and of course, sam houston is a paradigm of honesty. you will no doubt do ample justice to the motives which prompts this communication to you. and i should censure myself if i were to conceal from you the knowledge of any facts which would enable you during your administration -- during your administration to acquire texas. so houston wants to acquire texas on jackson's watch. during his administration. if it is in accordance with the policy of the united states, if you want it, i want to make it happen for you. it is probable that i may make texas my abiding place. in adopting this course, i will never forget -- and that's houston's emphasis, that's not

mine -- i will never forget the country of my birth and he never did. so let's recap. there's old hickory himself. okay, houston arrived in texas intent on fomenting the evidence. john wharton, a prominent member of the war party, invited houston to texas and wrote openly of an anticipated rebellion as early as june 1832, according to albert pike who overheard the chin comment, houston spoke of becoming president of a republic before he had even set foot in texas. houston consulted with his political mentor, andrew jackson, then president of the united states and an expansionist, who was at least

aware of houston's intentions as early as 1832. houston wrote of enlisting indians in u.s. territory as auxiliaries in the event of a change. president jackson named houston his envoy to the pawnee and comanche tribes. and most compelling, houston wrote president jackson describing conditions inside mexican texas that could, if properly managed, promote the acquisition of texas by the government of the united states. he's no longer even trying to be coy. given the contents of these documents, there's no doubt that houston had committed himself to fomenting rebellion in texas, a rebellion which would culminate in texas becoming part of the united states.

right. let's fast-forward four years. it's march 1836. houston's long-anticipated change had begun with the "come and take it" fight at gonzalez. early in december, a texan volunteer army forced the surrender of mexican general martin perfecto decost and his centralist force in san antonio de bexar. in february 1836, a vengeful antonio lopez santana splashed across the rio grande at the head of an army numbering some 7,000. on february 23rd, he arrived and laid siege inside the alamo. on march 1st, texan delegates arrived to attend a convention held in the town of washington. wasting no time, they declared independence the following day. on that exact day, sam houston issued a proclamation that made

its way through the anglo settlements. at first, this appears innocuous enough but close inspection reveals some odd inconsistencies. since delegates did not confirm houston as commander in chief of the army until march 4th, this march 2nd proclamation appeared more than a little presumptuous or at least peremptory. still, it was typical of houston's large and in charge style. if one reads the body of the document, houston's intent seems clear. and let's do that. war is raging on the frontier bears the siege by 2,000 under the command of general sesma.

reinforcements are on the march to join with the besieging army. by the last report, our force was only 150 men. the citizens of texas must rally to the aid of our army or it will perish. let the citizens of the east march to the combat. the enemy must be driven from our soil. our dissolution will accompany their march upon us. independence its declared. it must be maintained. immediate action united with valor can alone achieve the great work. the services of all are forthwith required in the field, sam houston, commander in chief of the army. okay, not what you would expect. yet in his postscript, he

forcefully carries the thrust of his original message -- in one breath -- let's read what he says. p.s., it is rumored that the enemy are on their march to gonzalez and they have entered the colonies. the fate of bexar is unknown. the fate of bexar is unknown. the country must and shall be defended. the patriots of texas are appealed to in behalf of their leading country. in one breath, houston urges the public to rush to the relief of the alamo. in the next, he insinuates that the alamo may have already fallen, the enemy is on the doorstep and texians should prepare to defend their homes. talk about mixed messages.

could it be as early as march 2nd houston was already preparing his case for withdrawal? on march 6th, 1836, general houston departed washington for gonzalez to take command of the relief forces gathered there and break the siege of the alamo. the irony is, of course, that the fort had fallen earlier that morning. still, no person outside of san antonio knew that and certainly not the delegates in washington. on march 11th, the same day that houston finally arrived in gonzalez, two men galloped into town to report to fall of the alamo. according to a patriot, quote, their report was so detailed as to preclude any doubts about the

disastrous event. nevertheless, houston arrested the pair as spies while he publicly disparaged their information, the general privately admitted in a letter to colonel james walker fannen that he feared that, quote, a melancholy portion of it will be found to be too true. end quote. houston later claimed that he attempted to quash reports concerning the fall of the alamo because of the panic they would engender. in a march 15th communique, houston lamented that 20 of his men has deserted from the first sensation produced by the intelligence. he then derided them for damaging chitchat.

