what did he tell you? what did he say he thought would be happening? >> well, he knew that the north vietnamese forces were still there. that we needed to first of all do some policing of the battlefield to try to recover as many american soldiers, bodies as we could, try to get them back inside the perimeter. go through normal routine as a company once you go in line. establish your positions, put out listening posts, do all the kinds of military tactical things that a unit should do. and then establish good communications with the unit on the right and the left and the battalion headquarters. >> you stay there in the day and a night. before you're walked off. what was that night like? >> there were a number of probing attacks. at least along the sector that we were on. as i recall, we were on the --

probably the western side of the perimeter. no real heavy probes because they were looking for weaknesses in the line. my company being fresh, we had ample supply of ammunition. we were a solid company. they didn't find too many weaknesses. so they obviously probed some place else. >> tell me about your general feelings and your remembrance. of colonel mcdade. before the walk. what kind of commander was he? >> before -- >> before, yes. >> didn't know him. >> thefs there what, three weeks, four weeks? >> even if he had been there the whole time i didn't know him. he was a battalion commander of another battalion. remember, my unit was attached. >> right. so -- i'm asking because -- did he make contact with you all? >> didn't make contact with us because we didn't fall under his

command until we were ordered to move out. i mean, i could say the same about hal moore. i had not laid eyes on hal moore until the morning that we walked in to the lv. his reputation being a tough battalion commander but i was in a separate brigade, separate battalion. we just happened to be attached. and as i tell folks all the time being attached to a unit is like being stepchild. you are the last to do everything. >> right. >> in my case, it works well. >> yes, it did. so you get through the night and then the decision is made to walk to albany. what do you know about that decision to walk? lifted? there's also a question of why you even wanted -- why people were even going to go to albany. >> right. and in hindsight or do you want yeah, well -- on that particular

morning, when the colonel calls you to the command post and the orders of the day are we are going to move out, we know that a portion of this unit is going to be airlifted out. and some of you guys are going to walk. now, again, i overlay my attachment mentality that, obviously, they're not going to fly out the step children. so we assumed that we would probably be one of the units that walked out. because again, i think that the concept was at the time we had also established communications we parent battalion and there was some discussion of marrying up with that battalion at albany and that was an assumption on my part that we were going to go -- once we got to albany, we would be airlifted back to my battalion and marry up with my battalion. now, now after 40 years, i understand one of the reasons

that we walked out is because there was not enough airlift, helicopter lift support to fly everybody out. the months leading up to albany, there was lots of flying. >> yes. >> and most of the helicopters were at their 100-hour maintenance, mand tear maintenance so a number of them were probably down. that's after i read the book. >> right. so, you all move out and you're in the rear? >> uh-huh. >> were you tasked with the rear guard? were you just in the -- stepchild? >> no. again, but -- understanding the military tactics, when you are the last unit, there are in military missions there are implied tasks and specified tasks and implied tasks of being the last unit is you are rear security so that was a given. that was fort benning 101. so we being the last unit, rear

security but more importantly security of my particular unit was paramount in my mind. >> tell me about your lieutenants. >> good lieutenants, young. had one ocs. larry hesse and he was the one that was killed. terry martell. and terry martell was able an rotc lieutenant. from barrea, ohio. my other lieutenant was jim patswalk. and he's from baltimore. and i had one platoon that was commanded by a noncommissioned officer and his name for whatever reason i haven't been able to -- last night when we were talking, i was trying to get the guys to refresh my memory so when i did the interview today i would be up to speed on who was there. and then i had my -- what was an

unusual scenario, my xo was also on the ground with us. and his name's don adams and don's from atlanta. >> and your radio operator? >> radio operator's, again -- yeah. hersh from allentown, pennsylvania. and jimmy smith from albamars, north carolina. >> so you all move out that day. and a lot of people have said you were weighted down. the whole group was weighted down with a lot of -- you know, moving a lot of materials. >> a lot of -- well, i won't say a lot but we had equipment that normally -- anticipating being flown out soldiers carry a lot more stuff than they would if they had to pack it. we normally had -- but the

canteen, the two canteens of water and extra ammunition. but again, a lot of -- we had gotten resupplied and so lots of resupplies that we had we still had because we didn't do -- we didn't expend a lot of ammunition that night so, again, even the ammunition that we expended we replenished in the morning. so i wouldn't say we were burdened down but it was an unusual load for an air mobile company to be carrying. and it was unusual for an air mobile company to be walking around in the woods because normally airplanes came, picked us up and we got a free ride. so i wouldn't say we were unusually burdened down. it was probably more than we were used to carrying. >> what was the terrain like? >> for the first part of it, it was fairly clear.

