had they had the ability to go out and push against it, they would have found out what was behind it. and what was behind it was this build-up of johnston's army. so it's easy to understand how the union forces find themselves surprised here, if you understand that if grant was to go and get viable intelligence, he was going to have to violate orders and attack the confederacy, period. and he's not willing to do that. because halleck was so adamant that they wait, they wait, they wait. so the federals totally misread the fact that johnston has roughly 44,000 men positioned to attack the union forces at pittsburg landing. if the federal picket front had been pushed in slowly over the course of the last two days to where it was closer in proximity to the union front than where it began, the confederate buildup and the union forces were still

lulled into a sense of safety, everything was all secure. at lease the high command. there were men in the ranks, there were officers in the ranks who were of different opinion. one of them was a brigade commander under benjamin prentice, colonel everett peabody. he violates orders and orders out a combat reconnaissance because he's fearful that there's something in front of them based on the way he's reading intelligence, and his brigade is not going to be caught unawares, and he sends out a combat reconnaissance. did peabody believe that the entire confederate army is out there? probably not. but he knew something was out there and he wanted more intelligence. so he didn't tell he was sending out a combat control, he didn't tell sherman, whose force would

have to march across his front, to perform its patrol. he didn't tell him he was sending it out. so nobody knew that federal force, ruffle five companies of infantry at 3:00 in the morning on april the 6th started marching to the south, southwest to corinth road. by 4:55 a.m., three shots rang out. they had hit, apparently confederate calvary. they were mounted who road away from the federals after they fired at them. the combat control was under the command of major james powell who threw the men into

a skirmish form mags towards the lotion where we're now standing. when the elements of the sqwirmish line broke out here, they encountered infantry picket posts, seven man details who fired off shots at the federals and retired. just the gray light of dawn breaking, very quiet morning except for the sudden eruption of the few muskets being fired, a few shouts being heard across the lantd scape, federal officers giving orders and what all, when in the far distance, the union troops would have picked up in the darkness, darker forms here at the junction of the woods. and those darker forms were the main picket front of hardee's corps, they were standing there in formation. the federals slowly advance and hardcastle unleashes a

massive volley upon them and the battle of shiloh erupts and the fight is engaged. the con federals were in close proximity. hardy's front consisted of four brigades, 800 yards in front of him, five brigades from braxton brag's corp and stacked behind him were -- nearly 44,000 men. johnston had achieved his surprise. although it would be federal reconnaissance that brings on the battle of shiloh because a brigade in grant's army violated orders and took initiative to send out a force. but it will take, the confederate forces in front of us, the better part of two hours to bring the forward brigades to bear against the main union

camps on the south side of grant's large encampment. and that would be the divisions of sherman and benjamin prentiss. so part of the problem the con federals were running into is this engagement consumes about an hour. it would be an hour before hardee's troops are commanded to move forward after the squirmish begins. so powell and hardcastle are banging away at one another for nearly an hour before the main line under hardee's command steps forward. when it does, powell quickly realizes this is big-time. because he could just set there and count muskets, count flags and realize he's facing more than a mere reconnaissance. this appears to be a sizeable force much bigger than a brigade and he will begin to retire from

this position. the confederates now, and you can just look at the landscape and just realize what they're going to have to encounter as they move forward. because you know how these men fight battles in the mid 19th century. they do it shoulder to shoulder in uniforme lines. linear formations. battle formations. they do that because the individual infantry solder lacks fire power. he's got a musket that he has to load through the muzzle, which is time-consuming. under the rush of combat, this being able to load and fire in three minutes is a bunch of baloney. these guys if they're getting a round off every minute, they're doing pretty good, fumbling around with their cartridges, getting shot at, trying to maneuver at the same time, because they do maneuver and fire as well as stand still and fight. you can think mass formations,

even moving across open terrain you are going to have problems because of the undull lating terrain, but if you factor in, as we've already discovered that 90% of the battlefield is covered in forest, now you're trying to maneuver your uniform lines through these intervening trees and they immediately break up the formations. so it's a slow go. just being able to rush forward across this intervening mile of terrain to get at sherman and prentiss' division of camps, you're not going to be able to do it, maintain order, maintain communications, maintain line of authority over the troops and maintain cohesion. and if you're meeting resistance, every time you meet resistance, you're going to come to a stop because you're going to have to deal with that resistance. so that's why it take the better part of two hours, it's actually three from the time the first shots are fired, but the better part of two hours once the main line begins to role forward

