and we actually sell teacups and dinner plates with "votes for women" on them. it is one of our more popular items but she believed in this cause and attracted many, many thousands of people to his lawn overlooking the atlantic. the chinese teahouse was built as a folly by alva for fun for entertaining purposes. she actually hired two architects who went on a tour of china for a year. they came back with this design so we will see that in a minute. so alva vanderbilt, built the chinese tea house really as a folly in 1914. she hired two architects and commissioned them to travel to china for more than a year and they came back with this design, which was later built. it was an expression of fun she

used to host parties centered around the tea house and certainly it was a great focal point standing on the terrace looking out to the sea overlooking this tremendous silhouette the wonderful red color. i think a great, great addition to the entire property of the marble house. >> this week on the civil war, author and history professor, william shay, talks about the battle of pea ridge arkansas, fought on march 7th and 8th, 1862. he spoke to a group at the library in benton, arkansas, a few days after the battle. this is a little over an hour.

>> all right, i think we are about ready to start. i would look to welcome you to the saline county library and our series on civil war history. celebrating the 150th anniversary of the civil war. and my name is steve purdue curator of the arkansas room and head of genealogy and local history department here at saline county library. tonight we are very privileged to have with us a very prolific writer and on civil war history. william shea. dr. shea is professor of history at the university of arkansas at monticello. a native of louisiana. he has a b.a. from louisiana state university. and a ph.d. from rice university. shea has been a fullbright

scholar in china, consultant for the national park service and battlefield guide for the smithsonian institution. he is also author or co-author of numerous books and articles on american military history. specially the civil war west of the mississippi river. his most recent book is field of blood, the prairie grove campaign from the university of north carolina press. it received the fletcher-pratt award of the new york civil war roundtable for the best book published on the civil war in 2010. and the j.g. ragsdale award of the arkansas historical association for the best book published on arkansas history that year. among his other books are pea ridge, which we are here tonight to hear excerpts from, civil war campaign in the west, university of north carolina press, vicksburg is the key, the struggle for the mississippi river, university of nebraska press, and the virginia militia in the 17th century, louisiana

state university press. let's give a good saline county welcome to dr. william l. shea. [ applause ] >> i understand that i am honorable to everyone in the room and possibly this part of the county. before i begin my canned presentation will somewhat tie me to my notes, i want to point out this masterpiece of cartography. almost arkansas. what the arrow depicts is essentially the movement of the united states army of the southwest in the first half of 1862 as that army moved from missouri, just off the top of the map, the board, through springfield, to the battle site at pea ridge, in benton county, arkansas, and then a long

circuitous route almost, but not quite to little rock, probably to the cabot/jacksonville area today. and then looping back around and across the delta to helena on the mississippi river. and what we'll do tonight is explain how this operation unfolded, what happened along the way, and of what importance it was in arkansas history. and in the civil war, the history of the civil war. the pea ridge campaign began atop the ozark plateau in the depths of a midwestern winter. and it ended, 700 miles away on the banks of the mississippi river at the height of a southern summer. from start to finish, the campaign lasted almost exactly six months. when the was over the confederacy in the trans-mississippi had suffered a

military and political disaster from which it never recovered. it could not ever recover. for the people of missouri, arkansas, the indian territory, and even to some extent texas, pea ridge was the turning point in the struggle for southern independence. without question, it was the most important military operation west of the mississippi river in the entire four years of conflict. so let's take a look at it. this remarkable operation had its genesis in missouri. in fact, it had almost nothing to do with arkansas, except it ended up wrecking the northern half of the state, almost as a byproduct, unintended consequence. by the end of 1861, the war in

missouri had degenerated into a strategic stalemate. union forces held st. louis. and the missouri river valley in the center of the state. confederate forces occupied the southwest part of state near springfield. the first attempt to crush the rebels ended in disaster at wilson creek, 1861. a second attempt had sputtered out unsuccessfully in the fall. winter brought a halt to campaigning and allowed a dissatisfied abraham lincoln to clean house in missouri. he appointed a new commander, major general henry hallek, hallek received flak for his peculiar personality and odd decisions in the civil war. but, in fact, he was an able military administrator and first rate strategist. he was determined to reassert union control over missouri. all of missouri. he realized that he could

