iran has engaged the taliban before former president, afghan president rabbani was assassinated. he was in charge of the peace negotiations with the taliban. he was visiting actually tehran, and iran tried to arrange meetings between him and the taliban. and when it comes to countries like pakistan and india, iran may -- because of the nuclear program -- be more amenable to cooperation with these countries. recently, iranian/pakistani cooperation has increased because of tensions between pakistan and the united states, also because of iran's growing international isolation. iran is trying to do more trade with pakistan, trying to build a pipeline to provide natural gas to pakistan, just a major project. and pakistan has indicated that it will not cancel the project. we'll have to see whether it will succumb to u.s. pressure. so, yes, pakistan is a rival of iran and afghanistan, but iran

also needs pakistan for other reasons, including -- because of its deteriorating economy. on india, there's a lot of indian/iranian convergence in afghanistan. both countries are dedicated to fighting the taliban. india has supported the northern alliance in the past. and india also relies on iran to ship goods through -- to afghan. india helped iran build a port for shipping. it will be interesting to see how the regional dynamics between india, iran, and pakistan will shape afghanistan's future. for afghanistan, because it's a relatively small country surrounded by big countries, i think it will be hard to come up with a regional solution because all of these countries have their own very specific interests that are at times contradictory.

thank you. >> thank you. on a rather pessimistic note. let me see if i could -- so, just bring a question each to you to start the discussion. then we'll open the floor for questions. please identify yourself when you come in to ask a question and speak into the microphone for the benefit of those who are watching this on the web or on tv. you talked about sort of pakistan and what it needs to do and the changing policy. but you also started by saying that pakistan's major concern in afghanistan is india. can you get pakistan to do this, the kind of things you mentioned, without working the india/pakistan peace at the same time?

or can you see a situation where pakistan could become -- or could do some of the things you've mentioned without the india peace or things being assuaged? you talked mostly from a realist paradigm where the problems are and some of the problems that are being out may not be as realistic. is it an issue of time lines, then? the it an issue that some of the sort of projects that we've talked about which can bring peace is a long-term, long-term measure? whereas a transition is coming in two or three years and the region is looking at that and perhaps starting to hedge its bets because of things that may not fall in place? another provocative question, i think you've alluded to this, but i wanted to sort of ask if i have understood this correctly. if i follow what you're saying, then could one conclude that in

u.s. policy iran's isolation or the problem with iran trumps the need to get iran to work positively in afghanistan? and i'll leave it at that. so, i think we'll get brief answers and then we'll open it up. >> sure. i think you're very right. this is what pakistani policymakers essentially are obsessed with or look at very seriously. they also have the whole civil war scenarios in afghanistan in front of them. but a couple of points. one is we must remember that pakistan's elitist orientation has always been south south asian, india -- i mean, whatever they do, they look towards india and oppose it or whatever. and there are big problems, of course, with india. they had also -- and also is -- i mean affected how it makes policies towards afghanistan because there was no real

expertise on afghanistan. i look at things that have been written about afghanistan today and pakistan. a lot of the big effects are wrong. i mean, the composition of the society, one's life and that kind of stuff. the thing -- the real answer to your question is that in the 1990s there was a reasonable conflict of information in afghanistan. all of the region's conflict converged on afghanistan. if there was a central asian militant group, it was hiding in northeastern afghanistan. sorry. northwestern afghanistan. and there was a pakistani militant shia groups, the leadership was hiding in kabul and there was -- there were some anti-iranian activity maybe. today that kind of regional conflict information is centered in pakistan or in pakistan's tribal areas. you have the imu headquartered where? you have all these other groups headquartered there. so it's not only about -- for

pakist pakistan, afghanistan, unfortunately is no longer just a foreign policy issue. it's very much a domestic issue. and i think a smart policy or smart thinking should consider that and make these policies. thank you. >> thank you. no. it is not a question of timing. it is a question of policies before economics. this is the argument i'm trying to make here, that it's not that the projects -- you know, everybody is hedging their bet before 2014. the time line is an american withdrawal time line. it's got nothing do with the regional security problems within the region time line. this is what i'm trying to say. the questions would be, would will the americans continue to fund or continue to stop? this may or may not have to do with 2014. but the rest, uzbek, tajik water problem, that's not 2014. that has to do with a lot of the questions of electricity that will be available for afghanistan. the chinese interest in central

