south vietnam was in their mind as well. it's like taiwan where the americans, maybe they could build bases. they didn't like that. in mao's view, the chinese should help the north vietnamese as much as they possibly could. and china became heavily involved in doing so. they helped build the north vietnamese army in the 1950s. massive amounts of military aid. during rolling thunder, the american am booing campaign of north vietnam in the late '60s, the chinese gave lots of help to the north vietnamese. for example, this were 80,000 chinese workers that were building roads and railroads in north vietnam during rolling thunder. and this was pivotal because the north, this chinese help is pivotal. the north has little help of convincing the u.s. to negotiate or u.s. to leave just with its own resources. by the mid 1960s, they were

worried there was going to be another fight. after 1964 during the gulf of tonkin, as the professor will talk about where you have the first of the shooting between north vietnam and the american navy. this convinces the chinese that they had to commit troops to north vietnam as well. and they have to do this because they're afraid, well, maybe the americans might come into north vietnam. but for chinese troops there, probably they won't. the chinese also started making preparations to fight the americans if they had to. when the u.s. sent major combat units into vietnam in april of 1965, the north vietnamese leaders also feared that they might get an intervention in north vietnam. again, they're looking at korea. the ghost of korea hangs over both sides here in thinking about what to do. and so in april 1965, the chinese give the order to send troops to north vietnam. and between 1965 and 1969, there are 320,000 chinese troops that serve in north vietnam. at one time there's as many as 170,000. this is critical in many ways. to the north, they want these chinese troops because the more chinese troops there are in north vietnam, that's two

things. one, it acts as a trigger. if the americans come north, there will be a war with the chinese. and this is helpful to the north vietnamese. plus, if there are chinese troops in north vietnam, the north vietnamese can infiltrate more of their regular units into the south or cambodia or laos. when you think about american options next week, think about american options for dealing with this war, keep in mind the chinese presence here and the factor that that brings to the table. now, in 1964, the north decided that they would consolidate their control over the central highlands and they would extend into other parts of lowland areas of vietnam. and they're thinking that now they're getting prepared for what they think is going to be a final offensive against the south. and after the gulf of tonkin incident and the fact that they couldn't negotiated a settlement, the north decided at this point they really had to

start committing regular north vietnamese army units to the south because they're fearful the americans are going to come in. they fear they have to match any escalation that's going to happen in the south. they also try to think, well, if we act quickly enough is what they're thinking, maybe we can push the south vietnamese regime over the top before the americans are able to get enough stuff in here to prop it up. it doesn't work quite the way that they planned. but that's certainly what they're thinking. at the same time, they're trying to balance support from the communist bloc, the soviets and the chinese, because you've had this split. which would be something that the north vietnamese do a very good job of continuing to get stuff from both sides. now, at this point, 1965, you enter the next phase of the war, the american war. as the north vietnamese called it. in 1965, the u.s. starts sending major forces into south vietnam. the soviets at this point heavily commit to supporting the north vietnamese. when the u.s. intervenes, the north here faces a completely new war.

and they've got to figure out, okay, how do you counter american pow? i you've got on one hand american land power but on the other hand you've got american air power as well. both of these things worry them. now, when the u.s. becomes heavily involved, the north, again, they're continuing to prosecute their strategy the way they had before. you've got the political elements of it, but you've also got the military elements of it. and part of the political element of it, this deception and propaganda campaign, when the u.s. becomes heavily involved, the north tries to do everything it can to undermine the american will to fight this war. and also, they continuously try to portray the american mission as impossible. there's no way the americans can win. you can't do anything here. and you could make an argument that they're so successful in this, that's the conventional wisdom in much of the world today that this is impossible. america can't win no matter what they do. a communist victory is inevitable. they also mask and lied about

their motives and their actions. they did this wonderfully, wonderfully well. and they did everything they could do to discredit the u.s. actions in the war. and they were often aided in this by sympathetic elements in the western press, anti-americanism both in the united states and abroad, and they proved very, very successful here. and all of this that they're doing is made easier by the fact that most foreigners don't know anything about vietnam. and they don't know anything about southeast asia. and also you have this strange -- this really odd moral relativism that emerges of a narrative about the war, particularly on the western dialogue about the war. everything that america does becomes portrayed as something that's illegal, immoral. you can't do it. it's criticized. but the constant and just constant atrocities of the communists are just ignored. forgotten about. that didn't really happen. we won't talk about that. it's a very odd situation that emerges. now, but on the military side of it, again, when the americans come into the war, they have some problems about how to deal with the americans.

