greatest minds in this nation to work problems. we were asked to do not only a longer-term perspective in terms of policy and procedures but also determining a root cause. we were able to work not only with the sicientific advisory board but the f-22 system program office, the air combat command, which we'll hear more about in a few moments, the air staff, the major commands in the air force, as well as the navy, who uses on board oxygen generation systems well in several of its aircraft and what i would consider to be a completely collaborative relationship with the primary equipment manufacturers in this case, lockheed martin, boeing and honeywell, all of whom, in my view, totally focused on providing the people we needed and the assets we needed to try to get to the bottom of the

problem. now we also took the results of the ground test that general hogue and his team had run and his recommendations for dynamic airborne tests because some of the things that were occurring in the aircraft, in the incidents, happened in the air, could not be repeated on the ground, and during the -- what i would say is very extensive challenge tests to the life support system and particularly the onboard oxygen generation system. they believe that they needed to specially instrument f-22 and get it in the air to determine whether we could find repeats of some of the incidents that had occurred and help us get the root cause. so we took their base sick results from the ground tests and their recommendations for the flight tests, worked through those in great detail and established a flight test series of not only profiles but

protocols for measuring the system we had. if you were to see the picture, over 40 censor installations on the airplane to try to understand the entire end to end process of producing oxygen for the pilot. as a result of general hogue's work and our initial look at the data, as well as the design of the flight testing, i would say two things were important here. one, we developed a series of hypotheses, and they could be broken down into two main hypotheses, one for some reason the on board oxygen generation system is not producing enough oxygen for the circumstance that the pilot finds himself in at that moment. so a lack of production, or second, for some reason, the onboard oxygen generation system and the environmental control system that feeds it, the air that it then produces the oxygen

from, may be inputting some contaminant that is getting through the onboard oxygen generation system and perhaps denying the pilot of normal function or the ability to absorb oxygen at a normal rate. so those were the two basic hypotheses, each had five, and in one case, six subhypotheses all of which helped us structure testing and ultimately the procedured that we would use to return the aircraft to fly. so we also knew from the statisticians at that time that given the history of physiological incidents in the aircraft, that a flight test profile of 14 sorties, including all of the censors, including all of the testing that went on on the ground, post light, we would be unlikely, according to the statistics, to actually have a physiological incident present itself or the conditions that might result in a physiological incident, we were unlikely to have that case in those 14

sorties. nonetheless, we now that as a result of the censors that we were probably going to understand the system better and some of its vulnerabilities and that would lay the groundwork for the kinds of things that we could do to the entire fleet and provisions that we could provide to both the crew chiefs that would be doing ground engine runs and the pilots flying the aircraft that would make it safe for them to return to fly while we continued to gather data and better understand what the root cause might be. so at the end of the flight tests, as we determined we were unable to have the root cause determined, we were able to, in my view, put in place the proper safety measures and mitigate risk mitigation techniques that would allow the f-22 fleet to return to fly at a much greater rate while we were continuing to collect data from the systems that we put on the pilot and in the aircraft and the protocols

that we put in place to ensure the integrity of the life support system. so that we went from ground test to flight test to what we call return to fly phase and the fleet is still in the return to fly phase and moving into, as the general will talk about, a transition phase, all right? despite those efforts, though, we do not have, this day, the root cause in hand. we have some pretty good ideas and we have a series of tests that the scientific advisory board believe were necessary to continue to explore the envelopes of the system and understand it completely, and the stand-up of that activity or the continuation of that activity as being managed by general lyon and his task force that was recommended by the advisory board to stand up in september and begin the process of collecting the data,

analyzing the data, and determining other mitigation activities, as appropriate, for the fleet. those are ongoing today. now when we get to the findings and recommendations of the air force scientific advisory board, i will not read them to you, as i mentioned you have them, but i will tell you they break down into three main areas. one deals with policies and procedures usually a higher level, if you will, than at the tactical level in terms of our acquisition processes, our acquisition policies. they are also in an organizational and structure of our organization, those recommendations, and then last, our equipment recommendations set up to not only protect the pilots and crew members today, but also give us the kind of information we'll need as we get to the root cause, which i'm sure we'll find eventually. but also as we -- as we go