accomplish little as long as the confederates threatened saint louis which was the -- becoming the great union depot in the western theater. every union soldier standing on the defensive in missouri was one less union soldier whom hallek could put into the offensives he was planning for 1862. hallek's first order was to push price out of missouri and keep him out hallek ordered samuel curtis of iowa to advance into southwest missouri, find price, bring him to battle, and destroy him. if price refused to stand and fight, curtis, and i quote here, curtis was to drive him into the wilderness. by wilderness, hallek meant arkansas. curtis was an 1831 west point

graduate who resigned from the army after only a couple years of service. he prospered as an attorney, a civil engineer, a businessman, and a politician. a man of many interests, he help found the republican party, and he was at one time, founder and president of the union pacific railroad corporation. he also was an avid gardner and tended to halt in the middle of campaigns to wander through fields looking for wild flowers. when the civil war erupted, kurtis resigned his seat in the u.s. house of representatives. he was iowa's very first congressman. and he offered his services to the u.s. war department. the aging general in chief of the u.s. army, winfield scott, remembered curtis from the mexican war. and he essentially arranged his appointment to general. scott's faith in curtis was not misplaced. when the dust settled, curtis

would be the most successful commander in blue or gray west of the mississippi river. curtis realized early on that his greatest opponent, his toughest opponent would be geography. the campaign would take place atop the ozark plateau in the middle of winter. the absence of railroads and rivers meant the federals would have to advance on crude frontier roads. the operative word is crude. under such circumstances the science of logistics assumed critical importance. every step forward would take the federals farther and farther away from their base of supplies in raleigh mathematics of the process was inescapable. at some point the union army would reach the end of its logistical tether and it would simply grind to a halt.

it could go no further. now precisely when and where that would happen could not be predicted. curtis prepared as best he could. fortunately for the union cause, curtis, like hallek was a first rate administrator. he stripped his army of all nonessential gear, officers, for example, were allowed to take two and only two pairs of socks. on the campaign. he made numerous other adjustments in how much wagons could carry, how much horses would be burdened with and so on and so forth the to top things off he beat the bushes, all over the west, until he found, a highly experienced, regular army quarter master. in the person of one captain phillip sheridan. sheridan would go on to greater things and become the commander of the army years after the civil war. it has been lost off to history that he started off as a master

of supplies. he was an essential cog in the machine that kept the army of the southwest in the field. all these preparations paid off in one way or another. curtis' command would cover more ground and cover it faster than any other army in the civil war. the remarkable, no other word to use. the remarkable mobility of the army of the southwest kept the confederates off balance throughout the campaign. it was one of the keys to union victory. now the army of the southwest was -- like all forces west of the mississippi, relatively small. it consisted of about 12,000 troops, but its most distinguishing feature was not its size, but its composition. almost exactly half of the union soldiers were midwesterners of british stock. many of them dating back to the

puritans of the 17th century new england. but the other half was recently arrived, german, hungarian, czech and polish immigrants. simply giving orders in the army of the southwest often involved a complicated procedure. on one occasion, four translators were involved getting polish troops to move to a given position. nevertheless, curtis triumphed over this kind of adversity as well. curtis began his campaign in february, 1862. for two weeks, the union army struggled across missouri, slowly approaching springfield. and as hallek had hoped sterling price was completely unprepared for the appearance of a union army in southwest missouri at that time of the year. price, of course, was a politician. not a soldier.

