solution? again, when i'm saying these things i'm not off my talking points from central asia because this is all the things that have come around with central asia. this is, for example, there was one person who is very close to the uzbek government i met in one of these meetings and since it was off the record, he said he got up and said i have three questions. a, will karzai stay, b, will nate toe go, and three, who is responsible? i thought he's being problematic but you know what, these three questions are the three questions everybody in the region is asking. will karzai stay, will nate toept go and who is going to be responsible. let me come to these questions. this is the question behind all the cooperation you're getting in central asiaen 0 the ndn and, et cetera. the questions is there. so the first problem is whoo? i'd like to add two more to the problems that this person from us beck stan mentioned. first of all, obviously, there is no confidence in the region. there's -- this is a region where there is very little

confidence among the corrupts. but does that mean that we have to solve all the problems of confidence around the region before we solve the problem of afghanistan? this heart of asia. there is the problem of the kashmir, the rushal central asia problem, the iran saudi arabia problem, do we solve everything before we solve afghanistan or do we have a process going at the same time? we have a principle of nonintervention, neutrality, sovereignty for afghanistan and confidence building for the region. second problem about this kind of regional push is so big we actually think we actually have a region that can come around afghanistan. now, there is a liberal view and a realist view. the. the liberal promoted in the u.s. and the international community because the countries of the region including central issuia, pakistan, japan have common interests in defeating nonstate actors, drug traffickers and terrorists and extremists and, et cetera that they are going to

come around and cooperate. hence, or because they have interest in trade promotion, therefore they will come together. that is the kind of liberal approach that we'll have trade as the thing that will bring everybody together. but there is the realist view that actually says in the presence of anarchy which i would say the region definitely applies, we actually have a lot of countries playing their own interests, security dynamics within each other. pakistan has their own dynamics, central asia russia, have their own, et cetera, et cetera. so compounded with the lack of capacity, a lack of ovenity of the afghan government, everybody plays their own security problems. so the question is do we have a region? are they really viable together because they have common interests? second, third problem, there is a lack of trust in the future of afghanistan. and let me be the bearer of that message because i've heard it so many times and it seems that we should be in denial if we think

that there is a mistrust. i have mentioned this to government officials in afghanistan that there is quite a lot of mistrust in the future viability of the afghan state. is it going to be sovereign? is it going to be neutral? is it going to be strong? is it going to be respected within? is it going to be respected outside? does it have good governance. is going to go through anarchy, to separation and cessation. is it going to have ethnic rule reckoniation, all questions on everybody's mind. the third one, two, three, fourth elephant in the room, the presence of the u.s. in the region. does -- is an issue for the region. because there is quite a lot of lack of clarity about the content of that partnership with afghanistan and because of the less than good releases between u.s. and iran, the question is for at least the central asian

countries about how much there's going to be negotiations with iran using the basis that are in other places. so the question about is it going to be the u.s. presence in the region going to be ben nev lant in terms of raining, capacity and equipment and hardware and money which is what everybody wants or is it going to be more aggressive in terms of violations of sovereignty, et cetera, et cetera. this is the question that they're asking themselves. and fourth, who is the actor who can actually create these kinds of conditions for a regional approach? so far it's been the u.s. because it is the u.s. the most efficient, largest actor that has the most at stake in all this. but the question is how muchlet sit could have he it has its own war going on, as well. therefore, the central asian countries constantly talk about the u.n. as being the actor that would have a role in this process. now, i finally get quickly to

the core of my presentation which was about the central asian interests in afghanistan. i've said quite a lot of it in terms of broad pictures, these conceptual things that are important. afghanistan presents both an opportunity and a threat for the central asian, five central asian countries. it's but however, both the opportunity and the threat that weep think. are not really opportunities and threats. in the west, in the committee we assume that an central asians need access to the south to sell their energy, electricity, you know, gas, et cetera. they need access to the seas. they're willing to get -- be we assume that they need equipment and pone and so therefore, they will collaborate with the ndn, the northern distribution network especially now since there are all these discussions in terms of leaving some of that hardware behind when we leave afghanistan. we leave some of it, there's some discussions going on a

little bit strange, but i don't know where we're going with that. third one, we are also assuming that central asians would want to have alternatives to the russians in the region and the chinese kinds of complete if you have gone to central asia you would have noticed chinese investment in the roads and all the tra structure and lots of money with no conditionalities and very little interest on the loans. so the chinese have come in economically and inundated central asia. it the is this is they would be alter naatives. we also assume that they also have this kind of common threat coming from central asia. we talk about the drug problem, we talk about the terrorism problem. the drug problem yes, it comes from afghanistan but it really lubricates the central asian economies. soto go at it very strongly is going to be problematic i would

