possible they could start enriching to higher levels tomorrow, which at this point we have to make this decision tomorrow. not likely, but possible. we need to start laying some of the diplomatic groundwork for that possibility. outreach to the british, the french, other allies, tell them we're serious about using force, would they support us, here's what we see as the red lines that would force that decision, do you agree with these. these are the kinds of consultation we should be having now. to answer your question directly, if we got to that point and couldn't build a coalition, i think that the cost of a nuclear armed iran are so high that it would still be worth striking. i think the cost of a nuclear armed iran would outweigh the cost of international condemnation that would come in the wake of a u.s. -- the united states conducting a unilateral strike. >> your question for the doctor. >> so we've done this a couple times, collin, so i'll ask you the question i usually ask you,

which is, you know, so if diplomacy and sanctions fail, what would you recommend? if you got the call from the president right now and he said we have good intelligence that iran's enriching to 90% right now, what do i need to do? do i need to strike or do i need to just live with it? what would you say? >> it's a good question, and i've used this joke before, too. i'm quite confident that the president of the united states would not call me in that circumstance. got much smarter folks to call than me. i think it would depend. look, i think your risk/reward ratios are different. i think that the iranian nuclear challenge is a significant challenge but not quite as grave a challenge as you do. so the standard for me using military force or approving military force is probably higher than yours. the risk/reward ratio is different. i'm not a pacifist. i take the position that president obama did during the 2008 election campaign, which is i'm not against all wars, i'm just against dumb wars. so in my view, any israeli action against the iranian

program is a dumb war, because i don't think the israelis will have much effect. the bar has to be set extraordinarily high for the united states. these are the things i would ask myself. has every other option been exhausted? diplomatic, sanctions, et cetera. is there smoking-gun evidence that the iranians are actually going for a weapon, not just concerns that -- actual evidence that they are. are there nonovert ways of getting at this issue that wouldn't require large amountings of military force? if so, i have a strong preference for those over military force. are we able to forge a large coalition? here maybe i think, matt, you and i probably differ. i think the only scenario in which military action conceivably makes sense against iran ever at some point is that if it's like the 1991 war with iraq, not like the 2003 war with iraq. that is, a very large coalition -- and the reason is twofold.

one, because it's the only way to mitigate the consequences of the strike itself. and second and most important, if you don't have a large coalition going in, not just the french and the british, i'm talking arab states, nato, ideally a u.n. mandate, although that might not be required, it's going to be very difficult to maintain the isolation of iran in the aftermath of a strike. what we learned from the iraq debacle, frankly, is that we put a lot of energy into the first three weeks of the war and didn't think very much about the aftermath, and the postwar scenarios in iran are extraordinarily troubling. and if we're going to be able to keep them isolated, keep them bottled up, and prevent them from rapidly rebuilding their nuclear program, we'll need the russians with us, the chinese with us, the arabs with us. the risk/reward ratio i think strongly argues against military action. so i think the difference between the two of us is largely one of degree. you see the threat as closer and

bigger. you see the risk of military action as lower, and the benefits as higher. and i come to different conclusions on almost all of those things. i think we can wait longer. i think we have other options. and i think if we do this we should go big or not at all. >> that would be go big or go hom home. ar stay home in that case. >> right. >> i want to jump back in with a question. i've always wanted to ask this question on this subject, and it involves deterrence. president obama's the guy who made the call to go get osama bin laden and bin laden is gone. do you think that that in and of itself might be a deterring factor on iran or at least make them think twice about what they want to go and do in terms of maybe provoking a military strike? because, after all, the guy sitting in the white house is the guy who said, yeah, go get

bin laden. is that any kind of deterrent? >> well, i think one of the reasons that iran isn't taking some of the many proactive steps they could take, such as enriching beyond 20% toward the 90% they would need for nuclear weapons, is because they are afraid of possible military action. but i do think there are things that we could do to make that direct clear to iran and to strengthen that deterrence. so, i mean, in the past, u.s. officials used to say things like, well, all cards are on the table but the military option is a bad one and we don't want to go there. that puts the military option on the table and immediately takes it off. not a good deterrent threat. over the past weeks and months, the u.s. administration's language has become tougher. >> he doesn't bluff. >> he doesn't bluff. another said if iran builds nuclear weapons, they will be stopped.