he had no formal military training. and he had seen only very limited action in new mexico during the mexican war. and he had all sorts of -- personal, and professional shortcomings. most notably, an utter lack of administrative skills. price may have been at the head of his army. he was never running his army. the army was not a confederate force, a pro-confederate, independent, missouri state guard. a rag tag force of maybe 7,000 8,000 men at this time. the missouri state guard was the only true militia army in the civil war. like all militia forces it was deficient in leadership, in organization, training, and logistical sport. volunteers provided their own arms and ammunition, clothing, equipment, and they pretty much came and went as they saw fit. now, price feared, correctly as it turned out, that the

approaching union army was larger than his own. having neglected to fortify springfield, he abandoned the town without a fight. in mid-february and fled southward towards arkansas. much to his surprise, curtis followed. the result was a rare instance, i can only think of one or two other occasions in the civil war of a sustained pursuit of one army by another over more than a week. the two columns for that times, hurried south in frigid weather. men and animals plodded through showers of snow and sleet. they struggled to maintain their footing on road glazed with inches of ice. despite such appalling conditions the union vanguard, the first missouri cavalry union, and the confederate rear guard, the first missouri cavalry, confederate, talk about a brothers war, kept up a

running fight -- actually, it was more of a walking fight and squirmishes flared basically every other day. in the middle of all this, the civil war came to arkansas. it was february 16th, 1862. when price crossed the state line into benton county. he and his cold, weary troops continued on to cross hollows, 20 miles farther south, roughly between rodgers and springdale today. and there they joined forces with the confederate army of arkansas. the commander of that army was brigadier general benjamin mcculluck of texas. measles prevented him from gaining immortality.

mcculluck missed little else. he fought against santa ana. he mined for gold in california. he commanded a troop of texas frontiers, rangers on the frontier against apaches. he served in the congresses of the republic of texas and the united states. he did many other thanks that brought him quite a measure of celebrity in antebellum america. he is often described as the anti-bell lum version of daniel boon from an earlier period. and he did a number of things that brought him celebrity in antebellum, america, he is described as the antebellum version of daniel boon from an earlier period. one of the most remarkable things is how his celebrityhood, is that a word? how his celebrityhood has faded to the point where today almost no one has heard of him. mcculluck was untutored in military matters. he dropped out of school after, four, five years.

but he was a natural soldier and blessed with a sure grasp of tactics, strategy and administration. his army, the army of arkansas, consisted of over 8,000 men from arkansas, texas, and louisiana. it was an unusually well-drilled and well-equipped fighting force and it was widely regarded as the premiere confederate army in the trans-mississippi. unfortunately for the cause of confederate independence, price and mcculluck could not stand each other. price was alternatively condescending and overbearing in his dealings with mcculluck. and, understandably, mcculluck developed an intense dislike for the pompous missouri politician. he privately described price as

a windbag, an old poop, and nothing but a fat, old militia general. personality conflicts of this intensity were bad enough. but there were other differences that turned out to be serious problems. perhaps, most important, was that, at this stage of the war, the spring of 1862, price was not yet a confederate officer. he was commander of the missouri state guard. missouri never became a confederate state. as such, price was really a free agent. he was primarily concerned with affairs in missouri. and really at this point didn't give a hoot about what was going on elsewhere in the embattled confederacy. mcculluck of course was a regular confederate officer. he received his orders from the

confederate war department in far away richmond. and his primary concern was the defense of arkansas. the two men had miraculously managed to cooperate very briefly, the previous summer when they combined to win the battle of wilson's creek. not far from springfield, missouri. but by the time the pea ridge campaign rolled around they weren't on speaking terms, no longer on writing terms. they communicated through third parties and intermediaries, clearly this was no way to run a war. the combined confederate armies, by this time, they were at cross

areas, not close together. measured by curtis, the two fueding jerrells eventually abandoned cross hollows and resumed a retreat. they tramped through fayetteville and burned the business district for reasons that remain murky, even today. they kept on going south until they entered the boston mountains. and there, they remained inactive, their commanders squabbling, for the next two weeks. the federals entered arkansas right behind price's fleeing army. in fact, they entered arkansas the very next day. february 17th, 1862. curtis was exuberant. men cheered. polil ches.