say. to be very unkosher about this. it is not a very kind of you know oh, let's all go after the drugs but the drugs actually do have the -- they run the economies that are not run on oil and gas in the region. so terrorism, central -- we know in the meetings we've been having quite a lot of central asians constantly blame the -- if you see the borders, they're well sealed line. this is not the duran line. it's actually a lot of central asian jihadists that are fighting now in afghanistan. you have the dimu, the islamic jihad unit. so this entire terrorist and drug trade being a big threat in afghanistan i think is a little bit overblown. the most issue is that there is interest in insulating themselves from afghanistan per se because there's very lack of clarity about the future of afghanistan. and in the meantime, trying to,

how could i say if you're alive to be polite to milk as much as possible resources out of those who can actually give them because they think that we can, you know, get resources out of this. we have heard about the projects. this is something that this audience may be familiar about. i wanted to play my controversial problematic about these projects that everybody is heard about or is casa 1,000, tapi, et cetera, and the railroads, et cetera, et cetera. i'll give you seven problems there are with these types of economic projects. economically integrate region in the hasn't worked so. the russians are now starting to pull in their economic cuss tops unit. ment of the central asian countries are moving towards that one. so it's the move for integrationing is more north than it would be south. there is questions about who would be paying for the project.

financing is not guaranteed. there is serious problem for the central asian countries in all these talks, but where is the money. the problem of iran is a problem for central asian countries about because a lot of roads do go through iran and it's much more expensive not to go through iran. if we want to apply the sanctions it's going to be problematic. politics come in the way of economics completely in this region. just an example about the surplus electricity that tajikistan wants to sell to afghanistan when it has its own serious problems on electricity almost at war with uzbekistan. we do have political problems in the region that cannot be solved through economics can be exaspirating. the countries prefer bilateral than multilateral and regional because of the competition with each other and because of the gains thaeltd get. they're unsure how much the taliban if they come to power would hold on to their promises on economic contracts.

there has no good record of the taliban having held -- having had a good economic strategy before. and finally, chinese are giving a lot of guarantees on money. russians are giving guarantees on security. central asians want guarantees. this is it the message of my talk. they want guarantees. this is the word. iranians want respect, central asians want gish tees and that is not what is not being given. to understand this and i will -- i went to the paper we have just talked about on central asian regional security complexes, to understand this problem, you'll have to understand that basically central asian countries have three types of interests. internal survival, so therefore they would like to feed their populations so that there is no problems with that, and that they can do through investment which they can get the money and roads that can be built. competitioning with each other. us beck stan, rivalry and that

jeek stan and uzbekistan it's such a long story i will not get into. it's all in the paper if you're interested in seeing. therefore when you have a situation in the region where there's a lot of competition rivalry, they draw in the global powers rivally along the lines of their own rivalry. in that region the global powers have a dual approach either central arabal doesn't matter at all, or central asia is actually the core. both russia, china and the u.s. have played this type of ambiguous role on this central asia. central asians play up the unambiguity and try to get as much as possible from each of these powers. so any this sno whether it's all uncertainties, at approach of central asian countries to afghanistaning is cautious, is much more insulation, if there

are guarantees to get some gains, we will, otherwise we will insulate ourselves. there is quite a lot of skepticism in terms of what would be the future of all of these things i talked about. i'm sorry, there is really no time to go through the policies each of these five republics. it is in the paper. each of these countries have given some indication of their interests in the political setting by themselves playing a role in that and an economic gain. it's all in the paper and you see they're quite divergent because in each role they play their own interest. finally, what would be the final solution that would be good for this region? if you have a scenario that there is u.s., russia cooperation, that increases, that's the solution central asians would love because that's when they get the guarantees on all sides except that how much would that be against chinese,

influence in central asia because they would really like to keep their options open. russians give them opportunities and then the security guarantees, et cetera. the very good scenario is you have russian usa cooperation in the region. otherwise they continue to play their bilateral game which would not be regional interest. and they would concentrate on community issues, et cetera or insulation which then in the long run i actually believe that we need to have a lot more of a regional approach than an actual bilateral approach for the central asian countries because in the long run, they will not have their benefits. they would have more competition and more conflict within themselves if we actually promote the bilateral approach supposed to the multilateral one. but at the same token, for the afghanistan and the big rinl, i do remds more of a bilateral approach to the big central --

