defense system. you are the acting assistant secretary of defense policy for asia and pacific security affairs. what is in the secret deal? are we to be concerned about the effects of limiting our missile defense system, our only protection that we have with respect to the emerging and rising threat of north korea to our homeland? >> congressman, i am not aware of any secret deal. we do take the missile -- the growth of north korea's missile capability very seriously. as i indicated, we're working very closely with south korea operationally and with other countries in the region. >> since you said you are not aware of a secret deal, perhaps it's not a secret deal to you, it is secret to us until it was caught on the microphone. are you aware of the deal the president has with medvedev and russia that would be revealed to us after the election that perhaps is in not secret to you that would limit our missile

defense capability in deployment, use or scope that of course is a serious concern to this committee as we look to the rise of north korea? are you aware of the subject matter of the president's missile defense deal, secret or not, with the russians? if you're not why are you not? >> no, sir. i am not. i can assure you that we do believe that missile defense in our phase adaptive approach to the region is very much alive. it's very much part of our comprehensive approach to deal with the threat posed by the north koreans and something we're committed to. in the closed session i'd be happy to describe in detail the steps we're taking. >> you are an appointee by the president? >> yes, i am. >> i would appreciate it if you would ask the president what are the details of his deal with the russians concerning missile defense that cannot be disclosed until after the election, and police report it back to this committee because we have grave

concerns as to a president having any restriction on our defensive systems especially with as you have eloquently described the rising threat of north korea. i would greatly appreciate that. thank you. mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. reyes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for being here this morning. always good to see you. i guess one concern that i have and others have had as well has been whether or not there's any intention of drawing down further the presence of u.s. troops in theater. is there any plan or are there any contingency plans to do that in light of all of the issues including sequestration that would play into that kind of

scenario? >> congressman reyes, there are no plans that i am aware of that draws down any forces on the peninsula. we are staying at 28,500. there may be adjustments inside those capabilities, but it is those adjustments would be to improve our overall force posture. there are no plans that i am aware of. >> and in terms of the agreement that we have with the particularly for the stability of the korean peninsula with the south koreans, are there any concerns and i apologize for not having been able to be here. i had another meeting that i have to be at, but are there any

changes that we contemplate based on the new leadership in north korea in that partnership with the south koreans? >> congressman reyes, first off, i believe the alliance is as strong as it has ever been, particularly our military partnership. the concerns that the south koreans relay to me is obviously they're very concerned about the continued willingness on part of the north koreans to continue to test ballistic missiles, and pursuance of nuclear capability. that causes great angst and concern, and i think right now that's probably one of the biggest things. obviously they have not forgotten the sinking of the chonan that occurred in march of 2010 and the shelling of the

wipodo island that occurred in november of '10. they're very watchful of that and mindful of it. they have put a lot of emphasis on their military for overall readiness, i will tell you that. >> and in terms of the progress that had been made prior to the demise of kim jong-il, are there any indications that those kinds of efforts or talks are taking place in lieu of the concerns that you just expressed of the sinking and the shelling of the by the north koreans? is there any prospect that those talks of economic opportunities

being sought out by south koreans at this point? >> congressman, i have not seen any great change as a result of the succession with the new leader. i would welcome any discussion obviously. i think if the parties can discuss their differences, that's always a good thing. i have not seen any change. i defer to dr. lavoy on any policy issues in regard to that. >> i could add to that, congressman. north korea is an authoritarian regime of course. and political successions are difficult when you don't have a representative government which is the case there of course. what we're seeing now and what we anticipate is provocative behavior because unfortunately this seems to be the only way that the north korean regime

that don demonstrate its bona fides to its population. they can't meet the needs of the population, the nutritional or other educational or other needs of the population, so they resort to provocative behavior. despite efforts to stabilize relations with the north and to deescalate tensions on the peninsula following these very dangerous activities in the past. now once again because of an internal political dynamic of north korea it appears that they are once again inclined to take these provocative steps, most specifically the announced long-range missile test flight. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. scott. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i was just going back and forth with my aunt who has a nephew serving under you there in korea, young man named jake butler. forgive me but i know you were

