you may not convey something in the way that's heard. >> the only other topic i would add, is we do talk about the role is industry in this context and i'm sure the other community members will be able to weigh in on this as well. they are certainly the entities closest to this problem and the ones with the shortest distance to controlling their own supply chain and their products and we have a set of recommendations in this report, both about creating incentives for them to carrots and sticks, to meet fda standards. we talk about having more programs like the secure supply chain product that the fda has now on drug safety. we think that's a very good one and should be evaluated at the conclusion of the pilot and hopefully adopted. but also looking at the issue of doing more to develop approach sticks in this context and that's liability.

it can be difficult under some circumstances to hold importers of unsafe food and drug products liable for those activities because of how far back in the supply chain in this report we talk about ways that you can potentially improve the ability to hold those entities liable in the united states. >> questions? >> see if the committee members want to make a final comment. >> would any of the committee members like to make a final comment? >> i'll start. i will say that when we undertook this project, we realized how broad in scope it was. and i really feel honored to have been a part of this, because we have learned a lot of information and we have -- i'm walking away from this understanding that, yes, there

are a few bad actors that seem to cause grief for all of us, for the regulators, for the patients, most importantly. the consumers. but also for the industry. i fully believe most of industry, whether it's food, medical product, device, are ethical and are doing their best to manage these problems. but they also need assistance in helping weed out the bad actors. so this really has to be a partnership where all stakeholders are doing their part. it cannot rest on the shoulders of fda or on the shoulders of regulatory agencies. it has to be a full commitment by all parties involved in this. >> i would just agree with that. i mean, you can -- i think as a committee, we united around the idea that there is an alignment of incentives to addressing this problem on health, trade and development. all those actors i think ideally want the right things here.

that's certainly true for industry as well. and there are little things you can do to make it easier for them to have that alignment and to achieve the safe food and drugs that all consumers want. whether they're in the u.s. or other countries and we're hopeful that the specific recommendations that we put forward are undertake son that can happen. >> i want to finish and i echo those concerns. this is a long-term issue. this is not going to be corrected tomorrow. there's components where we need to share what's already in place, we need to develop the ability. someone asked a question earlier out here about early this morning on so if this was -- if the recommendations were in place, would the avastin not occur? not necessarily. we have to realize there's always going to be problems and

as martha said we're impressed within each country the desire of the countries to get rid of these issues and get rid of the food safety issues, but how do you do it over such a large and complex situation? so we really need to apply technology. this needs to be a constant effort to improve so that ten years from now we have less of these problems occurring. so thank you very much for listening to us and i really encourage you to actually look at the entire report because a lot of the issues are dealt with in great deal. the pros and cons of the approaches to it. thank you.

republican presidential candidates mitt romney and newt gingrich will speak at the national rifle association's annual meeting tomorrow. also addressing the nra former presidential candidate rick santorum, house majority leader eric cantor, texas governor rick perry and wisconsin governor scott walker. that's live on c-span starting at 2:00 p.m. eastern. this is c-span3. with politics and public affairs programming throughout the week and every weekend, 48 hours of people and events telling the american story on american history tv. get our schedules and see past programs at our websites and you can join in the conversation on social media sites. the u.s. and five other countries are set to begin this weekend. negotiations with iran over its nuclear program. the former deputy director of

the international atomic energy agency last week offered a history of iran's nuclear program. from george washington university, this is about 50 minutes. >> good afternoon. and welcome back to the george washington university's elliott school of international affairs. i'm doug shaw, i'm an associate dean and i'm grateful for your participation in today's workshop on teaching the nuclear fuel cycle, what practitioners and the public need to know. i'm particularly pleased to welcome the doctor who i'll introduce in a moment. this event and the nuclear policy talk series of which it's a part respond to the mission to make the world a better place by conducting research that responds to global human challenges, to educate a new generation of leaders to face those challenges, and by

engaging the policy community who deal with those challenges every day. today's discussion is particularly urgent. we live in a dynamic moment in the understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle. just last week in a speech at the nuclear security summit in seoul, south korea, president barack obama said we all know the problem. the very process that gives us nuclear energy can put nations and terrorists within the reach of nuclear weapons. and he responded to that challenge by calling among other things for an international commitment to unlocking the fuel cycle of the future. in a short essay in the huffington post yesterday, the president of the mcarthur foundation responded to the urgent danger of nuclear terrorism by urging a ban on the production of materials from nuclear spent fuel and the enrichment at high levels. yesterday, elaine grossman reported that the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission has

deferred action on a petition from the american physical society urging that an assessment to proliferation risk should precede the licensing of each processing facility in the united states. informed opinions are converging on the important topics, but they're framed by the different expert communities. it is our objective here in the nuclear policy talk series to bring these together. we've brought over 200 nuclear policy experts to campus in the last three years. as part of a nuclear policy talk series ranging from gw elliott school alumnus and acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, to senator richard lugar, united nations security council's ban ki moon and murray snyder. we're engaged in research on the topic as "going nuclear and