big asia countries where i think our recommendation would have been to actually have a third party negotiator do bilateral discussions with all the neighbors about the different problems that there is while there is this confidenceable measures that are on going. and the country that's building measures could be extremely small. and plaintiff sidique talked about trade. i would trade on the transport. i would say even more interesting than that is counter-terrorism. counter-terrorism is something that we can all agree on and it's something that the states can and have proven the record of being able to cooperate. in the counter-terrorism cooperation, there's quite a lot of confidence building that can happen. >> thank you, that's fascinating. you told me before you had five countries, not one country to cover. alik, down to you please. >> good morning. thank you. usip for inviting me to speak about iran and its interests in

afghanistan. usually pakistan gets most of the attention when at the comes to afghanistan. but we have to remember iran is a key player arguably, iran is a second most powerful regional country in afghanistan and parts of afghanistan especially western afghanistan, iran is the key player. iran also has a lot of influence in kabul with the karzai government as well and other various actors. usually iran's presence and influence and activities in afghanistan is portrayed as negativetively, especially in the u.s. press and media. and indeed, iran is doing things that can be considered to be negative, but i think essentially iran's policy in afghanistan is a balancing act. meaning that iran is doing certain things to help stabilize afghanistan and actually promote u.s. interests indirectly and at

the same time, iran is doing things that undermine afghanistan's ability, stability. so i think on the surface, iran is pursuing contradictory objectives. why is this? the main issue in terms of iranian policy in afghanistan the nuclear crisis with iran. and iran's rivalry with the united states and its allies. iran views afghanistan through this competition with the united states and as tensions with the united states increase over the nuclear program, there will be fallback in afghanistan. and i think this just goes to show the that u.s. policy toward iran in terms of containing and pressuring iran has also and in fact a negative effect on other u.s. policy objectives including maintaining a stable afghanistan. having said that, there's a lot of natural convergence between

iranian and u.s. interests in afghanistan. mainly neither side wants the taliban to emerge as the ultimate victor in afghanistan. neither country wants a taliban-ruled afghanistan. the taliban we have to remember is a very anti-shia, anti-iranian organization. iran is a majority shia country. the taliban is influenced by very anti-shia strains of wahhabi anise lam. in 1998, in fact, iran almost went to war with the taliban. i remember that year that are iran amassed up to 200,000 troops on the iran/afghanistan border ready to invade afghanistan. this was because the taliban had massacred iranian diplomats in the african city of ma zur esharif and massacred thousands of ha czar raz or shia and are

supported by iran. and when the united states invaded afghanistan, after 9/11, iran was very cooperative. iran viewed the u.s. invasion of afghanistan in very pragmatic terms. back then, of course, president muhammad ha tammy who was a reformist was a reformist i suppose still was president of iran. iran was very much concerned about the u.s. reaction to 9/11. it was worried about how the u.s. was going to behave toward iran. and essentially both countries were on the same side. iran was helping the northern alliance which was composed of pro-iranian tajik and ha zhara groups. actually, iran was probably the biggest supporter of the northern alliance along with russia and, et cetera. and there were even reports that iran helped provide intelligence

to the united states in battling the taliban. the former commander in chief of the iranian revolutionary guards interview stated that there were iranian intel officers embedded with northern alliance units that were helping u.s. forces combat the taliban. and after the taliban was overthrown, iran played a crucial role in establishing the karzai government during the bonn conference of 2002. i want to go into great detail. my colleague at the rand corporation ambassador james dobbins worked directly with the iranian delegation to establish the karzai government. so i just recommend you read his writing on the issue but iran played an essential role in creating the karzai government and making sure that the northern alliance didn't dominate the karzai government to an extent that would really

upset the pastuns and destabilize the government in the future. but after iranian/u.s. tensions increased after iran after iran labeled as the emperor of the axis of evil, iranian cooperation in afghanistan with the united states really diminished. iran's supreme leader ayatollah khomeini, who has never been crazy about cooperation with the united states, viewed ka tanny's approach as not being successful. and a lot of conservatives in iran also thought to themselves, well, iran helped overthrow the taliban and established a karzai government, look what it's getting in return, as being labeled as part of the axis of evil. but there are still things iran is doing in afghanistan that could be portrayed as being value to believe the united

states and to afghanistan as well. iran is one of biggest economic players in afghanistan. there are thousands of iranian businesses operating in that country. the western part of afghanistan, especially the city of harat, is linked to iran, in terms of energy and infrastructure. iran has built roads in western afghanistan, is building a railway into harat and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on schools, roads, infrastructure, mosques, et cetera. it's one of the biggest foreign donors in afghanistan. but at the same time, going back to negative iranian activities, iran is supporting measure -- is offering or giving measured support to the taliban. we know that iran is providing limited amount of arms and trading to the taliban, not to the great extent that it was

