but the record will state that. >> well, i think what we did learn is just some of the things that you say. while i can't go into all of that here, it was a tremendous exercise. i give air force credit for helping us set it up there, they did a wonderful job and we brought in all of our capabilities and our components and some tremendous lessons learned. at a classified level, i think you can see that. and you can say we're headed in the right direction. and i think we are. >> i think this afternoon is best. >> my time is about to expire but long-term, how do you see the cyber con evolving and changing? >> i would put it as a platform,

anymore we want dhs to re-create an nsa, so we need these two components of dod to work together. it's got the technical talent, it's got the access and the capability. and work with the intelligence side of nsa to further support the combat and command. i think that is going in the delight direction. thank you for your service as well. >> gentlemen, thank you for your service, general alexander, i thank you for your recent trip down to ft. gordon where you say a pat on the back and a morale

boost to some of the smartest, hardest working, most committed americans who are doing a great job of helping protect our great country and i think for doing that at the nsa, ft. gordon. cyber com itself has a little over 1,000? >> a little over 1,000 authorized. that's not only cyber command staff, but it also directs the defense of the dod networks. in our cyber, what i counted in those other 12,000, army cyber

command. >> okay, i wanted to make sure i understood that. nsa today does a pretty good job of intersecting and protecting the dot-gov networks. over 1,000 times an hour, to 6 million times a day, communications from foreign terrorists and organizations. even with that huge magnitude of hacks into the season, general, nsa has done a remarkable job of protecting that system. are you satisfied with where you are in that regard today? >> actually, i'm going to answer this twice and contradict

myself, we're making progress and we're doing a great job on it. i do think we have the best defense right there. but it could be better, and i think for the future, from military command and control, it must be better. so i think the i.t. mode modernization that the nsa is looking at will make it even better. >> we're looking at legislation, lieberman-collins, one and the same, or the alternative legislation really doesn't address that question, they're doing what you're doing, protecting the dot-gov. >> what we do to protect our networks, beyond what you would normally do for our civilian network is what we think we

should be getting to the information sharing. >> going one step further there, nsa also monitors the dip of the industrial phase, and it may be in those numbers that i heard you use before, hacks into the nsa industrial base have happened and nsa does a good job of protecting those scenarios, where that has happened, you've been notified and you're able to respond to it, is that correct? we provide them -- the internet service providers actually do the work. the reason that that's important

is i believe that's how we can scale in protecting other critical infrastructure in the mechanisms in which others are working. what we bring to the table and what fbi and others would bring, is specific things that we see going on in the network that may be sensitive or classified. they actually operate, the part that we're able to work with the dib is that they will protect and safeguard classified information. that is a key element of this approach. >> my point being that your relationship with the nsa providers allows the defense industrial base to have that protection. >> now it's been taken over by dhs, so they're actually the lead. they have been doing that for six weeks, we're at the table and provide technical support, but they're actually the lead on that as well.

>> looking at another what i would consider critical infrastructure our electric grid, there's a mechanism in place to develop by industry where if they say something unusual, then they notify nert, and nert immediately goes to uscert. they are able to provide protection to the grid under voluntary standards. >> i think that's slightly different if i could. because in those notifications, you have gone out of real-time to now a part where actually wire in the forensics mode so what they're delling is something that has occurred and by the time it gets to uscert can do is not prevent it, but only help them understand it.

so the information sharing part that you and others have proposed will take that to a more real-time capability or at least allow that. where they could say i see x happening, until -- they, industry could tell the government that that is occurring, that you could take it to the forensic side to the production side. which i believe is hugely important to the protection of the country. >> that is on information sharing, this is really the key as i understand it that to be if they have the capability of sharing private -- with the government as well as other industries, like industries, then isn't that the crux of what

it's going to take to protect all the informational base in the short run as well as the long run. >> the one that we provide they want to noe what other things provide them. they bring a wealth of knowledge in how to con fig rate. if they're not operated to a standard, then what happens is you have other ways of getting into the network that we probably are not looking at. we assume that the doors will be locked. if the doors are not locked, then somebody would get in, or if the window was open.

