so harris assisted by another staff officer brought johnston down into the ravine, got him off his horse, laid him up against a tree, ripped open his coat, his shirt looking for a wound. of course, they're imagining something up in the, you know, vital part of the body. johnston's wound actually was from the back side around -- had entered just below his right knee into the top of the calf and clipped open a primary artery. he had a bleeder. hadn't done much damage to the leg itself in the sense it hadn't shattered the bone or anything. he was wearing high boots. that would have hidden the wound. he was unconscious. i had tried to prime to consciousness with a little alcohol. it seemed to run right out of his mouth. final scene is very tragic, kind of shakespearean. he's in the arms of his

brother-in-law. johnston, do you know me? johnston, do you know me? but he's gone. johnston had bled to death in a very short time. probably wounded somewhere around 2:00. dead somewhere between 2:30 and 2:45 from a loss of blood. highest ranking general officer in the united states military history to die in come bad. a full ranked four star general. his generalship debated to this day. his qualities are debated to this day. as a motivator of men, he had few equals. r in his time frame of american history. harris will leave this ravine and ride west and tell general beauregard that he is now in full command of the army. we've moved just roughly say a

half mile to the northwest from the center of bell peach orchard location to the center of the union line astride the eastern corinth road into a position that's iconic with shiloh, known forever after the battle as the hornet's nest. they mark the center of the brigade's participating in the assaults. you think of the story of the fighting in the sector, you know, you have a deployment portion. that's when the federal troops occupy the position and then you have an assault phase where the confederates are attempting to attack the federals here. they're doing so in piecemeal fashion, primarily lone brigades making these assaults in succession in some instances over the course of the midday and through the afternoon.

they were dead center. pretty much dead center on the battlefield and the confederates attack through what they describe as a dense underbrof. heavily thicketed zone. they called it an impenetrable growth. that's different from the normal vegetation on the battlefield which was old growth forrest. the confederates are attacking through the thikt. >> why are they attacking through the thicket? it provided some semblance of protection as they tried to maneuver and get into a position to confront the federalists holding the line here. besides, if they moved any further to the north they'd pass through a wide open field which it was infill lated fire from the federals. to the south there's another open field and the thicket provided cover. it provided some semblance of

protection. it is also apparent that these confederate troops in the thicket rarely ever saw their opponent, the thicket was that dense. they saw the flashes of the muscle from both the musketry and artillery. they rarely saw physical form of enemy force. we just passed up the eastern corinth road from confederate markers which note the farthest advance of the organize's attacking the hornet's nest to the union front that ran parallel to an old wagon cut. what's amazing is nobody in either army really mentions the existence of this road.

there's not a letter, a battle report, or a diary entry that selects on the fact that there's an old wagon cut here. there are 6200 federal troops positioned on this wagon cut and not one of them in april 1862 mentions its existence. now we know it exists but they don't select upon it and that's important because this wagon cut later on becomes an iconic sunken road and it was nowhere near being sunken. a wagon cut, maybe a foot deep here as it crossed the top of the ridge and that's about it in 1862. we know that's about it because in the initial descriptions of it when they begin to reflect on the fact that, hey, yeah, there was a road there, that's the initial descriptions. and somebody applied the bar

partially sunken and the word stuck. from that point on it's known as the sunken road. i refer to it as just a wagon trace and one of these days, you know, maybe the term will be dropped. it's a post battle term and it stayed and been applied to the road. what it does do is delineate the federal position, a position the federalists will hold from the earliest troops arriving here will be under will wallace's command. they'll occupy it about 9:00. they'll be joined by prentiss' remnants which these markers here to our south note and prentiss goes into position about 10:00. he retreats through prentiss and wallace and hurl burt. these 5400 men, he gets 5 to 600 men rallied. he'll be joined by the 23rd

missouri. prentiss will come forward with 1200 men. he'll take a position here in the center of the union position. wallace's troops on the north to the right of prentiss and hurl burt's troops to the south. and there are 6200 men on line and there's enough troops in reserve to constitute about 3,000 more force so there's a large number of troops on this sect sector. we've already framed up the story. we know 2/3 of the confederate army are engaged in the union oak right flank in the crossroads. so you start just factoring out who's not present in that fight and we know that throughout the course of the late morning and on into the early afternoon johnston's getting about 1/3 of his command engaged over at sarah bell farm, the river road and the peach orchard sector. he starts saying, that's almost the entire confederate army.