before you have any brigade upon brigade sized actions. immediately in front of the most forward advanced federal camps. and in that two hours, what is the union army doing? they're waking up to the fact that it's not the normal morning. not the normal sabbath, sunday of april 6th as they had planned. and that alarm which will sound in sherman's camps, and prentiss's camps where he now comes to realize that apparently a force has been ordered from his own division to engage the confederates and he has to deal with this, they become aware that something is happening. so the alarm will sound in the forward camps and that alarm will be picked up through the rest of the army, straight back to pittsburg landing as these divisions become aware that there's some sort of alarm emergency on the front.

and men will then be called by the long roll to get their equipment, get their weapons and move to their formation points and get ready. and that getting ready is the saving grace to a large extent to how the union army is going to encounter the confederates in the first four to five hours of the battle. so the supplies is not quite as complete as they would have desired, but it's still a major surprise on the united states army. johnston's mission was every effort be made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut his line of retreat to the tennessee river and force him back on owl creek where he'll be obliged to surrender. so johnston is envisioning striking the union left first, turning it, cutting off that viable retreat to the tennessee

river and then using the mass of his army to drive grant's army back into the swamps to the north out on snake creek and destroy them. that's what that obliged to surrender means in johnston's battle orders. he's going to force them to surrender or destroy them in detail. he completely envisions a battle of annihilation. he's trying to win. be decisive in the battle of annihilation. neutralize grant so he can deal with all these other problems. so this confederate force has a mission and that mission is to turn the union left flank. only the confederate high command knows that mission. the troops in the ranks don't understand that they're doing anything except locate enemy forces and fight them and defeat them. that's about the bulk of what the confederate soldier knows about what their mission is here. the roads that the public traverse today on the battlefield, 95% or so are the same routes of movement, the

same road lines that were here at the time of the battles. they straightened them out a little, took the kinks out, but you know, that's kind of a preservation plus for the visitor. because they don't have to understand well what was the historic road network because we just tell them it's the same. it hasn't changed. and then the markering system will clue them in to where missing components are. there were two cabins sitting here and this would be the point where johnston established his first field quarters once he enters this portion of the battlefield on the morning of april the 6th. so he would have been able to look down the avenue here, see his troops maneuvering through the woods. he would have already saw some of the initial combat, in fact, first thing that greeted

johnston's eyes when he arrived was seeing his troops retreating in the face of heavy federal fire and he would have to ride amongst the arkansas troops and rally them. johnston would be called to rally the troops throughout the day, he's a very motivational leader. he understood the issues of the volunteers, what motivated the men, what the men looked for in their leaders, and he was a man who could make that happen. he was of a big persona and had a unique appreciation for volunteers that many of his peers, north or south did not hold at this particular stage of the civil war. so he would be here for a short while as the opening phases of the battle began. so he would see troops making the initial attacks on sherman's division and then he would ride eastward here and supervise the main thrust to what he believed was the union left, which was the engagement against

prentiss' sixth division. of course it's from prentiss's division that the combat troops came out from peabody's brigade. that would be reinforced, this is where johnston encounters a retreating arkansas troops, and that reinforced union party would fall back on the main federal line that prentiss and his brigade commanders had -- thrown foortd of forward of their camps. and sequentially, even though initial attacks are being thrown against sherman's force at shiloh church location, the main thrust, given that johnston wants to turn the union left, the main thrust to the con federal army is to our east and on the con federal right.

because they want to make that happen before they begin to push to drive the federals north ward. but it's simultaneous fighting, and getting the public to realize that things happen. there is a chronology to it, but often it's happening at the same time. and realizing that we go from two forces constituting 250, 300 men, okay. so that's the battle front when the battle starts. but by the time we reach 11:00, the battlefront will be three miles from left to right. and a raid across that three miles then will be the great mass of the two armies engaged in pitched battle. you will have at that point in time roughly 80,000 men fighting we've moved east from where the battle began.

