knee into the top of the calf and clipped open a primary artery. he had a bleeder. hadn't done much damage to the leg itself in the sense it hadn't shattered the bone or anything. he was wearing high boots. that would have hidden the wound. he was unconscious. they had tried to prime him to consciousness with a little alcohol. it seemed to run right out of his mouth. final scene is very tragic, kind of shakespearean. he's in the arms of his brother-in-law. johnston, do you know me? johnston, do you know me? but he's gone. johnston had bled to death in a very short time. probably wounded somewhere around 2:00. dead somewhere between 2:30 and 2:45 from a loss of blood. highest ranking general officer in the united states military

history to die in combat. a full ranked four star general. his generalship debated to this day. his qualities are debated to this day. but as a motivator of men, he had few equals in his time frame of american history. harris will leave this ravine and ride west and tell general beauregard that he now is in full command of the army. we've moved just roughly, say, a half mile to the northwest from the carabell peach orchard location to the center of the union line astride the eastern corinth road into a position that's iconic with shiloh, known forever after the battle as the hornet's nest. they mark the center of the brigade's participating in the

assaults. you think of the story of the fighting in the sector, you know, you have a deployment portion. that's when the federal troops occupy the position and then you have an assault phase where the confederates are attempting to attack the federals here. they're doing so in piecemeal fashion, primarily lone brigades making these assaults in succession in some instances over the course of the midday and through the afternoon. they were dead center. pretty much dead center on the battlefield and the confederates attack through what they describe as a dense underbrush. heavily thicketed zone. they called it an impenetrable thicket of young growth which is different from the normal vegetation on the battlefield which was old growth forest. the confederates are attacking

through the thicket. people say why are they attacking through the thicket? because it provided cover. it provided some semblance of protection as they tried to maneuver and get into a position to confront the federalists holding the line here. besides that, if they moved any further to the north they'd pass through a wide open field which it was infillated fire from the federals. to the south, there's another open field and the thicket provided cover. it provided some semblance of protection. it is also apparent that these confederate troops in the thicket rarely ever saw their opponent, the thicket was that dense. they saw the flashes of the muzzle from both the musketry and artillery. they saw the smoke. they rarely saw physical form of enemy force.

so we just passed up the eastern corinth road from confederate markers which note the farthest advance of the organization's attacking the hornet's nest to the union front that ran parallel to an old wagon cut. what's amazing is nobody in either army really mentions the wxistence of this road on april 6, 1862. there's not a letter, a battle report, or a diary entry that selects on the fact that there's an old wagon cut here. there are 6,200 federal troops positioned on this wagon cut and not one of them in april 1862 mentions its existence. now we know it exists, but they don't select upon it and that's

important, because this wagon cut, later on, becomes an iconic sunken road and it was nowhere near being sunken. a couple of wagon ruts, six to eight inches deep, here as it crossed the top of the ridge in 1862 and that's about it. we know that's about it because in the initial descriptions of it when they begin to reflect on the fact that, hey, yeah, there was a road there, that's the initial descriptions. and then somebody applied the bar partially sunken and the word stuck. from that point on, it's known as the sunken road. i refer to it as just a wagon trace, and one of these days, you know, maybe the term sunken will be dropped from the usage. but it's there. it's a post battle term and it stayed and been applied to the road. what it does do, though, is delineate the federal position,

a position the federalists will hold from the earliest troops arriving here will be under will wallace's command. they'll occupy it about 9:00. they'll be joined by prentiss' remnants, which these markers here to our south note, and prentiss goes into position about 10:00. he retreats through prentiss and wallace and hurlburt. he will reorganize his command in the rear of these two divisions. of the 5,400 men he began the ballots with, he gets 500 to 600 men rallied. he'll be joined by the 23rd missouri. 575 souls. prentiss will come forward with 1,200 men. he'll take a position here in the center of the union position. wallace's troops on the north. to the right of prentiss and hurlburt's troops to the south. and there are 6,200 men on line and there's enough troops in reserve to constitute about 3,000 more force, so there's a large number of troops on this sector. we've already framed up the story.