through that process, some of those equipment recommendations will probably remain because the f-22, as general jones indicated, is a very unusual airplane in terms of its capabilities. there is nothing else like it. operating environments that we have not typically operated our aircraft in in those -- in that type of an environment. and so some of the things that we have recommended give us a much better understanding of the pilots' performance in those environments that we have not operated in before, and it's a good thing to know, not only for the pilot to know, but for it wn my view, our understanding of the aviation physiology aspects of operating in that environment, which we, frankly, are not as aware of as we should have been and our recommendations put in place a mechanism by which we will be much more conversant in that area. i'll turn it over to general

lyon and he can talk about the ongoing fly activities and the task forces that he's leading. >> good afternoon. i'm major general charlie lyon, director of operations from air combat command. our role at air combat command is provide mission-ready forces to conduct operations in this specific case, f-22s flying air superiority missions in support of our combatant commanders across the globe. i returned from a tour of duty as commander of air force forces in afghanistan as we're in the midst of the stand-down. i was asked to get involved to become a part of the effort by general marten and others to propose to return to fly the f-22 fleet. i'm happy to report that since september of last year, we have flown over 10,000 sorties. that's a lot of sorties in a short amount of time. the f-22 provides unrivaled, unmatched, capabilities to

protect our friendly forces on the ground and at sea and reassure our allies across the globe. our task force. our task force consists of members from inside the government across different commands, different disciplines, and also with members of industry. collaborative effort. data is shared from every investigation board, every advisory board, every source is sharing data to get to the root cause. we are implementing the recommendations given to us by general martin's group and others and we continue aggressively to pursue the root cause of these unexplained incidents. let it be no doubt safety is paramount to men and imwho operate it and commanders who command them and senior officers like myself. but when we wear this uniform, there is risk. there's risk inherent in aviation, risk inher rintly in

conducting military operations. we have a motto, people first, mission always. as we return to fly, i was, and continue, to be confident in the safety of the aircraft because it is the people, the sons and daughters of american moms and fathers, that we put in these aircraft in the air and on the ground every day to operate them. to conduct a mission that the nation asks us to do. so we're well into the implementation phase, well over 10,000 sorties. the incident rate related to these subjects is 0.1%. let's me say that differently. 99.9% effective pflying rate. but that's not good enough. we will not rest, we will not stop, we will not end this journey that we're on until we carry that 99 to the farthest right decimal point we can. that concludes my opening remarks. >> ladies and gentlemen, we'll

go ahead and take some questions. michael? >> with military.com. i wanted to ask questions for general lyon here, with the future use of the f-22, two questions, is there a ceiling right now in terms of altitude for flying the f-22? and as well, are f-22 flying alert missions now -- sitting alert, excuse me in places like alaska, and other places in the u.s.? >> thanks for the question. the f-22, as general martin alluded to earlier, has an operating envelope that exceeds that of any other fighter aircraft that we've produced. we're operating in the. that exeeceeds what we do with r current aircraft in inventory. f-22s have sat airspace control alert for homeland defense missions. currently sitting within the continental united states with the lower 48, if you will. we also use other aircraft,

f-16s, f-15s, we use as many aircraft as required to meet the northern commander command's needs. it's not uncommon to use a variety to fulfill the mission. >> it doesn't have altitude restrictions now within the f-22s envelope and it is flying? it is sitting alert missions now? >> it is sitting alert missions today. >> there's no restrictions in terms of altitude? no, yeah? >> i'm not going to get into a detail of some the operational capabilities of the aircraft in the forum but it's operating in an envelope that expands and goes onthat of any other fighter aircraft today. >> hold on. >> i'd like to follow up. without getting in the classified information like, can you help us understand what's so different about the pilot -- the environment that the pilot is in in an f-22 that essentially, particularly in the case of the

oxygen generator, increases the risk to the pilot? what is soferent about this ft in terms of the pilot's environment? >> let me if i could, jim, talk about that. as i came on active duty in 1970, i, along with all pilots, go through a physiological training course that's required every three years, and we try to understand the effect of altitude and day and night and nourishment and all of that on the body's ability to operate in the aviation arena. we do everything we can to try to make that aircraft as close to the atmosphere that they're used to on the ground. but the fact is, as we go up in altitude, for combat aircraft, we maintain a pressure differential between the outside air and the cockpit air of an amount that should there be