the commander of the third id and very proud of fort stewart and what you gentleman accomplished, ladies and gentlemen accomplished over there, and representing george well and the united states well. i want to speak just very briefly that we're very proud of. could you speak about the program what it means in a potential conflict with north korea? >> congressman, first off, in respect to jay stars, that gives us moving target capability without going into the classified portion of it. more importantly, what i am looking for as a commander is i have a set of priority intelligence requirements and i welcome any system that is going to help me answer those requirements. it is an added capability that

does help us on the peninsula. >> my cousin is honored to serve under you as a commander, his mom wanted to ask why was issued live am nice. we'll answer that behind closed doors. thank you, mr. general. i field the remainder of my time. >> thank you. mr. andrews. >> mr. chairman, i apologize to you and the witnesses for being tardy, i was in a hearing with the secretary of education. no disrespect to you gentlemen. dr. lavoy, within the confines of this public discussion, i wanted to get the thinking behind the linkage of the missile test that's coming up presumably next month, and our decision about whether to execute and follow through on

the food aid agreement with north korea. i am not sure what i think about that idea but let me play devil's advocate here. one argument might be that lifrpging the two punishes the north korean people without having significant impact on the north korean leadership, would further intensify anti-u.s. or anti-western hostility, and therefore strengthen the hand domestically of the north korean leadership to engage in such extra legal and unwelcome activities on the international stage. how would you assess that argument and respond to it? >> well, i can tell you that it is regrettable that the food aid is not moving forward. the north korean population really needs nutritional assistance and we're prepared to provide that to north korea.

the real motivation and the linkage, this is not intended to be linked to anything else to any movement by the north koreans. however, the fact that north korea so brazenly violated commitments and just so recently agreed to, in the discussions in bejing, and its commitment that it announced on february 29th on leap day, and indicates that they're not reliable and we cannot expect them to meet other international commitments including the commitments that they have agreed to that are associated with the provision of nutritional assistance to the needy population in their country. >> i understand the basis, the rationale that they dishonored their agreement so they really abandoned their right to claim what they would get under the agreement. my question really more is whether we think that's going to be effective in altering the behavior of this government or whether it is going to worsen our position. you obviously think it will be effective relatively speaking? >> well, congressman, we don't

believe that nutritional assistance should be a lever to achieve a political outcome. it is a humanitarian effort that we have intended and it is regrettable this stopped. by the reason again why we're not providing that food assistance at this point is because we have our confidence in their ability to meet their agreements has been diminished. we do not use it agency a lever to change their policies. >> they might see it differently but that's okay. again, within the confines of this public discussion, either of you would be pleased to answer it. how do you assess the role the people's republic of china in dealing with this outlaw behavior by north korea? are they more helpful than not or more harmful than not, neutral? put another way, what do you think the optimal behavior of the prc towards this problem is and how close are they to obtaining it?

>> congressman, i think as we have discussed already, china has potentially a great deal of influence and probably more than any other country on the regime in north korea, so of course we for a long time have been talking to the chinese, consulting regularly with the chinese, about how best to influence the north koreans and in a manner to effect reforms at home and to conform their international behavior to acceptable standards. objectively we can see that north korea continues to behave outside the rules of normal and acceptable international conduct. so that influence has not been as effective today as we would have liked. we continue to consult with the chinese and with other countries that discuss with the relations with north korea about north korea's behavior, and as our partnership with china deepens,

we hope china will see the interest in the spirit of this partnership. >> i am hopeful of that, too. unless you see everything as a zero sum game between the u.s. and the prc which we certainly don't, and i hope they don't, this kind of instability in their own region can't possibly be good for the prc, and certainly not good for the rest of the world. i hope that we would continue those efforts to find common ground that would encourage north korea to act within the community of nations. thank you. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. west. >> thank you, mr. chairman and ranking member also. i just want to also say steadfast and loyal, general thurman, great to see you again. i want to kind of dovetail off of what my colleague mr. andrews talked about because i was stationed in korea in 1995, camp casey and i think that we continue to see this series of saber rattling and us giving in and more rattling and us giving in and honoring of their

