commander, kernel ever receipt pea body. he violates orders and orders out a combat reconzans because he's fearful that there's something in front of them based on the way he's reading intelligence, and his brigade is not going to be caught unawares, and he sends out a combat reconsans. did peabody believe that the entire confederate army is out there? probably not. but he knew something was out there and he wanted more intelligence. so he didn't tell he was sending out a combat control, he didn't tell sherman, whose force would have to march across his front, he didn't tell him he was sending it out, so nobody knew that roughly 5 companies of infantry at 5:00 in the morning on april the 6th started

marching to the south, southwest to corinth road. by 5:50 a.m., three shots rank out. they had hit, apparently k confederate kal vary. they were mounted who road away from the federals after they fired at them. the combat one troel was under the command of major james powell who threw the men into -- towards the location where we're now standing. when the elelements of the swirmish line brouk out here, they encountered infantry picket posts, seven man details who fired off shots at the federals and retired. just the gray light of dawn breaking, very quiet morning except for the sudden eruption

of the few muskets being fired, a few shouts being heard across the landscape, when in the far distance, the union troops would have picked up in the darkness, darker forms here at the junction of woods. and those darker forms were the main picket front of hardee's corps, they were standing there in formation. the federals slowly advance and hardkasle unleashes a massive -- the confederates were in encloses proximity. hardee's front consisted of four brigades, 8 hundred yards in

front of them were 5 brigades in braxton bragg's corps, and stacked behind him were -- nearly 44 thousand men. johnston had achieved his surprise. although it would be federal reconzans that brings on the battle of shiloh because a brigade in grant's army violated orders and took initiative to send out a force. but it will take, the confederate forces in front of us, the better part of two hours to bring the forward brigades to bear against the main union camps on the south side of grant's large encampment. and that would be the divisions of sherman and benjamin pren tis. so part of the parts the confederates were running to is, this engagement consumes about

an hour. it would be an hour before hardee's troops are commanded to move forward after the squirmish begins. so powell and hard castle are banging away at one another for nearly an hour before the main line under hardee's command steps forward. when it does, powell quickly realizes this is big time. because he could just set there and count muskets, count flags and real nice he's facing more than a mere reconzans. this appears to be a sizeable force much bigger than a brigade and he will begin to retire from this position. the confederates now, and you can just look at the landscape and just realize what they're going to have to encounter as they move forward. because you know how these men fight battles in the mid 19th century. they do it shoulder to shoulder

in uniformed lines. linear forms. battle formations. they do that because the individual infan interestory solder lacks fire power. he's got a musket that he has to load, time consuming. under the rush of combat, this being able to load and fire in three minutes is a bunch of baloney these guys if they're getting a round off every minute, they're doing pretty good, fumbling around with their cartridges, getting shot at, trying to maneuver at the same time, because they do maneuver and fire as well as stand still and fight. you can think mass formations, if you factor in, as we've already discovered, that 90% of the battlefield is covered in forest, now you're trying to maneuver your uniform lines

through these intervening trees, and they immediately break up the formations. so it's a slow go. just being able to rush forward across this intervening mile of terrain to get at sherman and prent tis's division of camps, you're not going to be able to do it, maintain order, maintain communications, maintain line authority over the troops and maintain cohesion. and if you're meeting resistance, every time you meet resistance, you're going to come to a stop because you're going to have to deal with that resistance. so that's why it take the better part of two hours, it's actually three from the time the first shots are fired, but the better part of two hours once the main line begins to role forward before you have any brigade upon brigade sized actions. and in that two hours, what is the union army doing? they're waking up to the fact

that it's not the normal morning. not the normal sabbath, sunday of april 6th as they had planned. and that alarm which will sound in sherman's camps, and prent tis's camps where he now comes to realize that apparently a force has been ordered from his own division to engage the confederates and he has to deal with this, they become aware that something is happening. so the alarm will sound in the forward camps and that alarm will be picked up through the rest of the army, straight back to pittsburg landing as these divisions become aware that there's some sort of alarm emergency on the front. and men will then be called by the long role to get their equipment, get their weapons and move to their formation points and get ready. and that getting ready is the

