could get this updated, first of all, during the consideration of the new s.t.a.r.t. the president said i intend to modernize or replace the triad strategy, strategic nuclear delivery system, a heavy bomber, air launch cruise missiles and icbm an nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and slbm and maintain the united states rocket motor industrial base. he goes on and elaborates on that. now, this statement was made after this chart. do you have an updated chart on this that would reflect what's happening today? >> sir, may i take that for the record and get the chart back to you? >> yes, you certainly may. that's very reasonable. it's very reasonable. last thing on that, something no one talks about but i've always been concerns and that is relating to the technical nuclear weapons. we made -- several of us on this side of the aisle and the other side of the aisle -- made an effort to include tactical

nuclear weapons at the time that we were looking at the new s.t.a.r.t. program. and as it is right now, it's about a 10-1 advantage of russia over ourselves. do you have any -- do you agree or disagree with me that that should be a part of the plan? >> i agree it should be a part of the plan, yes, sir. >> all right. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator inhofe. senator nelson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank to both of you for your service and for your kind remarks this morning. i appreciate that very much. general kehler and general alexander, the comments today and all of the discussion for some period of time has indicated the growing threat of cyber warfare to the threat to the united states national security. as we engage in this discussion, there is an ongoing

restructuring of stratcom's headquarters with the new headquarters. general kehler, can you give us some indication why an aging facility would not be an appropriate facility as we take on new responsibilities but particularly as it relates to the high-tech cyber situation? general alexander, if you had some thoughts about that, it would be helpful, too. thank you. >> sir, the activities that go on at stratcom are unique activities. we perform those activities, particularly the command and control that we have of our strategic forces, the planning that we do for our strategic forces, the intelligence support that's required behind our continuing need for strategic level deterrence and being able to command and control forces under high stress. all of those really come together at stratcom

headquarters. the demand that today's systems place on that headquarters building have far outpaced the ability of the building to keep up. not only do we have vulnerabilities because of the cyber concerns that we've expressed earlier, but we have physical plant vulnerabilities there. you're well aware of some of the failures that we've had, catastrophic failures in the building systems themselves that have threatened to take that one of a kind location and really make it inoperable for months. we barely averted that kind of a catastrophe a year ago in december. with a flood, of all things, in the basement, a burst water line. so as we looked at ways forward, given the unique nature of what we do, given the one of a kind responsibilities that are performed there and giving -- given the continued importance

of all of that in our deterrence posture, the conclusion that the engineers reached was that you could not modify the building, that basically what you needed to do was go and build a new command and control facility that houses all of the activities that we're going to need to perform. that remains my assessment today, that we need to get moving on this. i think that it is proceeding well. i believe that we're headed toward contract award. i know the corps of engineers has responsibility in this regard and things seem to be moving forward, at least everything that i can be aware of, and much of this, of course, needs to be in the realm of the corps and others. so from my perspective, senator, the bottom line is the recognition that we do something unique there, that it isn't about a brick and mortar building. it's about what goes on there in the computer systems, in the need for support systems,

information technology and the suppo supporting networks that put all of that together so that we are prepared to continue to perform this deterrence mission as far into the fauche as we can see. >> thank you. as you know, when it comes to the cmr replacement facility, nnsa has deferred for five years the construction of the chemistry, metallurgy or cmr replacement facility. is this delay in the cmr replacement facility a concern for you in not only meeting our responsibilities and obligations and commitments on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty but just in general, keeping our arsenal current? >> senator, it is a concern for me. i think of all of the items in the '13 budget, those items that would be associated with stratcom's portfolio of mission