combat damage, the cockpit doesn't explode. in an airline you stay at 8,000 feet. in a fighter aircraft it begins to go up to maintain five psi pressure differential so you won't have a catastrophic explosion during rapid decompression. we sort of drew a line in the sky that said at 50,000 feet we will not fly above that altitude without a pressure suit on, because a rapid decompression could cause the evacuation of air from your lungs and the cockpit at a rate you could not survive without having a pressure suit. this airplane flies routinely above 50 now, feet. woo have a partial pressure suit. we have in our life sustaining system a capability for that pilot to survive a rapid decompression. our service ceiling is classified but it is above 50,000 feet, and our aircraft today are operating above 50,000

feet. okay? to answer your question. but it's not so much the environment of the cockpit as the potential should the pressure -- should a rapid decompression occur that caused our restriction, all right? i will tell you at 50,000 feet your carbon pressure is around 20,000, 22,000 feet. so you must use supplemental oxygen, or high percentage of oern, as you would if you're mountain climbing into mt. everest or whatever, using supplemental oxygen. >> has that environment contributed to the flaws or malfunctions of the oxygen generation system? is that what you haven't been able to determine? >> if we look at the incidents, what we'll find is we've actually had a series of physiological incidents below the altitude at which we would expect to see them. and that's 25,000 feet or below. we have seen those incidents in

an area where you would not expect them. but we don't have the root cause for why that is. we have some pretty good assessments, we have pretty good tests being worked now but we don't have the answer. it's not up in that altitude. these incidents have -- we had some at high altitude but some at altitudes you would not have expected as have other aircraft, not just the f-22. >> for someone who is not a pilot, not a doctor, describe by physiological incidents in laymen's terms? how many incidents have led to crashes of f-22s and how many pilots and/or people on the ground have been killed in these incidents? >> first of all, physiological incident is usually identified by the crew member. usually recognized by the crew member as a result of the training where we actually train somewhere to see what would happen if they began to not get

the oxygen they needed. we trained for that on the ground. we have altitude claim bers that we take people up and take their masks off and begin to see their color queuity goes down, they get light-headed, they feel woozy, a headache or something like that. they all understand what their symptoms are physiological incident is a condition where the pilot recognizes that something is not working exactly right with respect to his ability to understand the environment, control the aircraft, or his senses of normalcy. so that's an incident. and they can -- they can manifest themselves in many different ways. so because of our concern about the presentation of oxygen and the right pressure to the pilot at the right time, we have tried our very best to make sure that they understand that there may be a condition that they should be aware of, we have given them indicators to help them

understand the performance of their body, and if they feel different, see some reading that doesn't make sense, they will declare an emergency, use the emergency oxygen, come in and land and that is a physiological incident. second part of the question? >> the number of crashes and/or deaths? >> there have been none. there have been no. we have had -- with respect to an oxygen failure system, there have been no crashes and no loss of life due to the loss of oxygen to the pilot. >> with all due respect, isn't that being reviewed in the case of captain jeff heaney? >> no. i would say that the accident vex board has completed its work and their findings and recommendations indicated it was not the lack of oxygen. now that is being reviewed. >> it is under investigation? >> i understand that. i understand that's true. >> i'd like to be clear on that. >> the loss of captain heaneys a

tragic loss. the loss of any fellow airmen we take very seriously. they're a member of our extended air force family just as a loss of anyone who serves in uniform. the accident investigation board looked into the conditions surrounding that evening of the 26th november, 2010, they looked at it in great detail. in fact, we waited until the summer/fall came alaska to recover additional equipment which gave the board more insight. faced with the complex emergency procedure at night, cap taken heaney was unable to maintain aircraft control and impacted the train. that incident, that accident, and other things which have been reported because we have a culture of safety in the united states air force, of reporting when things don't go as they should be, and as general martin said we train to these high poxia like symptoms on the ground is one of the first thing is i did 31 years ago, before i

set foot in a simulator or aircraft, altitude chamber and learned about physiology. so we have this culture where we expect that our pilots will let us know if something is not quite right. we convene these investigative boards. and that's what this study group is to look at this in a very detailed manner over a significant amount of time. >> so you're convinced that the investigative board that found that the cause of that crash that killed captain hainy was due to pilot error. >> the board found he was unable to maintain aircraft control when faced with a complex situation. >> we have visited with abc news

