former student bruce lindsey on integration and north little rock high school. >> as if they know what is going to happen. but we don't know what is going to happen. we don't realize what's going to happen when we get up those steps. but they seem to, because the crowd is with us now. the momentum is behind us. and they are pushing us up the steps. >> these stories and others from c-span's local content vehicles in little rock, this weekend on c-span 2 and 3 next, a house oversight committee hearing on methodsuse security administration, including the use of body scanners at airports. officials from the tsa and the u.s. coast guard testified at a joint hearing held by the house oversight and transportation committees. this is just under two hours.

>> the committee will come to order. the oversight committee exists to secure go fundamental cansavo know that money washington takes from them is well spent. and second, americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. our duty on the oversight and government reform committee is to protect these rights. our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to know what they get from their government. we will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the american people and bring genuine reform to the federal bureaucracy. this is our mission statement. today today we are calling the third hearing conducted by the oversight committee, today a joint hearing where we plan to

hold at least two additional tsa oversight hearings in april and may. there is no question that the tsa serves a vital role. the question is in a post-9/11 period, are we getting value for our money? do we in fact have a system which is thorough and complete that in fact takes care of all of us? or do we have a fairly expensive, labor intensive system that in fact is not making us appreciably safer. in a time of budget limitations, tsa, although essential, must in fact deliver value to the american people. with more than 65,000 men and women working for tsa, it is not a small agency. this is more men and women working for an aviation-based safety organization thantomobil america combined.

only one quarter of the funds used by tsa come from aviation fees. 3/4 come directly from the american people. meaning those of us who do not fly are paying a heavy price for those who do. but even the billion and a half plus dollars paid for out of landing fees and other collections, ticket fees, to run our airports in fact is a high price to pay, a burden if you will on our efficiency. so whether the dollars come from ticket fees or come from the taxpayer directly, it is essential that we review tsa's effectiveness. by 2013, tsa will arguably by its own accounting have waste in order than $500 million of taxpayer money developing advanced imaging technology, or ait machines. in addition to public outrage over privacy violations,

classified gao reports paint a dire picture of ineffectiveness. gao believes screening of passengers by observation techniques or spot program, which has already cost taxpayers $800 million is ineffective, and that congress should consider limiting funds for this program. gao as a nonpartisan organization claims that tsa deployed spot before having solid scientific bases for its effectiveness. and that when it worked, it was only an accident. despite a potential $3.2 billion cost to the federal government and industry, gao continues to find the tsa is failing to properly administer twik, the transportation worker identification credential. i have seen this failure myself. i have seen a mandated bio id simply waived.

showing a picture id is not in fact what congressman dated. deploying these and deploying them in a way which is quick and effective is essential. let's remember, they cost a lot of money to produce the card. simply using it as a high-priced id card is not acceptable. without creating a plan to upgrade its explosive detection system, or eds, which will cot $964 million or more to the taxpayer, tsa cannot ensure updating eds will be feasible or cost-effective. let me just reiterate. eds is an important system. whether it's the inadvertent touching of fertilizer or the real operational use of explosive, we need to know. we need to screen. it is an effective tool if it work. if it doesn't work and work 100% of the time we have the biggest problem we could possibly have.

lastly, the vipir program, inte from security expert and legal scholars about the effectiveness and constitutionality of the initiative. tsa is not performing or taking into serious consideration the cost benefits, and that is a big part of what this committee is here to ask questions on today. not is it nice to have. not might it work. not do we must do something, but in fact have we done a cost benefit analysis? we have screened through many resources, developed, researched, but only deploy those which work. in fact, what we do know here at this committee and at the transportation committee is that we have fielded products that don't work in the past. and when it becomes known by the public that a product has a

gaping flaw, that product becomes essentially useless. sadly, what we discover is even when it becomes public, there is no other tool. so in fact we continue screening people, knowing that screening alone is not enough, and that the public knows that. with that, i now recognize the chairman of the subcommittee on aviation infrastructure, mr. petri, for his opening statement. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you for organizing this important hearing and doing so with the transportation committee. after 9/11, the transportation committee held a number of hearings to attempt to determine what happened and what needed to be done. it became very clear at those hearings that the then existing federal policy of requiring easy access to the cockpit in case

there was a medical emergency or something of that sort was not the most secure way to go. that policy was changed, and now our cockpits are hardened. that is to say it's very difficult for a passenger to take over an airplane and turn it into a weapon, as happened at 9/11. that in my opinion is the most significant security change since that time. beyond that, of course, people can go on airplanes and possibly take a plane down, can create mischief, become a harry caray person, as they could if they were to go to a football stadium or on a cruise liner, or any other sort of train, other modes of transportation. we do have a security problem, but it's not restricted to airlines. and the major part of the danger of airlines i think was dealt with when it became impossible

for people to take over the airplane and turn it into a weapon as happened at 9/11. that said, of course, we have this regime that all of us experience who serve in congress if we live any distance at all on a weekly basis, if not more often. we're inspecting millions of travelers, hundreds of thousands every month the same people over and over and over again. and that has to be wasteful and intrusive. and this has been going on now for ten years. if it's going to go on for another ten years, it behooves us to come up with a more efficient, less intrusive, more sensible program so that we concentrate on where there might be a risk rather than inspecting the same people over and over and over again.