international security in the 21st century" coed itted by michael brown reflects. we're developing new course offerings in this area including a new graduate course this fall offered by professor of chemistry and international affairs christopher cahill on nuclear materials science funded by a grant from the nuclear regulatory commission. so it's a great pleasure to convene this discussion today to have all of you here together. and to have the opportunity to introduce the doctor to discuss the situation in iran which is obviously a -- the pressing issue that intrudes discussion of nuclear fuel cycle choices into the lives of many people around the world. he's currently with the science for international affairs at the john f. kennedy school at harvard university. he's spent 27 years prior to joining harvard with the international atomic energy

agency in vienna, and the last five of those as deputy director general and head of the safeguards department. and he oversaw effects to monitor iran's nuclear program and examining nuclear programs around the world and inspected nuclear facilities in south korea, iraq, syria, libya and elsewhere. seeking to ensure that nuclear materials were not diverted for military purposes. he's one of the world's leading experts an iran's nuclear program and led the efforts in recent years to implement an analytical culture to guide them. please join me in welcoming him. >> thank you very much. good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. i hope that i don't spoil your

appetite because i don't think i have very good news for you. nevertheless, so if we look at the iranian nuclear program, i have been asked to provide a snapshot where we are today and then i'm going to look one year forward where we might be one year from now. and then i try to draw the first lessons from the verification point of view. and it's a big job if you look at the whole nuclear program because it's very large. they have so far 40 reports on safeguard implementation on iran. if you look at together, they are normally around ten pages. they're somewhere around 400 or 500 pages thick stack of information. and it's very difficult to understand because the agency used to report by augmenting. so you never get the full picture until recently. before christmas, i was in a

panel in brussels with the ambassador who is the iranian representative to the iaea and there was one thing that the two of us agreed. this is that we are probably the only persons in the world who have read all those reports. because they all so different to read. let's go back to the iranian nuclear program. the concern about it for a number of reasons, and maybe the biggest reason is that iran conducted this clandestine enrichment two decades without fulfilling its reporting requirements to the iaea. and moreover, actually irandy verted nuclear matter which it never reported. this is a classical diversion of nuclear material. it also accepted nuclear material from the safeguards and

went and did some additional experiments for this. here is lesson number one. that it is called a spade a spade, called black a black, but you never heard that the iaea say that nuclear material was d diverted. the reason was when it came into the light of the international community the reason for that was that the agency didn't call it diversion and noncompliance, because it would have immediately transferred into the united nations security council. and eu 3, france, germany and u.k., at this point in time failed. that iran will comply with the requirements and therefore there will be a negotiation, so they said no problem. unfortunately this turned out not to be the case. because in 2003 when this all

came out, iran committed itself to open transparency. but nevertheless, when the first declaration came from iran and other small -- it didn't include what this was called a p-2 program. which is more advanced than the ones which are now currently running. iran failed to include that in the declaration. here is the second lesson. i think the international community should have been harder at that point in time. should have put the clear red line, if there is a problem with the compliance or declaration, it has its consequences, but this wasn't the case. people say, okay, it's a small problem. lets not worry about it. until we hit the next snag which was the re-establishment of uranium in spring of 2004. again, iran passed another red

line because the original agreement with eu-3 was no uranium enrichment related activities until iran is in full compliance with its international obligations. and at that point in time, it wasn't but the international community let this thing to drag again. i think these are the lessons from this early stage that when you deal with the problem like that, you need to be clear. this is the -- this is what's required. this is the red line, which is there. and if it is parsed or moved, it has consequences. then in 2007, finally -- or 2006 this deal finally collapsed and iran started the uranium

enrichment. this time, the enrichment went up very swiftly. today, iran is even producing uranium which is 20% with regard to isotope 235. why it is of concern, it's concerned for the following reasons. first of all, iran is producing 15 kilo grams per month now. 15 kilo grams per month means they'll have a stock of 250 kilos of that material by the end of this year. 250 kilos, if you take that and you modify the centrifuges which are there, you don't need to put any new centrifuge, you just use the current ones, you can turn this 250 kilo grams of 20% enriched uranium to highly enriched uranium in let's say one or two months' time. so this is now then a step or a

situation where we are today. so iran is actually heading to be able to -- or have a capability to produce nuclear weapons grade material if it so wishes. and in other terms, when you produce 20% enriched uranium, and you want to produce highly enriched uranium, once you have done 20% of your -- to 20% enriched uranium, actually you have done 90% of the effort which is required. so you have all of that minor step left. this is why the concern is there because at the same time, not only with regard of iran's past nuclear declaration, but to certain aspects of the nuclear

program. what are those? actually, they start already in the 1980s, late '80s, and the physics research center which is located there and is associated with the saudi technology in tehran. and that was raised in 2004 when it became public and more attention in iran wiped it away. why the concerns about the physics research center? actually, if you go to their website, this is where actually this young lady was working before and is still working. there's a dossier which explains what they have been procuring from open markets.