the obama administration's rhetoric has become tougher, but there's more we can do in this direction. we didn't talk as much about the sanctions on the military side, but as we go back into negotiations i think -- you know, it's not clear to me we have a good strategy in terms of what we're willing to accept from iran, what we're willing to offer them in order to ince incentivize them to put curbs on their program and on the other hand what kind of sticks we're bringing to the negotiations. on the stick side, we should make it clear to iran if p we meet in the next couple weeks there are possible benefits for them such as lifting of sanctions if they're willing to put real curbs on their nuclear program. but we should also clearly communicate much more so than in the past if they take provocative steps such as kicking out inspectors, if they enrich 20%, that the united states will use force to stop them from building nuclear weapons. so i think we should use carrots and sticks in a more strategic way than at least from what i can see we have done in the past to this point. >> okay.

>> you know, i think, frankly, their view of our military credibility is probably mixed. i think that -- and this is -- they've seen in the last two or three administrations actually going back before that, you know, a series of iranian prove vagss, terrorist bombings in places like lebanon and syria, proxy attacks against u.s. forces in iraq and afghanistan not bring about a military response from the united states directly against iran. i mean, it's in large part why they use proxies to create plausible deniability at arm's length, to prevent that, but nonetheless, they may interpret we don't have the stomach to come off them because they've killed american soldiers in iraq or afghanistan and we've not come after them. on the other hand, you know, it's hard to argue that president obama -- i know he got the peace prize in 2009, but he's against using force when it's in important interests of the united states. you mentioned the osama bin laden raid, but of course there's the libya example and also the surge in afghanistan, which was very politically risky and a major escalation of that

conflict, too. clearly, this is a president who's willing to use force when he judges it's in the national interest. he's made the argument in the context of iran that iran's nuclear proliferation risk, that it crosses that threshold of vital national interest to the united states, he says everything is on the table, including military force, and he says he's not bluffing. a nuclear iran is unacceptable. it's pretty clear to me. so the question is, you know, do we have to become even clearer in the way that matt suggests? i don't know. i think those threats are pretty clear. and, oh, by the way, we have 40,000 forces in the gulf with pointy objects right at the iranians. we have another 100,000 forces on their eastern flank in central asia. i think they get it, okay, that we're there and we're present. the thing i'm worried about at the moment from folk who want to beat the war drum even higher is we have to calibrate this very carely because the iranian

regime could get to the point they believe we're so committed to military action that the diplomacy stuff is a feint, that we're just trying to check the box on the way to war like the bush administration was accused to doing in 2002 on the way to war with iraq and there's no hope in diplomacy. that could be a self-fulfilling prophesy. or you make the threats so in your face, so overt, it becomes very difficult for the supreme leader to back down, because what he said over and over again the we're not giving in to pressure or threats against our regime. if you threaten their regime over and over with military action, it becomes that much harder to give them a way out that would save face checkally. i think we've calibrated it just about right. a sufficiently credible military threat to buttress diplomacy while not being too loose in our talk about war, which is what obama talked about, and to emphasize that there's still a window of time for diplomacy. >> i think it's time to take

some questions from the audience. if you could line up at the microphone. we have one that is going to be over here in the corner. so if you could line up there and ask your questions. i would ask that you identify yourself and please ask a question, not make a statement. or a lengthy statement. >> thank you for the informative presentation. >> not ready. >> whoops.

>> somebody to say "take five." >> got to love technology. please identify yourself. >> abraham, retired foreign service. thank you for the informative presentation. i'd like to ask about the -- likely of iran taking israel given the fact that the third most sacred place for slam is located in jerusalem and that in israel proper there are about 1.5 million arabs living in israel plus another 2 million within 14 miles of tel aviv, for example, the west bank is 14 miles from tel aviv, the gaza strip is 40 miles from tel aviv. it's not a jewish state, really. there are millions of arabs living in the same territory, living and working, and as

mentioned, jerusalem is the site of the third most sacred place for islam. so i don't see any -- barring an accident, i don't see any reason for iran to attack israel, because for israel there is no reason to attack iran, because, first of all, iran will not attack them and also the israel economy is booming, the stock market apparently is not paying attention to the crisis because it's going higher and higher. so what do you think about this? i'd also like to ask you about this crisis atmosphere which is created. so to what extent does it benefit both israel and iran in a sense that for israel diverting attention from the palestinian issue -- usually when an israeli prime minister is coming to washington he's being rebuked for bank settlements, for expansion in the west bank. this time around he got a reprieve. they only talk about iran and israeli the underdog.

