i mean, a lot of things went wrong. for someone with his level of inexperience, which is true of everyone else, he did okay. lee is like this too. he does terrible. all right. why is lee put in command of the army? >> johnson gets injured. >> johnson takes a bull let where is the other four star? he happens to be in richmond. put him in command. the rest is history. lee has nothing to do with that. you can make the same argument about various episodes in grant's career. so what is grant's career like? it wasn't great. he does pretty good in mexico. he has an excellent combat record in mexico. some of you probably heard of

grant's -- he liked to -- what's the story? some issues with alcohol. and it's still controversial if that ever comes up during the war. some people say there are few episodes. some people say none at all. the consensus is he obviously does fine. but he gets out of the army. hi happens to know how to be an officer. then he gets various opportunities. he makes the most of them. all these things are strangely random. unlike lee. he has a distinguished career. not just in mexico. but throughout the rest of it.

there's a lot involved in this. so that's something to consider about when you evaluate the question of are there good generals or not. why would an institution like the naval academy want to focus on generalship? what is it about our mission here? yeah, what would it do to the naval academy if they talk about there are all these constitutional and bureaucratic factors and a lot of it is luck. why might especially the folks at ban kroft hall be a little concerned if that's what i was telling you all. >> yeah. also, how might it be -- how might it hurt, even if -- even if all those statements are true, how might it hurt the organization if everyone just thinking of, you know, it's really context of that matter. >> people o who are passive and become victims of their environment. >> exactly.

have any of you heard of the concept of friction? okay, mr. goodman. >> the fog of war. >> yeah. in wars, even the simplest things become difficult. they're so plagued by uncertainty and chance. and also fear, right? people are getting killed, and things don't quite seem to work right a lot of times. and there are very human things. we'll have an optional staff writer. i'll point out things. people get tired. they run on too little sleep. they're asked to make decisions of incredible importance. that's why mistakes are made. stonewall jackson is a great example. what's to him? he's shot by his own men.

we'll talk a little bit about this. it's shot near where jackson is shot, by his own men, even after being warned by lee, be careful, you know what happened around here. he goes out on the patrol to do reconnaissance. you don't have satellite imagery. you have to look at the stuff yourself. it's night. it's confusing. he comes back and makes noise. his own guys shoot him. he eventually recovers. i think he's shot to the neck. so these are the kinds of random things that happen. and he calls it, you know, it's friction versus genius is related to this issue of character. and by the way, where did you hear of friction before? >> we had to do reading for warfare. >> okay. all right. the marine corps is really into

this. this is partly because he himself was a serving general and serving officer. the main way, and it's partly because intellectually he's a 19th german. one of the ways you overcome friction, by friction, using the concept of machine. where all the gears get gummed up. you guys are in the naval services this is, you might be, mr. connors might be having to lubricate things to make them work, or telling a chief to tell it and then telling some one else to do it. >> tell the chief to tell somebody else to do it. >> because you guys are officers, right? so, how do you overcome that, that frikttio that friction? how do you overcome inherent problems of getting the most basic things done. for klosowitz, some of you

mentioned it. t that is an argument for grant, grant's tenacity is seen as a virtue. something goes wrong, something always goes wrong. he find a way to overcome it. that is the ethic we try to teach you here. something goes wrong, what are you supposed to do, give up and give excuses? no. right? you are, i hope -- you are not supposed to do that. right. but here is something i want you to think about. this is an academic history class. this is not a leadership class. i an not saying people who teach leadership are wrong, one thing you might want to ask yourself at times is that really true? is that in fact the correct way? is that really how things occur? and that arguably is a different question. you can make that compatible, with giving your all, and trying to overcome things best you can. that is, really a moral and ethical issue than one that

historical. everyone see what i am saying here. there is potentially -- when it is professional ethic. you have that because of moral and ethical reasons. whether that is operative in the way of explaining history correctly is a different issue and is actually much more comb ply kate comb -- complicated. that is something you should consider. because, you see it -- do you still do hobson's law an things like that as a plebe? i think they used to give this to plebe -- historic, destroyer captain. something goes awry, the ship sinks. he is asleep in his cabin. he end up, i think he goes down with the ship. right? why does he have to do that even though? why are cos relieved even if subordinates screw up.

