that's probably, that's the widely criticism, probably the most powerful criticism. i think gallagher quite ably goes through the problems with guerrilla war with confederacy and i would say first, there's recently a big book about guerrilla war recently came out by a guy, he finds, he thinks guerrillas are more important than other wars. he acknowledges it's probably more important because it's so self-defeating, that guerrillas probably cause so many problems, because they become prone to a lack of control and we don't

really cover it much in this class. you probably have heard of missouri and the crazyness that occurs in missouri. from the perspective of southern rights civilians, guerrilla war is not a great option. also, what crucial and important institution, confederate social institution is is very vulnerable? slavery. it requires stability of the laws and i know some of you, have you been talking professor camoy's class on slavery? one of the things that makes slavery different from other forms of property, they are human beings. they have wills and the ability to run and leave. unless you have a legal apparatus to catch them, force them, confine them, they're the institution was going to have a hard time to survive. and gallagher in this reading that you have, spends pages basically demolishing the guerrilla option. when people get obsessed,

vietnam, attempts to compare you know, the confederates should have been doing what mao did. this is a problematic comparison for obvious reasons. the more, the more credible alternative is what mr. conners considered, which is what wigely argued. what part is partisan orientated? the southern part. even there, remember, it was green. is green commanding policies? and is aided and knows how to work with them and then you've got washington with a continental army and you gave example of yorktown. even yorktown is a coin of opportunity.

he happens to have a british army follow him up there. that's the more effective criticism of lee. what he should are have done is fought this fabian strategy and kept his army in one piece and used the confederacy's vast size to his advantage. so, this is, and we have other military for examples. what helps with napoleon? what big country does he invade? russia. it's the same. it's too big. you get more and more worn down and that's potentially a problem that can be used against the federals. who repeats professor lud will talk about this a lot. who repeats the french error in russia? nazis. >> it was actually the disadvantage to the confederates that they picked washington, not washington, richmond as their capital and not something further south. >> that is problematic, and your readings don't have, richmond is chosen probably because virginia is so important. it's the home state of so many presidents, including washington. virginia is var large in terms of population. richmond has the iron work, which is one of the few centers of confederate industries, so

it's of extraordinary political importance and that's one of the reasons why it sort of seals the deal. in retro spect, was it really such a good idea? no. but everyone early on thought the war would be short and weren't thinking these things through. >> going back to the whole size issue, i mean, i'm sure that the russians were aware that their country was huge, is there any evidence that southerners were like we have a large piece of real estate here if we can just survive? >> yeah and i think some of the newer scholars show there's more of a talk by some people, by some confederates early in the war and there's more criticism than we used to think of people like lee for being too, well, what school does he come from?

the place you love to hate, right? well that's too strong. one team. we're joined. we're purple. so -- but what the confederate high command all comes from that same institution. west point. that's one of the reasons it's off the table for them. that's not the way west pointers fight. i think gallagher has a quote. the same quote i use at the beginning of my book. i will repeat the story to you. after the confederate armies clearly lost -- yes. >> wouldn't it have just been an advantage. they are just made -- they had to make a decision to split fween their state loyalties. i don't see where the argument comes. it's not the way they wanted to fight. >> west point significance is that it is the only way, using

organized armies for both sides it's the only way they can imagine how to fight a war. for both sides, it's -- no matter which section you go with, you go west point, yes you have a sectional loyalty but you end up in a military institution that says this is the way soldiers fight. right? so that's what -- that, to some degree, imprisons them. that's part of the reason is that warfare has all sorts of problems and complications that would not have made it a viable solution. even though some confederates talked about it. that doesn't mean it would have worked. >> there is quite a di fintive book on that exact subject called west pointers in the

civil war. >> yeah. it does talk about some of those things. >> is there an honor or integrity question with that kind of warfare? >> precisely. it's not that the regular army folks have no experience with it. >> wouldn't that mean they would have to sacrifice that. >> that would have been the problem. that the capitol -- the capitol is still of great political importance. it is related to the issue of

what do the confederates want. they want to be recognized and losing your capitol does not help your cause. fair enough. during what war? the united states loses the capitol, they lose new york, and its -- and the americans still win. that's a fair reprize. all right. >> that's different. they were trying, the confederates were trying to keep their capitol so that great britain would support them also. i think it's different because in one mind in the revolution.

they feel like they will not have the support of great britain. america was not trying to have support of anyone else. >> yes. >> i don't think it's all that different. i think in the american revolution the americans were looking for support from the french. holding on to showing the french that they could beat the british. was it green that at fort saratogo? >> that is a crucial battle. >> you're right. >> back in the american rev lug, the french were in slang.

because the french and the english need their support but they were not really as. >> the fact in 1776, 83 that the british and french were fresh off a war with each other and they really hated each other but in 1861 the concert of europe is in full effect. >> and also, the british and the french. partly because of the refroech.

really the british will come and make the decision to come in when it seems to them that the decision has already been made. it is hard to defend far away. all right, so recognition is an important thing. the confederates are going win enough victories to prove that. whatever that meeps. also what is not mentioned in your readings, there is a big problem for the british which is slave slavery. slavery is an issue for them. the british abolished slavery. through a program of gradual emansipation. because of the incredible humanitarian. there was a movie made about

this. and the british, they are a little bit on the fence about some of the issues. but they generally don't like slavery. this is going be a big problem for them a big hurdle for them to advance beyond. there is another group of people that we have not talked about and that's gallagher's arguments. one argument is that -- it has been an issue. one of you said that. lee chooses a strategy partly to attack northern public opinion and break its will. but what does it feed into? >> what's the problem with the strategy? he has got -- we will talk about maybe some of the operational issues. but it also doesn't recognize.