because the initial walk out was -- again, part of lz xray but as we move further -- get my directions, move further north, the elephant grass became more prevalent so that became an issue in terms of visibility. but other than that, relatively flat. i think when we went back in '93 and looked at it it looked more like north georgia woods than we imagined. with the elephant grass. >> right. >> added. so the visibility was really limited and at least a portion of the way and then of course closer we got to albany there were these -- and terrain feature that sticks out in everybody's mind is enormous ant hills. >> right. >> which still don't know how, why, where, whatever.

but they became part of the terrain. but again, i would imagine that visibility probably no more than 100 meters in either to the right to the left or the front of the formation. >> okay. >> so i think guys were pretty close. >> did that worry you? do you remember being concerned about -- >> every day that i was in vietnam i was concerned. and not so much concerned about me but the welfare of those guys that depended on me to do stuff. so concern, absolutely. and after all, we had just witnessed horror and some people probably talk about a letdown because we weren't more relaxed. i got to tell you, the commanders or the leaders were not relaxed. i know none of my ncos were relaxed. they were always cautious about what we did because we didn't have the normal intel.

we didn't have the kind of navigational goods. ie, good maps to basically point out what the terrain were. we were kind of stumbling in the dark. >> didn't you all have one map? >> yeah. >> alpha and then another rudimentary map? >> we did some -- yeah. and the reason was because, again, going back to how we got there in the first place, we were doing highway security on a pass just south of on kay and the mission was to provide outpost highway security. we got a call that you're going to be airlifted in to lz columbus for a operation. no maps. not even the kind of communications, the exchange of communications that you would normally get when you exchange

units like that. >> right. >> so flying in, the chinook pilots, because again, we landed on an lz, nonsecure lz and ch-47s. >> we can go in to detail on that another time. >> that's a whole other story. >> yes, absolutely. so the two north vietnamese are captured by delta company up front. >> right. >> they run in to them, get them and mcdade calls all the company commanders to the front. how did you feel about leaving your company and going that far up the column? >> again, reality and what i know now. okay. my thought process has changed over 40 years. but at that point, i mean, you have to remember. i was a good infantry captain. >> you went. you said, yes, sir. >> who if they said, we want you

to come up front, i didn't go through this checklist of how do i evaluate the commander? why is this guy not using the radio? why is he -- no. it was okay, guys, off and on. off your feet. off your ass. on your feet. we're going forward. and that's basically what we did. >> tell me about mcdade and the conversation you all had up there when you got there. >> didn't really have a conversation. when i got to the position where we were actually starting to assemble to do the briefing, we started to get incoming. mortar fire. my immediate reaction was, i don't know nobody. i don't know anyone in front of me. i don't know any of those guys on the side of me. the only comfort zone for me in this whole scenario is back down that trail where a-between 1st to the 5th is.

so my response to the incoming fire was a reaction of, i need to get out of here so that i can get back to a position. and again, in hindsight now i think about it and was it a conscious thought of i need to go back and save my guys or was it a conscious thought, i'm scared as hell and i need to get out of this particular environment so that i can get my thought processes together and then do the things that i was trained to do? and i haven't quite figured out what the answer was. but i think it was more training. i think it was more instinct. i think it was more response to a dangerous situation. and this may sound me lo dramatic but the safest place i believe for me on that field and the battlefield is back with the 1st through 5th.