providing support to iraqi forces fighting forces in iraq. but iranian support to the taliban and other insurgents is significant. iran maintains or supported certain pashtun groups that are a key part of the resistance to the united states. for example, the head of the hezbollah, lived in iran for a long time. so why is iran supporting the taliban? i think this is really a signal to the united states that if the united states or israel attacks iran and iran's nuclear facilities, then iran can increase the support to the taliban. so far we haven't seen very sophisticated iranian weapons go to the taliban, including advance surface-to-air missiles that could target just helicopters or explosively formed projectiles that did so much damage to u.s. forces, that

cost so many u.s. casualties in iraq. but there is the possibility that iran could step up its support to the taliban in case of an attack. and this fits iran's overall national security doctrine of letting others do the fighting for it. there have also been reports of iran having significant ties to al qaeda. iran is known to host senior al qaeda members within its territories. it's not clear how active iranian support of al qaeda is currently. a lot of al qaeda members are known or reported to have been actually under house arrest in iran, and iran could be using al qaeda members as a negotiating -- as a leverage against the united states. again, if the united states attacks iran, iran could let al qaeda loose. i think the relationship there is somewhat murky.

i wouldn't overexaggerate iran's role in al qaeda, but there are some ties there that could really be used by iran in the future. in addition, iran faces its own insurgency in southeast iran. the ballucis have been very restive. the iranian government actively discriminates against the ballucis, who also live in pakistan. since president ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, discrimination against the ballucis has really increased. the balluci area is one of the least developed parts of iran, and the balluci group has been very active against the iranian government. it has assassinated dozens of iranian officials.

in 2010, i believe, it carried out a major attack on a meeting of the revolutionary guards and killed several senior revolutionary guards, officers. and the iranian government has directly accused the united states of supporting the balluci insurgence. they've also blamed israel, saudi arabia, and also pakistan, some of its regional rivals. when one was captured in 2009, he, quote, unquote, confessed to receiving cia support, and iran's supreme leader has stated that the united states has given active support to them. i'm not saying this is necessarily the case. haven't seen any evidence for it. but this is the iranian perception. so we could argue that iran is to some extent supporting the taliban and afghan insurgents as

a payback to those who are supporting the balluci insurgents. iran can also be using the connections to the taliban as a form of leverage against afghanistan. and our colleague mentioned that afghanistan doesn't are respect in the region. afghanistan is not an equal player. it views afghanistan as an inferior country and a country to be dominated, a country that can serve iran's interests. so i think when it comes to the issue of afghanistan regional cooperation for iran it could be a zero-sum game. there are winners and losers. this is how it views the u.s. presence in the region. but iran does have a number of issues with the afghan government, as well. there are disputes over the helmand river. the iranian government accuses the afghan government of preventing water flows to iran. and there have been some reports that according to the afghan

police iran actively help building a dam. there is the issue of arnott koiks. iran has one of the highest addiction rates in the world. there are literally millions of iran heroin users. a lot of them are young. and iran has spent hundreds of millions of dollars and has lost thousands of lives trying to protect the iranian afghan borders. so this is a major issue for iran. and often the drug flow is cited as a reason for regional cooperation, and not just regional cooperation but cooperation between iran, the united states, and international forces and afghanistan. but at the same time, there have been reports that the revolutionary guards, which is very active in afghanistan, and is to a large part responsible for afghanistan, is spopsable

for the drug flow. we know the revolutionary guards are involved in the underground economy in iran, involved in the list of active iies. president ahmadinejad has act l actually hinted of this. and i believe recently the u.s. treasury department designated a revolutionary guard's officer of being involved in the narcotics trade in iran. so this is very possible. there were rumors of it in iran for a very long time. so if the revolutionary guards combatting the drug flow in afghanistan, it could also be very much involved in the drug flow. there are elements within iran who benefit by it. and also groups like jendala are believed to be benefitting from the drug trade as well. what will iran policy look like in afghanistan in the future? from tehran's perspective, the u.s. is now winning in afghanistan. and the time will come when the united states will depart afghanistan. iran has pressured the afghan

government not to sign a status of forces agreement with the united states. iran does not want a permanent presence, a u.s. presence in afghanistan. there's a good chance once the u.s. departs that iran would go back to its traditional policy of supporting tajik and hazara groups against the taliban. i think iran is realistic enough to realize that the taliban and the pashtuns will have a lot of influence in afghanistan and may dominate parts of the country, but it's also interested in maintaining its own zone of influence in western afghanistan. i think as long as western afghanistan is largely stable, this is okay with iran, as long as iran maintains some influence, it will not be a loss for iran. it will be a win. at the same time, iran's policy is nuanced, as