asia, is that going to be sustainable or is it going to be a rivalry with russia? that's not 2014 time line. russian move on the eec, the euro sect, the economic community up north. that's not 2014. so from the central asian point of view, it's not 2014 time line. the only thing would be how much are they going to use the military support they'll get, et cetera, et cetera. but it has to do with larger political dynamics that have to do with the larger dynamic ins of the region and the hedging of the bets in afghanistan, i don't agree with that read. i think that what they're doing is preparing themselves for the worst-case scenario. if there is going to be a situation where the taliban come into afghanistan and there is no national reconciliation and the taliban start pushing north, and then we have the separation and we have a worst-case scenario civil war, which was your scenario, a possibility, then every country would want to have

a region where they would insert themselves from the rest. you talked about western afghanistan for iran and we talk about the northern afghanistan for the uzbeks and the tajiks. it doesn't mean that they're going to go into further. it's insulation from their own borders. >> so the answer to your question is yes, the u.s. policy on the iranian nuke particular program to a large extent prevents cooperation with iran and afghanistan. i think in a lot of ways iran is an ideal partner for the united states and afghanistan because there is a convergence of interests. iran does see pakistan as a rival. the united states has major issues with pakistani support of the taliban. i think both countries would be interested in having a stable afghanistan for the most part, combatting the drug problem or elements of the iranian government would be interested in that. but the key issue is iran and the united states are locked in

a major rivalry right now. it's not a kinetic conflict for the most part. there's no war between the countries. but they're engaged against each other, across the middle east, across south asia and across the world, really. and the u.s. priority is to stop the iranian nuclear program and to stop iran from weaponizing this program. and that should be the u.s. priority. that should be our number-one priority toward iran. and it is one of our top national security concerns for all the right reasons. so i'm not arguing that we should take our focus away from the iran nuclear program and toward stabilizing afghanistan. i think, you know, the unfortunate part of the conflict with iran is that u.s. interests are damaged elsewhere. and i think that's just a natural part of foreign policy. but that's something we should take into account that by pressuring the iran, this has

ramifications for u.s. interests but also for smaller countries like afghanistan, even pakistan and other countries in the region. >> thank you. so we'll open the floor. and please do identify yourself when you speak and you can put up your hand for me to see. there's a question right here, then i'm coming to you. >> thank you. i'm a fellow at the national endowment for democracy. i have two questions. how much -- do you think pakistan's involvement or participation in afghanistan is the solution to afghanistan in terms of, like, the accord of the bonn conference? there is a lot of evidence the taliban no longer trusts pakistan. they could be anti-india once they come back to power. like will the taliban trust pakistan if they come back to

power? my question to you is pertaining to jendola. i think there was a graduate from pakistan and he always stood not for billoge rights. secular people there. he represented the rights of the sunni muslims. and he looked at pakistan as a typical example of a fantastic sunni state. so how would pakistan or wild pakistan's support of jendola, which is a force that idealizes -- that idealizes pakistan and also al qaeda, why would iran, on the other handle, which has had a history of crushing them, isn't there a counteraction in your own statement of, you know, jendola filgtsing for the rights? thank you. >> let's take one more question, and then we'll come back to the panel and then the next one. one here and then you.

>> thank you. i'm media. >> i'm sorry. i'll have to keep repeating this. if you can hold the mike very close for the people watching on the web. >> i'm media. i'm a former member of faculty of gw. however, i had the privilege of speaking in the geneva and bonn conference. and my -- i don't have a question, but i enjoyed the presentation of all my colleagues, and i was impressed by the details, particularly from shad. very thorough. however, mr. noda, just a comment and a footnote correction. you mentioned that iran was supporting the bonn conference and approach.

my memory and my -- as i eyewitness, yes, very active, great respect for him and facilitating the meeting, but the iranians were support rabbani and coalition of rabbani. and then finally they realized that there was no way, and that's why their faction, which is called cyprus faction, in protest did not participate in the government of karzai. thank you. that is just for your information. >> thank you. we'll start with you. >> yes. regarding your question, i never said pakistan supported jendola. i said the iranian government accused pakistan of supporting jendola. [ inaudible ] >> the microphone, please. >> why would they support a sunni group?