what does that leave here in the center. that leaves piecemeal brigades in the center and that's the story at the nest is that the confederates attack this position held in force by the federals with a repetitive series of assaults by individual lone brigades for the most part and those brigades are heavily outnumbered. the largest attack the confederates throw against this position is no more than 3500 souls. there they're outnumbered two to one. the average attack is around 2,000 personnel. so at any point in time they're clearly outnumbered by their federal opponent and then they have to negotiate the thicket and try to attempt to storm and breast the federal fire. the federal fire coming off this position must have been horrendous because confederates afterwards would style that fire and the sound of the whizle mini balls cutting through the

forrest as the sound of angry hornets and thus the position forever after will be labeled the hornet's nest. so the federalists seem to be holding their position well at the hornet's nest. so what dooms this position? well, the demise of the hornet's nest is what's happening on the extreme right flank and left flank of the union army. we know the right flank has been engaged with the greater propulsion of the confederate force. they were driven back to jones field before noon. counter attacks. it will take the better part of the afternoon for the confederates to halt, stop, and neutralize that federal counter attack and drive it again back into jones field. by now it's 3:00 and the federals having suffered heavy attrition, growing concerned about whether they can hold that flank, will decide to retire across tillman branch. suitable ground for defense, and they do so.

they require across tillman and form a new line. the right flank of the hornet's nest is becoming somewhat exposed to confederate forces now which are north of the position. then after johnston falls, confederates will reignite the effort on the extreme confederate right and we know that stewart retires. we know that union left flank now is beginning to fracture. hurl burt a 2e789s to hold the line and up until 4:00 he's quite successful in holding the line in a successive series of positions back across bloody pond and on into wiker field stretching over towards the river. by 4:00 he realizes he's unable to hold that front so he retires and he tells prentiss and will wallace he has to do so. they'll now have to roll their flank back to pick up what hurl burt is retiring from. unbeknownst to them, sherman mclernan have decided to move again.

and in this move they completely step back and away from will wallace's right flank and a gap develops. before the federals know it, confederates have worked their way through that gap. all of a sudden wallace and prentiss find themselves cut off at around 5:00 and they now have to try to fight their way out of here. what they're fighting against now is the entire confederate army still active on the field. for one time the confederate left and right flank were over three miles apart. they will meet in the rear of the hornet's nest here. they will slam the door shut and trap roughly 2250 federal defenders and capture them en masse, including general prentiss and will wallace will be mortally wounded trying to lead his command to the north and left on the field as dead. about 5:30 this fight is over so

we've finished up with the capture of the hornet's nest defenders about 5:30. we move from there, which is roughly a mile and a half from pittsburgh landing almost to within sight of the bluff line overlooking the landing here, an area where the visitor's center complex or the battlefield has always been located in conjunction with the national cemetery. so we're on the corinth pittsburgh landing road having moved up from the hornet's nest capture area and the hornet taes nest defensive perimeter to what was the final union position of the day on the first day known ever since as grant's last line. it's the last line of the first day's battle action. this is the line in which the divisions of sherman and mclernan and hurlburt and the remnants of prentiss and will

wallace will refire to. this is the line that the hornet's nest members cut off and would have sought safety but weren't able to reach. number of troops present. grant had at least probably 25,000 men effective along the front. on his left flank in the river were the two gun boats, the lexington and tyler. they could fire three miles deep onto the plateau. so that anchored the left firmly at deal branch ravine which lay here in front of us. so this union last line has a huge ravine just immediately to the south of the left flank portion of it and then on the extreme right is that tillman branch that sherman and mclernan backed up over afternoon. he had these two prominent landscape features to put between the confederate forces

and this new defensive perimeter. the hornet's nest capture basically is the climax of the first day's fighting. the majority of confederate forces never advanced beyond that point, but a remnant of the confederate army does. it's bebaitable the size of the force, but it's no more than about 10,000 troops at best. of that, i would say that only about 3500 men actually come under musketry fire in the final confederate attack of the day which will be delivered across deal branch against this section of grant's last line, from the mouth of deal branch westward for about 2/3 of a mile off of the river. so it's pretty much