responsibilities fared generally pretty well. there were some delays, adjustments, programmatic adjustments and other things that were made. i think we can manage risk across all of that. when i look specifically at the weapons complex, the ability of the complex to provide us the weapons that we need that have the appropriate life extensions provided, that give us the flexibility to manage the hedge and allow us to look at potential reductions as we go to the future in the stockpile, i think the thing that concerns me the most is our continued investment in the weapons complex. and so the issue with cmrr does concern me. i understand the '13 budget does provide for us to get moving in a number of areas. the secretary of energy and the secretary of defense sent a letter to the corning that reminded them that we're not ready yet to lay out what happens in '14 and beyond. until we're ready to lay all of that out, i remain concerned. >> well, it could be appropriate to at least start the process as

in the case of the stratcom headquarters which is going to be a phased-in funding over several years, at least a start could be made on cmr in a similar fashion. otherwise, it looks like we've just put together bailing wire and maybe a duct tape structure to get us through '13 budget-wise. >> senator, this is ultimately a do-out from the departments of energy and defense, and we owe you the alternatives. i don't have with me today because we don't have yet a set of viable alternatives that we can come and present. i do agree, though, with the main thrust here and that is i see no alternative as we look to the future aside from modernizing the complex. regardless of what happens, we have a fairly extensive backlog of weapons awaiting dismantlement that require the same kind of a modern complex to

dismantle. so i think from both sides of this equation, we need a modern weapons industrial complex that's highly unique and it is very specialized. we need that kind of a complex so that we have a safe, secure and effective deterrent. >> it's hard to draw an analogy other than to say that trying to put together something in a stopgap basis might get us through '13 but doesn't position us for what we might do years beyond and particularly with an aging stockpile. >> senator, we owe you some answers, and the study to produce those is under way. >> thank you. >> general alexander, as you relate to the responsibilities with cyber, i think you made it very clear that there's a role for the d.o.d., a role for homeland security, a role for

our law enforcement agencies, and continuing to find ways to work together is a reduction of stovepiping that has been so predominant in the past. are you comfortable that the agencies that are all trying to work together understand that the important need not to stovepipe and to break down even with some comparable authorities that will go to different agencies, but to continue to work together on this important threat to our country and to our business which is also a threat to our country? >> senator, i do. >> thank you. thank you, gentlemen. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator nelson. senator brown? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general kehler, i was wondering, do you consider the global strike command a pretty valuable -- let me restate that question, i'm sorry.

would you consider the air operations groups currently supporting the global strike command a valuable resource? >> senator, yes, we sure do. >> and are they irreplaceable? are they such an integral part of what you're doing that really, if you didn't have them, we would be in trouble? >> the entire force that global strike command brings to stratcom, in fact, that's one of our air force components, one of our major components, as a matter of fact, they bring us the entire dual capable bomber force, the b-52s and the b-2s. they also bring us the entire icbm force. they bring us an air operations center that allows us to manage all of our air activities in central artery comeand so what global strike brings and all of its subordinates are all very valuable to us. >> that actually provides real world time-sensitive planning support as well, correct? >> yes, sir. >> that's why, you know, when you're answering those questions like that, that's why i'm a

little concerned with the otis air national guard base. i was there a couple weeks ago, months ago, and they have a great mission in their air operations group supports central artery come's global strike command but by providing exactly what you indicated, the irreplaceable realtime sensitive support, and yet i've heard that the air force wants to break up this very valuable, irreplaceable unit to save money. i was wondering if, number one, you are aware of or were given the opportunity to comment on that proposal affecting that group and otis in particular? >> senator, if i could take that for the record, i would appreciate that. i don't know enough about the details about what's happened. >> it would be helpful. i agree with you. agree with everything you just said in your opening response to my questions, that it is irreplaceable, and it is valuable, and i know what these folks do there. especially being on the eastern seaboard of the united states and covering all of eastern

united states in some respects, i mean, the air guard in particular, and army guard as well and reserves, they give you great value for the dollar. i'm deeply concerned that we're cutting off our nose to spite our faces in that we're trying to -- it's kind of like the air force is saying okay, i'm going to keep all my toys here, and by the way, the guard and reserves, we'll take away what you have and really, i think i have not been yet convinced that these cuts represent either an acceptable level of risk or an efficient use of the money. so i would ask and i will get you the very specific questions for the record and i appreciate that. i was wondering, i know we're talking about cyber security. i know there's many proposals, we have one in government regs, administration, you and the military's working on a whole host of things. how are the rules of engagement actually working or being implemented or coming along with regard to the cyber command operation?