or related to nuclear activities. there's equipment related to uranium enrichment, there's one related to nuclear conversion. and uranium metals and things like that. why would military research center acquire nuclear related equipment? only equipment which is -- some of it is dual use equipment, but when you put them all together it looks like the institute was involved somehow on parallel nuclear studies with the -- which contributed to the development of nuclear fuel cycle. particularly the front end of that. this was never declared as an installation to the iaea and has

not yet been declared. when this became public, iran started to move the people after erasing that this to other institutes and today they're sitting there in an institution. you can call it from the iaea november report. then when you look what the scientists are doing, it doesn't look like they terminated their activities after it was wiped away. they have continued to study the nuclear physics and they have continued experiments which could be useful if you're, for example, designing a nuclear device. they have been doing experiments with high explosives, with explosives, which is also for the nuclear research. if you pursue that route. iran has explained them as

corner events. it has acknowledged that this kind of research is going on. if you call to the reports in spring of 2008, it's there. but saying that these are for military and civilian application, including civilian applications and the iaea asked at that point in time what are the civilian applications where you need microsecond timing for your explosions? that you have simultaneous explosions? unfortunately, iran was not able to answer to this question. they said that these are military secrets and they cannot disclose them. but i have hard time to understand why you cannot then disclose the civilian experiments. maybe their argument then is that the military people who did this sort of thing. what is the lesson what we learned from here? that's bit more tricky, but i

think it's important. first of all, it's to do with the access rights in a state. if iaea sees this kind of experiments which really appears to be supporting nuclear weapons, it should have an access to these sites. it should have access to the people, documentation and other studies. and interview the people. why? if i read article 3 of the mpt, it says the objective of the mpt is prevention of diverse and of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons or explosives. so the job is to prevent, not to detect. once we detect it's too late. diversion has taken place. we have failed to prevent proliferation. so therefore, the iaea should be proactive, should be in front of

the game and the u.n. security council correctly has supported this view of iaea secretary. but what is the -- this is perhaps the greatest lesson from all this. iran doesn't heed to these requests. and it has not heeded to the requests or the iaea board of governor, not to the requests of united nations security council. as a result of that, the authority of the two organizations is diminishing, whether you get someone who doesn't comply. and syria for example has already used this playbook in stalling in answering to some of similar questions with the iaea. so we have created a dangerous precedent. the first precedent actually to this came from north korea. it's not only the answer to the

iaea questions, but providing access to the certain sites. so what is at stake is actually the credibility of the whole mpt regime. let me talk a little bit more about the military activities. actually, iaea has been accused of misusing information that comes from intelligence, it comes from third parties. it's not able to verify the vicinity of this information. i don't think it's quite true. why? first of all, i mentioned this procurement which has about according to the isis website, there are 1,800 documents in which iran has been buying,

procuring, communications. these are coming from the member states of iaea. these are hard facts. those pieces of equipment has been ordered, it's been delivered according to these documents. they went basically by saudi university directly there. so these are hard facts. you cannot fake this sort of information from ten different countries. and you cannot fake retroactive things which took place 20 years ago. it's almost mission impossible. but in the iaea process, they goes and corroborates the companies and their dossiers and found out that indeed, these went there and the first ones was actually about the military aspect. not in 2005 after that famous --

but spring of 2004, iaea had first serious discussions with iran in particular about the procurement things which took place vis-a-vis lavistan. then the other pieces of information, physics, modeling of re-entry, et cetera, actually, iaea used to same grade to get out the information. follow the people who were on those communications, people who went to work with the people in iran. you have seen a scientist, iaea has been talking with scientists in several locations and the person indeed was there. he has explained according to this report to the iaea of what he was doing, and what kind of

lexus he became. i think they know who he was working. that's the way to authenticate the information that was there. you can't say from the single document whether it's a 200% through or not, but when you have this kind of wealth of information, let's say that you have a 90% probability that it's authentic, when you put this whole group together and they're internally consistent and externally consistent, horizontally, vertically, existing equipment, which is relevant to nuclear weapons r&d, you can come to the conclusion that someone was indeed studying this. now, the country then break in this circumstance the safeguard obligations? yes and no. no in that sense that as long as this experiments if they have

been in this domain on nuclear weapon development, if they have not included any nuclear material, actually, under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, those don't need to be declared, as long as no new nuclear material is there and you can do the kind of experiments using materials like tungsten or lead or something else. so you are not in noncompliance with in this particular item with your safeguards agreement, but certainly this is against the spirit of the mpt because i said first of all article 3 says that it's to prevent diverse and nuclear energy, to nuclear weapons. and the article 2 says that you should not even acquire knowledge, not only nuclear weapons, but knowledge on those. so in both cases, actually iran is -- has apparently been working against the spirit of

mpt, in my view. however, then you can ask, so why -- what is the authority of the iaea to verify this nuclear related r&d if it is not involving nuclear material? actually, that mandate comes from the security council resolution. security council resolution requires the iaea secretary to clarify the purpose of those experiments and that's why the iaea is doing it. and this is also the reason why iran is today challenging the security council resolutions. doing actually a very twisted -- in a very twisted way. they say