >> i'll have to do the research for you. i'll take that question. >> if i can just add that we want -- obviously we want the afghanistan economy to improve over time. we want it to be self-sufficient. we talked about that being a long road. we expect for the united states that we were able to compete on a level playing field and our company kz go in for the distractive industries and all industries. we have made that expectation clear and our companies have had an opportunity to compete. a part of helping afghanistan

take the next steps and get on its feet economically is going to be to help it create those opportunities internationally, not just for the united states but other countries, as well. i believe that we'll compete very effectively over time. >> i'm not talking about exploiting afghanistan. i'm talking about the fact that china is essentially exploiting our men and women in the military and the united states taxpayer by having us pay the burden in both blood and money for quite honestly an area where china is going to be the one that reaps the wind fall benefits of stability in afghanistan. and if they are not willing -- i don't understand where the benefits to the u.s. citizen comes in spending $10 billion a month if 21 months from now the end result is going to be the same. we are going to be out of there.

we will have lost more men and women and spent more money and china is capable of stepping in. >> gentleman, time has expired. mr. frank. >> thank you mr. chairman. general, i appreciate your team being here. i know you put on that uniform and you do a great deal for the cause of freedom. i have to point out a special greeting here to commander waltz who has been a friend of mine for a very, very long time. thank you for being here. and i wanted to suggest first of all that it is my opinion and context for the question here that the date certain in the draw down as articulated has had a detrimental effect on the overall mission here and put commanders on the ground in a difficult position. i wanted to follow up with

representative wilson's question regarding influence in afghanistan. you responded there is potential to cooperate for the long term benefit of afghanistan. you stated that you are seeking to check the negative assistance between iran and afghanistan. and i guess my first thought is, do you think this is possible or is this common ground between us and iran is possible given the leadership in the current regime and how does the long history between iran and afghanistan provide any sort of a basis for leveraging events in favor of our national security. and are we -- you know for certain we are effectively checking negative assistance by iran to the insurgency and is it

wise in your opinion to proceed with the current draw down given the iranian government support to the insurgency in afghanistan. >> a lot of questions there. sorry. we are seeking to understand exactly what iran is doing in afghanistan. we also understand that iran and afghanistan have their own bilateral relationship. and that is an ancient and in many respects productive relationship for afghanistan. i will not take issue with the fact that the afghan government has a relationship with iran. my issue is primarily in the area of security. and what we understand to be iranian assistance certain elements of the taliban. it has not bindramatic. it has not been pervasive but we seek to understand it and we

have inter dicted that on a number of occasions. we will see if it is modulated, if it is increased or becomes more pervasive then we have to take actions to continue to check that process. >> did you want to weigh in on that? >> as you know, sir, the iranian government has also provided not only rhetorical but material support to the afghan government. what we see is in many instances a positive influence. at the same time in another part of the country we have seen iranian support for the insurgency. so what we would like to do is to encourage continued support for the government in kabul and reduce to a minimum any incentives for support to the

insurgency. >> i guess it just occurs to me given iran's history of making ieds to blow up our troops in iraq shouldn't engender a great deal of trust on our part to the potential of using the long standing relationship between afghanistan and iran to our benefit. i'm not sure that there is a real basis for that. i mean, i defer in this case to the people on the ground. i'm suggesting that there seems to be a general pattern here and i'm just wondering what the draw down and the date certain has done to the overall at least the psychological array of our enemy's attitude towards continuing to resist the efforts of freedom there in afghanistan. and the general if you have other thoughts. >> we have not seen the iranian signature weapons in afghanistan

that we saw frequently in southern iraq. that would be a quick indicator to us that things have changed dramatically. >> we have two committees at the same time so i have to sprint to the other one. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. i would like to thank our distinguished guests for being here today and for your service to your country. i was wondering if the general has a scuba bubble because he ran out of uniform for all of his prestigious ribbons and metals. >> i have tried to stay above the water. >> common air breather. >> i perfectly understand. i would like to say it is kind of fascinating that we are talking about afghanistan but the subject of china comes up. we go to the pacific region and you expect to hear china and every country you go to the subject of china comes up. this morning i was talking about

the arctic and china came up about how they are building ice breakers to begin going out there to try to lay claims in the arctic ocean or whatever for resources because we know they are a resource driven country. i guess this committee will hear a lot of it. i've been hearing some questions and i guess it's related to a lot of the incidents taking place in afghanistan by some of our american service members, one is the quran burning and the other the alleged killing of civilians by a member of the military and other things. and our concern is immediately, of course, in this 24/7 news cycle and internet and people are thinking we are going to turn over american service members to the afghany government to be tried and to possibly be punished.