>> that's why you like washington, too. depending on public opinion, which is why he did raids and he attacked small detachments when he could pick up a win and say look at all of these guys. >> that's a good point. this is something -- >> their relationship with davis. to say that he would have been sad because he was not doing anything is a far stretch. lincoln didn't fire. >> what's the difference about.

>> in washington's air, public opinion is not as important. you had to have property to vote. by the time of the civil war, it's well established. only white men vote, but the franchise has extended. you have things like newspapers. you have a lot more -- public opinion -- it's not that public opinion didn't matter but the reply to mr. con nors is a strong argument there. confederate public opinion matters more. i will point out that sherman, for example, remember that poem i had you guys read?

he gets fired, partly because he is perceived as being too passive and therefore insufficiently aggressive. the broad spectrum of con federal public opinion which davis is responding to wants a more aggressive strategy and lee gives it to them. >> talk about how the confederacy was willing to fight all the way until after mathematics and on wards. you can't say okay, we're going be willing to fight all the way like this if we are not willing to take a strategy that is a little more cautious. >> okay. and this is a good example where strategies can collide with

public opinion. sometimes, that's why there is a division. this is purely military. that has to serve larger political goals which are sometimes not rooted in what is more militarily effective but what is values and ideals. is the most militarily effective goal always completely compatible with values and ideals? no. and there is always a process of negotiation that occurs between the two. all right? if you go too far, i mean, this is not necessarily something that your ethics class wants to touch. if you go -- what happens when they flash and one puts too much weight on the ideals?

what's the cost then? you lose. on the other hand, a lot of times even military organizations don't want to do -- you know, it's not anything goes. all right? the two frequently collide. and widely is right. and this is a way. gallagher is right when he talks about what confederate public opinion wants when he talks about the impairtives of southern white culture. they may be both right.

now we circle back around to lee. all right. you know, do we think of lee as a someone whose strategy -- here is this. do you think lee's strategy was plausible? >> the south never had enough manpower or industry to compete with the north. just the jauger naught of northern industrialization would have helped regardless. leads him to completely neglect

the west. and helped work some of the southern defeats there. he did well for himself. >> that is an argument that has not come up. >> was it just the -- the north thought it was going be a short war. it wouldn't have mattered so much down the line. in the 60s they were running out of men. the aggressive campaign would have paid off early in the war it wouldn't have mattered later on. >> that is lee's reply. lee would have acknowledged it. so it's sort of the only victory

is the gamble early. you can still say that's the only viable strategy. >> i was going go back to the grand versus military strategy. it was a plausible strategy if they had won a few more key -- if they had defeated the north and had not given the platform for the emansipation proclamation. >> my big thought is my criticism of lee comes when he finally switches to the defenses which he is forced to because his offenses plans before the wilderness which are kind of, i

would call them fever dreams. he thinks he can still move with the kind of speed and achieve the kind of depth that he did when he still had a well functioning offensive army. he makes all kinds of failures. >> yeah, although, i think consensus is lee pretty well during the campaign but he does it too late and his army is bled while by that time. by that point, he has already wasted so many men, that's part of the argument against his generalship in that case. but it's -- okay. let's do this. how many of you do think lee was plausible. that his strategy was plausible. most of think you it was

plausible. what did people think about the argument? he makes this about lee's victories being hollow? >> maz r massive casualties to achieve it. >> he would win the battle. then the next day. >> it's at times, it's in terrible shape. but it's not like he walks into washington in the post. he mauls the federals tremendously. but you need the three.

let's say he wins that gettiesburg. he has still got the logistical problem. he still has all of these sorts of issues. this is an argument against lee and one that should be considered. and part of it relates to how plausible you think that gettiesburg and that -- whether or not he could have done it. >> i don't think his strategy was at fault. it goes back to his positive trait that was a weakness was his aggressiveness. when he saw the the tide of

certain battles starting to change he would throw more men into the battle and they would get mowed down. >> and that's -- >> he intends to fight somewhere in the north. >> going. >> forced a federal army to a battle and to defeat it.

what happens in new york city around that time. >> who is lincoln's opponent? this is not in many of your readings. mcclellen is in a platform. the thought is the confederates

basely won. a lot of the northerners, the peace democrats don't realize that the confederates really want their independence. they think you can renegotiate this.

if you come up with so many barriers, then anything lee does is factual, whether or not you buy that. the questions are related. if you say a confederate victory is too many things. >> the confederate strategy, we say how good he is, the defensive strategy, wouldn't it have mad more sense. the size of europe at the time, they would have been closer to like the supply lines? they cough given up land. while still giving up small amounts of -- not losing the massive amounts of casualties.

>> didn't he go the north because the south was losing all the supplies? when they went to pennsylvania they took advantage of what was there? >> a lot of the supply systems is legalized theft, right? and that -- the federals do the same thing. northern virginia is completely devastated and completely opposite of northern virginia now. and that's part of the support. there is a supply impairtive there. lee is -- he does well in the overlying campaign. what is interesting is he is doing exactly what he doesn't want to do. and the interesting question becomes, you know, is he just personality wise unsuited to fighting? gallagher makes this point. let me point this out, too.

lee fights a masterful action in the campaign. johnston has a masterful delaying action. what happens at the end of all these things? you still lose. why? because what happens? you are pushed back and what happens? what kind of operation occurs? and lee suz that very early on. he says this very early on. if this becomes a seize, we're done. >> all the northern's priority and logistics and material, it's just gradually going to overwhelm the confederacy and therefore, sieges -- what happens after a siege? you lose an entire army. that's one of