they have disseminated throughout the frontier such exaggerated reports that they have preceded dismay and consternation among the people to a most distressing extent, end quote. but, friends, read once again the postscript to the march 2nd proclamation. houston himself was the first to float the wholly unsubstantiated rumor that the alamo might have already fallen four days before it actually did. houston found about 300 volunteers in gonzalez, men who formed the nucleus of the san asinto army. houston took stock of the forces at his disposal, the facts and

figures gave him little reason for optimism. okay, i'm not going to bother breaking this down. bottom line is that houston had at his disposal about 1,014 men. and these are spread from over about a 200-mill perimeter. now, what of the enemy forces? houston had no notion how many men santana had. but he knew his excellency had considerably more than he did. and it was probably better that houston did not know how many more. santana had left saltillo with about 7,000 effectives. but illness, exposure and combat

losses at the alamo had taken their toll. yet they still had well over 6,000 men under his command. houston had a tad over 1,000. it was obvious that houston could not defend gonzalez with the meager forces in hand. he would have to retire northward in hope of consolidating his scattered units. a few days later, the general explained his reasoning and in correspondence to collinsworth. this is what he wrote. we could have met the enemy and avenged some of our wrongs. but detached as we were, without supplies for the men in camp, our provisions, our ammunition, our artillery, it would have been madness to hazard a

contest. the soldiers had not been taught the first principles of the drill. if starved out and the count broken up, there was no hope for the future. by falling back, texas can rally and defeat any force that could come against her. end quote. okay, fair enough. under those circumstances and in the face of such odds, only the most rabid critic could criticize houston for retreating from gonzalez. by all means, fall back. yes, but how far? that was a question that at the time houston was reluctant to answer. thus houston began his retreat. he's there at gonzalez.

he retreats northward to burnham's ferry on the colorado, then to beason's crossing and then to san felipe on the

braswell river. then up river to a campsite and cross from the plantations just a few miles down river from washington where he started. while there, houston's unwillingness to reveal his ultimate destination generated an abundance of camp talk. on april 12th, the texian army broke camp and began an eastward march. april 16th, brought the volunteers to a major crossroad, both actual and metaphorical. the north fork led to nacogdoches and safety, the second toward harrisburg and confrontation. tensions ran high as the army approached the spot that they would recall as the forks of the road, the forks of the road. riding toward the rear of the column, houston remained silent, cheering the army took the south fork. since that day, controversy has surrounded the incident. did houston intend to turn south at the forks othe road? after the fact, he swore that he

did. but witnesses on the ground had different recollections. robert coleman, a houston aide-de-camp quoted the houston saying while they were across from grossis plantation, as soon as it is ascertained in camp that the enemy is at san felipe, half the army will be teasing me to fight. i am, however, commander in chief. i will retreat to the redlands. i will immediately issue marching orders and the retreat shall be commenced as soon as possible. now, that's what coleman said. and this is corroborated in

large part by something that anson jones, last president of the texas republic, also said. and this is a long quote for which i apologize, but it's at the crux of the matter. so bear with me. in my memoranda for 1839 of april 2nd is a note of a conversation with mr. j.w. houston of washington, d.c., an intimate and confidential friend of general jackson's and houston which he informed me that general jackson agreed to claim the natchez as the true subine turned treaty of 1819 with spain. now, this is the adams onise treaty of 1819. and that he would defend and fight for that line, the natchez. the retreat of general houston in 1836 was, therefore,

doubtless with a view to that understanding. and to place his army behind that line, it was anticipated that santana would not regard this pseudoclaim and would in pursuit of texans if the retreating policy were long enough continue, cross the natchez which would have afforded the government of the united states a pretext for making common cause with texas and produce the same state of things that was brought about ten years later by general taylor's advance to the rio grande. that is war by the act of mexico and with precisely the same wont of truth.

this plan was defeated by the determination of the texan troops by which general houston was forced on the 15th of april, 1836, to deflect from the road to nacogdoches, gaines ferry and ft. jessup and to take the one which led to san asinto. the affair at this place was one of those singularly fortuitous and accidental circumstances by which the best-laid schemes of mice and men are sometimes frustrated. the texan people have great reason to be thankful to a kind providence for that event. but the schemes of general santana, jackson, houston and gaines were all in different ways more or less a disappointed biat. now i am going to have to play hurry up now, i am almost out of time. there is the general gains of the u.s. army. now here's the deal. here is another thing. the army on the night of april 15th at mcsurly's, mccarly's,

within three miles of the forks of the road. after dark, the general met with colonel coleman and requested him to go amongst the soldiers and say that he would take the h harrisburg road. he yielded his own judgment in obedience to his superior. now, rus ik is secretary of war. colon colonel coleman obeyed. soldiers were suspicious and discontent prevailed.

forget what coleman says. forget what all the people on the ground said. forget what even steve harden says. the most compelling evidence comes from general houston himself in a speech he gave in houston in 1845. i received information that colonel travis and had succumbed to overwhelming numbers and had been prutly slaughtered. i sent a currier, ordering him to destroy all his artillery that he could not remove and retreat to vuk toictoria. here's the smoking gun.