we know that two-thirds of the confederate army at 11:00 to noon are engaged against the union right flank there in the union oak right flank in the crossroads. so you start just factoring out who's not present in that fight. and we know that throughout the course of the late morning and on into the early afternoon, johnston's getting about a third of his command engaged over at sarah bell farm, the river road and the peach orchard sector. and he starts saying, well, that's almost the entire confederate army. what does that leave here in the center? that leaves piecemeal brigades in the center and that's the story at the nest, is that the confederates attack this position, held in force by the federals, with a repetitive series of assaults by individual lone brigades, for the most part, and those brigades are heavily outnumbered. i mean, the largest attack the

confederates throw against this position is no more than 3500 souls. there, they are they're outnumbered 2-1. the average attack is around 2,000 personnel. so at any point in time they're clearly outnumbered by their federal opponent and then they have to negotiate the thicket and try to attempt to storm and breast the federal fire. and the federal fire coming off this position must have been horrendous, because confederates, afterwards, would style that fire and the sound of the whizzing mini balls cutting through the forrest as the sound of angry hornets and thus the position forever after will be labeled the hornet's nest. so the federalists seem to be holding their own here quite well at the hornet's nest. so what dooms this position? well, the demise of the hornet's nest is what's happening on the extreme right flank and left flank of the union army. we know the right flank has been engaged with the greater propulsion of the confederate force.

that right flank, having been driven back to jones field before noon, counterattacks. it will take the better part of the afternoon for the confederates to halt, stop, and neutralize that federal counterattack and drive it again back into jones field. by now, it's 3:00, and the federals having suffered heavy attrition, growing concern about whether they can hold that flank, will decide to retire across tillman branch. suitable ground for defense, and they do so. they retire across tillman and form a new line. so now you can begin to see that the right flank of the hornet's nest is becoming somewhat exposed to confederate forces now, which are north of the position. then after johnston falls, confederates will reignite the effort on the extreme confederate right and we know that stewart retires. we know that union left flank now is beginning to fracture. hurlburt attempts to hold the

line, and up until 4:00, he's quite successful in holding the line in a successive series of positions back across bloody pond and on into wicker field, stretching over towards the river. by 4:00, he realizes he's unable to hold that front, so he retires and he tells prentiss and will wallace he has to do so. they'll now have to roll their flank back to pick up what hurlburt is retiring from. unbeknownst to them, sherman mcclernand have decided to move again. and in this move, they completely step back and away from will wallace's right flank and a gap develops. before the federals know it, confederates have worked their way through that gap. all of a sudden, wallace and prentiss find themselves cut off at around 5:00 and they now have to try to fight their way out of here. what they're fighting against now is the entire confederate army still active on the field.

for one time, the confederate left and right flank were over three miles apart. they will meet in the rear of the hornet's nest here. they will slam the door shut and trap roughly 2,250 federal defenders and capture them en masse, including general prentiss and will wallace will be mortally wounded trying to lead his command to the north and left on the field as dead. about 5:30, this fight is over so we've finished up with the capture of the hornet's nest defenders about 5:30. we move from there, which is roughly a mile and a half from pittsburgh landing, almost to within sight of the bluff line overlooking the landing here, an area where the visitor's center complex or the battlefield has

always been located in conjunction with the national cemetery. so we're on the corinth pittsburgh landing road having moved up from the hornet's nest capture area and the hornet's nest defensive perimeter to what was the final union position of the day on the first day known ever since as grant's last line. it's the last line of the first day's battle action. this is the line in which the divisions of sherman and mcclernand and hurlburt and the remnants of prentiss and will wallace will retire to. this is the line that the hornet's net defenders cut off and would have sought safety but weren't able to reach. a number of troops present. granted at least probably 25,000 men effective along the front. on his left flank in the river were the two gun boats, the lexington and tyler. with their big 8-inch guns that

could fire three miles deep onto the plateau. so that anchored the left firmly at deal branch ravine which lay here in front of us. so this union's last line has a huge ravine just immediately to the south of the left flank portion of it, and then on the extreme right is that tillman branch that sherman and mcclernand backed up over at mid afternoon. so he had these two prominent landscape features to put between the confederate forces and this new defensive perimeter. the hornet's nest capture basically is the climax of the first day's fighting. a large number of confederate forces, in fact, the majority of confederate forces never advanced beyond that point, but