>> right now we're upgrading -- >> i meant that to you, general alexander. i'm sorry. thank you. >> right now, we're updating, if you will -- the rules of engagement that the chairman has put out were dated in 2005. given where we are today, what the joint staff has taken on is to update those. right now, all our measures are internal to our networks, what d.o.d. is authorized to do. what we're looking at within d.o.d. and then within the inner agency, what are the next steps that we should have, and how do we take those steps? i think over the next month or two, the joint staff will complete those standing rules of engagement and then move those to the inner agency and share those with you. >> what role do you see or what segments of the private sector should fall under d.o.d.'s responsibility, if any? >> well, i think this is where the discussion comes in. first -- >> let me just extend on that. if attacked, what entities would be considered an extension of

u.s. government facilities? >> i think those are decisions that you in the bills and the administration would make on when we actually implement response options or response options to support or to defend against an attack. that's the first step. so let me start with technically, what we're doing, i think the first part of that, senator, is to have the information sharing, to know that an attack is going on. we discussed that a little bit previously. that is the ability for industry to tell us that something is happening, and that either fbi if it's domestic, dhs or if it's foreign, that fbi and its cyber command in nsa would respond to. the issue and i think what we're going to walk our way through candidly is we've got to start some place. i think putting out where we are on the information sharing and having industry take the lead with dhs on providing us the insights of what's going on is the first right step.

i think that's the best step that we can take. more importantly, i think we need to take that step. what we can't do is wait. and i think your question and where you're going on this is absolutely right. we've got to take -- we've got to take measures now. i think those are absolutely important, because my concern and the statements that go to that is that if somebody is attacked, the way we find out about it today is after the fact. you can't stop it then. now you're in the forensics mode. so i think what everybody agrees is so we've got to get to a point where industry can tell us when something is going on so that we can help prevent it. then the options come up to what -- so what industry is included in that, and those are parts of the bills that i know that you're all considering. >> you know, that's great, but i tell you what, you know, we don't have all the answers. i can tell you that firsthand. what i'm concerned about is that we create a bill that has so much red tape and so much overlap and duplication that it

kind of -- you can't get out of your own way. so i would ask for your recommendations and guidance as well to be part of the process and let us know what your thoughts are and where you feel the weaknesses or strengths lie so we can expand or detract from that, and i am deeply concerned. i think you're right. i know you're right in the fact that we're always reacting instead of being proactive, and when the attack happens, we find out about it after, after our technology and intellectual property and military secrets and plans are stolen. and that deeply concerns me. i'm wondering, as the technology continues to advance with potential cyber attacks are capable, as you know, and i think have referenced, executed at increasing speeds, do you have enough leg room from the authorization standpoint to act at the earliest possible opportunity to defeat a cyber attack before it's

launched? attack before it's launched? do you have enough flexibility, do you think? >> those are some of the issues that are being considered in the rules of engagement. so i won't know until we're complete with that. we are pushing for what we think we need, and i think what the chairman and joint staff and osd will do is say okay, what makes sense? being extremely candid on this, it really comes down to so what are those actions that make the sense that we can do defensively analogous to the missile shoot-down? and i think there are some there that we're getting agreement on. yeah, it makes sense to stop that attack from going, but if you're to go after a computer in foreign space or some other thing, that might be a response option that would now take i think the president and the secretary to step in and start making decisions versus taking that on. i think that's probably where we'll end up and that makes a lot of sense from my perspective. >> first, thank you very much both of you. this is an issue that deeply concerns me and many other members of the committee. i will be submitting some questions for the record just -- or maybe we can speak offline.