saving grace to a large extent to how the union army is going to encounter the confederates in the battle. so the supplies is not quite as complete as they would have desired, but it's still a major surprise on the united states army. johnston's mission was every effort we made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut his line of retreat to the tennessee river and force him back on owl creek where he'll be obliged to surrender. so he's envisioning striking union left first, turning it, cutting off that viable retreat to the tennessee river and then using the mass of his army to drive grant's army back into the swamps to the north and destroy them. that's what that obliged to surrender mean in johnston's battle orders. he's going to force them to surrender or destroy them in

detail. he completely envisions a battle of anie lags. he's trying to win. neutralize grant so he can deal with all these other problems. so this confederate force has a mission and that mission is to turn the union left flank. only the confederate high command knows that mission. the troops in the ranks don't understand that they're doing anything except locate enemy force it is and fight them and defeat them. that's about the bulk of what the confederate soldier knows about what their mission is here. the roads that the public traverse today on the battlefield, 95% or so are the same routes of movement, the same road lines that were here at the time of the battles. they straightened them out a little, took the kinks out, but you know, that's kind of a preservation plus for the visitor. because they don't have to

understand well what was the historic road network because we just tell them it's the same. it hasn't changed. and then the markering system will clue them in to where missing components are. there were two cabins sitting here and this would be the point where johnston established his first field quarters once he enters this portion of the battlefield on the morning of april the 6th. so he would have been able to look down the avenue here, see his troops maneuvering through the woods. he would have already saw some of the initial combat, in fact first thing that greeted johnston's armies when he arrived was seeing his troops retreating in the face of heavy federal fire and he would have to ride amongst the arkansas troops and rally them. johnston would be called to rally the troops throughout the day, he's a very motivational leader. he understood the issues of the volunteers, what motivated the men, what the men looked for in

their leaders, and he was a man who could make that happen. he was a big per so na and had a unique appreciation for volunteers that many of his piers, north or south did not hold at this particular stage of the civil war. so he would be here for a short while as the opening phases of the battle began. so he would see troops making the initial attacks on sherman's division and then he would ride eastward here and supervise the main thrust to what he believed was the union left, which was the engagement against prent tis's sixth division. of course it's from prent tis's division that the combat troops came out from paebody's brigade. that would be reinforced, this is where johnston encounters a

retreating arkansas troops, and that reinforced union party would fall back on the main federal line that prentiss and his brigade commanders had -- and the battle moves in that direction, and sequentially, even though initial attacks are being thrown against sherman's force, at shiloh church location, the main thrust, given that johnston wants to turn the union left, the main thrust of the confederate army is to our east and on the confederate right. because they want to make that happen before they begin to push to drive the federals north wart. but it's simultaneous fighting, and getting the public to realize that things happen. there is a chronology to it, but often it's happening at the same time. and realizing that we go from

two forces constituting 250, 300 men, okay. so that's the battle front when the battle starts. but by the time we reach 11:00, the battle front will be three miles from left to right. and a raid across that three miles then will be the great mass of the two armies engaged in pitched battle. you will have at that point in time roughly 80,000 men fightinfighting we've moved east from where the battle began. we're now roughly 3/4 of a mile he's from there, and north. and we've came to where been gentleman men prentiss's sixth division was encamped along corinth road. his division was the youngest

division in grant's still organizing army of the tennessee. and thus he's still awaiting the arrival of regiments to join the organization. he has two brigades before it's complete, envisioned to have three brigades. so he's still awaiting the arrival of regiments. in fact some of the most recent arrivals had just went into camp the day before the battle. so think about 5, 400 men and all of a sudden now they're called into battle and some of the elements are new to the division. so it had to be quite confusion. over the course of the first two hours, johnston is able to maneuver his right-wing elements into attack positions to take on prentiss's division. so you have the preliminary actions, where they're fighting

powell's combat team and of course powell is reinforced by elements from the sixth division and they are squirmishing with the advanced confederate forces and it's just a slow process of the confederates continuing to maneuver, tinning to push forward, beating back these federal elements, before they come to bear against what is prentiss's main line. the initial combat front for prentiss lay in front of us. he advanced his forces anywhere from 2/10 of a mile to 1/4 mile in front of his main camp line and took position to stride the eastern corinth road. he had two batteries of artillery, and the guns of those two batteries were deployed the eastern corinth road and then