what we would be doing is looking at other types of nation state threat. i think we do have to have one set of standards, and we're working with the industry, with that said how do you have the industry players work with the government and so what's the right way to approach it? as you may know, we had a meeting a number of years ago yes we asked the electric companies how do we do this and who's going to tell us. that's the way we need to go about it is help them get there, not be burdensome but helpful. >> with respect to giving

voluntary participation as well as mandatory, but getting the industry to set the standards is the key and getting the industry to share the information is the other piece of that. both pieces of legislation is a critical part of it. mr. chairman, my time is up. i didn't vote for the s.t.a.r.t. treaty and one reason i didn't is because i was apprehensive about the administration not being able to do what they said they were going to do on modernization. i thank you for your specific comment on that, the fact that you're concerned about it and that is a critical aspect of this that we look forward to working with you as we go forward. it's got to be done. thank you. >> thanks, mr. chairman. >> senator, thank you. >> senator sessions? >> thank you, senator chambliss for that comment and general taylor it was great to be with you yesterday and talk about some of the issues you just

mentioned because the understandi understanding. >> what kind of funding would be laid out for the next decade to modern size our nuclear weapons has not been funded. and senator kyle is deeply disappointed about that. and mr. chairman, i am troubled by this little overheard conversation between the president and mr. medvedev, where president obama says of all these things overheard conversation, but particularly missile defense. this can be solved but it's important for him to give me space. and medvedev said, i understand, i understand your message about space, space for you.

this is my last election. fl. i understand and i'll transmit this information to vladimir. this is not a little matter. i'll tell you why it's not a little matter. we had a long debate over the missile defense. the left has never favored missile defense, bush was preparing to place a system in poland, out of the blue, it was cancelled, the poles were deeply shocked and disappointed, so were the czechs and we were promised, don't worry about it, we'll have another system, one in effect, i felt, that they were trying to change the course of things some of that was not even on the drawing board.

but we were going to implant a system that we had already placed in the united states. i guess what i say to me, the president makes us assurances that we're going to implant a new system, be it an sm 3 system, that will protect america, sure we cancelled that one, but we're going to build this new one, but the russians object to the new one, they object to it steadfastly for no good reason that i can see, except maybe to leverage politics. and now it sounds like the president is saying we're going to take care of the new system. not going to place it there. and after the election, i'll take care of it, vladimir, but that's not what he told the american people, what he told the congress. he told the congress we were going to build a system. so i'm worried about it. i can read -- i know what the

significance of this little conversation and it concerns me. and i'm also concerned that the policy of the defense department of the united states when it comes to the nuclear weapons you control, general is that we are moving to a world without nuclear weapons. the complete elimination of them the defense posture nuclear review. to the defense department's nuclear posture review was aimed at a world without nuclear weapons in it. that's what the commander in chief wanted and that's what the defense department put in there. so that's one reason that congress insisted that we budget sufficient money to modernizing the aging nuclear weapons. we insisted on that and it came up as a part of a new start debate. the president sent a letter to

us and promised it. but it's not occurring. the money's not there, so we're at a time of great danger as i see it. the defense budget is under great stress. we're looking to save money wherever we can save money, and it appears to me that the administration has -- does not have the kind of rigorous intellectual support for missile defense or nuclear weapons necessary to ensure we keep these programs on track. so with regard to that system, let me ask you a few questions. and if you have answered these, let me know because i was ranking member on another committee that i had to attend.

>> several of them are<  delay can you just tell us what the budget has caused up to delay. >> first, the stockpile and the deployed force that we have today i am confident is safe, secure and effective. those are the three watch words we tend to use when we're talking about this. so today, i think it has met its objectives and it's safe, secure and effective. however, we have weapons that are beginning to reach their end of life. the submarine weapon, it's not classified information that the w-76 submarine weapon, our life extension program is under way as we sit here today. i'm very encouraged by that and the program seems to be moving

forward successfully. what the budget reductions did is it slowed the delivery of those weapons. i believe that in all of these reductions, in a perfect world, we wish we didn't have to deal with budget reductions, but the fact of the matter is that the nuclear forces are not immune. i believe that we can manage that delay in the w-76. it's toward the end of the program that we can manage this. that part is mangle. the aircraft are reaching a point where they're at their critical age. the fy-13 budget begins that life extension effort, although it will give us the first unit, what we call the first production unit, most likely in 2019, instead of 2017 which is

what the 1251 report suggested. i believe that's manageable risk as well. >> i would just add a political risk that when you push things out and you're assuming congress will act rationally and predictably in the future, but i would say the more things that are pushed out, and they're not done when you plan to do them, the greater the danger is that it won't happen. >> yes, sir, in terms of operational -9risk, i believe can manage operational risk on both of those. we're looking at a study to look at the icbm and remaining submarine warheads to see if we can get commonality. we believe there's some possibilities there, we would like do go study that and see.