i don't want to have you reinvent the wheel, just some certain areas that i think i need a little better understanding of. thank you very much. >> thank you, senator brown. senator hagan? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think thank both of you for your testimony today and certainly for your service to our country. thank you. general alexander, the administration believes that it's crucial for critical infrastructure companies to carefully diagnose their cyber vulnerabilities and the risks posed to the american people should these vulnerabilities be exploited and to take steps to eliminate these vulnerabilities. the administration has proposed legislation to ensure that industry stands up to these responsibilities as a matter of national security. the administration's also seeking to extend the signature-based defense that the nsa and the u.s. cyber command have developed for d.o.d. critical infrastructure. since the administration is

seeking to implement both approaches, the implication is that neither one alone is seen as sufficient to meet the threat. others, however, take the position that information sharing in conjunction with the national security agencies defensive solution would be enough, that it's not necessary to require critical infrastructure companies to build up their own defenses. do you believe that nsa's signature-based defense deployed recently in the defense industrial base pilot program can defend our nation's critical infrastructure against nation state cyber threats, or do you believe that the critical infrastructure companies also need to close their vulnerabilities? >> senator, first, i think it's the latter. we need both. but i'd like to take it one step further because i don't think what we're talking about is having nsa deploy capabilities out there. rather, what we're talking about is nsa providing technical

capability to others to run so we don't want, nor do we want to run stuff within -- i want to make that part clear. it's not us putting stuff out there for us to operate. what we're really saying is industry has a bunch of signatures that can detect foreign actors that are coming against them. government has some of those. nsa, dhs, fbi. all of us need to work together to provide the best set of signatures to protect that critical infrastructure. industry can actually operate that and tell us when that occurs. i also think that you need to set a set of standards for how those systems are operated to give you the best and i'll call that, general kehler mentioned it and it's in there, resilience. we need resilience in those networks to ensure they can operate and be defensible while we're trying to defend the country outside. does that make sense? >> um-hum. you know, just last friday, i read about it yesterday, microsoft was accompanied by u.s. marshals, and they raided office buildings in pennsylvania and in illinois to disrupt a

group of computers, a botnet, that was harvesting bank accounts, passwords and other personal information from millions of computers, and microsoft's actions show what's possible and some say is certainly necessary now to stop cyber crimes. what are your thoughts on these actions just taken recently, and should they serve as a model for other private industries, and is there a takeaway for the department of defense on this recent raid? >> senator, i think it shows how we can work together, industry and government, to do what's right here, and by bringing both of those together we're better off for it. i think what we've got to do is we've got to come up with that solution in this area, too, and i know both bills are looking at that. i think that information sharing is critical. >> thank you. general alexander, it's often argued that terrorist groups and rogue nations such as north korea, for example, do not yet

possess the sophisticated and extensive cyber capabilities to effectively cripple our nation's critical infrastructure. for example, general cartwright, the former vice chairman of the joint chiefs, has publicly expressed doubt that this class of actors could carry out such attacks today. however, we are aware of what's described as a thriving international black market where it's possible to buy or to rent cyber attack tools in large scale supporting infrastructure, such as thousands or even millions of compromised computers that are deemed to be effective against almost any type of network or information system. this black market has developed to support the vast cyber criminal activities that have been estimated by some to now yield more revenue than the global legal narcotics trade. this criminal money then obviously fuels research and development of modern and up-to-date cyber attack tools. could this black market or rogue nations -- sorry, could this

black market and cyber attack tools and infrastructure now or in the future enable terrorists or rogue nations to acquire ready-made capabilities to inflict significant damage on the u.s. economy and our critical infrastructure? are you worried about that? >> senator, that's my greatest worry. i would go beyond that group. i think the proliferation of cyber weapons, if you will, grows, that we cannot discount the actions that one smart person can do. from my perspective, when we see what our folks are capable of doing, we need to look back and say there are other smart people out there that can do things to this country. we need to look at that and say how are we going to defend. from my opinion, that could go from as you described accurately, and i agree with that, could be non-nation state actors all the way up to nation state actors like north korea. i wouldn't discount any of them.