at woods and fairly field. we're now roughly 3/4 of a mile east from there and north and we have come from where benjamin prentice's sixth division was encamped along corinth road. his division was the youngest division in grant's still organizing army of the tennessee. and thus he's still awaiting the arrival of regiments to join the organization. he has two brigades before it's complete, envisioned to have three brigades. so he's still awaiting the arrival of regiments. in fact, some of the most recent arrivals have just went into camp the day before the battle. so think about 5,400 men and all of a sudden now they're called into battle and some of the elements are new to the division. so it had to be quite confusion. over the course of the first two

hours, johnston is able to maneuver his right-wing elements into attack positions to take on prentiss' division. so you have the preliminary actions where they're fighting powell's combat team and of course powell is reinforced by elements from the sixth division and they are squirmishing with the advancing confederate forces and it's just a slow process of the confederates continuing to maneuver, tinning to push forward, beating back these federal elements, before they come to bear against what is prentiss' main line. the initial combat front for prentiss lay in front of us. he advanced his forces anywhere from 2/10 of a mile to 1/4 mile in front of his main camp line

and took position to stride the eastern corinth road. he had two batteries of artillery, and the guns of those two batteries were deployed the eastern corinth road and then firing up the road corridor and then infantry positioned in front. and that was the main defense. over the course of roughly two hours, from 7:30 in the morning until about 9:00, the main struggle here takes shape. the initial federal front is held for about an hour, and they're able to halt, initially halt the first attacks by the confederates against the camps. and forcing the confederate leaders to bring more an more troops into play. and over the course of the

morning, johnston is able to maneuver half his army. half of the army. eight of the 16 brigades are maneuvered to a point directly opposite prentiss' division. that's an overwhelming mass. now, four of the eight brigades will be in direct contact with prentiss. the rest of them will move up into support and be in supporting distance. but it shows the sweep, the turn that johnston is trying to make as he is trying to cut grant's retreat to the river. because it's clear that johnston believes that prentiss is the left flank elements of the union army. and the reason we now know that apparently johnston believed that is the realization that the confederate leaders understood the union army to be facing west as opposed to south. in other words, when the

confederates planned the attack, planned the offensive, it is with an understanding that the union forces are west of pittsburg landing and facing west. because the confederates believed that corinth is further west than it is south from pittsburg landing. they have a slight miscalculation in their understanding of the geography and their maps illustrate this. their maps show corinth twice as far from east to west, from pittsburg landing than it is by miles north and south. we now know that the exact opposite is true. we know that corinth was tries as far north to south from pittsburg landing than it was from east to west. that little terrain perspective, confederates are marching from the west, slightly north, but generally eastward, led the confederate high command into

assuming the army faced west. retreat to the river. you would not, you would not logically, if you knew the federal army faced south, deploy with your army facing east, if your primary mission was to turn the union left first. that misunderstanding has a great deal to do with our understanding of why it's fought the way it is. and why troops maneuver the way they do. and why johnston brought so much of the weight of his army to bear against this point, is because he believes in the initial contact that he has struck the union left. he believes in the initial maneuver that he has turned that left. and by 9:00 when his troops are entering this union camp, that mass having driven prentiss's

5,400 men out of it, that he has indeed cut grant's retreat to the tennessee river. because, having brought half the army to bear here, he still, by knowing how his army is deployed, and knowing that troops to his left are engaged, and they are engaged over at shiloh church against sherman's division, supported by mcclellan's division, that his individual understanding is i have moved up, and i am now inside east of where my union is ienon forces at the church. therefore i have cut retreat to the river. it is very interesting. also, the maps show pittsburgh landing, almost shiloh church. not well north and east of

shiloh church as it truly was and still is. but that is almost due east of shiloh church. and if johnson has moved to a point where he is now inside the church, east of it, he would have this perception that he has turned grant's left. it is clear to see that developing within his own mind frame and his subsequent actions illustrate that indeed that is how he's thinking. because this massive fight for presentis's camps starting on the line here, falls back to the camp front, which is defended for less than an hour, before the federals are pushed out of it and they are pushed out of it because they're unsupported. there are no additional union troops in nearby support. sherman is over at the church

