if states just made this information available, and we didn't have to, you know, dig quite so much, and so presumably there will be a transparency expect a to the arms trade treat they will hopefully allow this information to be presented in a standardized, consistent and regular regular manner, which will make all of this work easier. so in conclusion in my opinion, the att needs to be practical and effective. and we need to balance var worthy aspirations and ideals concerning the arms trade with the reality of the global arms trade which we've heard from for this morning. it's not going to help to have a treaty at the end of the day that legitimizes irresponsible transfers, or leaves us way burdensome system that it hinders the legitimate commercial trade and nobody wants to be part of it. so you know, just lastly, unlike other conventional arms

treaties, like the land mine or the cluster ban, i want to stress that att is not about banning anything. it's about developing for the first time the rules of the game. it's about developing clear international standards for the global trade in arms. so we will see how states do with that task in july. >> thank you very much, rachel. i think was very helpful to provide a little bit of background to the att, and let me turn to bill. how does the united states see these issues? >> first, let me start off by thanki ining sipry for the vita work. a crucial rule in defense matters before it became international successful or sex toy discuss these matters. discussions like today are particularly welcome, because it means they are continuing to do its vital work and we're here to enjoy the fruits of its labor. and i'm here not to address the

trends in the international arms trade as paul did and as matt did, but rather to talk about two of the instruments that provide information, one of 9 instruments that existed that provides information, one that is being created that will also as well. conventional arms transfers are crucial security concern for the united states, and we have always supported effective action to control the international transfer of arms. international, pursuing this on two fronts i'm here to talk about today. the u.n. conventional arms and propose the arms trady we'll negotiate in july. the united states has ban strong supporter of the u.n. register since the first resolution established a multistep process to operationalize a voluntary register or conventional arms transfers. the register was intended to help identify -- sorry. to help prevent the excessive and die stabilizing of accumulation of arms in order to promote stability and strengthen international peace and security taking into account the legitimate security needs of

states and principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments. by any measure of the register it's a success. establishing a global norm in military matters and reinforcing civilian control of the military. during its 19 years of operations more than 170 states participated in the register at least one. more than 140 states participated three or more times an more than 100 participated seven time and 50, more than 50 participated every year. in the perpgs ranges in 76 to 126 states. by reporting in exports and imports the register captured the vast majority of the international arms trade in the register seven categories. even though some states may not participate in the register in a given year, or never registered, transfers involving many by having the export state report on the transfer even if the importing state doesn't report on the transfer. one mistake many make is look at

volume of the international arms trade and conclude the register is ineffective because the arms trade hasn't shrunk since created. that's looking at the wrong end of things. not that whether it's succeeded reducing the size of international arms trade rather, contributed to restraining its growth. wa would the size of the international arms growth be if the register did not exist? unquestionably it would be larger and more excessive and destabilizes arms buildup would occur fueled by your transfers of arms. the issue of irresponsible transfers brings me to my second topic. the arms traud treaty. trade treaty. it will be different from the u.n. register as it's created for a different reason based on different premises. the att is aiming to address the fact that there is no overarching international instrument to regulate the international trade conventional arms. once you've conducted responsibly arms transfers of a

legitimate enterprise. providing with materials necessary to fulfill the most basic functions of a government. protecting its citizens and enforces national sovereignty. nations have the right to defend themselves. as we all know there's a dark side that can have devastating quipses for peoples and regions. irresponsible transfers support terrorists, enable genocide and create and sustain and compound proliferation nightmares. the att discussions demonstrated a share of objective ill advised arms transfers by a number of countries and organizations. that's why we need an att. to better control some of the worst transfers across international borders. the united states is committed to actively providing a treat they contains the highest legally binding standards for the international transfer of convention's weapons. we recognize an arms trade treaty won't be the be all or end all or won't necessarily stop terrorism. legally binding instruments are

meaningless to such people because they are criminals who don't and won't abide by any reasonable agreements. this means that the only effective way to inhibit their activity is indirectly. all states much recognize the obligation to enact and enforce laws within their territory that krirm nallize isolate and punish those terrorist groups running within their territory that originate or transit through think territory. if the sovereign jurisdiction does not, the international community must work with that state do develop such a capability. the united states is acutely aware of the key role arms transfers play in the national security of most states and must take this fact into account in design the reporting of an att tailoring them to meet the nature of the instrument in its goals and objectives. make sure the att the regime does not conflict with other reporting regimes and create reporting fatigue on arms transfers. as a state which actively

reports its exports one of the burdens we have collecting the date te we actually report internationally and report internally. very transparent in terms of reporting stuff at capitol hill, and it does actually take a great deal of effort to do all of the different reporting submissions we have to do. the reporting is not being done for the sake of transparency for its own sake, rather to provide other state parties with information they need to judge how the treaty is applied in practice. att should require state parties to report annually to other state parts on implementation of the treaty and on either their physical transfer of arms or authorizations for transfer of arms. in reporting on limitations state parties should report on the actions they have taken during the reporting period to implement the treaty and on changes to the national systems of controls. the united states is open to the idea that reporting to other state parties on transfers or authorizations might be required for only some of the items that a state is required to control. a good starting point would be the arrangement arms list.

