don't crack down on them, and we talked about how you have to work with your security forces to maintain law and order, but in a -- in a context of free and fair elections. we spent 2.5 hours, and he was taking notes, and they did a lot of that. and mubarak did go out and campaign. and after that election, the egyptian press was saying, egypt will never be the sail. be the same. so we said, great job. you're on the road. go to the parliamentary elections, and the first round of the parliamentary elections occur and the brotherhood, not surprisingly, since mubarak had destroyed the center, and the muslim brotherhood was the only vehicle for expressing dissent left, the muslim brotherhood started to do well and mubarak got scared, and in the second part of that parliamentary election, they crashed down with a vengeance. and at that point our effort to get mubarak to preside over a

transition ended. it's not that we didn't keep talking about freedom and democracy, that the president didn't keep making the cause with mubarak, but we got, you know, in spades what dennis talked about. you don't understand our people. we tried your experiment, and it blew up in our face. it's a hard business, and, you know, one of the challenges for the obama administration is for those regimes that have not had revolutions. the monarchies which as elliott spoke of, have a legitimacy and are trying in their own way to reform. one of the challenges for the obama administration is to help those regimes actually do a democratic transition before there's a revolution, not after. but i offer the vignette about mubarak. it is very hard. and final postscript. in the last meeting that president bush had with king

abdullah of saudi, and where he talked again, once again, about reform and applauded king abdullah's reform, on the way out to the van where abdullah left, he said, mr. president, i understand what you're saying, but i'm afraid. i'm afraid. a man in his 80s, maybe 90s. bedouin, trying to reform, but, you know, such a long way to go. so it's very hard, but one of the things, i think, the obama administration has an opportunity to do is to try to get these regimes that have some legitimacy to lead their people to a democratic future without having to go through the disruption of revolutionary change. >> okay. thanks. >> i want to make a couple of comments. one is to offer further explanation on why there isn't a

center. elliott started it, and i want to add to what he was beginning to describe. and the second point i want to make will relate to the last thing that steve was saying, because there has been a lot of focus within the obama administration on precisely what you've been describing and indeed having precisely those type of conversations, which is, you can see what's coming. get out in front of it and then offering certain kinds of suggestion. but let me offer the first observation. mubarak very much did what elliott was describing, because -- and he wasn't alone at this. ben alli did the same. basically the so-called republics had no justification why they were in power. they had no idea that explained what was their reason for ruling. unlike the monarchies, had die nastic legitimacy. seam ambulance of legitimacy subpoena they had none. because they had none they feared in a sense those who could create a narrative that

would justify an alternative, and so what they did is, what mubarak focused on was making sure that there couldn't be an alternative narrative and, therefore, it had to be, in a sense, a binary situation. him or the islamists. in part for our consumption, not just ours but the west but also internally, because he sought to create a sense of fear about that alternative, and he played upon what has been historically a sense with egypt in particular about the great value and virtue of stability. now, he did something along the lines of what elliott was describes, because he did play footsie with the muslim brotherhood and islamists. in a certain level they ruled out violence and cracked down very hard on that and were extremely brute until thal in t and outlawed the muslim brotherhood as a part as such but by the same token allowed others to take over the

syndicates. egypt has an interesting history, look at the judiciary back to the 1920s. over time this developed of seam ambulance of independence, they allowed them to come in and take over, the islamists. whether the lawyers, the doctors, it was the muslim brother willhood too came to doe and this was okay from mubarak's standpoint. this is the way he lived and let live and gave them a kind of outlet. why the same token, anybody who was under the rubrics of secular liberal no possibility of emerging. no tolerance for them. so you look at what happened. basically, we're in a situation where you had one place that was seen as being completely authentic and off limits. precisely because the regime didn't have legitimacy, which was the mosque. and in the mosque, you had freedom of speech. so people in the mosque would stand up and athings. you can imagine. you come to the mosque, you see people who stand up an they're not giving in.

and all -- they knew how to play on anger that people felt and the fact that they didn't van alternative outlit. here was the mosque where you had asem ambulance of freedom of speech, were allowed to organize. the brotherhood to organize. where the embodiment of being non-corrupt was seen in the sense of being, in the sense of embodiment of social justice was seen, because they would engage in providing, you know, clinics. they would distribute food. when there was an earthquake in cairo, who was out there distributing food and blankets? it was the brotherhood. it wasn't the regime. every natural catastrophe you would see no sign of the government, but you'd see the brotherhood, and the brotherhood didn't have to provide a social safety net for the whole country. they could do it in a limited way but it would be seen. so what emerges? it's not just the kate in egypt but why there's a built-in image the islamists have.