infantry positioned in front. and that was the main defense. over the course of roughly two hours, from 7:30 in the morning until about 9:00, the main struggle here takes shape. the initial federal front is held for about an hour, and they're able to halt, initially halt the first attacks by the confederates against the camps. and forcing the confederate leaders to bring more an more troops into play. and over the course of the morning, john ton is able to maneuver half his army. half of the army. eight of the 16 brigades are maneuvering to a point directly opposite prentiss's division. that's an overwhelming mass. now, four of the eight brigades will be in direct contact with

prentiss. the rest of them will move up into support and be in supporting distance. but it shows the sweep, the turn that johnston is trying to make as he is trying to cut grant's retreat to the river. because it's clear that johnston believes that prentiss is the left flank elements of the union army. and the reason we now know that apparently johnson believed that is the realization that the confederate leaders understood the union army to be facing west as opposed to south. in other words, when the confederates planned the attack, planned the offensive it is with an understanding that the union forces are west of pittsburg landing and facing west.

because the confederates believed that corinth is further west than it is south from pittsburg landing. they have a slight miscalculation in their understanding of the geography and their maps illustrate this. their maps show corinth twice as far from east to west, from pittsburg landing than it is by miles north and south. we now know that the exact opposite is true. we know that corinth was tries as far north to south from pittsburg landing than it was from east to west. that little terrain perspective, confederates are marching from the west, slightly north, but generally eastward, led the confederate high command into assuming the army faced west. the battle plan was to turn the union left first to cut off the retreat to the river. you would not, you would not logically, if you knew the federal army faced south, deploy with your army facing east, if

your primary mission was to turn the union left first. that misunderstanding has a great deal to do with our understanding of why it's fought the way it is. and why troops maneuver the way they do. and why johnston brought so much of the weight of his army to bear against this point, is because he believes in the initial contact that he has struck the union left. he believes in the initial maneuver that he has turned that left. and by 9:00 when his troops are entering this union camp, that mass having driven prentiss's 5,400 men out of it, that he has indeed cut grant's retreat to the tennessee river. because, having brought half the army to bear here, he still, by knowing how his army is deployed, and knowing that

troops to his left are engaged, and they are engaejed over at shiloh church against sherman's division, supported by mclarne', that his visual understanding is i have moved up and i am now inside, east of, where my left is engaged union forces at the church, therefore, i have cut, retreat to the river, to the landing. it's very interesting. also the confederate maps show pittsburgh landing almost due east of shy low church, not well north and east of shiloh and east of shiloh church as it was. but that is almost due east. if johnston has moved to a point where he's now inside the church east of it, he would have this

perception that he has turned grant's left. it is clear to see that developing within his own mind frame, and his subsequent actions illustrate that, indeed, that is how he's thinking. because this massive fight for prentiss' camps starting on the line here falls back to the camp front, which is defended for less than an hour before the federalists are pushed out of it, and they're pushed out of it because they're unsupported. there are no additional union troops in nearby support. sherman is over at the church but they've entered the gap or vacuum between the two divisions so there's no lateral communication or assistance between sherman and prentiss occurring. they're assisting sherman but no one is assisting prentiss. he has one regiment that was

ordered out to join him at pittsburgh landing, scheduled to join him anyway, to become part of the division, 15th michigan infant infantry, but they arrive without ammunition. they go into the line of battle armed with only the bayonet. no pewter and no musket balls in any cartridge to put in any of those guns. amazing. they stand a few minutes before the colonel, oliver, is getting them off the front to get out of here and go find some ammunition. that shows you also the nature of preparedness that these green armies find themselves. they're ordered to reinforce ammunition and he is unable to obtain any until it gets there. he can't find any here and has to back out. so just a striking example of the unpreparedness. but that's the only support that prentiss receives. so he's overwhelmed by four