the united states strongly opposes reporting on denials of authorizations since this involves sensitive national security, commercial information and we don't want the att reporting advertisement of irresponsible marketers about market opportunities. some wonder if the att will render the u.n. surper few louse and to do away with it completely. that would be extremely unfortunate. these two instruments are designed to achieve different goals with different national participants. many will participate in both, but not all. given that the register involves political commitments to report transfer as well the at there involve a legal compliment to report transfers as part of a broader commitment to put in place the national system of controls, i expect participation of the register to far outstrip the att for years to come once we actually have an att. i expect that some countries who participate in the register will not be entrusted in joining an arms trade treaty. we need to maintain the register as a separate, distinct and

viable instrument to fulfill its obligative of promoting transparency is in conventional arms transfers. we need to promote a strong and effective att to promote common international standards. both instrument van important troel play in the area of international transfers of arms as does sipry. thank you. >> thank you very much, bill. i'd like to open it up to the audience. but maybe i'll take the prague tifb pa rogtive of the chair and ask a little background. one of the questions i had is how do the current efforts to try to control conventional weapons relate to efforts with what, in the '70s, the cat talks? i wonder if anybody can talk a little bit about that? and the second question i would have is that, you know, it looks like states have recognized -- rachel you mentioned this in particular, too -- the importance of transparency

measures. yet at the same time we've also seen a decline in the reporting of the u.n. register and so, you know, what does this mean for our future efforts on the att? so -- does any of the panelists want to -- bill? >> well, from my perspective, let me first address the issue that a decline in participation in the last couple years in the register. it's indisputable participation has gone down. it used to be between 90 and 125 countries would participate on an annual basis and over the last couple of years it's declined to being in the middle 70s. i mean, that's indisputable. the question is why you've had the decline, and from my point of view, i think for a couple of reasons. one is the continuing failure of the register to include small arms and light weapons as a category. it means the register is less relevant to the security kearns

of ma concerns of states around the world not affected by the seven categories. tanks, combat vehicles and aircraft, more threatened by the proliferation of small arms like weapons. this is registered as an optional eighth category if you will, only optional. states in africa, latin america and asia are looking at the continuing failure of the register to include small arms in concluding, i don't need to participate in this because it doesn't actually direct that i report on it. i think, also, that the, there's been turnover in personnel at the u.n. office of affairs which implements the register affecting their ability or their willingness to go out and contact member states and remind them about the need to report data to the register and basically pursue submissions to the register. that's lagged over the last couple years. and then finally i think also that states are looking at the fact that we have an arms trade treaty negotiation that's going to start this summer and

wondering what's going to come from that and have been focusing attention on att and not focusing attention on the register. waiting for that shoe to drop, if you will, to see what's going to come from that and thinking if we have an arms trade treaty we won't need to provide data to the register. i argued before, that would be short-sighted. i think we need both instruments. some are waiting for us to finish the negotiation to see what the obligation is going to be under the att to report data. >> okay. anybody want to add anything? okay. let me open it up. and, please, identify yourself and maybe we'll take a few questions. >> i am dan wit american university, and you talk about the -- force, it must be very difficult in collecting data to know how much of the product is reaching a regime versus state actors within that same geographic area. is there data of such a thing?

and if so, does it look as if is it gaining or losing opposition? in general. >> the woman here in the front? >> good morning. my name is -- from university of georgia. trait a trade and security. first of all, welcome to the community. [ speaking in foreign language ], as we say in swedish and thanks for putting together a very interesting panel. i have two questions, if you a allow me. this one goes to paul and the experts on the panel. you mentioned one of the trends, one of the worrisome trends, in the arms market at the moment s is -- is the capacity building, time or transfers that receiving more and more of. do you see that as a call with looking at strategic trade

controls and how we monitor and control the capability building equipment as something that we need to look at with the -- new eyes or from a different perspective? and how would that relate to the discussion regarding the arms trade treaty and the possible conclusion of weapons controlling parts of the -- the second question to you, matt. it's quite fascinating to see a friend down south displaying his new purchase in such a youtube-esque way. but how do you perceive this type of social media, tweeting and facebooking and youtube be these types -- how do you weigh that against possibility of tweaking the competition or putting a picture of something