it's in its interests. iran's interests are not just based on religion. the islamic republic doesn't let religion get in its way. it does things that we wouldn't think are -- you know, that would be contradictory for its interests. iran supports lots of sunni and shia groups despite being a shia state. it has ties with the taliban in the same group that has killed iranian diplomats and conducted attacks against iran. but when it comes to foreign policy often, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and that's how the view on the taliban. that doesn't mean that it will view the taliban as a friend in the future because i think that two groups are fundamentally to poetzed to each other. but it allows for a certain degree of cooperation as long as the united states is in power or has troops in afghanistan. in terms of pakistani support

from jendola, it might not have been active. pakistan has problems policing its borders. to jend la might have used pakistan's borders. interesting, iran put a lot of pressure against pakistan and made accusations, but remember, after he was captured, iranian officials thanked pakistan for their cooperation. so there is cooperation between the pakistani intelligence and armed forces. you're right, iran initially supported rabbani but switched support to other groups once it saw it wasn't in its interests. >> i think you ask the question, will the taliban trust -- or they do trust pakistan now. i think the answer is yes and no, because there is not, like, one taliban where everybody acts in unity. there are, like, different factions or at least the haqani

group is predominantly -- probably the biggest military -- has the biggest military muscle while the recommend news channels of the taliban regime headed by mullah omar has the political legitimacy and more is kind of the representative political body. during the taliban time in power, there were a number of issues. they never agreed on pakistan. mullah omar famously wrote a letter to musharraf and also asked him to become -- advised him to become a better muslim and not waste his time on advising others too much. the future afghanistan, i think anybody in power in afghanistan has to deal with the complexity of society, which is multiethnic, which has been through tremendous suffering, tremendous war. and the taliban, the one thing that we should remember about the taliban, they are an islamist movement but an

afghanistan-specific movement. so if they come to power in afghanistan or becomes part of the coalition, i think they have to deal with very complex issues about what to do with pakistan and they will probably consciously try to distance themselves from being seen as pakistani agents. >> thank you. we have two questions here. >> thank you very much. i am a visiting scholar at the george mason university. i have actually one question. if i caught you correctly, you pointed out that pakistan needs to make reforms, to implement reforms. could you please elaborate on that? what kind of reforms do they need to implement? and my other question is, so,

you know, you pointed out afghanistan is seen as a threat and opportunity for central asian countries. one of the threats is the issue of drug production. so you have been making resurgent region for a long time, i think. could you please let us know what kind of solution can be seen as a way to reduce the production of drugs in afghanistan? because it is another -- if i may be permitted to ask another question. >> i think let's go to the others. if we have time, we'll come back to you. >> okay. thank you. >> gentleman behind you. >> thank you very much. i'm from the afghanistan council. i want to congratulate you for a great panel. still no afghan representation. when we talk about regional, it would have been great to have one. let me give you a perspective on the afghan side. the pakistani side are not trusted by afghan. as simple as that.

i haven't seen anybody even in washington talking about afghanistan with respect. iran, i think you have nailed great. the one thing that you're mistaken, afghanistan is not a small country. it's the size of texas. it's a big country. it's a huge country. in the 2009 elections iran had a huge impact with the money they give to the candidates. surprisingly, countries behave and the chinese have gone capitalist on us in afghanistan. so -- which is surprising, but unless there's honest and sincere efforts shown by the neighbor neighbors, while unfortunately in the past, especially in the past 30 years, the afghan have witnessed this huge interference within their affairs by the neighbors. so unless there's an honest effort by the leaders of the these countries, how do you

expect the afghans to believe the regional solution? they have to go with the big powers weather the strategic partnership and all that. so the question is there. >> okay. thank you. >> about the question of reforms, the reforms that i wanted to affidavdvocate or see reforms in pakistan about the federally administrative tribal areas, it's still ruled under a leftover colonial regime. last year there were major reforms, some reforms initiated, but those are not enough in my view, because i just think that people from these estimate, 4 million to 7 million residents, they're not still covered by the constitutional clauses that get into fundamental rights. so they're not equal pakistanis enemy. and their reform is more of

pakistan's political parties by and large kind of agree on it. but because there are military operations, so -- and one step back has been the introduction of this law for the action, aid of civil power, which is a temporary law. at least for two years. but it's not a good law, because there are no -- the procedures are not -- it doesn't guarantee fair trial anyway. about your observation, about afghanistan neighbors, one of the problems that we deal with when we talk about cooperation among afghanistan and neighbor, it's a disparate region. the interest for pakistan, you cannot compare them to the interest of them in afghanistan. it is a region that has famously gone back with-in a way where there was regional cooperation. they were all part of the soviet union. but today they have mined their borders, bike pakistan with tajikistan.