>> with your guys. >> because i knew these guys. >> did you ask mcdade? >> no. no. >> his reaction? >> didn't do the traditional click your heels, salute three times and turn around and go. it was, turn around and go. >> the trap has been sprung in the middle. >> uh-huh. >> and there you go. and you're off. how fast are you going? it's in the book but i want to know -- >> miles per hour. i'm being facetious. >> were you sprinting full speed or trying to drag the guys behind you? >> no. i was young. but these guys were younger than i was. they had more equipment than i did. >> yes. >> but again, because they were so good i -- never had to look for them. whenever i -- wherever i went, they appeared. and so, my assumption was that these guys are right there with me.

and i'm thinking that probably for a portion -- i would like to think that probably for a portion of that trip that they were and i would hope that probably never get the answer to that but i would hope that -- i didn't leave them. i would hope that they were able to stay as close as they possibly could. but obviously, it was not enough because i got there and they didn't. so -- >> how long did it take you? i mean, was this a five-minute ride? was this 30 seconds? you're traveling about 560 yards. >> right. right.

and you've got -- >> in my mind, in my mind it seemed like forever. but i think in actual time it probably didn't take very long at all. 600 yards is a couple of football fields. three or four football fields. so i -- the actual -- in to qualify it in minutes or whatever, maybe five minutes. six minutes. >> what do you remember seeing? were you -- was a trail? more of a trail or -- >> it was -- yeah. it was more tracing the steps that i had come out because, again, not a -- this was not a conscious effort of, if i don't stay on this trail or if i get off of this trail i'm going to get lost. i laugh all the time about

paying attention to where you go. so you can always know how to get back. again, that's another one of those learned infantry officer things that they put in the back of this little computer and it's there. so i kind of retrace where i was going. to actually -- to see actions to the right and left, to see guys fighting and firing, those kinds of things, that's a blur. these guys were looking at me like, now that you're here, you got to do something. tell us what to do. >> what did you tell them? what did you do? >> guys, we -- number one, we have just -- didn't have to tell them. they already knew. we have been ambushed. this is a -- we need to execute the processes that we know to go about so the first thing we needed to do is establish a

position where we could be fairly secure. one of the first airplanes that landed in the makeshift perimeter that we had were medevac choppers. when they came in, i basically went over to the first bird that landed and talked to the pilot. basically, said this is what's happened. on your way back in, if you can bring ammunition, water, medical supplies, whatever we need, because we have been hit pretty bad. we're in pretty good shape but i imagine the units in front of us are -- are having more problems than we are. the combat effectiveness of my unit was probably 75%. and after having read the book, you kind of know what the guys up in front of me were like. >> yes. >> so it was -- once we started to, again, get the wounded out

and get some supplies and whatever, then we concentrated on, again, accountability, where everybody is and -- >> can you describe kind of the physical layout of your perimeter? how large did you set up? >> it was wide enough that we could accommodate at least three platoons and i had my weapons platoon which was inside and a headquarters. so pretty good sized and large enough that helicopters could at least come fairly close. i don't think they landed inside the perimeter but fairly close because i remember -- probably two, three sorties of medevacs came in. it was getting pretty late. the battle, about 1:00, 1:30. by the time everything kind of calmed down, it was getting dark

because i remember tully and his guys came just at dark when they -- and so i -- if my recollection serves me, the perimeter was big enough that his company could fold in and we didn't have to push out any further. >> okay. tell me about the battle during the day, before the night. >> mm-hmm. >> how intense does it get for you all? >> pretty intense because we've got some pretty serious -- and i will call them more than probes. they were assaults. at least in my mind. assaults on our position. but again, we were -- once you can re-establish combat integrity, or unit integrity, whatever, an infantry company is a pretty formidable force if you don't have to worry about rear security. because we are where we are, most of our efforts are outward.

