then what happens to johnson? you guys already said. he gets fired. bartly because he's perceived as being too passionate. the broad spectrum of public opinion of which davis is by necessity responding to wants a more aggressive strategy. and lee gives it to them. >> at the same time the gallagher reading is full of this talk about how the confederacy was willing to fight all the way. you can't say, okay, we're going to be willing to fight all the way like this if we're not willing to take a strategy that is a little more cautious. >> okay, and this is a good example where strategies can collide with public opinion.

sometimes that's why there's a division. this is purely military. but that has to serve larger political goals, which are sometimes really rooted not so much in what's more militarily effective, but what is values, for lack of better terms. ideals. and is the most militarily effective goal always completely compatible with values and ideals? no. there's always a process of negotiation that occurs between the two if you go too far. i mean, i know this is not necessarily something your ethics class wants to do. what happens when they clash and one puts too much weight on the ideals? what's the cost then? >> you lose. >> yeah.

you lose. on the other hand, a lot of times military organizations -- it's not anything goes. there's a sense that you've compromised so much. and the two are frequently in collision. and the two frequently collide. and this may be an example. and this is a way of maybe saying in a sense widely and gallagher are right. gallagher is right when he talks about what confederate public opinion wants. when he talks about the imperatives of southern white culture. widely may be correct from a strategic perspective. a military strategic perspective. all right. they may be both right, but that's perhaps the confederacy's biggest prom, is making those

two compatible. so now we circle back right to lee. do we think of lee as someone with strategy -- do you think this? do you think lee's strategy was plausible? say why. >> the south never had enough men or industry to be with the north. north was too big of a power. i think it was in the gallagher reading. i forget who he was quoting saying the north fought with a hand tied behind their back. it would have overwhemed the south regardless. he was too oriented on virginia and the home state. he could have perhaps shifted some troops out there and help

with some of the southern defeats there. he did well for himself for the most part. but he sacrificed and that really hurt the south. >> that is an argument that has come up. that's another criticism of lee. let me let roth in. then it wouldn't have mattered down the line in the late 60s when they were coming up to the end of the war. if it would have paid off early in the war then it wouldn't have mattered early on. >> that is actually lee e's strategy, too. i need to win the war early, because eventually it will become a matter of time, and then we'll definitely lose.

so the only chance for victory is to gamble early. although, okay. i think it was a plausible strategy if they had defeated the north and not given lincoln a platform for the emancipation proclamation. i mean, things like that would have warn him down and kept out foreigners long enough so i think he could have won. >> my thought is my criticism of lee comes when he finally does switch. which he's forced to because his offense's plans before the

wilderness, which i would call them fever dreams. because he thinks he can still move with the kind of speed and achieve the depth that he did when he still had a well functioning army. he makes all kinds of failures in the battles. i guess it's a tactical failure less than a strategic failure. >> yeah. although, i think the consensus is lee does pretty well during the campaign. he does it too late. and his army is bled white by that time. and it's not. he's already wasted so many. that's part of the argument against his general ship in that case. how many of you do think lee was plausible? that his strategy was plausible? so most of you think it was plausible. what did people think about the

argument, widely makes this about lee's victories being hallowed. hollow? he would suffer massive casualties to achieve them. >> he would win the battle and hold the land. but then the next day he would have to leave anyway. yeah, remind us again. does the federal army completely dissolve? no. it's at times, especially in the case, it's in terrible shape. but it's not like he walks into washington on a post. he mauls the federals tremend s tremendously. that's why he always needs the victory. he wants the follow on.

but let's say he wins at gettysburg. so what? he wins at gettysburg. and he loses a third of the men in the process. he still has all sorts of issues. and this is an argument against lee. and one that should be considered. and part of it relates to how plausible you think that gettysburg and ready he could have done it. >> i don't think it's his fault. i think it's fine and what was needed for himself to win. but his positive trait was a weakness with his aggressiveness. he became way too reckless with his men. he would just throw more men into the battle, and they would

just get mowed down. but it would work to weigh down the north. >> i have an issue with his strategy going into gettysburg. the point of his campaign was obviously he wanted to win a big battle in the north, but wasn't the military objective to get to harris burg? >> yeah, he does not intend to fight in gettysburg. >> yeah, if he's going after the hub like harris burg or the industrial center, so what. you make it. if he was to take over on the factories, so what? >> his goal is really to force the frodo army to a battle and to defeat it, decisively. and that should crush the northern opinion. and it's not completely.