in the wrong place? how can you evaluate this type of information where you can put anyone together with anything and then post it somewhere in the -- so, thank you. >> okay. paul, would you like to take a stand? >> yeah. i was going to add to bill's comments on the register first, but sort of tracking decline, one of the things we noded, the decline has been the reports, bill suggested, those states who feel perhaps the relevance of the att with regards to, well, if i have nothing to report, why should i report? maybe comes through, and not pushing those states to sort of see the value in the conference building of actually giving a report is one of the things i think is key there. with regards to our arms transfers database we don't just look at transfers to states but to actors. compared with matt we have much fewer sort of transfer there's. although we do anti-tank guided weapons, which you'll see with

some states. some non-state actors because year not tracking in our database the rifle, the ammunition and the smaller arms and weapons. we have some evidence and information public database but i think not as much as matt is finding with the illicit arms project. that said, we have a project tracking illicit trafficking paying a lot of attention looking tools to prevent trafficking by air and now with maritime i mentioned, looking at ways of exploring this, these particular issues. with regards to the trends in terms of transferring more than just the complete system but the means to produce, the blueprints, components, coming from different areas. i think -- i guess rachel agrees it really talks to the att discussions i think in terms of the need for ensuring that these states actually have these control systems in place. when talking with european

licensing officers one of the thing they often raise is that it's one of the facts they take into account when doing risk assessments, to what extent they have an export control system in place and how they regard them and how well they're regarded internationally. i think that's a key aspect there and something that's certainly work flagging up for us. one of the things i think it shows is it's a biased market. what we're seeing is that some of these recipients are able to put grave demands on supplies and in the past, and you're seeing transfers not just more advanced equipment, also the means to produce. and i think that that talks to the att. and the discussions i'm used to there you have people talking about, there's a group of suppliers and everyone else is resill yents. i think it's much fuzzier and complicated, as you said. therefore to me that really talks of the need to have some sort of global instrument. also i'll butt in on matt's social media front. we also use these as open sources. and it's the same problem with still images you've used a lot as well.

with regards to the information we have, a private database where we keep the rumor, cook -- cookiest stuff. we have have one image, we might be careful putting it in a public version. with the small team we have we were able to cross-check and verify from different sources and although a time lag, might be something from 2011 we'd like to put in the database for the public, just not confident about, we'll sit on it and wait but are happy to speak with people if they have a query. you know, do you have information about such and such a transfer? we're happy to share that, but with a caveat. >> yeah. i just wanted to jump in on a coup couple of the points as well. the arms trade treatly only look at state-to-state transfers. but one of the goals, of course, would be to prevent diversion into the illegal market and most

often that illegal market ends up being used by the actor. there is a link in the treaty to the actors but a very politically sensitive issue at the u.n., because some non-state actors are seen as more desirable than other states, other states, even, in terms of allowing them to acquire weapons. so the arms treatsy most likely only going to focus on the states themself. the states themselves on the building of equipment and technology transfer. that may, in fact, be within the scope of the arms trade treaty. if you look at the paper, it has been suggested that technology transfer and equipment to build weapons systeming be included within the scope. a couple of cautionary notes about that. you want to make sure that you're capture what's you actually intend to capture. if you have a very broad den

definition what that could mean, you could be covering e-mail exchanges about a weapon systems with no details, again, each system. the key is to avoid the major loopholes that could be created where for parts and components for example, or the technology where you could take apart say a fighter aircraft and send it piece by piece and avoid the stipulations or the obligations of the arms trade treaty. so you need to figure out how to avoid those loopholes but also to future proof the treaty in that new technologies being developed we haven't thought of yet would still be captured down the road. there's this is fine line between specificity and leaving things broad enough, broad enough but you don't overly capture. >> matt? >> in regards to data on end

users, there are many different or nonstate actors. it depends on what you mean by nonstate actor. while i think it's important to clarify what we mean. ardless, it doesn't really matter because end users are rarely specifiednif data transfers. but also, there are very few states that if you mean by non state actors, if you mean unauthorized end users, criminals, drug cartels, et cetera, there are very few states that permit those types of transfers directly and those states that do don't publish data anyway. but what would be useful in terms of end user information to the extent that this doesn't compromise commercial sensitive information or propriety information is transfers to entities that develop a history

of leakage or diversion. that would aid in plugging some of the holes that result in diversion to the black market. in regards to the excellent question about photo shopping in the age of social media, that is a real concern. and sometimes it's very ob obvious. but most of the time i mean, the technology out there to do that is sophisticated enough and readily available enough for the amateur looking at this, it could be -- they're not going to spot disparities. i think it's a capacity that we, the research community have to develop as we seek to make better use of this tool in this pursuit. >> if i could just say something about the att and the issue of the capacity-building transfers and what not, i agree completely with rachel. i think the att will need to he include this somehow in the scope of the items that are covered. the u.s. thinks it should include parts and components and technology transfers and what

not. we need to be careful we don't make this overly burdensome on states to comply with. that gets at the treaty specifying the what's need to do, not the how states need to do it. in terms of what gets reported, there's not going to be reporting on technology transfers and parts and components. yes, there should be a requirement for states to subject those things to national controls and integrate that into your national control system. because of the numbers involved i don't see there's any way to report on parts and components being transferred in the context of the reporting regime that the att is going to create. it's likely we'll just have an obligation on states to control the transfer of them but not to then actually report on the transfer of them. >> okay.