the -- >> that's far more questions -- >> they will -- >> if p we could wrap it up. got a line -- long line behind you. >> iran is getting -- the price for oil is $90 a barrel. it's $120 because of the crisis. they're pocketing $100 million every day because of that crisis. thank you. >> thank you. >> i think the prospect of iran directly using a nuclear weapon or transferring it to a group like hezbollah or a palestinian militant group to use against israel is extraordinarily low, for the reasons you point out, for the religious reasons. i also think the iranians fan ti themselves as the champions of resistance and blowing up millions of palestinians doesn't advance that cause. and it risks massive retaliation, both by israel and the united states, which would end the islamic republic, it would end the revolution.

it's hard to see what objective would be satisfied by doing that. i don't think the regime is suicidal, even if we don't like them all the time. i don't think they'd use it against israel. as it relates to whether this is all just diverting attention. look, it may have some of the effects you're talking about. from the iranian perspective, they're not happy with how far this has progressed. it's clearly hurt their economy. now that the oil sector is being attacked -- they could potentially be in trouble. maybe it served their purposes at one point, but i think we've crossed the rubicon on that one. for the israelis, maybe it diverts attention from the palestinian issue, but i don't think that's why they're doing it. i think israeli leaders genuinely believe the iranian threat to them is existential, so i think they genuinely believe iran is the number-one threat in the region and they're not just playing politics with that. >> i would agree with colin it's incredibly likely iran would launch what would be a suicidal nuclear war.

that said, i don't think we can dismiss the prospect of nuclear war between iran and israel or iran and the united states. when we think about what led to the deterrence relationship between the united states and the soviet union, which wasn't all that stable, by the way, we came very close to nuclear a couple times, including at the cuban missile crisis, but we think about what led to stability in that relationship, almost all those factors are absent when you think about the iran/israel balance. israel, for example, would have to fear in any crisis it couldn't sit back and absorb a nuclear attack like the united states and soviet union thought they could in the cold war because it's two small. one, two, three bombs against israel means the end of the state. they would have strong incentives to go first. similarly, from the iranian point of view, iran, at least initially, would have a small arsenal that could be vulnerable to an israeli first strike, have a use 'em or lose 'em problem if there's going to be a nuclear war, they'd want to go first. i think in that kind of

situation where both sides have first-strike incentives in an escalating crisis, countries are doing things countries do during their nuclear crisis, dell gate nuclear launch authority to lower commanders to convince their opposition they're serious. >> next question, please. >> my name is eli. and talking about building a coalition, a broad coalition in particular, and global opinion, after the gulf war ii or iraq in 2003, and the claims of wmds that didn't quite live up to expectations, yellow cake, aluminum tubes and so forth, what level of intel -- how hard would that intel be to get relatively neutral countries on the side of the coalition and striking iran? thank you. >> dr. craig, start with you.

>> as i pointed out before the iran situation today and the iraq situation in 2003 are very different. one of the differences is is we have a much better window on what's going on in iran's nuclear program. we have inspectors on the ground visiting facilities every two weeks, writing very detailed reports every three months, so we have a good sense of what's going on there. it's the international atomic energy agency, not one country making the claim, not the u.s. intelligence community. it's a respected international organization. so i think the international community believes the iaea when they talk about what iran has on the ground. and outside experts do these cal lagss and say if they made the decision today, four months to the material, a year to a weapon, et cetera. i don't think intel is going to be the problem. in terms of can we build the coalition, i think we can, but i think that, you know, we haven't even really begun and i think that that's a mistake. i think that we should be doing

