found by the iaea secretary in noncompliance with its safeguard obligations, so passing this dossier to the united nations security council was illegal. and therefore, the security council resolution is also then illegal. and therefore, iran doesn't need to comply with this. and this goes back to this -- my statement. let's call a spade a spade. let's call black black and white white. because if the iaea secretary had in this 2003 report -- late 2003 report written that iran was found in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, it would have been okay for the -- not okay at this time for iran and they could not use this argument which they are now using. actually, they go -- they have

even read their document because they went to the statutes and that's another kind of procedure which perhaps the secretary didn't follow literally. because noncompliance, according to the iaea secretary, the statutes, is established by the department of safeguards inspectors. that's what the language says. it's not the director general. director general should take this report which the inspectors make and pass it to the iaea board of governors. but in practice, it doesn't work like that. and actually, iaea board makes its own procedures and practices and rules itself. so there are precedents for example from north korea that you don't need to follow exactly that way. it was not the inspectors who suddenly did the report on north korea to iaea report.

it was the director general. i think that the past practice shows that this argument of iran is perhaps not the right one. but this is one of the lessons we need to learn. so what needs to be then done next? well, first of all, there should be a meeting next week, friday the 13th of april. actually, as someone asked me this morning how it is going to take place, i think i corrected -- i think that there is still a royal mess because it appears to me that they have not agreed about the venue for this important -- where this important meeting takes place. i have not seen anything on the agenda either, so we will see where it takes place but it's an important answer. if we look where iran is today, and i spoke about this -- that

they might have 250 kilos or 20% enriched uranium by the end of this year or even more if they so desire. and then asked, hey, iran has been 18 years -- 18 months away from the nuclear weapons so why this is always like that? actually, there are several reasons for that. one is that the sanctions are binding. sanctions are binding, the nuclear program, it's more difficult for iran to get equipment, raw material, sensitive raw materials which you need to have when you manufacture centrifuges. you don't want to produce yourself all small pieces in your own factories. if you do that, you slow down the program because you use a lot of additional intellectual

talents for reverse engineering, learning lessons through of how certain things are to be manufactured so they are durable. this is one of the reasons for the delays. the sanctions and then consequently not access to the material and you need to put additional resources for indigenous products. then the other area is sabotage. there is evidently sabotage against the iranian installations. this is nothing unusual. if you go back to the soviet military program someone was sabotaging them from 1950s, pakistan was subject to quite a bit when it became public, particularly during 1980s. so this is nothing new. there's some unexplained deaths in the program.

i don't think those have really much effect to the program other than that they have use much more resources to protect the people and conceal certain things. so it makes the program more ineffective i would say. then military threats. they have also impact. but when you look, for example, the underground facility and iran is saying that actually they're going to build ten enrichment blocks on the ground. it takes a toll. once you build another enrichment facility which is in this case very small, actually, you start to waste your resources. you waste your resources on planning, you waste your resources in acquiring infrastructure, which is hard to get you to the sanctions. so you use your best people to make those designs so they have

an impact on the progress of the program and we see it. and the military threats, you have to put all of your assets, if you look now they are caving in uranium enrichment. they are caving in uranium conversant, et cetera. when i say caving in, they have also to protect those materials which they have produced. those are a little bit more than 100 kilos of 20% enriched uraniums, almost four tons of uranium. hex achloride enriched to 3% level. a lot of talk has gone for the tehran research reactor and its needs for the fuel. i think that this is an artificial need for a number of reasons. in 2003 when iran disclosed to

the iaea that it's building a heavy watt reactor to iraq which is another concern because of its plutonium production capabilities, the argument at this time was they needed this heavy reactor because the tehran research reactor is aging, it's not any more safe. and then besides that, they also acknowledge that it's located in earthquake-prone area, and almost in the middle of town because tehran has grown tremendously since 1960s when this reactor was built. so in 2003, they felt that this reactor is not needed. and i think it's in a way true still today, because if you think this has been built in 1960s, the location is not the best. so if i had to do this, i would build a reactor somewhere else. outside of tehran. i don't need to produce 20% enriched uranium to have a fuel for that.

russia has still as a legacy from the cold war 100 tons of highly enriched uranium and i'm sure they're happy to sell it if they find a client. and you have 100 tons of highly enriched uranium. you need only to take 20 kilos of that and then dilute it to 20% level, then you will have fuel for tehran research reactor for the next ten years, at least. same thing is with the production of this 250 kilos of 20% enriched uranium. it's actually enough for the reactor for the next ten years. more recently iran has perhaps prepared the public opinion by telling that they also want to export this material. this is then justification to continue with the production, because if you already produce it for ten years, why would you

produce for 20 years or 30 years, but by exporting you can provide a justification. even though at the same time when you -- if you remember when president ahmadinejad was here in new york, he mentioned this is not economically viable. so for me, it's a little bit odd that on one hand you produce something, but it's not economically attractive. so why would you continue to produce? also, 3.5% enriched uranium. actually, very little need for iran on that as well. because they have security production of -- or secure fuel for next ten years from russia. even if you enter its uranium and you have enough of it for fuel, manufacturing is not an easy thing. and i think that mr. karl can tell you more about it.