we have to be prepared for all of them. only one of them could do tremendous damage to this country. >> thank you. last july, general cartwright also speaking as the vice chairman noted the challenges of recapitalizing all three legs of the triad with constrained resources. general kehler, you have raised a similar point, that we are not going to be able to go forward with weapons systems that cost what weapons system currently are costing today. in the search for a solution to these challenges, options seem to take the form of delaying the current programs or reducing the size of the planned programs. what are your thoughts on the pluses and minuses of each of these options? >> senator, first of all, i continue to support the need for a balanced triad of strategic deterrent forces. i think the triad has served us well. i think it continues to serve us well. i think that as we look to the

future, there are attributes that are spread across the triad that continue to make sense for our national security. having said that, i am concerned about the costs, and so i think there are a couple of things that we need to keep in mind. we need to phase these programs appropriately. we need to make sure that we have matched the investment with the needs. we need to control costs. i think there are a number of programatic steps to take as we go forward. when i look at the ohio replacement program, i know that we are making decisions here today that will be with us for decades to come. the ohio replacement program as far as we can see into the future, we believe that we see the strategic need for and the strategic value of a submarine based part of our deterrent so moving forward with that, even though we've had to delay the program some, is going to be important. that's also important with our allies, the brits. i think it's important that we have a dual capable long-range

bomber, and it isn't just -- it needs to be nuclear capable, but it won't just be used for nuclear purposes, and if we do our deterrence job right, it will never be used for that purpose. it may very likely be used to employ conventional weapons which is what b-52s and b-2s and b-1s have done. the final -- and that program is under way. i think controlling cost is going to be a big issue in both of those programs. the next question then becomes the future icbm. we have begun an analysis of alternatives to look at what shape, form that might take. and then as we go to the future, i think we will get to a number of decision points on all of these systems that will allow the future environment to shape what the ultimate force outcome becomes. >> my time is up. thank you, both of you. thank you. >> thank you, senator hagan. senator ayotte? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, general alexander and

thank you, general kehler for being here today and for your service. general kehler, the senate support for the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty was tied to modernization of the united states nuclear complex and strategic delivery system, and specifically during the senate confirmation, the president committed to modernization in what became known as the 1251 plan that was incorporated in the 2010 ndaa, isn't that right? >> senator, yes. >> okay. and if you look at that commitment in the 1251 plan, there was an initial plan submitted in may of 2010, and then a month before the ratification of the senate treaty, there was $4.1 billion added over five years to the plan. isn't that right? >> yes. you're talking about the d.o.d. -- >> yes. but that was specifically

reflected a month before the ratification of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty put into the 1251 plan as incorporated in the 2010 ndaa. >> senator, i think that's right. that's a little before my time, but i think that's right. >> the reason that was done is because modernization was such an important issue to getting that treaty through the united states senate, because modernization is very, very important for our nuclear program, isn't that correct? >> yes, it is. >> okay. well, the 2013 budget request underfunds the commitment made that was expressly made in conjunction with the ratification of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty by over $4 billion over the next five years. isn't that the case? >> it is not -- it is lower than the level of the 1251 report. yes, it is.

>> it's $4 billion lower. roughly. >> i think that's right. yes. >> okay. which the president a month before ratification, to get the senate to sign on to the reductions in the s.t.a.r.t. treaty added $4 billion because we were so worried. i wasn't here at the time, with you i know manich my colleagues were very worried about the modernization of the program if we were going to make the reductions required by the s.t.a.r.t. treaty, rand if we're -- and if the president is not following through, why didn't we include the $4 billion in the commitment on modernization and in particular just to break that down, you -- senator nelson had asked you about the chemical and the metallurgy replacement facility. that's an 83% cut in that facility. in fact, we're not following through at all in our commitment to that facility, are we? >> well, the commitment's been delayed.