a remnant of the confederate army does. it's debatable the size of the force, but it's no more than about 10,000 troops at best. of that, i would say that only about 3,500 men actually come under musketry fire in the final confederate attack of the day, which will be delivered across deal branch against this section of grant's last line, from the mouth of deal branch westward for about two-thirds of a mile off of the river. so it's pretty much anti-climatic, the last little spurt of energy from the confederate force. grant was sitting on the line watching this last little effort by the confederates, and it's clear to everyone who examines his thoughts that day and what he's saying to staff officers and all, that he sees a shift

and a change in the confederate effort. he sees the momentum disappear and a pause. confederates pause as things close out that evening. you know, he's heard to utter, by a staff officer of buell's nearby, not beaten by a damn side. and the officer thinking grant was giving an order, he rode even closer and wrote down later that the general was saying to himself, not beaten by a damn side. and clearly the day ended. grant proceeded and the confederates' momentum had shot itself out, played out. the confederates paused, and as we know, they began to retire

for the night totally uncovering and leaving the federal front, and that clearly could be sensed by grant himself. throughout the afternoon, grant was visibly upset by officers who came to him talking about retreat, but grant would have none of it. he was determined that he was over with. got his reserves coming in. whoever takes the next step forward can seize the initiative, and he planned on that being ulysses s. grant, don carlos buell, and the united states army the next morning. we've actually moved out from pittsburgh landing area and grant's last line to discuss the second day fighting here at

shiloh. throughout the history of the battle, second day has kind of got shortened on any major discussion or interpretation. primarily, that has a great deal to do with the fact that overnight, grant received sizeable reinforcement. you know, johnston was hoping to do battle before buell had arrived. well, unbeknownst to johnston, buell had arrived. in fact, buell's advance division had reached savannah, tennessee, on april the 5th. he had not simply arrived at pittsburgh landing, but he had made the juncture with grant and was in striking distance of reinforcing grant as long as grant held access to pittsburgh landing and the ability to get troops across the river. buell actually comes in on steam boat. meanwhile, nelson's crossing over land to a point opposite, and the remainder of buell's column is slowly filing into savannah.

they're not all going to be able to march down. it's clearly evident grant will have to provide shipping to get buell's forces here, and that's what happens. nelson reaches a point opposite pittsburgh landing and begins to cross at about 5:00, 5:30. he'll get roughly 12 companies on the field engaged against the confederate's last assault against what is grant's last line, and that's the sum total of buell's involvement on the first day. so there will be a constant convoy of shipping between atlanta and pittsburgh throughout the night. offloading personnel, as well as all of the elements of what it takes to wage war, all of their equipment, food, tents, you name it.

grant's troops will occupy the right. grant will use a sizeable number of his force to reinforce buhl throughout the day and support buell's engagements on the east side of the battlefield. grant is able to infuse into his army the same number of troops that he loses on the first day even if buell was still way back to columbia, tennessee, or up to nashville, grant would have been able to replace his first day losses with what troops he had available that he did not use on the first day. confederates under beauregard, they have a serious problem. they can't replace those first day losses. in fact, they get one lone regiment marching in on the battlefield that day, 731 souls in the 47th tennessee infantry and that constitutes the reinforcement of the army of the mississippi under beauregard. bow beauregard claims he enough men to fight the second day

fight. he probably has upwards to 28,000 to 30,000 troops, but tr. but brandt, if you see the number of troops he's able to get back into play on day two, he gets roughly 36,000 troops on day two. you add that up with buell's force and now the federals almost outnumber the confederates two to one. so the arithmetic is completely altered. the british attack on day one with a slight numerical advantage over grant's force here. grant now attacks on day two with an overwhelming force. also, that overwhelming force, the fact that it's been reinforced, catches buebueagardd his army completely off guard. where do they go the first night? the first camp they possess in the battle, they go back to p

prentice's camp, they go back to stewart's camp, and they go back four miles off pittsburg landing. they completely uncover the front. and that's when the federals begin to advance before dawn on day two. they're actually able to maneuver out and take advance deployed position far inland from pittsburg landing. and they don't have to fight for it. and day two fighting in a short time is quickly turned on this union numerical advantage. the confederates will have to

safely redeploy. they're actually reinforced and attacking back. beauregard will be alerted to the need to rattle the army, and it will be a better part of two hours of getting the troops out and maneuvered into position in which they can engage this union force coming down upon them. things fall apart rapidly on the confederate left. one, grant is able to bring to bear the elements, the surviving elements of his army. when sherman and mcclarnon joined the field, within the matter of an hour, they were able to turn the confederate left and turn it back southward toward shiloh's church. by noon the confederates are knocking on the door of the shiloh church. they'll be joined there by the extreme right element under alexander mccook, and the fighting at that point in time