they're seen as authentic, they're islam and that's indigeno indigenous. secondly, seen as being credible, because they actually stand up and they say things. thirdly, seen as being effective, because they deliver some social welfare. fourthly, they're seen at non-corrupt and embodying social justice. the antithesis of the regime and they're allowed to organize. and the secular liberal alternative isn't there. first of all, they are carry a stigma because they're secular. they're not allowed to organize. when the time comes and they're able to, the young generation is able to use social media and the internet, they're able to organize around a principle of opposition, but they're not in a position where they've had the time to create in a sense an identity, an agenda, a platform to think about how do we now present ourselves and our identity to the public? they have all the disadvantages in the early going and the islamists have all the

advantages. there's one very interesting change in everything that's happened, if we use the word awakening. and that is, this was a region that was characterized, since i'm in an academic setting. i'll use the jargon. not a participatory political cull chulture. one of the reasons i'm feeling unaez about where thing are. people in this part world today increasingly see themselves as citizens, not as subjects, and as citizens, they should have rights. as citizens thashs can make demand, have expectations, as citizens they should be able to hold their government's accountable. what they don't have, and this gets to the point elliott was making as well. they don't have institutions that are there that allow them to express what citizens would express. and it's going to take time to build those institutions, and one of the things that has to

happen now, playing upon their self-image of being citizens and the fact that they feel she in a voice and are not simply going to give up that voice, it's important to create standards of accountability. again, on our own we can't do this. because we don't have the credibility to be able to do it, and it's very easy to try to blame things on us. but the more the narrative of blame the one that's adopted, you know, the more you're not going to see one house built, one job created it's a the not going to address demands and expectati expectations. there are things that can be done but you have to create standards of accountability as it relates to the regimes where the islamists will have all the advantages. last observation, which gets back to what steve was saying. it is essential and the administration has done a lot of this and has done it at a lot of different levels and there have been sustained conversations especially with the whole range of our friends about, the wung thing you can see is that in the

region you see a sense of citizenship emerging. and you're going to have to find ways to respond to that. you're going to have to create a sense of inclusion. you're going to have to create a sense that people have the means to participate and in somehow shaping their own future and destiny. it's an easy thing to spap it's a hard thing to do, precisely because you get back to what king abdullah said to president bush.l say, we understand. i'm not going to identify the individuals who say this now, because they're in power, many of them will say they understand, but they don't quite know even with, when we make suggestions, even when we suggest, you know, ways we and others can be helpful, they don't quite know how to take the steps that will be responsive without unleashing a set of forces that they fear will undo them. and there aren't too many people in power who are going to take step thessaly will actually undo their hold on power. >> thanks. well, dennis, especially since you brought up the question of

the islamists and the mosque and the mosques, also this shift in identity from subject to citizen. that brings us to the main topic for the gathering here today, the question of religious freedom. elliott, this question to you first but i'd like the others to reflect on it as well. it's what is the role of religious freedom in he's in ongoing transformations? i mean, has -- when we hear religious freedom, is that a stalking horse for a greater role for islamism which in turn wb aggressive or religious freedom potentially a key solution to pluralism and creating institutions and citizenship that dennis was talking about? especially for non-imlawsist muslims as well as minoritieses such as christians and jews? >> why do they get the easy questions? >> yeah. >> it seems to me a very difficult question.

these are countries in which for the most part there was a fair amount of religious freedom, for the most part. the restrictions on religious freedom tend to have two kind, one, minorities. for example, in many, many of these countries there are laws against changing your religion from islam to another religion. and then there were the restrictions that the state put on the muslim brotherhood at other expressions of let's call it islamist belief. now the systems are open and you can have something closer to popular sovereignty. it raises a question of religious freedom again. and it's interesting. i wrote a column in monday's

"washington post" that criticized tunisia. not because it's the worst example at all of difficulties, but because it's so important because it was the first and is the model, a place everybody says tunisia has a really good chance of making it. the movie "persepolis" was shown. this led to prosecutions of those who showed it on the grounds that it offended public morals, because there was a scene in which one of the people in the movie had a visualization in her mind of god. an image of god. and i said, that's a violation of freedom of expression to go after -- for the state to prosecute. and it is wrong. and i had a liberal tunisian friend say, no, no, no. you're wrong. here's why. it's very hard. this is brand new to us.