so regional cooperation is not easy. and you also have to consider other recent powers. china, this is the region where all the big powers live, most of the big powers -- china, russia, india, and also of course middle east. >> thank you. on the drug production, obviously it is a big problem in the central asian area. it's a health problem. there's much more addicts now than there was before. it's now being seen in the hiv. but the central asian countries have not been as strong about the failure of the nato and american troops to curb production in afghanistan. but, you know, russians have been quite adamant about a fight that the nato and the u.s. troops had to eradicate narcotics. the central asians are a bit more cut on the transit and they're aware there is the possibility of balloon effect, where if production stop in afghanistan, it moves up to

tajikistan and other areas. there is plantation quite a lot in that region. they also are aware that you also need chemicals to be given in order to produce drugs and that is going through the borders. they also know there's quite a lot of demand from russia and europe, so therefore they become more of a transit. it's more easy for russia to be vocal than the central asians, a little more implicated somehow. and the economy that is actually affected from the government to the low-level people and quite high. but what is the alternative is actually -- alternative livelihood for both the production farmers and also for the transit, because a lot of the time the people who are actually trafficking are the people who are -- have no other alternative jobs as well. so it's a very complicated situation. it has to do with also the demand as much as the supply. so another conference on the drugs, if you may. and the gentleman, you're asking about neutrality, yes?

afghanistan wants to be neutral. how can they get guarantees so they don't have intervention? the u.s. talked about neutralization last week. there was discussion. neutralization was a dirty word. a country is difficult to neutralize. neutralization was not the right word, but neutral afghanistan is the right word. the question is how do you actually create that? it's not really possible to actual actually have verification. they agree, which is what they would on the communication. i think it's possible to do neutrality in action and not just necessarily in words. action is both ways. there should be guarantees that afghan is not being used for attacks on the region, and the region does not also -- yeah. do you have a solution?

>> when i use the term "small," i mentz iran perceives it as a weaker or smaller country. although there's a lot of cultural historic religious affinity between iran and afghanistan, iran still views afghanistan as really a playing field in its competition for the united states. we talk about regional solution, but what is the regional problem? i'm not sure if there's a regional problem for a lot of these countries. iran's problem in afghanistan is that the united states has a presence in afghanistan. the solution is for the united states to get out and not have, you know, long-term crisis. that for us is not a solution. that is not in u.s. interests but in iranian interests. as long as afghanistan is going to be divided and have a

relatively weak central government, i think to a large extent it is at the mercy of its much more powerful neighbors, especially give than a lot of its neighbors are undemocratic countries that are willing to use force to achieve their means. >> thank you. we have a question here. >> thank you. i have a question. you talked about a region solution. if you remember in 1996 era, there were, like, six plus two farm laws, meetings in tajikistan, pakistan. i would think afghans see the regional -- the region country not as a solution but the problem. and also, you discussed the economy, the pashtun economy. we know that most of the pashtun

economy is considered a trade, but that's smuggling. what steps can be taken to help the pashtun economy? thank you. >> i think -- i mean, for most people in the border region, and they're not only pashtuns, there are ballucis and others, people along the line, the basic question is not worrying about what is legal or illegal. i think a number of steps can be taken. for example, just bringing the current levels of the two country together, so it will cut down on, for example, why would you buy a japanese tv in peshawar from -- a smuggled tv for 5,000 rupees when you could get it for less when all duties are paid. there are minor, not really big issues. the big problem is -- i

challenge is also i think the pashtun relation to the state. they have very different experiences with the two states. in afghanistan, they have a dominant group, they have a different perspective on things. in pakistan, they were the people who fought the most wars against the british and all of southeast. a century, small and big, if you count it. and then in pakistan being a minority and have these. sometimes i joke with my pakistani friends. some of our minorities have the same events as, like, pa tunes and ballucis in pakistan have. so the key question here is more people-to-people contact, more government-to-government discussion on these issues. i don't think the government really discusses these issues. they discuss maybe big demand in the past two years to be given access to the taliban leadership in pakistan or demanding from

pakistan to bring them to table. but i don't think he has ever had a detailed plan of how to go about reasonable cooperation. >> unfortunately, that's all the time we have for questions. i want to bring it to the panel to give them one last word before i wrap up. so if you would. >> one last word. okay. like i said, i think there is -- there is -- there was convergence between iran and u.s. convergencgence in afghani, but i don't think we'll see that as long as islamic is in power and at odds with the united states. given the situation between iran and the united states, i don't see a lot of positive policies coming out of iran unless the u.s. withdraws from afghanistan. even then i think iran will