will cease all north of shiloh church as beauregard is collecting fragmented demands dripping off the front, reorganizing them, and on several instances, personally leading them forward into the attack. staff officers will see him grab colors of disorganized units, rally the men and just ride forward in the face of federal fire, and they're just beside themselves. because just that morning the body of albert had been put in the wagon and now all of a sudden beauregard is going to be in the same situation. so when he gets in his face and says, you cannot do that, he says the word must follow, not go. because once the staff observed the fire, it left the troops exhausted, and they were no longer responding to commanders to go forward. they had to be led much in the

fashion that sydney johnson realized they had to be led on the first day. so it became a desperate cease-all battle at the crossroads where we'll move to now. fighting here at crossroads north of shiloh church where we've moved to, we'll come full bear against the confederate left. the hamburg free road basically constitutes the confederate front at this stage of the battle. so from noon on, they're defending the road line at a very important lateral line of communication and the confederates are pressing down against it. here grant's forces will be joined by elements of buell's command and the fight for the crossroads will see-saw, see-saw, of course, over two hours. union forces will attack and deem to gain an upper hand, and beauregard will grab nearby forces coming off the fight, reorganize them and are able to throw counterpunches back which

will stem the tide of the federal ioo onslaught and the confederates will seize back some of the initiative only to have federal forces arrive from pittsburg landing and now they're contending with new forces, and beauregard illustrating that the troops needed to be guided forward in person and basically not told to move forward shows the state of the army. it's beginning to dissolve. the question confronting beauregard, will they be able to avoid catastrophe. the thing is completely reversed. a seeming victory, that victory he had wired richmond the evening before that had been won, you know, saddenned by the loss of albert sydney johnson, but they had received a great victory, which was going to be reported across south in

newspapers for the next few days had really turned around. and beauregard faced catastrophe, because if he continues to try to struggle to maintain his position, he suffered the possibility that buell and grant, their combined forces, will be able to cut him off and destroy him in detail. so staff officer thomas gordon rides up to him and just basically lieeans over in the saddle and says, sir, do you think the army at this point basically resembles a lump of sugar standing in a pool of water, although holding its form, is about ready to dissolve? and beauregard says, i'm going to order a retreat. and so word went across the lines the troops are to retire. they gather up what they can. they've been doing that all day, anyway, destroy what they can, and retire. now the situation is, can we

retire with some semblance of organization so that we're not caught by a rapid pursuit and destroyed on the move? so he'll have to constitute a ready reserve. he'll take breckenridge, basically, to build this reserve on. he's the most inexperienced corps commander, but beauregard picks him to command the reserve to fall back. not because breckenridge has great tactical skill, it's because he has a whole organization to mount what is going to be a very difficult mission, and that constitutes a suitable rear guard. and the battle terminates with a successful withdrawal from confederate forces. gregory spends the night, basically, in the position the confederates hailed on april 5th when the battle began, and the next morning he'll slowly begin

to retire towards mickey's, which is a road junction eight miles to the south and west where the confederates had planned their assembly for the battle of shiloh. beauregard will arrive that evening of the 7th and actually get back. there he will try to constitute a ready reserve because he's got this torn, bleeding army that is now moving back to the vicinity of coren. the crossing points are about 7.5 to 9 miles to our southwest. most of the confederate forces are beyond luke creek by the morning of april 8. so there will be no ability for grant to mount any ready pursuit. in fact, grant's standing forces do not permit pursuit. he does have two elements, william t. sherman and thomas j.

wood from buell's command on april 8 primarily to see whether or not the confederates are regrouping for another hit. that's grant's biggest worry, that they may be regrouping for another strike. it's a bloodletting of proportions the nation was totally ill prepared to kind of factor. 23,746 men wounded, killed and missing. 3,500 men killed outright, basically, and 6,420 wounded and roughly the remainder, 3,600 or so, captured forces. they were constituted as missing, many of them wounded. so a massive bloodletting of a huge scale. the federal believed one more big strike and this war would have broke wide up in the west and everything would be resolved. sh shiloh disproved that completely. the confederate