we've done this a couple of times. i'll ask you the question i usually ask you. if diplomacy and sanctions fail, what would you recommend? if you got the call from the president that said ir-- what

would you say? >> i'm quite sure the president would not call. he's got much smarter folks to call than me. >> i think it would defend. our risk-reward ratios are different. the standard forme using military force is probably higher than yours. i'm not a passivist. i take the position that president obama did during the 2008 election campaign, which is i'm not against all wars, i'm just against dumb wars. in my view any reaction is a dumb war. the bar has to be set extraordinarily high for the united states. these are the things i would ask myself. has every other option been exhausted, diplomatic, sanctions. is there smoking gun evidence the iranians are actually going

for a weapon? not just concerns but actual evidence. there are non-overt ways of getting at this issue that would require large amounts of military force? are we able to forge a large coalition? and here maybe i think, matt, you and i probably differ. i think the only scenario in which military action conceivably makes sense against iran, ever at some point, is if it's like the 1991 war with iraq, not like the 2003 war with iraq. that is a very large coalition. and the reason is two-fold. one, because it's the only way to mitigate the consequences of the strike itself and second and most important, if you don't have a large coalition going in, not just the french and british, i'm talking arab states, nato, ideally a u.n. mandate, though that i might not be required, it's going to be very difficult to maintain the isolation of

iran in the aftermath of the strike. in the iraq debacle, we put a lot of energy into the first three weeks and not a lot into the aftermath. we're going to need the russians with us, the chinese with us, the arab states and asian states wus with us, the europeans with us. unless you go in with a large coalition, you're not going to be able to prevent iran from reconstituting its program on the back end period. i think the difference between the two of us is largely one of degree. you see the threat as closer and bigger, you see the risk of military action as lower and the benefits as higher. and i come to different conclusions on almost all of those things. i think we can wait longer. i think if we do this, we should go big or not go at all. >> that would be go big or go

home. right. or stay home in that case. i want to jump back in with a question. you two can go ahead and question each other. i want to jump in because i always wanted to ask this question on this subject. it involves deterrence. president obama is the guy who made the call to get g and get osama bin laden and bin laden is gone. do you think that in and of itself might be a deterring factor on iran, or at least make them think twice on what they want to go and do maybe in terms of provoking a military strike because after all, the guy sitting in the white house is the guy who said, yeah, go get bin laden? is that any kind of deterrent? >> i think one of the reasons that iran isn't taking some of the more provocative steps they could take toward producing nuclear weapons is because they are afraid of possible military action.

but i do think that there are things that we could do to make that threat clearer to iran and to strengthen that deterrence. so, i mean, in the past u.s. officials used to say things like all options are on the table but the military option is a really bad one and we don't want to go there. it puts the military option on the table and takes it immediately off. over the past few weeks and months, the administration language has become tougher. >> he doesn't bluff. >> panetta says if iran builds nuclear weapons, they will be stopped. but i think there's more we can do in this direction. we didn't talk as much about the sanctions, diplomacy route on the military side. as we go back into negotiations, it's not clear to me we have a good strategy in terms of what we're willing to accept from iran, what we're willing to offer them in order to

incentivize them to put curbs on their program and what kind of sticks we're bringing to the negotiation. we should make it clear to iran if we meet in the next couple weeks that there are possible benefits from them, such as lifting of sanctions if we-the-put curbs on their program but we should communicate if they take provocative steps such as kicking out inspectors and enrich above 20% the united states will use force to stop them from building nuclear weapons. i think we should use carrots and sticks in a more strategic way than from what i see we've done in the past to this point. >> i think their view of our military credibility is probably mixed. they've seen in the last two or three administrations actually going back before that a series of iranian provocations, terrorist bombings in places like lebanon and saudi arabia, proxy attacks against u.s. forces in iraq and afghanistan

not bring about a military response from the united states directly against iran. it's in large part why they use proxies to use arm's length to prevent us to doing that. on the other hand, you know, it's hard to argue that president obama, you know, i know he got the peace prize in 2009 but he's not a, you know, he's not against using force when it's in the important interest of the united states. you mentioned the osama bin laden raid and the surge in afghanistan was politically risky and a major escalation of that conflict. clearly this is a president who is willing to use force when he judges it's in the national interest. he's made the argument that iran's nuclear risk crosses that threshold. he said he's not bluffing.