i then determined to retreat and get as near as andrew jackson and the old flag as i could. let me read that again. i then determined to retreat to get as near to andrew jackson and the old flag as i could. now, this is at gonzalez at the very outset of the campaign. and if this is true, did he lie to the government and his soldiers when he told them, i plan to fight at the colorado? i plan to fight at the brasse? yes. yes. what other conclusion could one draw? and why? well, he wants to lure across the nachez so gaines would intervene. now, there's even talk that houston on the day of the actual

battle -- april 21st -- is saying, hey, guys, let's build a bridge, a floating bridge across buffalo bayou. for you folks in houston, that's bayou. buffalo, bayou. and retreat in these taxes. are you crazy? here they are now. do i believe that on the day of the battle sam houston wants to build a floating bridge and retreat across the buffalo bayou? i do. and here's why. a battle fought at san jacinto, even if a victory, even if a victory is not going to achieve houston's political goals, which remember, is to bring texas in to the united states. if gaines had engaged santana on texas soil, gaines defeats the mexican army.

i think we can know that's going to happen. texans secure their independence. what had formally been a texan war now becomes an american war. having spent their blood in treasure, americans have an investment in texas. texas joins the union much sooner than it did historically and the bottom line, houston finally achieves his long-term ambition of bringing texas into the union. but that didn't happen. why didn't it happen? because of the soldiers, themselves, and t.j. rusk who

doesn't get much credit at all. so what's the takeaway? what happens if houston had gotten his way? the texan army marches into east texas? santana pursues houston across the natchez river and gaines intervenes. the battle that follows is an american victory. texas takes the fast track to annexation. the republic of texas exists for one year instead of ten. texans failed to develop a national character. the republic of texas plays little or no role in the emerging texan identity. and the republic of texas plays no role in the evolving myth and mystique. no texas exceptionalism. and modern texans would likely act like those other people. thank you very much. do we have time for questions? or have we run over? >> just one or two questions, please.

>> yes, sir. way, way here in the back. >> just a comment. some years ago when i was traveling through colorado, there was an article "the denver post" that said due to the dropping of oil prices in houston and texas areas, texas was in danger of becoming just another state. >> yeah. >> one of my favorite quotes. >> nah. we don't, because we've got a distinct history, which also means we have a distinct culture. if a people think they're different, they are. anybody else? any other questions? way, way here in the back. yes, sir. >> thank you.

you mentioned the number of men that houston had in his army. >> yeah. >> were there any tejanos involved in part of that army? >> absolutely, absolutely. i did mention juan. yes, there were federalists tejanos in that army, as there were centralist tejanos fighting with santana. tejanos are all over this conflict, and i would refer you, if you're interested in that topic, to an article i wrote in "tejano journey" where that book discusses the role. of tejanos in the texas revolution. again, the name of that book is "tejano journey." >> the reason i ask, when you have the lineup, maybe next time you can include and cite the number of tejanos with the army. >> they're included in the forces with famine and with grant and johnson.

so they're included, but they were in larger units, yeah. so they are included in that number. i think we're almost out of time. if you have more questions, i'll be in the hall. >> thank you very much, dr. hardin. [ applause ] >> just over 30 years ago, sandra day o'connor became the first woman appointed to the u.s. supreme court. tomorrow the former justice takes part in a discussion looking at her career. the three women who followed her to the high court and still currently serve. events hosted by the supreme court historical society and freedom forum and you can see it live at 6:30 p.m. eastern on cspan 2. also tomorrow, live coverage of the indiana senate republican primary debate between senator richard lugar and challenger,

who serves as indiana treasurer. the hoosier state holds its primary may 8th. is begins at 7:00 p.m. on cspan, or listen on cspan radio. april 15th, 1912, nearly 1,500 perish on the ship called "unsinkable." >> once the lookout bells were sounded, once the lookout sighted an iceberg ahead. they struck the bells, in the process, three times, ding, ding, ding, which is a warning saying there is some object ahead. doesn't mean dead ahead. means ahead of the ship. doesn't say what kind of object. with the lookout, after they struck the bell, he went to a telephone nest and called down to the officer on the bridge to tell them what it is that they saw. and the phone was finally answered, the, the entire conversation was. what do you see? and the response was, iceberg right ahead.

and the response from the officer was, thank you. >> the truths and myths of that night, sunday at 4:00 p.m. eastern. part of american history tv this weekend on cspan 3. all tonight here on cspan 3, american history tv in primetime. and we continue now with our look at a symposium examining the 1830s texas revolution between u.s. settlers and the mexican government. we conclude our coverage of this symposium with greggdimmick on how archaeological evidence is being used across texas where the revolution ended. this is 35 minutes.