one of the problems they have is usair power. how do you deal with air defense? they had the brilliant idea, in some ways effective, just have everybody shoot at the planes as much as they can. start with that. but they moved quickly to get help from the chinese and the soviets. they get soviet migs, ground defense stuff and build a defensive and very dangerous air defense network against the united states. now, the ground war, though, dealing with this is the most -- arguably the most important for our purposes here. and they have to figure out how to fit this ground war against the united states. again, the north -- the generals and the political leaders in north vietnam, they don't agree about how to do this. they fall into two camps here. again, you have the tan bloc that i mentioned in the beginning. they argued that you have to match american escalation and you've got to fight hard the whole time. you've got to do this hoping you can push the south vietnamese regime over the edge before the

u.s. builds up too much. they also wanted to increasingly commit north vietnamese army forces to the south and vc units to fighting the americans. they wanted to go to phase three very, very quickly here. now, general jiap has a different view. he's the head of the army, but he wants a slower approach. he argued stay in phase two. protract the war. drag it out. the u.s. will get tired eventually and leave anyway. it can be really bloody if we don't. so let's be a little more patient here. jiap loses the debate on strategy. the vietnamese decide they're going to go for the knockout blow. in july 1965, jiap launches an operation trying to cut south vietnam in half. north vietnamese defeat at the hands of the american 1st cavalry division. they reassess. they said perhaps phase three isn't the right thing to did here now. they back away from phase three from conventional warfare.

and they decide for a while jiap wins the internal debate about how to prosecute this war. as u.s. troop strength rises in 1965, up to 100,000 men by the end of the year, the communists decide, okay, we'll go back to protracting the war. well, concentrate our attacks and yes, we'll fight the u.s. some, but primarily we'll just fight on the periphery. we're not going to go for the big battle, the big blow. this only lasts a while. the north vietnamese reassess. when they're assessing, they do a very good job of identifying what we planned to do. they really assess the united states strategy very, very well. in 1965 they predict the u.s. will build up its forces there, protect its bases in the population centers, try to build up the south vietnamese army and south vietnamese government. and at the same time, they believed that the u.s. effort would be undermined by a lack of public support for the war. and they also believed the u.s.

effort would be undermined by the fact the south army was weak. you've still got this rivalry in the vietnamese high command, how do you prosecute this war? general tan, again, who commands the communist force in the south, he believed that the u.s. would not have enough troops to do what westmoreland was doing, to prosecute the attrition war that he's going to do. and he believed that the u.s. would end up having the same problems and the same fate as the french had. and so he adopts a very aggressive form of phase two where he's really going to -- he's not going to go full conventional war against the americans, but he's going to very aggressively fight the arvn, fight the american army. and to provide the strength for this, the north basically moves to a point of the mobilizing the entire country for the war where north vietnam has to become a base for sending men, materiel and so on for fighting this war in the south. the problem with doing this, through 1966 and 1967, they pursue a very aggressive form of phase ii. they're trying to keep the u.s.

off balance, trying to end pacification -- american pacification programs, trying to break the army. but they suffer a lot of casualties doing this. and it isn't having the effect that they think it's going to have. they think they're going to break the american and the south vietnamese will by doing this, but it's not happening. and by the end of 1967, the north in a lot of ways, a lot of the leadership's becoming disillusioned. they don't seem to be winning the war. they're having to replace all their losses by sending troops from the north. they're beginning to see alienation in the south among the southern supporters of the war because they look at all these north vietnamese forces coming down and they say this is just the north taking over. plus, the leadership in the south begins to fray. again, they're not seeing success. they're taking a lot of casualties. in may of 1967, general tanh, he looks at the situation. he thinks the u.s. is weak. he thinks they're unable to protect the south vietnamese army.