now, some one give me an argument against that? how can you always guarantee -- where does, what if it is a brand new ensign, what if it is -- >> they shouldn't have been doing it without having a qualified ood. which would have been signed off by the co which in fact -- >> that is the navy's ethic, right. and -- that's to make sure that every commanding officer gives his or her all in taking these responsibilities seriously. i mean that is arguably you have to do that as an organization. what is the most controversial thing that happened to most marines in afghanistan recently? ended up on youtube. yeah, what do you think is going to happen to the company commander? >> relieved. >> everyone has moved on. i don't think that person's career is going to go anywhere after this, in all honesty. i an just saying that, i have no

real information. but why do you think -- what if -- can he supervise every little thing that happens. >> heap reyatecreates the cult. the military takes thattet etthn very seriously. that is a professional imperative. is that the best historical explanation for things like whether or not a whole country or army wins in the war or not? maybe not. maybe not. all right. can you still -- you see how those are different? a question of causality, whether professional ethics. that being said, most military historians take the view of that generals do matter. they will talk about things like -- you know, loss of nerve. all right. sometimes they'll be incredibly

critical about it. right. and they will be sort of -- the military historian's version of monday morning quarterbacking kind of. all right. so it is almost similar to, poor joe flacco. how he its krs criticized is th fair? now i want to throw this back. come back to grant though. grant. what do you think -- i know i've didn't give you the case against him. any one who wants to try to push back on that. or construct an argument. or maybe if you don't believe it. yes? >> his strategy was look keep throwing more body at it until he won. he realized we have more men than they do. it was, lost 7,000 people. like two hours. so, i mean. >> yeah, that is -- we don't think it is quite that bad.

there are plenty of things you can criticize grant for. we think that is an exaggeration. >> he really didn't, liking look at his men. more as objects than people. like, my focus is to one the war. don't really care about the casualties. >> i think wily subscribes to that view. >> i wouldn't say he doesn't care about his people. i would say he has the hierarchy of mission and then on down. understanding that he has to get a task done, knowing that he has to put forth these maneuvers that put his people at risk and there its also arguments and war theory that if you love your men you allow them to go forth and fight. where like mcclellan's argument was i love my men i don't want to put them in the face of danger. they were itching to go fight. do you love your men you are not trusting in their ability to go forth. that is a matter of we was in brandt's -- >> all right.

>> i was going to agree with her, actually. there are things, that he said he didn't care for them because he threw them at certain situations. they also don't, being a regular private or corporal in an infantry, you don't get the strategy, you only see the tactics. while they may see he is throwing body at a certain level. they are seeing he is not choosing to skip certain battles and move on to certain other things and not picking every battle across the line to wrack up wins. but overall, get a victory on strategy. >> from what we know of grant's reputation among his troops, he was -- generally, he was not loved -- how many know this by nicknames? sherman is called uncle billy. lee is called robert. mcclellan was called little mac. it was fond. you hatch these big parade.

they like parade. i know you all love parade. you live for parades. right? and, and, mcclellan, was a great horse man. he would do a flourish. his troops would go crazy. and really, it is seriously true. you know, the sense among historians. grant never got that kind of -- nickname, but he still had a lot of, you know, he was very respected. right? and that's a different issue. right. but the question of whether or not that is an index of effectiveness. mcclellan was loved. not as good a general. let me point that out. mr. connors let me get you. >> old blood and guts. yeah, he kind of grind the hell out of you at the same time he gets victory. that's what you appreciate. >> soldiers, we know from history, troops are willing to fight, especially if they know they're going to win. the tradeoff has to be they have to have a sense of their winning

or getting something out of it. yeah? >> i did get a sense that the conf confedracy was capitulating. maybe too much credit -- maybe --thfoot. >> at the end of the overland scam pain is the lincoln administration, political situation in great shape? no. people are terribly disappointed at the end of the summer of 1864. and do you remember what battle changes it? of course, the argument is grant deserves some credit for that. grant is the one that puts the motion in the strategy that involves moving in different avenues of advance. and one of those is sherman. and grant has lip tagsmitations. some are fail because of a -- because inept field commander.

you know, the bench of effective field commander is low. grant has political imperatives he has to respect. but that is a good subtle argument of too much credit. >> another reason that he quits his job, you mention lincoln. lincoln was -- just so thrilled to have a general that was at least aggressive. and, lincoln also -- was -- had more of the annihilation to be look you want to -- his generals to attack lee's army. not necessarily take richmond. which i know mcclellan was more about taking richmond. and lincoln needed somebody who would do something, whether he won or not. >> man not so much grant's doing as it is lincoln's. mr. connors. >> grant's biggest failings are tactical, not strategic. he is strategically very good. but tactically less so. in, for example, that again, wilderness in sharpsburg.wilder

flanks turned. that denotes bad tactical skills. >> cold harbor. >> cold harbor. battle of the angle. >> that's not grant. thinking sharpsburg. >> sharpsburg. >> same thing. mcclellan, '62. september. >> spotsylvania. >> the angle. yes. yes. you can certainly criticize. we'll walk back around. the way this all are open to question. although in grant's defense, is it grant's job to be doing tactical level stuff? >> no. it is supposed to be -- >> supposed to be his staff. there is arguably an organizational issue there as much as anything else. all right. grant, part of grant's trouble in the overland campaign, this is not clear in the readings you have. grant has two very different and

profoundly conflicting hats. he is in effect the field commander in a very awkward commander relaotitionship. he is fighting lee. and what is he supposed to do. wily talks a lot about it. he is coordinating all the federal armies. all right. this is as if general dempsey had to do his job as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff while being in afghanistan commander. right? why do we not do things that way? it's too much for one person. really too much for one person. all right, kind of absurd. but the american system is pure -- bureaucratically, has quirks in it. howlick should have played the role of keeping the big picture. howlick -- there are not that many great military writers united nations precivil war