we're trying to build -- i think he would have said a liberal democracy. and there are a million issues. and one of the toughest issues is precisely the kind of thing you're talking about. if you push those issues, you americans, complete freedom of expression in the religious realm, then tunisians, none of whom want to see that kind of movie, and who are conservative muslims at base, they are going to say, all, they are right. this democracy stuff brings with it chaos and sacrilege, and down the road, prostitution, homosexuality. that's the line that is given. by the salafist. and, you know, he's not wrong, but he's not right either. what i wrote back to him was the problem with what you're saying is there is no limiting principle. first of all, there are no

tunisians who want to see persepolis? award-winning movie? zero? and if there are only 20% of the country, then they don't count? and if the argument is you can't show a movie like that because the vast majority of tunisians don't want to see it, suppose the vast majority of tunisians think women should not be aloud out of the house without a burqa? is that okay, too? there is no limiting principle. that is my problem with that argument, that -- so i think what you're going to have is to some extent a competition among the freedoms that we want to see these countries adopt. you'll see this happen in election campaigns, where islamists, generally will argue

against the secular parties, they're going to take you down a road that's going to end with french-style secularism, where there's no place for religion in the public square and take you down the road for sodom and ga norah. gomorrah. which will sell to some millions of people in the region. but the answer to that which is okay, fine, we won't have freedom of religion, for 25 years until things settle down, cannot be right, either. so i think it's a complicated interplay. and not a simple question of sort of saying well, every kind of freedom you can think of should now advance at exactly the same pace and will advance at the same pace because after all, they're all interrelated. i do think we have a role here. the american style of secularism is not the french style. i think we should be trying to explain and to defend the

american model, because i think a lot of people in the middle east are beginning to become in tunisia also, familiar with it and realize it may be a much better model for them than the french model, but also we don't believe in majority rules period end of sentence, end of paragraph. we believe in liberty under law. we have a constitution. it has three articles to begin with about how the state is constructed, then ten amendments, about freedom. i think we do need to say repeat repeatedly and out loud that we don't view democracy as the ability of those who get 51% to impose anything they like on everybody else. that is not what this struggle is all about. >> steve? >> yes. >> i want to pick up on all

that. i think, you knowish the religious freedoms are extremely important to us, as a value. i looked at the ten amendments, the first amendment and i thought to myself i better check that. i think it starts out with freedom of speech. and for those of you that don't have your pocket constitution with you, actually the first amendment says congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. and only then do you get free speech and assembly and all the rest, because i think in some sense, if you've got freedom of religion, the other parts of that amendment follow on as corollaries. freedom of religion is important but as lawyers say, hard cases make bad law. and if we force these regimes coming out of their history as a first issue to deal with that question of how far does freedom of religion reach, an issue that

has bedevilled our country for 200 years, you will hobble their democracy, and i think that's elliott's point. it's very difficult to draw that line. we're struggling to do it after 200 years. if we put that on these governments as a first order of business, they won't make it. so what should we be doing? i think something short of that. something that will enable the resolution of those questions but does not force them prematurely, and that is religious tolerance. and that's where i would make the focus. myron washer, who is known to a lot of you. i was on a panel a couple months ago and he said something i thought was profound. he said in the middle east, neither arab nationalism nor political islam had a tradition of tolerance and pluralism. and that's what the middle east needs. now, why does they say that?

because if the middle east cannot solve the issue of tolerance, then you're going to have a situation where the political authoritarianism of political authoritarianism of the mubaraks is going to be replaced by religious authoritarianism which is what the middle east is now, she yaria, that's the threat to democracy, i think in freedom under the long term in the middle east. what does that mean. we and elliott is right, we have a role, we need to be pushing for religious tolerance, for an understanding the majority rule does not mean you get to impose your values on everybody else, and that there has to be some space between the state and religion. and interestingly enough, prime minister of turkey helped in that in a speech he made in cairo that really actually angered a lot of islamists

because he said look, the state should be equal distance from all religions and no religions. and the state ought to run a system where all religions have a place, but the premise of that is going to be tolerance. and i think that's what we need because if there is going to be stability over the long term there has to be tolerance as an element of democracy because if we go to sectarianism where one religious group is able to impose their view on the other that is also an instability waiting to go viral. so i would say tolerance. >> dennis. >> religious freedomism and islamism and arab spring. >> i think, i don't really have much to add what either elliott or steve have said. i think they have both captured it not only effectively but eloquently. the only thing i guess i would -- this is not a difference, it's not even -- it