he thinks they can't protect the pacification efforts. what you'll get out of this is a decision once again by the north to go to phase iii. and he wants to launch these coordinated attacks all across south vietnam. now, when he comes up with this plan, what becomes known as the tete offensive. his idea, his push for this offensive becomes what will drive the next element of north vietnamese strategy. the north decides they're going to launch a massive offensive tied with massive uprisings all across south vietnam. they're going to do this at the beginning of the vietnamese new year at tet. they decided that now is the time to do this. they could defeat the u.s. militarily. and they would do this during a u.s. presidential campaign, and this would force the u.s. out of south vietnam. now, mao tse-tung, they talked to mao and the chinese. mao is very supportive of their doing this. and he believed just like ho did that the u.s. would be defeated here and that the u.s. would be

forced to withdraw. now, the plan for doing this is pro-pronged. one, military offenses in the rural area, some of it they did early to try and draw off american troops, but they'd also have uprisings in urban areas by other vc units. if this didn't produce a victory, they would hit more times, they would have follow-on operations. these operations would wear undo the enemy, and they'd get americans to surrender or american defeat or a negotiated settlement. now, the first phase of this begins in october of 1967. and they have limited uprisings along the cambodian border. attacks are bloody. they don't really achieve very much. in january of 1968, this offensive really kicks off. they use about 80,000 troops. they attack 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 64 of the 242 district capitals. again, it's all over the country. most of the attackers are vc. 2500 people. and there's several thousand others that will go missing. and this has an interesting effect on morale.

it encourages the south to fight harder. in may of 1968, you'll see a new phase of communist attack. and there are other attacks in august. the final phase of tet is in mid-february of 1968, this lasts for three weeks. and all of this is extremely bloody for the north. and for the communist forces here. tactically and operationally, tet is an abject failure. the north suffers enormous casualties. you see it on the slide here. the vc is just decimated by this. and they're no longer able to in south vietnam, strategically, it's a great success because in some ways it shatters american morale and certainly undermines it. they had no idea it would have

that effect. the political effect in the united states that it did. but they get a good benefit out of it. after that, after this giap wins the strategy war again. he says no go back to phase ii. phase iii is too bloody. in september of 1969 ho chi minh dies. the party's secretary becomes the leader of the north. communist policy doesn't change because the leadership changed. they still want south vietnam. they still want french indochina. but at this point they will back off from the very aggressive phase ii and concentrate more on guerrilla war and try to rebuild their infrastructure, units and lick their wounds for a little while. now, what is important for them to be able to do this, one of the things that makes them able to rebuild after this is the situation in cambodia. now, cambodia is important in this war particularly for the communists grew the longer the war went on. they began using cambodia as a

base area in the late '50s and they benefited from the fact that the prince was pretty pliable, didn't have a great grip on the country. he decided he would appease hanoi. this didn't work out very well. the communists basically turned his country into a war zone as a result of it. and they eventually went to supporting the khmer rouge the home grown camera boed fighting against cianouk. yan communist. it becomes critical for communist supply efforts in south vietnam. now, in 1970, a general -- cambodian general overthrows cianouk and starts fighting the communists. his new government -- his new government demanded that the communists leave in three days. they didn't. and here you have the intervention of the communists -- really a significant