commitment and promises so my simple question is do you ever see an end to this pavalovian experiment of international extortion coming out of north korea. >> we certainly hope to see the end to that and doing everything possible to do this but it's a regime that as i indicated because of their own internal compulsions, which are completely dysfunctional and out of step with the 21st century that leads them to this behavior and probably only when they can reform internally can they get international behavior to align to acceptable standards. >> but does there come a time when our perceived benevolence they translate into weakness must be ended for us to stop this crazy cycle of international extortion? that's how i see it. i'm a simple guy from the inner city of atlanta, georgia. that's how we call it. >> well, congressman, i wouldn't expect you're a simple guy.

but let me just say that i wouldn't characterize our approach as benevolent or weak at all. >> but they perceive it as weak. >> i'm not sure that they do, sir. >> there are quotes in some of the papers out of prk that say so. do you believe that the incredible debt situation where china holds 28 to 30% of our debt, we're almost to the economic disadvantage against china, does that have an adverse effect of our foreign policy in dealing with north korea? >> as i indicated a moment ago we do have a strong partnership with china, we are consults with china on a range of issues, particularly north korea because china does have so much influence. and we believe that china can be an effective partner and can provide more influence on the

north korean regime than it has been to date. >> but do you think that china sees itself as being able to be somewhat belligerent because of the fact they do have this control of 28% of our debt and a little bit of a trade imbalance advantage over us? you think that gives them leverage? >> congressman, that's not apparent to me. we talk with china about real world international problems and how to deal with them. >> general thurman, commanders like yourself always taught me two questions. that you have to answer when you're briefing a plan. sir, what do you see as the most dangerous and the most likely courses of action coming out of north korea? >> thanks, congressman west. the first thing i worry about every day is a miscalculation on somebody's part that causes a conflict that we haddant planned for. that's the first thing.

secondly, i worry about the asymmetric capabilities that the north koreans have, whether it be with special operations, forces, or the i want deduction of kim bio and in cyber. those are some of the things that i worry about. i think we're postured well to repel an attack. they have a considerable number of indirect fire systems and as expansive as seoul is, any round coming our direction could potentially do damage. so i worry about that. so the importance of staying ready and remaining vigilant is very important for both roc and u.s. that's 24 hours a day, seven day as week. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you.

mr. pilazzo. >> thank you, mr. chairman. like to thank our witness for being here this morning and testifying. i had to spend most of this committee in another committee so i haven't been able to follow the entire line of questioning. i want to first of all, i'm sure chairman whitman talked about his pay com visit. i was part of that when we did that and it was a wonderful trip and the republic of korea was on there along with the philippines and japan. everywhere we went one of our common denominators of concern was china. and also what was our u.s. posture going to be. and if we moved our posture to where our allies thought that we were maybe retreating or just falling back a little too far for their general welfare, then they would have to do whatever they have to do to take care of the security and stability of

their population. so, i guess what i'm saying is i hope we're focusing on china. i know the president was talking about it being an emerging threat, that and cyber security, the middle east, making sure that the shipping lanes around the world are continuously open because our economic and national security depends so much on it. then the next thing you hear we're talking in another hearing and we hear that i don't know, or a separate conversation actually, that the chinese are even building ice breakers to go to the arctic to begin claiming the north seas for those resources. so that causes me concern and hopefully we'll perhaps continue to focus on their behavior and expose it. and all the while you know, they are increasing their spending on their military and we're cutting a half a trillion dollars over the next decade and staring down the barrels of a double-barreled

shotgun with the possibility of sequestration and that scares me. i guess i'll switch gears. from a cpa standpoint i like to see the cost benefit. we're doing some realigning and moving further back and i had a chance to visit young song, i haven't had a chance to visit the new site. are we getting the best value for our dollar? i mean we kind of kept the peace for them for decades now. and i know typically wherever the u.s. military has been that footprint is one of the most valuable pieces of property left on that continent or in that country. is it -- sir, are we doing a fair exchange? are they paying for their fair share? are we giving up a nice piece of property for false appeasement? >> congressman, thank you for that question. first thing i would tell you, i