about hainy's crash and investigative reports said he did not experience high pox ya. how are you able to determine that particularly considering no toxicology tests were done two weeks after he crashed. >> i will attempt to answer that for him. after more of the equipment was recovered, the board was able to reproduce the final minutes of that accident. and in that reconstruction, there is every indication to the board's belief that captain hainy was not incapacitated, that he was focusing on the complex emergency that the general described and that that channel liezed detention led to his disorientation and failure

to recognize that prior to impacting the terrain. so the reconstruction of what the aircraft was doing, the inputs to aircraft controls made the board's belief that he was not incapacitated and ultimately it was disorientation. >> so for 29 seconds as he was crashing, he didn't make any inputs at all on the controls. if you're crashing, you don't move anything? >> so let me use a personal example with over 2,000 hours of flying. when you have an emergency, you are focused on that emergency and there are times when we are susceptible and vulnerable to overchannel liezing our efforts. and i think every pilot's training is to analyze the

situation, but to maintain aircraft control. it is a difficult thing to do, particularly when you introduce some environments that he was faced with, such as night. and so i can fully understand being channel liezed and trying to absorb everything that's happening in a complex emergency. >> the f-22 program implemented by law so in case this program needs to be resurrected it could happen quickly. with regards to this ongoing study, how are you implementing the study? >> i'm sorry. i don't understand the concept of reverse blt. could you explain that again? >> according to them, they want

to make sure that we produce something as quickly as possible if in case it is necessary. how are you implementing that? >> you're referring to the strategy that was prom gait ed n january? and your question is about what the recommendations are? they are not related. >> how would you implement the recommendations here into reverse blt? >> from an air staff perspective, we are not engaging in any dialogue about restarting the f-22 production line. the last aircraft has come off of that production line. so as air combat command in our air force studies the recommendations of general martin's group, we will examine any changes that are made to the

aircraft as changes to those that are already procured, not e restarting a production line if i think that's what your question was. >> are you taking any additional steps to mitigate some of these fizz logical instruments? they seem to be continuing even with the steps you have taken thus far. is there anything more you can do? >> when we made the decision to return to flying in september after looking at all the information brought forward by advisory boards, there were a set of recommendations given to us to implement. they give us the confidence that this aircraft is even safer than it's been in the past. it has been a tremendous track record. i have a couple things in front

of me today. we very quickly took commercial off the shelf technology. one of the hypothesises discussed earlier, is is there a lack of oxygen? this is a pulse oximeter. those of you who may be long distance runners may wear heart rate monitors. this measures your heart rate and oxygen levels. the pilots wear these. if there's any indication of an abnormal oxygen rate, we terminate the flight. all eyes are focused on the safe recovery of that pilot and aircraft at that time. another measure we put in place, the second hypothesis is is there an issue with the quality? this is a filter. it it has a hep filter and charcoal layer in between e. like many of you may have on

your furnaces at home. this filter iss out particlats. we wear these on every flight. we analyze these whenever we have an incident to see what's in here. we haven't found anything of a significant level yet that's come through this. the other thing that we have done is initially, to get to the emergency oxygen system, there was a small ring that was in there. we replaced it for $47 a piece. they produced this handle which is now in every aircraft in alaska. it's in 70% of the fleet today and will be complete within the next two or three weeks. so these are some of the measures we put in place. and i'm glad you asked about the incident the other day. we have taken a 911 call approach. that's how seriously we take this.

we have instructed and talked to the members in the field. whenever you get any indication that something may not be right, call 911. terminate the flight. all eyes are on you and the safe recovery of that aircraft. we meet those pilots when they get back on the ground with a medical team who goes into an immediate response to care for the pilot lot, check his oxygen level, we take additional tests and send the tests off to the lab. for the instance we have, nothing has come back. but the incident the other day, what we found was there was invalid data here. but we didn't question it. nobody second guesses a pilot. let's get it on the ground and continue to learn to get to the root cause. >> so is it possible thz a feez logical phenomenon and there's nothing wrong with the oxygen

system that's strictly related to the assent or the g forces or something that this plane is capable of generating? >> if i could, let me start off by some of the discussions we had in the scientific recovery board about that issue. this aircraft was the first aircraft designed after gold water, after the pac card commission reports on acquisition and its initial design, it was the first aircraft designed with the knowledge that it was likely to be flying in a chemical biological environment. we were going to protect the pilot with ensembles. in this airplane, we intended to ha