and a nuclear iran is unacceptable. it's pretty clear to me. the question is do we have to become even clearer in the way that matt suggests. i don't know. i think those threats are pretty clear and, oh, by the way we have 40,000 forces in the gulf with pointing objects right at the iranians. we have another hundred thousand forces on their eastern flank in central asia. i think they get it, that we're there and we're present. i think i'm worried about from folks who want to beat the war drum high ser we have to calibrate it higher because the iranian regime could believe we're so committed to military action that the diplomacy stuff is a faint, that it's just an illusion, that we're just trying to check the box on the way to war, likes the bush administration was accused of doing on the war with iraq, that could be a self-fulfilling prophecy or you make the threat

so in your face, so overt that it becomes very difficult for the supreme leader to back down. he said over and over we're not going to give into pressure or threats against our regime. fun start threatening their regime over and over with military action, it becomes that much harder to give them a way out that would save face domestically. i think we've calibrated it just about right, a sufficiently credible threat to buttress diplomacy while not being too loose about war and to emphasize there's still a window of time for diplomacy. >> i think it's time to take some questions from the audience. if you could line up at the microphone. we have one that is going to be over here in the corner. so if you could line up there and ask your questions, i would ask that you identify yourself and please ask a question, not

make a statement. or a lengthy statement. >> thank you for the informative presentation. >> wait a minute. we're still not ready. >> we need somebody with like "take five." >> got to love technology. >> okay. >> please identify yourself.

>> abraham, retired farm service. thank you for the presentation. iran attacking israel, given the fact the third most sacred face of islam is located in jerusalem and another 2 million within 14 miles of tel aviv, the west bank is 14 miles from tel aviv, the gaza strip is 14 miles from tel aviv. i not a jewish state. there are millions of arabs living in the same territory, living and working. as mentioned, jerusalem is the site of the third most sacred place for islam. so i don't see any -- barring an accident, i don't see any reason for iran to attack israel. for israel there is no reason to attack iran because, flaum, iran will not attack them and the israel economy is booming,

tourism is strong and the stock market apparently is not paying attention to the crisis because it's going higher and higher. so what do you think about these? i also would like to ask you about this crisis atmosphere, which is created. to what extent does it actually benefit both israel and iran in the sense that for israel it's the diverting attention from the palestinian issue. usually when israeli prime minister is coming to washington, he's being rebuked for west bank settlements and expansion in the west bank. this time around he got a reprieve, they only talk about iran and israeli is the underdog. the iranians at the same time -- >> that's far more questions -- >> instead of 90 barrels -- >> if we could wrap it up. we have a really long line behind you. >> iran is getting -- the price for oil san diego 90 a barrel and the world price now is $120

because of the crisis. so they are pocketing $100 million every day because of that crisis. thank you. >> thank you. >> i can try to go very quickly. i think the prospect of iran directly using a nuclear weapon or transferring it to a group like hezbollah or a palestinian militant group to use against israel is extraordinarily low. for the reasons you point out, for the religion reasons, think iranians fancy themselves as the champions of resistance and growing up millions don't advance that cause and it risks massive retaliation. it would end the islamic republic and end the revolution. it's hard to see what regime would be better for that. as it relates to whether this is all just diverting attention, it may have some the effects that you're talking about. i think from the iranian perspective, though, they're not happy how far this has

progressed. it's clearly hurting their economy and now that the oil sector is being attacked, they could potentially be in trouble. maybe it served their purposes at one point but i think we've crossed the rubicon on that one. as it relates to the israelis, maybe it diverts attention from the palestinian issue but i don't think that's why they're doing it. i think israeli leaders genuinely believe the iranian threat to them is existential and i think they believe iran is the number one threat in the region, they're not just -- >> i agree. i don't think we can dismiss the prospect of nuclear war between iran and israel or iran and the united states. when we think about what led to the stable relationship between the united states and the soviet union, which wasn't all that stable, we came close to war a couple of times including the cube and missile crisis, almost