yes, please. >> thank you. i had a question for mr. malzahn and anyone else on the panel that would like to comment on this question. the export controls in the u.s., the administration has taken a position that they're too strict and that you know, they're going to reform the process. they introduced many reforms about three years ago which i'm not sure what the status of those reforms are, and the house committee just prepared a report two days ago reinforcing the message that industry is very unhappy with the export controls and they're going to be continuing to push for reforms. so i guess my question would would be, what are the implications going to be eventually for the arms market if export controls are reformed

in the u.s., and where do you see that going? >> let me say a couple things about that. one, i don't work directly work in export control reform. i have colleagues who do. we talk with them. so they inform what we're doing in the arms trade treaty in terms of the substance of the discussion we've had at the prep coms and at the negotiation. at the negotiation, it's not going to be a case of the tail wagging the dog, not going to be the way the negotiation happens that's going to directly determine what the u.s. is going to do in the export control efforts. it's going to be the other way around. what we do in the att reflects what is going on in the export control reform discussions. in terms of what's likely to come out of the export control reform, it's going to be i hope

a streamlined more efficient less burdensome regulatory regime for u.s., you know, for u.s. companies or for companies which do business in the u.s. but it's -- and the effect it's going to have on the international arms trade i think that it remains to be seen. it certainly is not going to expand it the international arms trade. this is about how the u.s. goes about regulating the companies. we're talking about streamlining it and making it more effective, not about removing regulations or controls on them. it's not about decontrols. now, one thing i will say as far as complaints by u.s. industry about the overly burdensome nature of the regulations and stuff, i'll note that with this incredibly burdensome system of regulation, we still are the largest arms exporter in the world in terms of i take industry concerns seriously but i have to keep in mind sort of the background all this is going on in. industry never likes regulation, never likes controls. on some level, it's interfering with their ability to you know, go out and maximize their

profits or whatever. now there are responsible companies and what not, but it's the role of governments to regulate and control industries that need regulation and control. we think that the international arms trade in one in which we continue to need controls on. that's why we're doing an arms trade treaty. other countries recognize the same kind of thing. >> any of the other panelists want to comment on this issue? yes, please. >> yes. i work with the senate international trade and security, ega. more direct towards you, bill, as much as the state department, the american government supports the att and is working rather diligently towards it, there's still the issue of passing it through congress. and a majority of senators have actually signed on to a letter saying they're against the att. >> not exactly. they're against a particular kind of att. >> right. so the in that sense, house do you expect that to move forward in congress and actually changing their minds because as much as it's a particular

economy now still, write off the att in general? >> can you maybe explain what that particular kind of treaty is? >> yes. all right. there are two different congress it will letters from 45 republican senators from 13 democratic senators in which they express opposition to an arms trade treaty that would undermine the second amendment in the u.s. the administration couldn't agree with more. we're not going to participate in negotiating an att that would undermine the second amendment, the right of the u.s. on a national basis to decide for itself the rights and abilities of its citizens you know, to buy arms and transfer arms internal. the att won't cover that all. it's about international transfers. it's about transfers between states. so i actually agree with the sentiments in the letter. he read both of them. what i see in there doesn't require me to do anything differently in terms of the negotiation for the u.s. because we're not going to allow an att to get into this. this is a door that the rest of the negotiation accepts that is

closed that the att is going to cover international transfers, not internal transfers and not internal regulation issues related to, as i said, stuff that is involved with the second amendment, the right to buy arms and what not. so the i don't have a problem with the two congressional letters. again, it's not that they oppose an att. they oppose an att that the conflicts with the second amendment. in terms of the u.s. ultimately to ratify the att, i think that will depend on the specifics actually in the treaty. we're hoping to do in july or what i'm hoping to do in july is push for negotiating a treaty we will be able to ratify but it will be up to the senate to decide if it wants to provide ratification or not. we're aware of the kind of treaties it it the senate is likely to ratify and we don't want to the participate in negotiating a treaty that we expect now the u.s. will never be able to ratify. so my goal is to negotiate one that will allow the u.s. to ratify it. >> yes, please. gentleman and then w g