>> i believe we can go forward with operational defense. the two secretaries of energy and defense have said we do not have the plan in place for what happened in 2013. a concerns me. when i look to the infrastructure, and i mentioned earlier, to another question, it's a very unique, highly spec)&ized program. the uranium processing facility remains in place. the plan to upgrade what we call cmrr, the chemical

metallurgical. i'm concerned about that, i am concerned about our ability to provide for the deployed stockpile. and that is my number one concern here. so i have some concerns. we owe you answers. the two departments are working together to look at what alternatives might exist.xd i will be concerned until someone presents a plan that we can move forward with. i believe with can move forward and -- i will remain concerned until we go a little farther down the road. >> well, thank you, you are the customer, you are the person for whom these weapons are delivered.

and you need to share with us, and i believe you have honestly, both the good and the bad news. and i think it's up to congress to make sure that out of all the money we spend on national defense, we make sure that we have sufficient funds to maintain a&jñ credible nuclear stockpile. so thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, gentlemen for being here this morning and for your service and hopefully i won't keep you too much past lunch. i wanted to start, general taylor, if i could, about new s.t.a.r.t. treaty implementation. as you know, the treaty was an extremely difficult and strenuous debate in the -- the -- voiced their sup for the treaty which i think was very

helpful in getting it done. but can you tell us a little bit how the implementation of the treaty is progressing? >> senator, i can. there are a number of segments in implementation of the new start treaty that work forward together. the second is we need to eliminate those launchers that count against the overall treaty limits that have not been in use for a very, very long time. for example, we call them phantoms, simply because they count on the books, but they have been deactivated a very long time ago. some number of bombers, the b-52s are in the bone yard and need to be dismantledismantled. there are others that need to be eliminated not converted from

nuclear to nonnuclear, but completely eliminated. those processes are underway, the wheels are turning, they are about to finish the study that -- i'm comfortable that those pieces are moving forward correction, the second thing is we have to get ourselves down to the central limits of the treaty and that's 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 launchers and 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers. we have gone through the joint chiefs with proposals, we believe we are -- in the meantime, we have begun recon figuration activities, we are demorphing all of the ooix cbms

-- we are reconfiguring the numbers of warheads on the submarines, so we can get our warheads down to these certain limits. all these steps are underway, senator, i will toll you, that we know that there's a clock running here. we have to be at those central limit limits. >> the icbm field are sensitive to weather. so we have got to leave ourselves from slack. but we need to make some decisions and we're poised to make those.

>> the russians are also meeting their requirements under the treaty, as far as we know. >> they are. >> i want to spich now to the refueling tankers, because general taylor, i know you have commented one of the important support elements of a long range bomber is obviously a refueling capability. we have seen that where we have the 17 5th -- i appreciate the skill and the importance of having that component. can you talk very briefly about how critical it is for the air force to remodernize that capability and how important it is that we have the new kc 4600

tanker for those long range. >> i think we appreciate the value of what makes us a global command. in large part what makes us a global command is our ability to project power. in large part our ability to project power is based upon our tankers. it isn't the only thing that allows us to project power, and by the way, i think the big advantage that the united states military has is our ability to project power. in that mixture, i think there is probably, when i look at my friends in air capability

command, and our leagues in -- there is no more valuable asset that we have than our long range aircraft, that can give us strategic facilityings and the tankers that make it so. when i look at important things for us in the future, a modern tanker fleet is irreplaceable and is crucial for our success. i think that the united states' ability to project power relies on that as well. and it relies on space and counter space. it's they are truly global in nature and their ability to move a lot of fuel to power

projection forces is critically important. >> and i know it goes without saying that in addition to the equipment that's required for all of that, the skills of the human talent that's required to do is also critical? >> the most critical part. >> given that, one of the things that i have worked on in my civilian life before i came to the senate was the importance of education, and obviously one of the things that we're struggling with both in the private sector and in the private sector, i think it's particularly true in the defense rather tharena is me that we have the trained engineers, scientists, mathematicians that it's going to take for all of these jobs in the future. can i ask if both of you might comment on what your com