all those factor are absence when you think about the iran/israel balance. israel would have to fear it couldn't sit back and absorb a nuclear attack and retaliate like the soviet union thought they would do in the cold war. it's too small. israel i think in a crisis would have strong incentives to go first. similarly if you think about it from the iranian point of view, iran initially would have a small arsenal that could be vulnerable to an israeli first strike. they could have a use them or lose them problem. if there's going to be a war, they're going to want to go first. in those situations where both sides have first strike incentives in an escalating crisis countries are doing things countries do like put their nuclear weapons on high alert as a way to try to convince their add ser sayery they're serious. there's a possibility things

could spiral out of control and catapult to a devastating nuclear exchange. >> talking about building a coalition, a broad coalition in particular, in global opinion after the gulf war two or iraq in 2003 and the claims of wmds that didn't quite live up to expectations, yellowcake, aluminum tubes and so forth, what level of intel, how hard would that intel have to be to get relatively neutral countries on the side of a coalition and striking iran? >> thank you. >> dr. kroenig, start with you. >> as i pointed out before, the iran situation today and iraq situation of 2003 are very different. one of the differences is that we have a much better window on to what's going on in iran's nuclear program. we have inspectors on the ground visiting iran's nuclear facilities every two weeks, writing very detailed reports every three month.

we have a very good sense of what's going on there. it's the international atomic energy agency inspectors there, it's not any one country making these claims, not the u.s. intelligence community, it's a respected international community. i think they believe the ia when they talk about what iran has on the ground and outside experts do these calculations and say if they made the decision today, four months to the material. so i don't think intel is going to be the problem. in terms of can we builds coalition, i think we can but we haven't even really begun and i think that's a mistake. i think that we should be doing the initial outreach and we'd have a better idea of what kind of coalition we have. >> i agree with the first part and disagree with the second part. if we started overt diplomacy or quiet outreach to the permanent members of the security council or others on military action, it would confirm there were suspicions about the united

states, which is we're through the motions of sanctions and diplomacy. it could complicate both our ability to have diplomacy work because people want want to play that game with us and make it more difficult to force the coalition you're talking about. the only way to do is is to have a genuine commitment to diplomacy, let that process play out. if it fails make it clear it wasn't because of our demands and that it was iran that walked away from that process and use that to pivot to create a coalition. do i think it would work? i don't know. we have a recent case study which is when the iranians turned down the tehran research deal after first accepting it, it allowed the united states to create a normous -- an enormous coalition. i think we're playing it about

right, which it's not diplomacy as just in checking the box and that we're serious and if we're not serious, then we pivot towards a different approach. >> next question. >> my name is stephen davis. let's introduce another element into this equation. visiting the iaea web site today, they have an eight-minute introductory film. one of the commentators was henry kissinger who said, if we are standing with the podium with 20,000 nuclear weapons under our feet, it's very difficult to ask another nation not to develop one. if we are going to be serious about a nuclear-free world, do we not have to be serious about disarming ourselves? >> look, i think ultimately the

nuclear none proliferation committee has reciprocal commitments. and states like the united states and the soviet union and others that signed the treaty initially as nuclear states, they have an obligation to move towards disarmament. i think actually the obama administration shares the view that there are obligations on both sides, which is why they moved aggressive forward on new start, which was not an insignificant political risk. i think matt thinks some of those cuts go through too deep but i don't know if that's true or not. but in any case, i think the administration believes basically we also have to make good faith efforts to start to shrink our arsenal. but it doesn't excuse iran's commitment under the npt. the fact of the matter is iran gave up the right to have nuclear weapons when they signed the npt. unless they're willing to pull out of the npt, the iranians are not a member of the npt, we are

a member and committed to drawing down forces, that member is ironclad no matter what we're doing. >> kbh you put yourself in the place of the leader of tehran, they're probably thinking what nuclear weapons serve our interest, can we build nuclear weapons, do we have the industrial capacity, how close are we, how tough are the international sanctions against us, can we live with these, will the united states and trillion conduct a military strike. it's likely that they're saying does the united states have 2 -- 2,200 nuclear weapons or 1,500? i don't think it's something playing on the iranians' minds right now.