intervention of the north vietnamese communists in cambodia. you provoke a civil war in cambodia that becomes pretty messy and lays the foundation for some disasters afterward. now, the nixon administration at this point decides also to take the war to cambodia and hit the vc base areas here, which is very effective. and messes up a lot of the north vietnamese plans and delays some of their operations for a year. but for the north, the real war for north vietnam is still in south vietnam. and the communists during this period in the early '70s will intensify their guerrilla activity, particularly in rural areas, the southern part of the country that's heavily populated. and again, they're still looking to build their forces, to destroy south vietnam. and so, again, build forces. defeat their pacification efforts, defeat the pacification efforts of the americans, expand their base areas. here's what they're trying to do. but the communists have their problems here as well. this war has gone on a very long time. the protracted nature has an effect on us, but it also has an effect on the communists as well. and their cadres are getting tired. people are beginning to lose

support particularly in the south, the communists fighting there. and it's increasingly difficult for the north vietnamese to recruit supporters in the south. land reform is happening in south vietnam is hurting their recruitment. the pacification programs are hurting them, and they begin to lose control of certain areas and so on. they see things happening that are weakening their position. but the u.s. at the same time as this is going on is drawing down its forces. and the communists looking at this, they smell victory. you know, giap was authorized to mount an invasion in 1972 before the u.s. withdrew. the north believed that the south vietnamese would collapse, the u.s. would be humiliated and that would be the end of the war. giap opposed this move. he argued, look, the arvn is too strong. usair power is too effective. don't go to phase iii now. just wait. the americans are leaving. again, he loses this fight. and the north decides that they're going to go to phase iii once again. they benefit from huge amounts of soviet and chinese aid to do this. and they launch what becomes

known as the easter offensive in march. 1972. and here again, the communists are fighting while negotiating. negotiations are going on while they do this. and here again, the communists, they go to stage iii. the invasion is launched in three phases. the phases are on your outline. it's poorly executed, it's heavily bombed and ends in failure. some of the sources will say the north suffered 100,000 dead during this invasion. again, it's difficult with the numbers to know. but they did get some benefit. they took parts of south vietnam that they hadn't controlled before and they will hold these when they negotiate our withdrawal. now, the failure of the easter offensive made the north vietnamese a lot more amenable to cutting a deal with us. with the united states and then getting out. they felt this was necessary for them to get what they wanted. they get the americans out, then they can get what they want. it also cost giap his job. they keep the political offices, but he's no longer running the

north vietnamese party. the communists decide for a while that they'll put the emphasis on political struggle after the americans leave. they also have to rebuild their army which they do. in october of 1973, they decide that they're going to make another offensive. they decide, okay, it's 1976 is what they're planning for. they're going to launch an offensive. giap says no, let's go in '75. for once he makes the argument to go to phase iii. they're not sure they want to do that. in december of 1974, they're trying to test if the americans do what they're promising to do, support the south vietnamese regime and particularly with air power. we don't do anything, the communists think they have a green light. in march of 1975, they launch this large conventional invasion that topples the south vietnamese government that by this point had been pretty much abandoned by the united states. what kind of conclusions do we get from all of this? well, one, the conventional wisdom of much of the american population here is false about

vietnam. vietnam was not conquered by guerrillas. it was conquered -- it was certainly guerrilla warfare is is a big part of how the north wins this thing, but its armored corps of the north vietnamese the north wins this thing but it's armored corps of the north army that overruns south vietnam in 1975. mill banks is the history professor and veteran, as well. talks about the first rule of counter insurgency, if they're driving tanks, they ain't insurge insurgents. pretty good rule, i think. you have one here one of the keys that's success to -- or key to this war is what's the value of object? claude talks about determining how much people will endure, how much to sacrifice for it. the value of the object is pretty object here to the north vietname vietnamese. they'll pay the blood sacrifice, whatever they have to pay for almost as long as they have to. there's points where the will frays, as well. when they wonder if they can win

it. they immense determination and certainly always one of the north vietnamese strengths. now also, the north vietnamese here prove like the americans in the american revolution the strongest country doesn't always win. the vietnamese are weaker than the united states and the coalitions against them. yet, in the end, they're the ones that are victorious. they're not super men. the communists weren't super men. they made mistakes, sometimes learn from them and sometimes they wouldn't but they're tenacious. and they overcome their errors. their opponents didn't learn as much. now, conclusion of general giap in all of this, his quote right here is what mattered. the human factor has been decisive. the moral factors as clause would call them. the determination, their decision to fight this out as long as they had to. that was important. but also, the support of the north they had is very, very