think we're getting a very good deal with the roc government. the property of young song, we will keep a residual because that is important with our day-to-day business that we do. i interface daily with the roc chairman of their military as well as their ministry of defense. so we'll have a small footprint there and of course the u.s. embassy will eventually relocate out to young song on some property there. in regard to the cost, there are shared costs. i would be more than happy to give you a detailed cost break-out of that so you can see, but i believe we're getting a very good deal. i believe that the roc government welcomes u.s. presence. you spoke of china, we are a

stabilizing influence as long as we're forward deployed. that would be something that needs to be factored in all of these discussions because that's important to maintain stability in that region. i think overall the roc has been more willing and you can go back to 1991, now you have continued to increase their spending to assist u.s. forces stationed there. >> thank you, general. i know on our trip there they were receptive and very supportive of u.s. troops in roc, so keep doing a great job and good seeing you. hopefully i made it aware to chairman whitman i would like to go on another paycom trip. it's a grave importance and i think it's important we gather as much information as possible and come back better prepared for hearings like this. so thank you all both. i yield back. >> thank you.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. i like my colleague i'm a little disadvantaged, i came from a markup in homeland security. i don't know what went on but the question i had i think has been addressed. i was concerned about, as the overall cost of realignment of the u.s. forces in south korea and how much is being funded by the republic of korea. can you give me is it 20%, what are we talking. i don't need raw numbers. what is their responsibility and what numbers does that equate to? >> congresswoman, first off on young song relocation the government is paying for that. there will be costs associated with our communications in specific requirements and related to our unique requirements for our communications networks. that's a responsibility of ours as well as some of the onm

requirement and srm requirements that will be required in the future. the land partnership program was a u.s. initiative and funded by the u.s. primarily. we did use special measures funding from the roc government but i'd be more than happy to give you the cost breakout. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back the balance of my time. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i was interested in your comments, general, what keeps you up at night worrying about the operational, special op forces that north korea has, their cyber as well as the weapons of mass destruction capabilities, those are the things that stood out to me as i read your testimony as well. i have to admit i did not realize that north korea had the

world's largest special operations force, over 60,000 trained and loyal soldiers at the president's beck and call at any moment. i wanted to focus in on the other two areas. you say regarding the cyber that the newest addition to the arsenal is the growing cyber warfare capability, that north korea employed sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber tactics, such attacks are ideal for north korea providing the regime a means to attack without attribution and have increasingly employed against a variety of targets including government and commercial institutions. so i was wondering what are we doing to help counter this threat? >> congresswoman, first off, that is correct what you just

read. it's an area that i have placed greater emphasis on to make sure our networks are properly protected. i would be more than happy 18 closed session to go into the detailed capabilities of what the threat is that we see in a closed forum. >> they deployed us against our military so i would like to know more about what actually happened there. so let me move to the weapons of mass destruction question, saying that you list that as a significant concern and that you assess the capability to manufacture, transport and deliver a variety of persistent and nonpersistent chemicals, nerve, choking and blister agents, could be delivered through artillery or missile systems and that if they were to employ them, it could use highly

pathogenic agents such as anthrax and plagues and in dense populations this would be a tremendous problem. i guess my question are our current proliferation and policies and programs effective tools to mitigate these threats and what more can we do? general or secretary? >> congresswoman, first thing, in regard to our protection of our men and women who are serving on the peninsula. i have placed a lot of emphasis on our overall chemical, biological defense training. we train on that, on a frequent basis. i'm confident we have the right capabilities. that's the first thing. secondly, in terms of biodetection, we have placed a lot of emphasis on our installations with our biological detection

capabilities. and so it's important to keep that current. we do work with our roc forces, they are very good with their chemical capabilities, and we train in those type of environments. so i'm confident in regard to that. i do not see the north koreans giving up this capability. i think it's something we have to deal with given the current set of conditions. >> would you like to add? >> i would add, thank you very much. i think what the department of defense brings to bear, what general thurman and his theater bring to bear are three important things. a strong deterrence capability. to deter the north from use these horrendous weapons of mass destruction. a robust defensive capability. should these be used general thurman and his forces together with the south kor