>> i'd like to just raise this question of north korea. it's hard to argue that north korea or that iran is more irresponsible than north korea and yet the bush administration was willing to accept north korea getting nuclear weapons. so why are we now -- where were the warmongers when this was going on under the bush administration? why were we willing to accept north korea getting nuclear weapons and not iran? obviously one of the elfments here, the key elements, is israel. and i think they're putting president obama in an extremely difficult position. it's an election year. nobody's mentioned this but -- and the idea that if we attack, everybody knows that gas prices are going to skyrocket and it's one of the issues that cost in the auction. so you're putting him in an extremely difficult position.

>> matt? >> i guess the first thing i would say is i think some people think that this is -- we're worried about iran's nuclear program somehow as a favor to israel. think that's the wrong way to look at it. the united states has good reason to be threatened by iran's nuclear program, even if israel didn't exist. president obama said the same thing. iran's program threatens international peace and security. on the north korea example, in 1994 the clinton administration seriously considered the use of force, decided to do it and backed off at the last minute. i think it's not clear whether that was a good decision or not. i mean, if you think about what a nuclear armed north korea has looked like, it's been more aggressive, attacking a warship that's transferred nuclear technology to syria, maybe even other countries. we haven't seen the full range

yet. i think if a nuclear armed iran looks like north korea organization pakistan, we should really be concerned. >> on the israel issue, i think undeniablely israel is a factor in our calculations. from someone who was on the inside for three years, it's not the driving factor of our policy on iran. it's the judgment of this administration and the previous view administrations that an iranian nuclear weapon is a significant threat to u.s. vital national interests in a volatile region. israel matters i think in shaping certain decisions but not in the ultimate court. i also think there's actually been some evidence in the last couple months that this administration isn't prisoner to israeli desires on this. how do you know that? because if this administration had been prisoner tho those desires, obama would have laid

out much clearer headlines at the apec conference, we would have just green lit an iranian attack instead of just telling them not to do it or we would have committed to doing it ourselves now. this is a viable ogs. how do i know? half the republican candidates running for president have suggested green lighting an israeli attack or doing it jointly or doing it ourselves claiming the red line is now. there is a way in which you could be more behold ento the israeli view. we see that on c-span just about every day on the other side of the political aisle. at the end of the day they're making judgments based on u.s. national interest. israel factors into that. protecting israel is part of our national interests in that part of the world. it's not wrong. it's just the way it is. >> yes, ma'am.

>> hi, my name is deana. i'm here more as a person who has a lot of iranian friend who is fled the country because of elections in '09 and they're very active here in the united states. most of them are at school. it seems to me that the biggest enemy for iran in iranian regime are iranian people themselves. and considering the fact that now the elections are coming up and considering the united states does have enough time on their hands to go to the diplomatic solution of this probl problem, where do you see the iranian people there waiting and it's a huge iranian meeting here in los angeles. where do you see iranian people in this region of inviting them to be in the coalition, as you said, that are against iranian government. >> we didn't talk very much about the internal politics in

iran. >> i think this administration has been pretty clear about the atrocious human rights record of the iranian regime and has been more vocal in criticizing it but also taking action on the sanctions front it to designate entities involved with it. as it relates to the questions here in today's discussion, there's not a consensus that the united states should attack iran. there's a lot of concern a u.s. or israeli attack will give the regime a chance to brutally repress the opposition. it could rally support around the hardliners for some period of time. it could have other effects over the long term but i don't see it as being productive toward helping the opposition or leading to a short-tem regime change. i think we have to be careful about -- regime change would be good.

whether it would solve the cluk clear -- where the dispute happens is over whether that prom should be weaponized or not. the thing that kerps me about a psych on iran's tuke clear program it could convince people who were on the fence about whether iran needs a deterrent or not that they need one. so i don't want that conversation to happen. i want a different conversation to happen where they dial back their nuke clears and we can continue to hammer out -- it's not, ternl actors dropping bombs. >> colin pointed out a strike on iran's nuclear facilities could have negative consequences in terms of internal, domestic political events in iran.

others have pointed out you might get this rally effect in the short tem but that over time it could leave to criticism for bringing the crisis on the country. so in the long term it could weaken the current regime. it might very well being the case that a strike would strengthen the current regime. i think getting nuclear weapons would strengthen them as well. it would buy them some legitimacy. both of those scenarios you're possibly looking at a stronger regime. >> president obamaia ahmadinejad's tern ends next year. are there things we're not thinking of that could impact the discussions of iran's nuclear capabilities. if you could each give a quick thought o