you'll need to have all the specifications and -- and from russia, so you're able to manufacture the fuel safely. you cannot invent yourself on this. if you want to have this reactor, the centrifuge to produce fuel, they need 20 times of low-end uranium every year. now, none of us have been producing in the last two years -- well, there may be two tons per year. so you need ten times that in order to be able to feed it. if you do it, you need much different centrifuges in order to accomplish it. then the last thing before i summarize the lessons further is that how well we know the

uranium nuclear program. yes, the nuclear program is very, very well handled, but is there something which we don't know? the unknown? what kind of assurances do we have? i would not raise any fears to this end, because what iran is doing when it sees this assassination of military threats, et cetera, what it's been doing in recent years, it's established a thing which is called passive disorganization, which the job is to diversify, conceal, go underground, distribute the things. now, they might have been penetrating there, but that joy may not last long because iran like any other country, they have a right to make

countermeasures. so i don't think that we can pursue, for example, one year or two years from now we can read iranian nuclear program necessarily like an open book. they have taken measures. and they continue to take it. so for international community, i think the solution is to find out a solution at iran, to stop this enrichment, clarify all the military related r&d which clearly serves for offensive and not defensive purpose. sometimes said that the physics research center is protecting the people, but, you know, if you are studying simultaneous explosion, it's not really to do with the protection of the civilian people. it's more of looking at the design of a nuclear weapon and what you need to do if you plan

to go on that road. then the last thing there is that people say that this program came to a halt in 2003, 2004. i would say yes and no. yes, in that sense that a lot of activities were reversed and the people went to the other jobs, but they maintain there their capabilities and experience and they do some low-key experiments which serve apparently the origin of purpose. so i don't think we should be really happy. but actually, there's another reason why we should not be happy. because the last job of this team was to document everything, what they were doing. why would you document something which you don't plan to use? i think someone in a country decided that one day we may go back to those experiments and we need to have these things documented.

so then the major lessons at the end. there are positives and there are negatives here. first of all, i think i'll start with the positive end and this is the iaea verification scheme, we have seen it in iran, particularly in 2003, the detection of this high-end enriched particles and explanations put iran to disclose its full program at that time. secondly, if iaea uses all the inspection rights, it's -- i think we fail to use the inspection and i think in particular they should have used it in syria. then the third lesson here is that when countries have this

kind of compliance problem, there are two ways to go. one is stop cooperating with the iaea and then the issue can be closed in a fairly short period of time. i give here as an example libya. we went through this verification process in a couple of years. same was the case of south africa. it was not the compliance issue, but when south africa had dismantled its old nuclear weapons program and iaea verified that in '92. it went fairly swiftly when this was a cooperation. but then when the confrontation is taken like currently is the case with syria and iran and north korea, things drag. and unfortunately at the same time, the countries if they want to do, they can reach capabilities and they're closer and closer, higher and higher on the ladder to get the nuclear

weapons capability if not capacity. and there is also a difference in my view what is the nuclear weapons capability. actually, you should not do this sort of research which iran has done. we should not cheer they stopped some of the activities in 2003 because the information is there. this part of the program should be dismantled. first establish what exactly took place, how wide it was. it should be dismantled or make unusual in a verifiable manner. and then there should be a long term monitoring in place like was in south africa for a couple of decades so these are not used to re-establish those things. and then the last lesson before -- which i said already in the beginning that when we look at all these cases, iran,

north korea and syria, there is an erosion on the verification scheme and there's the way that the authority of the iaea's challenge, actually at this point of time the director of -- director general of the iaea i think in an unfair way is a target by some of the member states, in that sense that they tried to undermine his credibility. but i personally feel that he's doing the right thing, based on that information when i left in 2010. and certainly this has -- the role and the authority of the united nations security council is diminishing. so with this positive remarks, you know, i'm ready for your questions.

>> you are a national treasure, as the japanese like to say. of norway and all right-thinking people, thank you for your remarks. i have two questions. you spoke about hardening, deepening, caving in, i wasn't sure if you meant caving in this way or a cave underneath. probably doesn't matter. but as you know, there's a very prominent prime minister in the middle east who talks -- i forget the exact phrase, but a limited time before which there -- it will be too hard to bomb so to speak underground facilities. and i'm wondering if you have any views on that in terms of whether the limited time is half a year or a year or every year it's going to be one more year? that's my first question. my second one is in your closing -- in your closing

remarks, you talk a bit about -- i thought, about weaponization. and as you know, at least according to the press, the u.s. intelligence community, mr. clapper in particular, does not believe that the iranians have not gone further with weaponization. does the iaea track weaponization? because i don't know the answer to that. and secondly, do we have a long period of time ahead before a weapon -- usable weapon can be fabricated? thank you. >> thank you. well, you can look at the military -- i hope first of all, this all gets sorted out and iran will dismantle the capabilities and provide not --