critical. again, they're weak compared to opponentings. if you're weak like the north vietnamese it is important to have powerful friends and they did and key to producing the north vietnamese victory here in vietnam. so thank you very much for your attention. [ applause ] we'll start promptly at 9:00. on "washington journal" form morning we'll look inside the race for the presidential nomination with mike allen and evan thomas on their new ebook "inside the circus." we'll discuss the scope of student debt in the u.s. and the affect on the economy with mark kantrowitz, founder of a website focusing on financial aid and questions and comments of

bullying in the nation's schools joined by jack buckly with the national education statistics and katherine bradshaw with the prevention of youth violence. "washington journal" is live on c-span every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. friday, more "american history tv" on c-span3 in prime time. at 8:00 p.m., the american artifacts series travels to montpelier to learn about the cemetery and nearby slave semiri. 8:30 p.m., a living history museum in old stur bridge village, massachusetts that depicts early new england life from 1790 to 1840. later at 9:00 p.m., look at the role of first ladies, including a collection of inaugural gowns and white house china from the smithsonian's national museum of national history, friday starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span3, american

history tv. this sunday, on c-span's "q & a". >> i met both of my senators. bob casey and pat toomey and just being able to meet them and talk to them. >> some of the leaders like leon panetta talked about being financially sound because if we're not devoting money to national defense is going to be worthless. >> high school students from all 50 states who participated in a week long government and leadership program in the nation's capitol shared opinions interacting with the government. aall of my cent and senators said there's partisanship and everyone that we've met said that and i wonder if everybody's saying that but it's not actually happening.

is there a discrepancy of what they're saying and actually doing? i never really thought about that before i came here. >> the u.s. senate youth program, sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span. this saturday at noon eastern, on c-span2's "book tv" join the live call-in program with author chris kyle talking about his life from professional rodeo rider to becoming the most lethal sniper in u.s. military history. at 10:00 p.m. -- >> if you think of yourselves as a family and a team, and she said, you know, when i get a raise at work he's proud of me. it's like we got a raise. our family got a raise. i felt as though she defined providing to include what he husband does and she had a lot of respect for what her husband was doing "the richer sex" author on the changing role of women as the breadwinners of the family and impacts their lives. also this weekend, "america the

beautiful," director of pediatric neurosurgery ben carson compares the decline of empires past and america and what can be done to avoid a similar fate sunday 3:30 p.m. next, a 1965 film it led "why vietnam" produced by the u.s. army. it aired on abc and in syndication as part of the big picture series produced from 1951 through the 1970s. the series focused on battles and figures in u.s. military history. this is 30 minutes. >> okay. move out. ♪

♪ >> my fellow americans, not long ago, i received a letter from a woman in the midwest. she wrote, dear mr. president, in my humble way i'm writing to you about the crisis in vietnam. i have a son who is now in vietnam. my husband served in world war ii. our country was at war. but now this time it's just something that i don't understand. why? why vietnam? why vietnam?

why vietnam? >> munich, 1938. german chancellor adolph hitler arrives for a conference to be held here with british prime minister neville chamberlain. this meeting will long be remembered for it opens the door to the dreams of dictatorship. >> we regard the agreement we signed last night and the anglo-german naval agreement as a symbolic desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. >> peace in our time. a shortcut to disaster. but even then this was no new lesson.

it had stared us in the face with mussolini and ethiopia. ethiopia's emperor made his protest to the league of nations. but nothing was done. we'd also seen the auschwitz in austria and nothing was done. then in 1950, aggression was again unleashed. this time across the 38th parallel in korea. free men had begun to learn the lesson and something was done. the lesson had been learned, and president johnson had phrased its meaning well.