may be simply a semantic way of saying the same thing steve said. i think the critical point here is respect for minority rights. and if again, when i was talking about standards of accountability i was trying to get at the idea there are political standards of accountability and economic. and one of the political standards of accountability you preserve a space for competition, when you preserve a space for competition it means you also have to respect the views and rights of others. so there has to be, and you were both saying this, it's not the majority rule, there has to be the right of those who get elected have a right to make laws sbrut to interests rights of minorities. if there is a respect for minority rights then by definition there will be tolerance and this i think is going to be a really -- this is going to be a hard slowing and we see it, by the way, in the egyptian muslim brotherhood now.

you see a kind of pulling and thrashing there over exactly trying to define what the role of religion is going to be as it results to the state, everyone may say they are all for article 2, the roll of sharia in egypt and the shrine in law, there is a difference among those who feel it should be a much more omnipresent law and those who say there has to be separation. and the extent to which i agree with both of my colleagues on the idea that we have a role to play. the one thing i would add i think we'll be more effective if we can build what amounts to a large number of partners saying this internationally and repeating it over and over again so it becomes a mantra. and if it becomes a mantra, then it becomes something that the muslim brotherhood will realize

the world is watching at a time they want help. they have to meet certain standards. but also their own publics will, it seeps into the bloodstream. i think they had that psychology of being citizens but don't have the mechanisms how to act on that. >> i want to put one more question to our panel before we turn it over to the audience for questions as well. this is on a country that is not necessarily associated with arab spring but arguably some might say the early seeds of the arab spring, not just in tunisia but in iran with the green movement protests. the headlines in iran these days have mostly to do with the impasse over their nuclear weapons program. i'd like to ask the panelists, elliott, begin with you, the hard ones to you first. given that the nature of the iranian regime is almost defined by a particular, you know, brand of religious intolerance, do you think that religious freedom

advocacy whatever that might look like might be a way into the side door of promoting reform moderation, better path forward in iran especially given the religious minorities and the many iranian muslims who don't share the regime's interpretation. >> i do. i do because you know, i think the people of iran have now been inoculated against this form of political and religious organization by having the horrible experience of living under it. they have seen what it really means in terms of intolerance and corruption. and i believe they would vote against it if there were ever a free election. which is why there's not going to abconstitutional referendum in iran asking the people whether they want it any more. so i think it's something that will change when this regime some day falls.

i think there are many, many iranians we'll never know the exact numbers until iran is free, but who believe that this is a corruption of shia islam and in fact, i think it is and it is a great change from the way shia islam has been practiced at least for the last couple of centuries. they really, i think, essentially destroyed the system of having emulated leaders by bringing them all under the control of the state which ruins them and the entire system. and it is not therefore surprising that some of the most important resistance to the regime comes from the clerical establishment that -- and in fact, there were several prominent shia leaders including some grand ayatollahs who refused to vote in the recent

elections on the grounds that it was all such a corrupt -- such corrupt political system. ultimately, and they look around, i'm sure, and they realize that in some of the arab countries we've seen free edexs in tunisia, in egypt, islamist parties win a free election, big victories, but in iran the population is really disgusted with the kind of islam that the state is forcing on them and they realize what that means for the future of shoeia islam in iran. i think that in the case of iran, carve out an exception here but generally speaking the push for religious freedom i think is very helpful overall in arguing for a better future for iran. i am troubled by one part of

this picture, and that's the ba high. this regime has been vicious and murderous when it comes to the bahai who have had troubles in a lot of islamist countries but nowhere as in iran. and i don't know whether the post islamic republic will understand. this is part of the same disease of intolerance and should be ended, or whether what you'll find is people saying the state should not try to impose what is the correct form of shia islam on us but you know, the bah arks i are heretics so that can't be tolerated. one has to hope this experience on -- teaches tolerance not only for your own group but by

definition the real meaning is tolerance that i would hope they would go beyond to real religious freedom but tolerance for those not in your group. >> steve. >> i want to go back. i think the answer -- i would have given a different answer. i think elliott's actually right. my answer now would be having been informed by my colleague, is yes but. in a sort of indirect way. and i go back, actually, to that first amendment. congress shall make no law respecting an establishments of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. and those you know, for 200 years there is a tension between those. and i think it helps in iran in the following way. if the watch word is free exercise of religion and free exercise of all religions, that requires a tolerance of all