not only transparency, but i think what's needed really is openness from the iranian side to explain the rationality behind the program in a way but pretty much on that, why prime minister netanyahu sees that the time is closing. because i think that this is to do more with their military needs, what israeli can do alone, without help from the other states. so they have limited capabilities, so they have to strike when you can still stop the program for a while. but once it's all under ground, it might be beyond their scope. and we have to remember, what's also happening now is that iran has -- many places. so the more they have time, the

more there will be places. manufacturing. i don't think -- i have not seen anywhere what is the place, for example, centrifuge is manufactured. they have been distributed all over in iran. so having perhaps one target, you may have three or four. you know, if you want to -- as an example. so it's not only about chrome or -- the problem, if you want really to stop them by military means, you need to step a lot of targets. so i think this answers the difference between the u.s. and israel in this respect. u.s. has much more power to do with. and this is not also anymore a

surgical strike like was in iraq. or this place in syria. because they were isolated buildings. you knew exactly where you go and what you need to get. but here you have perhaps ten places which you need to eliminate in order to make sure that this doesn't take place. then surgical strike is a surgical strike. it's not a sledgehammer. but if you really want to stop the program, you should use sledgehammer. elimination of a couple of places. you only buy time. but actually, israel's community use the sledgehammer. what happened in 1991, and gulf war actually stopped nuclear program, and you now see the history books. he actually also -- why he kept

some ambiguity there was in two ways for his own caharisma in iraq and his arc, iran. so he wanted to show i have these capabilities, if needed. so that answers that. and then if you see that someone is working with the experiments which are related to nuclear weapons, you should be worried. you should be worried about the declaration of that state. because sooner or later, if you work with this kind of thing, you need a nuclear -- therefore, you would erase the question, has all the nuclear matter been declared to the iaea or are there some activities which i don't know. and in order to understand that, you need also then to study that

weaponization part. and see that how it fits with the other findings. and this is the scheme we have been through, for example, in case of south africa. and which is actually a good example for the way iaea works. because first of all, south africa had given up its weapons program. i think it was ' 86 or '87 but then there was an agreement, and iaea started verification in late 1992. so we started to verify a thing which didn't exist anymore. so what we did, we actually established the whole history of the south african -- until 1992, see how it went from peaceful plow share type of explosives that is to the weaponization. we went through the programs, we went through the equipment, we

went through the nuclear material, day by day, huge amount of information, which was also -- which was very difficult, because some of this information, actually, south africa had destroyed by purpose, because they were expecting a regime and felt at that time it's not good to leave this documentation. so we have to interview the people in order to understand what took place. and then all this information -- locations and people and the funding together in order to get cohesive -- as cohesive picture you can get afterwards. and there's something similar which we -- i think the iaea is doing in iran. and in order to do that, you need to have additional authorities like resolution with the country to heed.

also allow to interview people, have access to the sites and equipment. >> thank you, doctor. i'm afraid we're going to have to give the doctor the last word, two panels in a row. your remarks were very, very illuminating for us, and i'm very grateful. please join me in thanking him. if i could invite our panel on reprocessing and global security to join us here, we will get you said under way very presently. tonight on american history tv, looks at the battle of hampton roads, the civil war naval conflict, also known as the battle of monitor. from the mariner's museum, american history tv tonight at

8:00 p.m. on c-span 3. hydraulic fracking is a form of natural gas drilling where millions of water, sand and chemicals are pumped underground to break apart rocks and gas. the u.s. geological study held a discussion on how it works, location of natural reserves and environmental concerns. this is about an hour and ten minutes. >> okay. thank you for allowing us to use this broadcast to give an understanding just what hydraulic fracturing is. at this time, i would like to introduce our first speaker, who is doug duncan, the associate coordinated for the u.s. energy resources program. and doug was first attracted to geology when his parents hauled

him around collecting rocks on field trips. and after getting geology degrees from the university of georgia and penn state, doug worked cleaning up nuclear waste in washington state. also spent time looking for oil and gas as a geophysicist for exxon and managing environmental research and monitoring at the nevada test site before coming to the u.s. gs. and doug will address us tonight on the increasing role that unconventional oil and gas resources play in the nation's petroleum. >> thanks, dave. okay. welcome, everybody. thanks for coming out tonight. i'm going to talk about unconventional oil and gas assessments in the united states. and i want to talk about this for several reasons. one is to set the stage for the following two talks. but also just to give you an idea of what role directional drilling play in enabling the production of these un --

so-called unconventional resources. and i'll start out by saying that the nation is still very dependent upon fossil fuels, including oil and gas. and in particular, gas provides about 25% of the supply of energy that our country uses every day. and this particular diagram is for resources. and on the left-hand side of the graph, the data, the line in the middle is for 2010, and that's the most recent data that we have from the energy information administration. and the -- you can see that there are a number of different sources -- all of these are conventional and some are unconventional. and unconventional resources are those that take a special technology like hydro