the initial outreach. i think we'd have a better idea of what kind of coalition we could build if that was over and part of our diplomatic strategy. >> i agree with the first part and disagree with the second part. if we started over diplomacy or even quiet outreach to the permanent members of the security council or others on military action, it would confirm there were suggestions about the united states, which is basically we're going through the motions of sanctions and diplomacy in order to justify -- create a fig legal around a military strike in iran. it could complicate our ability both to have diplomacy work, because people wouldn't want to play that game with us, and it would make it more difficult to forge the coalition you're talking about. the only way to do sit is the way we're doing it now, have a genuine commitment to diplomacy, let that process play out. if it fails, make it clear that it wasn't because of us and our demands and unreasonableness, but that those demanlds were international. do i think it would work? i don't know. but we have a recent case study,

which is when the iranians turned down the tehran research reactor deal at the end of 2009 after first accepting it, it allowed the united states to create an enormous coalition to pass a security council resolution against the iranians in the spring of 2010 which is the most severe sanctions iran has ever faced by the international community. so i think we're playing it about right, which is that it's not diplomacy as just checking the box, like the bush administration did in 2002, but that we actually mean it and that the onus is on iran to show they're serious and if they're not serious, then we pivot towards a different approach. >> next question. >> yes. my name is stephen davis. let's introduce another element into this equation. visiting the i-aer, website today, they have an eight-minute introductory film. one commentator is henry kissinger who said if we are standing at the podium with 20,000 nuclear weapons under our

feet, it's very difficult to ask another nation not to develop one. if we are going to be serious about a nuclear free world, do we not have to be serious about disarming ourselves? >> i think ultimately the treery has specific statements. states like the united states and the soviet union and others could sign it as nuclear states, they have an obligation to move towards disarmament. i think actually the obama administration shares the view that there are obligations on both sides, which is why they moved aggressively forward on new s.t.a.r.t., which is not an insignificant political risk. i think matt, for example, thinks some of those cuts go too deep, but i don't know if that's true or not. in any case, i think the administration believes, basically, that we also have to make good-faith efforts to start

to sh shrink our arsenal. but it doesn't excuse iran's commitment under the npt. some ask doesn't iran have the right if p the u.s. has it and others? they gave up the right to have them when they signed the npt. unless they're willing to pull out -- the israelis aren't a part but we are -- that right is ironclad regardless of what we're doing. >> i would say when you put yourselves in the shoes of the leaders in tehran and how they're making their nuclear calculations, i think they're probably thinking would nuclear weapons serve our interest, can we build nuclear weapons, do we have industrial capacity, how close are we, how tough are the international sanctions against us, can we live with these or not, will the united states and israel conduct a military strike? i think these are the things they're probably thinking about. and i think that, you know, it's unlikely they're saying, well, does the united states have 2,200 nuclear weapons or 1,500?

because if they have 1,500, we'll stop, but if they have 2,200 we'll go ahead. i mean, you know, there is this link in international treaty obligations but realistically i don't think it's something playing on the iranians' minds right now. >> yes, sir. >> -- energy department on these issues for 20 years. i'd like to just raise this question of north korea. it's hard to argue that north korea or that iran is more responsible than north korea. and yet the bush administration is willing to accept north korea getting nuclear weapons. so why are we now -- where were the warmongers when this was going on under is bush administration? why were we willing to accept north korea getting nuclear weapons and not iran? obviously, one of the elements here, the key element, is is israel.

and i think they are putting president obama in an extremely difficult position, it's an election year, nobody's mentioned this, but -- and the idea that if we attack, everybody knows that gas prices are going to skyrocket and it's one of the issues that will is costing. you're putting him in an extremely difficult position. >> matt? >> i guess the first thing i would say is i think some people think that we're worried about iran's nuclear program somehow as a favor to israel, and i think that's the wrong way to look at it. i think the united states has good reason to be threatened by iran's nuclear program even if israel didn't exist. president obama said same thing, if iran's nuclear program poses a threat to international peace and security. on the north korea example, i mean, in 1994, the clinton administration very seriously considered the use of force, had basically decided to do it, and then backed off at the last minute. but i think it's not clear