and, curtis himself, sent a message back to general hallek in saint louis. a very short, pointed message. general, the flag of our union again floats in arkansas. it was a terrific moment for curtis and his men. but forgotten. overlooked in all the excitement was a disturbing fact. the purpose of the operation was to enable hallek to invade the confederacy elsewhere. grant, tennessee. pope on the mississippi river. and so on. neither hallek nor curtis anticipated that a limited campaign, a campaign intended to neutralize price, to push price out of missouri, had, had would take that this campaign would take the army of the southwest out of missouri and into

arkansas. sometimes happens with military operations or any kind of operation, the whole thing had taken on a life of its own. curtis was exhilarated at the success of what was his first independent command. he was no spring chicken. he was in his late 50s by now. it had been a long time since west point. and now at last he was gaining the military recognition, the glory, if you will, that he had always dreamed of. and the last thing he wanted to do was simply say -- good enough. turn around. and return to missouri. when curtis learned that price and mcculluck were no longer in front of him but, in fact, had retreated south into the distant boston mountains. curtis paused to consider the altered strategic situation.

he now faced the two largest rebel armies west of the mississippi river. these were the same armies remember that had combined the previous august to overwhelm the smaller union army at wilson's creek. natural attrition and necessity of garrisoning springfield and other locations had shrunk curtis' army down to around 10,000 men. and then there was the very disturbing matter of logistics. the isolated union army now, in benton county, arkansas, was 200 miles south of its supply base at raleigh. despite quarter master sheridan's heroic efforts, the supply situation was tenuous. it was very uncertain whether the union army could remain where it was, it certainly couldn't go any further. curtis, therefore, determined to hold his ground in arkansas,

take up a blocking position, and prevent the confederates from returning to missouri. he rode all over benton county and he noticed a line of rocky, limestone bluffs behind a body of water called little sugar creek. these bluffs ran east/west and they were five miles south of the missouri state line. below the bluffs was a creek. the top of the bluffs was the beginning of a rolling table land. it had no formal name. but curtis discovered that the local farmers called it pea ridge. so he decided that's -- that would be his blocking position. if the confederates made a move, tried to get back into missouri, threatened his forces. that's where he would dig in. that's where he would make a fight.

he knew he could expect no reinforcements, he could barely get supplies. he was on his own. but his mind was made up. curtis sent hallek another message. we shall be on the alert. holding as securely as possible. the next move was up to the confederates. well, to be more precise, the next move was actually up to confederate president jefferson davis. in faraway richmond. davis, of course, knew by now of the paralyzing feud between price and mcculluck. he decided therefore that he would solve this problem, not by promoting one over the other. he was smart enough to know that would just make things much, much worse. so he decided to bring in a third officer.

promote this officer over both price and mcculluck and essentially re-establish a proper chain of command. and the man he chose was an old friend and a neighbor from mississippi, earl vandorn. vandorn was a west pointer. a veteran of the mexican war. and a regular army officer who had served for years in texas against the hostile indian tribes. he was an excellent small unit commander. unfortunately, davis seemed to think being an excellent company commander was a perfect recommendation to become an excellent army commander. unfortunately, while vandorn was bold and brave to a fault, tremendously offensive-minded, he also was impulsive, reckless, and perhaps worst of all careless. he lacked administrative skills.

as we shall see, he had political sensibilities of a brick. his only qualification really, if you, if you -- if you examine the situation his only qualification for high command was his friendship with his fellow mississippian in the confederate white house, jefferson davis. i cannot help but quote at this point a letter that vandorn wrote to his wife in which he announced his new promotion, blah, blah, blah, blah. then at the close of the letter, he rather vague, breezy notion of grand strategy. i must have saint louis. and then haza. details not necessary. okay.

van dorn, who was in the army of northern virginia, under r.l. lee. the change of command had not happened yet, still commanded by joe johnston. vandorn left the post excited about his command in the trans-mississippi where he served most of his military career. he was very much at home in the west. he traveled by train from richmond to memphis in four days. a quick, reasonably comfortable trip. but once across the mississippi river, he was in a different world. no trains. no navigable waterways, that time of the year, the arkansas was shallow and dry. if you were to cross the state, you had to do it over land. that's exactly what vandorn did. it took him nine arduous days to make his way from memphis to the boston mountains a little north