brigades against two, clear to see that it's mass meeting less sizeable force. both flanks are turned. command begins to break down. colonel peabody's killed. his fifth and final wound trying to rally his troops, and everything falls apart. and at 9:00 prentiss is in full retreat. his force streaming, streaming northward through advancing union forces who are coming to his assistance but are unable to reach him given the time frame of starting where they began from their camps to reach the advance points on the battlefield. things have unfolded which will mean that subsequent fighting will be north of here on this particular frontage. johnston enters the camps. his troops are so overwhelmed with the success that they've had. they had issued rations before

they left corinth. most of the men cooked and ate their food before they ever got on the road so many of them have been without food now. remember, the battle was supposed to have been fought on the 4th. now it's being fought on the 6th. they have not eaten for two days or more. and then they hit this union camp, and of course later on union troops will claim that they weren't surprised. confederate veterans will comment, well, maybe they weren't surprised but they did have the most devoted cooks in the world because the food on the fires when they entered the camps. it had been a typical sunday morning in camp. not a lot of action was planned for a typical sunday morning in camp. there's, of course, going to be church services. there will probably be parades or reviews, but not a great deal of activities usually in a camp that's on a stand-down. so it's a typical morning. confederates hit this union camp and it was like a treasure trove

of luxuries. they have canned seafood, fresh bread, real coffee. they've got everything. have sugar. i mean, it's a treasure trove. not only that, they have all of the personal belongings of the people in their tents. there's a breakdown in command. not only are the men stopping, but their leaders have stopped to join them. the line officers in particular. johnston rides in amongst this and he's incensed. he's incensed when he finds officers plundering the camps. he challenges one he ceases coming out of a camp and he shams the man. we're not here for that kind of stuff, not that kind of plunder. he sees it and shames the officers in front of these men. as i told you before, he understands the motivation of these volunteers. i think he recognized he had a moment. he saw a cup sitting on a table, he bent down sadly and picked this up and he said, let this be my portion of the spoils today, then he urged everybody to get back with their commands,

reform, reform, there's more of those people to fight. there's more of this battle to be waged. and through his actions, the actions of hardy, brag, their subordinates, they get these troops back in to formations, and it's at this critical point johnston learns from a reconnaissance that there is a reported federal force off to his east. it's maybe division sized in strength is the report. now he can see federal camps to his right front as he gazes underneath the canopy off towards the hamburg purdy road in the distance. what he's actually looking at are the camps of what is the true union left. he doesn't realize that though. i think if you had stopped johnston at that point in time and asked him what he was looking at, he would have told you he was looking at the union rear. he's looking at the union

reserves. so what he decides to do, he's alerted to that threat and he will detail troops to deal with that threat, but he takes five of the eight brigades that he's brought to bear and he shifts them to the left with marching orders to move left and north towards the northwest. so it's clear now that if he's sending the better part of the force he's brought in against prentiss to his left front where he knows he's got a fight over at shiloh that he's shifted, cut retreat, that's been accomplished. he's sending five brigades to join the sixth that's to the west engaged against sherman mclernen and the mass of the army is going to go. he's shifted from phase one to phase two. the big push begins. it's interesting to note that this road divides the battlefield in two halves, west to east, and johnston's sending

11 of his 16 brigades into battle on the west side of the fact that he has some troops on his right that he has to be concerned about. we've moved over to shiloh branch below shiloh church which means we're roughly 3/4 of a mile from where we last were on the eastern corinth road. and the interesting thing is when you stand here -- well, i hope that the visitors really key up on it, because you see three position tablets here at the double bridges here below the church. there was a double bridge in place. you have two branchs of shiloh branch coming to a juncture on the west side of the road. sherman's camps were on the other side of shiloh branch of the for the most part, he did

have one regiment in the south on the east branch over here to our immediate east. i hope the visitors understand when they stand here and they look at it, that they pick up on some salient point, and the point is you're dealing with three different organizations of the confederate army. three different brigades. you've got patrick clay burn's brigade from hardy's core. you have pat ten anderson's brigade of brag's core. and you have bush rod johnson's brigade of poke's core. these are the center of the formations. we're dealing with 8:00 basically starting with clayburn, general time frame, through 9:00 and beyond. so we have an hour's point of time when these three brigades come into battle here. first clayburn, then