anti-climatic, the last little spurt of energy from the confederate force. grant was sitting on the line watching this last little effort by the confederates, and it's clear to everyone who examines his thoughts that day and what he's saying to staff officers and all that he sees a shift and a change in the confederate effort. he sees the momentum disappear and a pause. confederates pause as things close out that evening. you know, he's heard to you thor by a staff officer of buels nearby, not beaten by a damn sight. and the officer thinking he was giving an order, he rode even closer and wrote down later that

the general was saying to himself, not beaten by a damn side. and clearly the day ended. grand proceeded and the confederates' momentum had shot itself out, played out. the confederates paused, and as we know, they began to retire for the night totally uncovering and leaving the federal front, and that clearly could be sensed by grant himself. throughout the afternoon grant was visibly upset by officers who came to him talking about retreat, but grant would have none of it. he was determined that he was over with. got his reserves coming in. whoever takes the next step

forward can seize the initiative, and he planned on that being ulysses s. grant, don carlos buel and the united states army the next morning. we've actually moved out from pittsburgh landing area and grant's last line to discuss the second day fighting here at shiloh. throughout the history of the battle second day has kind of got shortened on any major discussion or interpretation. primarily that has a great deal to do with the fact that overnight grant received sizeable reinforcement. you know, johnston was hoping to do battle before buel had arrived. well, unbeknownst to johnson, buel had arrived. in fact, buel's advance division had reached savannah, tennessee,

on april the 5th. he had not simply arrived at pittsburgh landing but he had made the juncture with grant and was in striking distance of reinforcing grant as long as grant held access to pittsburgh landing and the ability to get troops across the river. buel actually comes in on steam boat. meanwhile, nelson's crossing overland to a point opposite, and the remainder of buel's column is slowly filing into savannah. they're not all going to be able to march down. it's clearly evident grant will have to provide shipping to get buel's forces here, and that's what happens. nelson reaches a point opposite pittsburgh landing and begins to cross about 5:00, 5:30. he'll get roughly 12 companies on the field engaged against the confederate's last assault against what is grant's last line, and that's the sum total of buel's involvement on the first day. there will be a constant convoy of shipping between pittsburgh landing and savannah throughout

the night. you can imagine boats taking wounded up to savannah, offloading wounded and then bringing fresh troops into play. so about 8:00 in the morning buel has brought in about 14,000 troops, they have arrived at pittsburgh landing and been deployed on what is the left side of the union front. and that's basically what grant and buel will do. they'll decide to divide it up. grant will occupy the right. grant will use a sizeable amount of his force to reinforce buel throughout the day and to support buel's engagements on the east side of the battlefield. grant is able to basically infuse into his army the same number of troops that he loses on the first day, even if buel was still way back to columbia, tennessee, or up at nashville, grant would have almost been able to replace his first day losses with what he had available that he didn't use on the first day.

confederates under beauregard, they have a serious problem. they can't replace those first day losses. in fact, they get one lone regiment marching in on the battlefield that man marching in on the battle and that constitutes the reinforcement, the army, the mississippi under beauregard. beauregard claims he barely had 20,000 men to fight the second day fight. historians believe he cut himself a little short and probably has upwards to 28,000 to 30,000 troops, but grant's force if you see the number of troops he is able to get back into play on day two, he gets roughly 36,000 troops on day two. you add that up with buel's force and now the federals almost out number the confederates 2-1. the arithmetic is complete ily

altered. grant now attacks on day two with an overwhelming force. also, that overwhelming force, the fact that it has been reinforced catching beauregard and his generals in the entire confederate completely by surprise. where do the confederates go over night? they go back to the first camps they entered in the battle, the first camps they possessed in the battle. they go back to sherman's camps. they go back to stewart's camps, and general pope with a large proportion of his corps goes back to the april 5th, four miles after of pittsburgh landing. they completely uncover the front. that's when the federals begin to advance before dawn on day two and they're actually able to maneuver out and take advanced deployed positions far inland

from pittsburgh landing. they don't have to fight for it. it is just left except for stragglers and call havery, and day two fighting in a short time is quickly turned on this union numerical advantage. they have to hastily redeploy from the zones and waking up to the fact it doesn't look like the federals are bugging out but reinforced and attacking back. beauregard will be alerted to the need to rally the army and so it will be better part of two hours of getting the troops out and maneuvered into positions in which they can engage this union force coming down upon them. things fall apart rapidly on the confederate left once grant is able to bring to bear the elements, the surviving elements of his army. when sherman and mcclen an cross