what happens in new york city around that time? the draft riots. okay, the north is deeply, deeply divided in some respects about the war. this is all terribly complicated. why is the atlanta campaign so important to lincoln? we have a famous letter from lincoln where he says i'm going to lose this election. who is lincoln's opponent? this is not in many of the readings. mcclellan of all people. now mcclellan is on a platform. the democratic party party and platform. the thought is the confederates have basically won. to allow the northerners, the

so-called peace democrats don't realize that the confederates really want their independence. they think if we do a cease fire, we can renegotiate this. and the confederates sometimes talk openly about how they want to encourage this. we really just want our own country at this point. but if you stop, you're not going the start the machine back up again, right? so we don't completely know what he would have done. yes, he was not in favor of emancipation. but mcclellan was a union man still. he would have been present. so that dynamic. is that counter factual is problematic. and that's another and this is related to a larger question. . this is how much chance does the

confederacy as a whole have? then anything lee does is impossible. and you see, the questions are related. if you say confederate victory is too many things are against it, then this is almost a stupid question. we shouldn't have this class. we should have a class. i should be writing out tables of manpower and industrial capacity and things like that. what? we say how good he is at the defensive strategy when he's forced to do that. wouldn't it have made more sense if he was closer and in the confederacy which is a sign of europe at the time. they would be closer to the supply lines, and they could have given up land at the same time. grow up in northern public opinion while still giving up small amounts of the casualties in the aggressive campaigns that he lurked on?

>> won he go to the north because the south was losing all the supplies? so when they went to pennsylvania, they took advantage of all the fields there. >> yeah, a lot of the supply system is sort of legalized theft. right? and the federals do the same thing. i mean, northern virginia is completely devastated. a nice prosperous place. gallows road with funny street names. and there is a supply imperative there. but, of course, lee zuz well, but what's interesting about the campaign is he's doing exactly what he doesn't want to do. and then the interesting question then becomes is he just personality wise unsuited to fighting? also, gallagher makes this point. lee fights in the overlying

campaign. johnson is widely his right guy. masterful delaying action. but what happens at the end of all these things? you still lose. why? because what happened? you're pushed back, and then what happens? what occurs? a siege. all right. and lee says that very early on. if this becomes a siege, we're done. and he says this as early as seven days. all the northern superiority and material is just gradually going to overwhelm the confederacy. you lose an entire army. so that's one of gallagher's

arguments. the stuff doesn't actually work. >> there's definitely something to do with the opposing generals. he's got a really good read on mcclellan or even burnside. burnside has a problem where he'll freeze up when he's given too much. kind of burn side bridge. it takes him a long time to get across that bridge. burnside can be take advantage of and exploited, as can mccl mcclellan, obviously. he doesn't get that good of read when it comes to grant. yes. there's something deeply wrong about the the potomac. i don't know if the historians have done such a great job. the army fights really hard as is effective. but it's generals.

it's partly because mcclellan because a lot of the officers he selects and the culture he creates is passive ones. also beaten by the same team too often. there seems to be a sense they get the culture of losers. and what is the opposite thing in the army of northern virginia? they think they're always going to win. and what's interesting about is is it's not just the army thinks that. who else thinks that? and gallagher has a lot of it. >> that's part of it. and what other important group of people? the confederates. average confederates. so when you look at things like gettysburg. it's interesting. the public reaction is not that negative. it's sort of well, yeah, we wish it went better. the first day went for the confederacy. where did it happen? in pennsylvania.

so we didn't get a huge victory. we thought the federals to a draw. we survived. the first day went better. vicksburg is seeing a complete disaster in contrast. the same thing occurs to some degree after -- lee's army is mauled. but he stays an extra day. he'll able to say this is a draw. he almost dares him to attack. mccullen makes the mistake and refuses. this is the importance of psychological factors. and if you're going to defend lee the way gallagher does, you're going to put a heavier premium on these things. that lee is able to build the culture of winning. so he has to take risks. and there are positive effects to this. so the army of northern virginia will be effective fighting force. but you wouldn't have that

culture of winning if you did the strategy that washington would have done. yes, you can rationally explain it to them. mr. kconners, you want to push back? >> a culture of winning as useful as it is. i think the description of them is like a bulldog whipped a t lot is used to getting whipped but will always keep fighting and keep fighting pretty hard. >> and will eventually win. >> and will eventually win. so there's a culture of tenacity that developed in the army of the potomac, where as the army of northern virginia when they lose, yes, they still have a culture of always winning, but the loss will somehow stick with them. i think. >> well, stick with them because they may have a culture of winning. so many of them will be killed it won't matter. and arguably, that is what happens to the army of northern virginia.