when we had hearings back at the time of 9/11, experts came and testified before the transportation committee from israel, a number of other countries that certainly have for many years faced very, very height erned security threats. a hardening of the cockpit is one of the things they advised and which we did. other things that they advised we have not done. trying to track people when they buy tickets and working on the intelligence side of things to see if there is some sort of likelihood that that person might be a risk, appropriate ways of inspecting people and how they behave. not just at the airport looking through their drawers and socks and sniffing at their shoes, but looking at how they interact with ticket agents, how they generally behave not just at the

airport, but as they go about their business preparing possibly to do things of risk. it seems to me that there are a lot more strategic and intelligent ways to go about it than spending hundreds of millions of dollars, impeding the growth of the transportation -- transportation sector, the aviation sector, and basically changing the psychology of americans to have them starting to feel that they have somehow done something wrong and they're being suggest to pat-down and shakedown, as we do when we're worrying about someone who has committed a crime or we're assuming everyone is guilty and treating them practically like prisoners when they're american tax-paying citizens. so i feel that we've got a lot to do to straighten this whole mess out. it's not a cost-effective or very disciplined approach. and after ten years, we'd owe more to the american people. mr. chairman, thank you for

having this hearing. >> i thank you the gentleman. the gentleman yields back. i now ask unanimous consent that our colleague from tennessee, mrs. blackburn be allowed to participate in today's hearing. without objection, so ordered. i will now note that the ranking members of each of the committees are driving in have been delayed. so it is not a flight as far as i know. so they will make their opening statements after our witnesses make theirs. i'm sure they'll be here by thenment with that i would like to introduce our first panel. mr. christopher l. mclaughlin is the assistant administrative security operations at the transportation security administration. mr. steven sadler is the assistant administrator for intelligence analyst at the transportation security administration. mr. steven lord is director for

homeland security at the u.s. government accountability office, our wing, if you will. and rear admiral zukunft. and i might mention without a doubt, the best jewel ever given to homeland security, in my opinion, and in the ranking member's opinion. pursuant to the rules of this committee, would you all please rise to take the ohs? raise your right hands. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're to be give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? let the record indicate -- please have a seat -- all witnesses answered in the affirmative. now my predecessor, whose face and portrait is up there, mr. towns, began a tradition of explaining the obvious. but he did it every time, and i appreciated it.

your entire opening statements will be placed in the order. in front of you you have a countdown clock. and like so many things that you look at, you say does it really matter? the answer is please summarize if you run out of time. we'd like to get through all of you and get you out of here with full questions and answers in a timely fashion. remember, your opening statements will be available in their entirety. mr. mclaughlin, you're first. you have five minutes. >> good afternoon, chairman, chairman issa and ranking and distinguished members of the committees. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. tsa has made significant strides in our deployment and utilization of ait over the past year. automatic target recognition software recently installed in the majority of our machines enhanced passenger privacy by eliminating passenger specific images while improving through-put capabilities and streamlining the checkpoint process. in the fall of 2011, my office

began to further develop operational performance targets including utilization goal that is consistent with the gao recommendations. tied to this, we implemented an action plan to increase utilization across the nation. as a result, our utilization performance between february 2011 and february 2012 improved by 200%. in addition to ait, we're employing cat bps technology. it will eventually replace the current procedures used to detect fraudulent or altered documents. we will deploy this technology for operational testing at a few airports beginning next month. technology is only one mechanism to identify potential threats. the spot program uses behavior observation and analysis to identify potentially high-risk individuals who may pose a threat to transportation security. spot was is effectcally validated in 2011 by the dhs science and technology division

representing the most thorough analysis of any behavioral screening program to date. no other counterterrorism or similar security program is known to have been subjected to such a rigorous systematic evaluation. this study revealed that spot was significantly more effective at identifying high-risk passengers than random screening protocols. that said, tsa continues working with dhs, snt, and the broader research community to increase the everythingiveness and the efficiency of this behavior-based screening process. subsequent to the validation study, tsa took steps last fall to enhance the program. under a new pilot, behavior detection officers deploy a specialized technique to determine whether a traveler should be deterred for further screening at the checkpoint. this additional action used by security agencies worldwide enables officers to better verify for spell concerns about suspicious behavior and anomalies. preliminary analysis shows an increase in the rate of detection of high-risk passengers, and tsa is currently