truman branch and join wallace in the matter of an hour between 10:00 and 11:00 in the morn they turn the confederate left and backwards towards shiloh church. by noon they are knocking on the door and they will be joined by the extreme right elements of buel's command under mccook, and the fighting that point in time will cease north of shiloh church as beauregard is collecting fragmentg commands and reorganizing them and on several instances personally leading them forward into the attack. staff officers will see him grab colors of disorganized units and rally them in and ride forward in the face of the federal fire and they're just beside themselves because judge u.s. that morning the body of johnston had been put in the wagon and taken south, trailed by his staff and all they can imagine is now beauregard is

going to find himself in the same situation. when they get in the face and say, sir, you cannot do this, he says today the word must be follow, not go. because as one staff officer had observed the fire and animation simply left the troops. they were exhausted. they were no longer responding to the urging of commanders to go forward. they had to be led much in the fashion this sydney johnston realized they had to be led on the first day. it became a desperate cease all battle at the cross roads where we'll move to now. fighting here at the cross roads north of shiloh church where we moved to will come full bear against the confederate left. the hamburg road basically constitutes the confederate front at this stage of the battle. so from noon on they're defending the road line, very important lateral line of communication and the federals are pressing down against it.

here grant's forces will be joined by elements of buel's command in the fight for water oaks pond and the cross roads will seesaw over the course of two hours. union forces will attack and seem to gain an upper hand and beauregard will grab onto nearby disorganized forces coming off the fight, reorganize them, and able to throw counter punches pack which will stem the tide of the federal onslaught and the con fed rats will seize back the initiative only to have a fresh union force arrive from pittsburgh landing that mccook can throw in and now contending with fresh forces and the thing see ysawed for two hours and beauregard indicating the troops needed to be guided forward in person and not told to move forward, shows the state of the army. it is beginning to dissolve. question confronting beauregard

and the confederates, able to avoid catastrophe and things completely reversed and the euphoria and the seizing of the unionen camp meant on the first day and wired richmond the evening before that it had had been won and saddened by the loss of albert sydney johnson and achieved the great victory which is going to be reported across the south in newspapers for the next few days had really turned around and beauregard faced the catastrophe because if he continues to try to struggle to maintain position and advance he suffers the possibility that the combined forces will be able to cut him off and destroy him in detail. staff officer thomas jordan rides up and basically leans over and says, sir, do you think the army at this point resembles a lump of sugar standing in a

pool of water although holding its form is about ready to dissolve and beauregard says i am going to order retreat. so word sent across the line and the troops tired. now, the situation is can we retire, order, can we retire with some semblance of organization so that we're not caught by rapid pursuit and destroyed on the move, so he will have to constitute a ready reserve. he will take breckenridge basically to build this reserve on. he is the most inexperienced corps commander and boe regard picks him to command the reserve that's going to cover the rear of the confederate to fall back and not because breckenridge is of great tactical skill but because he has a whole

organization in which to mount what is going to be a very difficult mission, a suitable rear guard. and with the successful withdrawal of the confederate forces breckenridge spends the night basically in the position the confederates held on the evening of april 5th before the battle began and the next morning he will slowly begin to retire towards mickey's which is that road junction eight miles to the south and west where the confederates had planned their assembly for the battle of shiloh. beauregard will ride that evening of the 7th and actually get back to coran and he will try to constitute a ready reserve because he has a torn, bleeding army moving back to the vicinity. most of them are beyond lick creek, about 7.5 miles, the

crossing points, to nine miles to our southwest. most of the confederate forces are beyond lynn creek by the morning of april 8th. there would be no ability for grant to mount any ready pursuit. in fact, grant's standing orders did not permit pursuit. he sends out a large reconnaissance, primarily elements of two divisions, sherman and thomas j. wood from buel's command on april 8th primarily to see whether or not the confederates are regrouping for another hit. that's the biggest worry, they may be regrouping for another strike. it is a blood letting of proportions the nation was totally ill prepared to kind of factor. 23,746 men killed, wounded and missing. 3,5 million filled outright basically and 16,420 wounded and the remainder