they're running low on ammunition and not many are left. by '65 are officers are all dead. you know, eventually the preponderance this is why confederate independence is very hard to get in the first place. so is this even a good discussion to have in i'm just throwing that out there. i think most military historians don't think it's automatic. i think most of us come to the agreement that lee came close enough to changing the tide of

the war by -- you came close enough with the hat trick you have to take it seriously. that being said, you can still make the argument. something more like washington. and remember, that might be true. if he is right about the power of public opinion, then that's still not a bible strategy. keep a lot of that stuff in mind. we'll talk about the grant. all right. leave.

[. up next on c-span3's america history tv. the other side of civil war as we take a look at general yewleye ulyssess. grant. and saturday morning at 8:00 a.m. eastern, more american history tv with an oral history of the vietnam war. >> april 15th, 1912. nearly 1500 perish on the sink called unsinkable. >> the lookout shouted iceberg

ahead. they struck the bells three times. which is a warning saying there's an object dead ahead. it doesn't say what kind of object. then he went to a telephone nest and called done to the officer on the bridge to thel them what it is that they saw. the phone was finally answered. the entire conversation was what do you see? and response was, iceberg right ahead. and the response from the officer was, thank you. >> samuel helper on the truths and myths of that night sunday at 4:00 p.m. eastern. part of american history tv. this weekend on c-span3. more from u.s. naval academy professor as he examines the

generalship of ulysess s. grant. >> all right. so today we will do grant. with lee obviously one of the ways the class was structured is you had one historian is an excellent battlefield general and a terrible strategist. and another former teacher who made the argument that no, lee's strategy was plausible. it didn't work out. but it wasn't because his strategy was implausible or not well executed. today i didn't give you an anti-grant reading. meaning grant is terrible. and the reason for that is the consensus view among most modern historians is that grant was a

great general. i sub jibe to that view. it's hard to get a good, curt reading that's plausible. so i don't. but i should mention that. during the war. right after the war. what happens to him after that. shows how americans like him. he becomes president. he's incredibly important. his memoirs -- how many of you read them. maybe an english class.

the very unvarnished and clear. that we have we romanticism. then you have a turn where people become indifferent to him. you can also draw that out widely. he stills sees grant as a great general. i mean, what is to complain about. grant is bloodthirsty. and you get all sorts of

stories. and there's a criticism of a blood thirsy general. then a few important military writes really start to rehabilitate grant. and this interpretation widely more or less repeats here. it's kind of the consensus view. some people will dispute piece, including myself. but you should realize that grant's reputation has ebbed and flowed. i still want you to e make a judgment. it tends to inspire less debate than lee. i wouldn't be surprised if this class is affected to some degree

by that. maybe it isn't. after giving you that little bit of context. why don't some of you start flushing out, at least in the reading you got, why is grant a great general? what makings him special? okay. that's a great opening line. you've advanced the class in a way. there's a reason why grant's reputation is always going to be easier to defend than lee's. because he wins the war. and lee doesn't. >> why do you argue he sees the bigger picture. it's not on instantaneous battle. his ultimate goal is to crush lee's army. but he sighs the bigger picture of the war. what the are three levels again?

strategies, operations. and grant is the master strategist. does grant always get his way on the operational and tactical level? no. does anyone remember and example? it's one of the readings. what happens at shiloh? is that grant's greatest battle? no. the union army is hot mapping to some degree. but how does grant retrieve the situation? why he sort of refers to it as a character trait. he doesn't panic. he recovers. i doesn't mean he's flawless. did you --

>> i think that he's got the nerve. mcclellan breaks and burnside breaks. shiloh doesn't break. wilderness when he gets flanks, he doesn't break. he withdraws and stabs again. >> and how does that relate to the big picture? how do those two connect? >> if he loses the battle doesn't necessarily mean he's done. he's able to get over it and move to the next one. who is a contrasting figure on this question of character? who is the guy who gets the strategy right but due to a moral failing -- i mean, that's basically the way 19th century americans are seeing it doesn't succeed. it's mcclellan.