conducting an analysis with the dhs science and technology directorate to inform a validation process for future roll-out. completing these program tsa ha teach -- i'm sorry, comping these developments, tsa has began teaching a tactical communications course for our front line workforce. this training focuses on active listening, empathy and verbal communication techniques and will be complete by the end of 2012. these initiatives are some of the key aspects of tsa's security infrastructure that provide the backbone for our overall risk-based strategy. this strategy demonstrates our commitment to move away from a one size fits all security model. while this approach was necessary after 9/11 and has been effective over the past decade, key enablers now allow tsa to move toward a more intuitive solution. perhaps the most widely known is tsa precheck. today approximately 600,000

passengers have experienced expedited screening through tsa precheck. by the end of 2012, we expect to offer passengers in 35 of our nation's busiest airports the benefits of tsa precheck. in addition, eligible frequent fliers and trusted traveler programs we expanded to include active duty u.s. military traveling out of reagan national airport. fwan national airport. last fall we implemented new screening procedures. and just last monday. passengers of 75 and older. finally we are also supporting efforts to start identity based screening. pilots have cleared security. these niche vifs have allowed us to expedite the screening process for children, our military, many frequent fliers

and now in testing the elderly. by enhancing the effectiveness, we will continue to work towards our goal of providing the most effective security in the most efficient way. >> the gentleman is recognized. >> good afternoon and distinguished members of the committee. the strength and security throughout the coordination system. the transportation. design

designed. the maritime facilities and vessels. there was no standard identity verification or background check. today facility owners and operators can look for owners and operators. >> several key objectives were met during the initial roll out in october 2007. enrollment sites, stones for and issuing checks. u.s. coast guard regulation implemented the requirement for all workers in secure areas. as of this month almost 2 million transportation workers

have received it. this past february, tsa deployed changes to receive comparability when applying for the hazard douse material endousement. under comparability compare retused paid. they can go collectly to their state licensing agency. this new capability at the same location on may 31, 12001, tsa

gathered information from 13 facilities and 13 vessel operations. on various types and models best suited to their business needs. this the final report was submitted to congress february 7, 2012. kwon sis tent with the character isices. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. i look forward to your questions. >> te. >> thank you for inviting me here to discuss tsa's progress and challenges.

>> the first policeman i would like to discuss today is behavior detection program. this program consists of over 3,000 behavior detection officers that are deployed to over 160 u.s. airports. this program is a key part of tsa's efforts to focus more attention on dangerous people versus dangerous items, which i support. while tsa has taken some steps to validate the science, much more work remains to fully validate it, establish sound performance me tricks and assess

me tricks. as we noted on our report, tsa deployed nationwide before determining whether it had a valid scientific basis. they did complete an initial validation study on april 2011, which concluded that the program was more effective than random screening. however, as the study itself noted, it was nt designed to answer the question whether you can use the principles for counter terrorism another key report recommendation was to develop better performance measures. for example, 27% of the 300 spotter resumed in 2010 were

illegal aliens raising questions about mission focus. the second program i would like to discuss today is the body scanner program, commonly referred to as advanced imaging technology or ait. this was in response to the attempted christmas day attack. about 640 of these units are now in place at over 160 airports. these machines provide spear year benefits since they are capable of detecting non-metallic threats. while most of the details tsa allowed us to note some of the details regarding some of the utilization rates. the good news is in response to

the report, the tsa agreed to take steps to address the low utilization reports. i would like to report that the tsa me trick credential program. tsa has now enrolled over 200 in the program. however, our 2011 report identified a number of significant internal control weaknesses in card enrollment, background checking and use that we believe has limited the benefits of the program. we conducted as part of this review. we recommended they strengthen program controls as well as complete an effectiveness study to clarify the programs contributions to enhancing security. tsa has established a working

group with executive oversite to address the important recommendations. we look forward to seeing the results of the committee's work. in closing, tsa has established a number of programs to this wart potential terrorist attacks. mr. chairman this concludes my statement, i look forward to your questions. >> i am honored to appear before you to speak about the coast guard's role.

requires that all trands por tags workers seeking unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities and vessels undergo a security check. it is required. the 12,000 regulated vessels and 50 regulated facilities. all of the proximate 2700 maritime facilities impacted. are and have been in compliance since the april 15, 2009

implementation rate. they continue to conduct unannounced and announced inspections. to conduct the feasibility and technical and impacts of implementing. delivered to congress on february 27 and the co-security benefits and capen'ts. additionally section 809