but the con fed rates have entered the gap or vacuum between the two divisions so there's no lateral communication or assistance between sherman and prentis occurring. no one has moved up to assent prentis. he got one regimen ordered to join him at pittsburgh landing, scheduled to join him, 15th michigan infantry, but they arrive without ammunition. they go into battle armed only with the bayonet. no powder and no musket balls in any cartridge to put in those guns. amazing. they stand a few minutes before the colonel oliver is getting them off the front and out of here to go find some ammunition. so that shows you also the nature of preparedness that these green armies find themselves. that the unit that's ordered out to reinforce, has in ammunition,

and is unable to obtain any until it gets here and of course can't find any here and has to back out. so just a striking example of the unpreparedness. but that's the only support prentis received. so he is overwhelmed. clear it see it is mass leading less sidable force. both flanks have turned. command against the break down. colonel peabody's killed, his fifth and final wound trying to rally his troops and everything falls apart. and at 9:00, prentis is in full retreat. his force, streaming, streaming north ward through advancing union forces, who are coming to his assistance, but are unable it reach him given the timeframe of starting where they began from their camps to reach the advanced points on the

battlefield. things have unfolded, which will mean that subsequent fighting will be north of here on this particular front anl. johnston enters the camps. his troops are so overwhelmed with the success that they've had, they had issued before they left and most of the men ate their food before they ever got on the road so remember, the battle was supposed to have been fought on the 4th. now is is fought on the 6th. many of them have not eaten for two days or more. then they hit the union camp and later on union troops would say they weren't surprised the confederate veterans were coming. well, maybe they weren't you are prize bid they did have the most devoted cooks on the world because food was on the fire when they entered camp. it had been a typical morning in camp. not a lost action on a sunday

morning in camp. of course, church services, parades, reviews. but not a great deal of activity on a camp that's on a stand down. and so it is a typical morning. so con fet rates hit the union camp and it is like a treasure trove of foods. they have luxuries, canned seafood. fresh bread, real coffee. they've got everything. have sugar. it is a teach you're trove. not only that, but all of the personal belongs of the federal troops are in their tent. so the men stop to plunder. so there is a break down in command. not only have the men stopped to plunder but the line officers in particular, johnston rides in amongest this and he is innocenced, particularly when he finds officers plundering in the camps. so he finds one coming out of the tent with cap dued belongses. he said, see here, we're not here for that kind of stuff, that kind of plunder. he shames the officer in front

of his men. as i told you before, he understands the motivation of these volunteers. i think he recognized he add moment and he saw a cup sitting on a table and he just bent down sadly and picked it up. he said, let this be my portion of the spoils today. then he urged everybody, get back with their command, reform, reform. because there are more of the people to fight. more of this battle to be waged. and through his access, the actions of hardy and bragg and subordinate, they get these troops back into formation. and it's at this critical point, johnston learns from a reconnaissance that there is a reported federal force off to his east. it's maybe division sized in strength, is the report. now he can see federal camps to his right front as he gazes underneath the canopy off towards the road in the

distance. now what he is actually looking at are the camps and what is the true union left. he doesn't realize that though. i think if you stop johnson and ask what he is looking at, would he have told you he is looking at the union rear, look at union reserves. so what he decides to do, he is alerted to that threat and he will detail troops to deal with that threat but he takes five of the eight brigades he is brought it bear and shifts them to the left with marching towards move left and north towards the northwest. so it is clear now that if he is sending the bet are part of the force he brought in to his left front, wre knows he's got a to fight over at shiloh church that he now shifted from maneuver turn flank, cut retreat, that been accomplished, he is sending five brigades it join the sixth that's to the west, engaged

against sherman and the mass of the army will drive grant into the creek. johnson shifted from phase one to phase two in his battle plan. now it is interesting to note that field divides the battle of two halves, west it east and johnston is sending 11 of 16 briga brigades into battle on the west side of the battlefield. we left prentis's camps where they were overrun. johnson deciding he is overrun. he knows there are troops to his right he has to be concerned about but we moved over to shiloh branch below shiloh church. which means we are roughly three quarters of a mile on eastern corrin th road. the interesting thing is when you stand here, i hope that visitors really