whether that was a good decision or not. i mean, if you think about what a nuclear-armed north korea has looked like, arguably has been more aggressive, attacking a south korean warship, has transferred nuclear technology to syria, burma, maybe other country, and we haven't seen the full consequences from a nuclear-armed north korea. we could still have an exchange. i think if a nuclear-armed iran looks like north korea or pakistan or other examples, we shouldn't really be concerned. >> you know, on the israel issue, look, i think undeniably israel is a factor in our calculations. but i can just tell you from somebody who was on the inside for three years, it's not the driving factor of the. si on iran. it is a judgment by this administration and the previous few administrations that an iranian nuclear weapon is a significant threat to u.s. rvitl national interests in a vital

region. israel factors in making certain decisions but not in the ultimate course. i also think there's been some in evidence the last couple months that this administration isn't prisoner to israeli desires on this. how do i know that? because if this administration had been prisoner to those desires, obama would have laid out much clearer red lines than he did at the apac conference. we would have green lit an israeli attack on iran already instead of basically telling them not to do it and we think it's a bad idea. and we would have -- or we would have committed to doing it ourselves. now, i mean, this is a viable option. how do i know? because half the republican candidates running for president have suggested exactly, you know, green lighting an israeli attack or doing it jointly or doing it ourselves, claiming the red line is now or, you know, that -- and so there is a way in which you could be more beholden to the israeli view, and we see that on c-span and cnn just about every day on the other side of the political aisle.

i think at the end of the day the administration is making its judgments on iran based on u.s. national interests. israel factors into that because israel -- protecting israel's security is part of our traditional national interests in that part of the world. but it's not wrong. it's just the way it is. >> yes, ma'am. >> hi. my name is dina, and i'm here more as a person who has a lot of iranian friends who fled the country because of elections in '09 and they're very active here in the united states. most of them are at school. so it seems to me that the biggest enemy for iran and the iranian regime are iranian people themselves. and considering the fact that now elections are coming up and considering that the united states does have enough time on their hands to go to the diplomatic solution of this problem, where do you see these iranian people over there who are probably waiting and also the huge iranian community here

in los angeles -- where do you see iranian people actually fit in in this of inviting them to be in the coalition as you said against the iranian government? >> we didn't talk very much about the internal politics in iran, so -- >> yeah. i mean, i think this administration has been pretty clear about the atrocious human rights record of the iranian regime, and i think it's been more vocal in criticizing it but also taking actions on the sanctions front to designate entities that have been involved with it. i'm sure there are folks who believe more should have been done. i think it relates to the question here we've been talking about in today's discussion, you know, there's not a consensus in the op is situation that the united states should attack iran. sfaft, there's a lot of concern that a u.s. or israeli attack would give the regime an excuse to brutally oppress the opposition, could rally support around the hard-liners for some period of time. i don't know what effect it

could have. it could have other effects over the long term, but i don't see it as being productive to helping the opposition or leading to a short-term regime change. i think -- the last point i would make is i think we have to be careful about -- i mean regime change in iran would be good for the iranian people. whether it would solve the nuclear issue is an open question. it would largely depend on what type of regime. where the dispute happens is is whether that program should be weaponized or not. the thing that concerns me about a strike on iran's nuclear program is that ultimately it could convince people who are on the fence about whether iran needs a nuclear deterrent or not, that they need one as the only way to prevent iran from being attacked again by israel or the united states or whatever. i don't want that conversation to happen. i want a different conversation to happen where iran dials back its nuclear activities in a diplomatic atmosphere and then we can continue to hammer them on their human rights record and everything else. at the end of the day, the iranian people are going to determine whether the regime goes or not, not external

actors, you know, dropping bombs. >> craig? >> the only thing i would add, colin pointed out a strike on iran's nuclear facilities could have negative consequences in terms of internal domestic political developments in iran. i think that's possible. you know, others have pointed out that you might get this kind of rally around the flag effect in the short term where it strengthens the regime but that other time it could lead to openings for regime critics to criticize the government for bringing crisis on the country. so over the medium to long term, it could weaken the current regime. going back to my point before that we have to always compare these options to the alternatives, you know, it might very well be the case that a strike would strengthen the current regime. i think getting nuclear weapons would strengthen the current regime, as well, if they were able to acquire the ultimate security guarantee to defend them from external enemies, buy them some legitimacy domestically. both scenarios you're possibly looking at a stronger regime. >> before y