i hope you will validate what i'm thinking. that is never going to happen. that is never going to happen in these cases. can you elaborate on that, either one? >> the current relationship we have with afghanistan allows us to try them under united states law. >> is it a possibility that this administration could say that's great but turn him over to the afghany government? >> i'm not the one to ask. from my perspective i intend to work close with the united states government to prosecute this case and we will do it under u.s. law. i was clear in that discussion with president karzai.

>> just to confirm that we have no such plans to do so. >> that could be an option if so chosen? there is nothing barring turning over a u.s. service member to the afghan government to be tried? surely, our men and women in uniform have some form of protection from corrupt government. >> there is the status of forces agreement in which it is understood that we have that right and we have given every indication that that is the way that we will proceed. >> okay. i'm not trying to go anywhere with that. i was just curious because i hear that and there are concerns. as of now we are not going to let that happen and that is good. we don't want to ever have that happen. >> what is the mood of our young

ncos serving in afghanistan in the light of the decade. i know some of them may be in their second and third term, some on their first. i understand how young military minds think, just an overall short opinion? >> i asked my sergeant major his view and his view is that the morale is high. these troops are focused on a mission. ten years into this conflict. they are as professional as we have ever seen, the noncommissioned officers of our armed forces in particular the u.s. army and u.s. marine corps who have been in close contact with the enemy where the benefits or where the real advantage that accrues us is small unit and junior officer

leadership. they are magnificent frankly. after this long in this conflict to see the morale as high it is, the professionalism and the desire to continue to serve really speaks well to the young men and women of the united states. >> thank y'all, my time is expired. one final question. there are many detainees currently held in the u.s. detention facilities in afghanistan who the u.s. forces have identified as enduring security threats to the united states. some of these detainees are afghans and some are third country nationals. the recent memo of understanding regarding the detention of operations in afghanistan does not provide a separate plan for afghan detainees who pose an extraordinarily high threat. it requires to transition all to

the custody of afghanistan within six months. it states afghanistan will consider favorably u.s. input regarding whether to release a particular detainee but given the current posture of the afghan government this is not very reassuring. i'm concerned about history repeating itself here. in iraq we waited until the last minute to deal with this issue and that particular example is not one we should be seeking to repeat. in light of the new mou what is your plan regarding the value of the detainees afghans and third country nationals to ensure these individuals wilt not pose a threat to the united states in the future? >> i will defer to dr. miller in a moment. should there be a disagreement with the afghans, should there be an intention expressed to release one of the detainees, ultimately that they control, we express our desire that they

not -- they will give it favorable consideration if in fact they continue to desire to release that detainee that question will go to a bilateral commission. the chair on the u.s. side and the chair on the afghan side of the bilateral commission is commander of isf and the minister of defense where we will have the conversation whether that individual should be released or not. i believe we will ultimately be able to resolve this to our benefit within the bilateral commission if they don't take our initial desire to be their decision ultimately. with respect to the third country nationals that remains to be determined. we have not yet addressed that and we will do that in the future. >> could i add just everything that general allen said is exactly right. i just want to add to it.

and that is that in addition to the transition effort that is underway being led by general allen there is an interagency task force focused on this question and third country nationals and we are working closely with the team that is in theater and understand that these issues need to be addressed and we need to have a conversation with you and your colleagues, as well. it's relatively at the front end but we know six months is not that much time. we look forward to having that conversation as this work progresses. >> very good. the concern we have is that detainees that have been released have returned to the fight and we found that they have in a fairly high percentage have gone back to killing americans. we really want to make sure that

we monitor and avoid that. thank you very much for being here today. i think we have cleared up a lot of questions. i hope this was beneficial. i think it will be to the american people to understand more clearly what is happening in afghanistan and the progress happening there. thank you very much and this committee stands adjourned.

here in washington the clinton global initiative is kicking off with the discussion of power and public service. founding chair will host a panel. being hosted by george washington university and live coverage gets underway at 7:30 eastern. coming up this weekend c span -- tomorrow afternoon justices examine whether the penalty for failing to purch