so we're in pretty good shape. and again, so as i recall, the assaults on our position probably came from the direction of the ambush. so we could pretty well concentrate most of our firepower. but then again, i did have indirect fire weapons, too to help us out. >> what about fire support? >> yeah. and again, one of the guys wounded in my -- in the initial assault was my artillery f.o. but they had backup. they had -- their rtos, or their radio telephone operators were also skilled fire support guys. so we did get artillery support, particularly as we knew we were going to turn off the air coming in. we could do some night -- we

used to call them night defensive fires to put them around the perimeter. so we did have a -- because there were -- there was artillery at -- and the lz slips me. it's probably in the book. >> still a falcon. >> yeah. right. >> so tell me about that night. >> i guess about -- the hour escapes me, but we were getting these intermittent radio calls from -- we initially thought it was probably the north vietnamese who'd probably captured some of our equipment and they were using our radios to try to get us out of our relatively secure position back into the ambush area. but we were getting this -- in one radio call was fairly consistent, and it was from -- the call sign of that was ghost

four six. and if you get an opportunity to interview john generette, that will be -- because his experience is one that i cannot imagine. i cannot imagine how -- what that must have been like. but at any rate, we got these calls. i was convinced that there were people still left in the ambush site. >> right. >> and that we needed to do something to try to get support for them or get them out. and at some point we decided we needed to go. so i basically made the decision that i was going to take a patrol and go out. sergeant klug, and i don't know whether you've interviewed fred or not, said, "captain, you cannot leave this perimeter and go out on a patrol and try to -- you've got more guys in here that you need to worry about. because the x.o.'s wounded.

i've got lieutenants that are down. i've got a number of my key ncos. and i'm going to go out on a -- >> right. >> -- rescue mission. not even knowing what's out there. so klug said, "i'll do it." so he takes a patrol and some stretchers that had been dropped off by the medevac guys that were coming back in to go out into the lz. and we're assuming, we get a single radio call, there's probably not a lot of folks out there. i don't remember the number. but whatever the number was, we took enough guys to do two-man stretchers. so i would imagine maybe 15 guys went out. and we did send a medic with them. his name's daniel torres. >> mm-hmm. >> they get into the lz, or into the kill zone, and sergeant klug calls back and says, there's not one guy out here, there are a whole lot of guys out here, and

we can't bring them all back. so i said, okay, you need to make a decision. and he said, i can't leave them out here because some of these guys are really in bad shape, we need to try to get them back because at that point tully had come in with his company and had brought his medical team, which gave us additional medical support. and he said some of these guys need treatment. and i knew that i had missing folks from my unit. and so part of that -- that sojourn into that pure hell was looking for "a" company guys. the other guys, i didn't -- i mean, there was some concern, but there was more concern about the guys from my company. and as reflected in the book, when you really -- when you believe that you have rescued

everybody, brought everybody back and then some months later you find out that one of the guys was still out there, and i think we went back out there in april. i think it was april. and found parts of his equipment that basically says he never got out. and after some investigation some of the guys in his unit basically thought that they saw him getting on a helicopter because he was wounded. and the only reason that we realized that he was missing is we had gotten a letter from his mother that had basically said she hadn't heard from him since decemb december. november, december time frame. so you go back out there and you find this guy.

it makes it a tough piece because you never want to leave anybody back, or at least think you that left them. so. >> tell me about the next day. >> we got up the next morning and went back into the lz. by that time some of the units from 2nd and the 7th were doing some of the same kind of searching for american bodies. i -- >> did you realize then kind of what had really happened up and down the line? >> right. because we could see. i mean, because we walked going back into the kill zone, we walk up the same trail where these guys had just sprung the ambush. lots of -- lots and lots and lots of wounded and dead folks.

and i'm saying lots and lots, but more than -- more than i'd seen -- more than i had seen prior or more than i would see in any one given battle. so it was one of the -- i think larry gwynn, one of his comments was there's no real glory in war. anybody who's ever said that's never been in war. because this was -- what happens when you encounter that much violence in that short a period of time, and i'm searching for the words here to try to

describe the emotion of going in the next day. >> yes. >> because i'm thinking long range as i'm going how do i get these guys -- because this is not -- for a lot of these guys this is not the end of the -- you know. a number of them were scheduled to rotate in december. i mean, they're -- but for a lot of the guys there was going to be a next day and there was going to be another battle. and i'm thinking, how do i motivate these guys, how do i make sure that what they're seeing here today will serve to keep them alert. and then the question in my mind is how do i as a company commander keep them safe? >> what did you tell them? what did you -- >> we talked. we talked about the need for preparedness,