period. howlick is the best that you have got. howlick is the only one in uniform. he doesn't do that. grantee ven seashe eventually t role. he is pulled in too many directions. i want to come back to the point. arguably there is some times a conflict between -- mcclellan is loved by his men. can you love your men too much? does that make you -- really? do people really buy that? or is that, or is this different types of -- well, let me let you discuss it. >> it is related to sports. if you are going to play shy and all that you are going to get hurt. if you are not aggressive taking the fight to them, you are going to hurt yourself worse. when an attack does come you are not going to be ready for it. building on grant, always pushing being aggressive looking for the right fight and all that. he was protecting his men. mcclellan was, i don't want to

go there and all that. so when a big fight did come. they weren't really ready for it. >> mcclellan does take a lot of casualties. that's an argument. awe also, like christina said, these men enlist to fight, fight for something they believe in or paid to do. so by not allowing them to fight and by trying to protect their lives, i thin tik the generals doing them a disservice. they didn't sign to just wear the uniform. in theory they signed up to fight and to one battles. >> anyone want to -- >> some of them were pressed in. >> yes by -- by -- by '63. then you have a lot of people who are -- i think i mentioned in the previous class, the draft works, not men are directly conscripted. states are given quo ttaquotas, there is incentivized to pay

bonus money. >> they were able to get out of it by getting some one else to go. >> yeah, yeah, substitute, yeah. they're not all complete plea volunteer buys this point in the war. >> didn't the draft come in after mcclellan was replaced. >> we are talking about grant. >> if he is arguing that he is doing a disservice to his men by keeping them in the camp. the draft does ant ply to mcclellan. >> fair enough. by not allowing them to fight or win battles, you could are gou that, who ever does this is prolonging the war, which in the long term is losing lives. >> there is kind of a, a conflict between short term and long term. and that's, and it's not adjudicating it correctly. right. that's -- that's okay. >> by putting your men in the battle, you have trust in them they will come through and win.

but shy away. the general doesn't want us to fight this one. if that happens over and over again. >> you guys are giving the very good institutional response. and it's perfectly defensible. let me push back a little bit. john bell hood. incredibly aggressive. men quite fond of him. what happens? he destroys his own army in effect. by attacking. i forget his name. good friend and colleague, civil war historian at unc-chapel hill. in the western army, sherman's army, he has, a story about, i can't remember which one, a corps commander who is -- who is very effective, very aggressive but some what disliked by

mismen. he is seen as a bit too aggressive. a bit too ambitious. so there is a fine line between -- yes, you know, troops want to, troops want to win. troops understand they have to, they have to do certain things to do that. but when do you have an officer -- who, who maybe wants that glory a little too much? you have to think of the dynamic between the generals, you have your political generals, who are there literally just to appease border states and people with their specific opinions and then you have the generals who are literally like militarily efficient. so, you have to look at the different background and how they got in those positions. lincoln appoints people as political generals. and they have no experience ever before. and they're leading green troops themselves. and then you have people who are very, very familiar with battlefield tactics and things of that nature and they're viewed as overly aggressive but they have the best knowledge and

experience in the field. who do you criticize? >> fair enough. i will point out a lot of time political generals are in place because -- out of respect to the desires of the troops. some of these controversial german generals, all of them have extraordinary dubious careers. and that used to be the joke. any of you get that? yes, exactly, right. so, a lot, they command german speaking. the german speaking communities are, actually politically quite important. a lot of them, if you do serious a history, you have to learn german, a place like saint louis, maybe. but, you know political, i mean it is partly because, out of respect to, i mean all their points are correct. let me just point that out. sometimes you have examples where -- this is kind of a conflict. i mean, i don't, that, that

times negotiating the conflict. concern between one's troops, what the troops want, and overall mission accomplishment. there may be a conflict there. there may be a way to square it in the long view, big view. this may look more ambiguous. i have seen this in counterinsurgency settings. do you think all senior ncos are thrilled with restrictions, escalation of force and roe and stuff luke that. no they're not. i have seen -- these are platoon sergeants who do what they're told to do. but are like, they don't like these rules. and what does the officer have to do? enforce them. all right. i mean, a lot of times, the marker of a good unit, especially the nco, modern unit is when they do stuff that they don't want to doable. they still do it. they will grumble a little bit.

especially if it is a senior non-com, having private conversation with his company commander. what do they doened at the end the day? that's what's taught. especially in high quality organizations. but there is, you know, there is a conflict. you shouldn't. i don't want you to think, these things can get very messy on the ground. historically that's the case too. so here is a question. a lot of times historians phrase, i think the consensus was lee was pretty good also. although there is more of a debate. although perhaps that's just because lee lost. he is more open to criticicriti. grant is hard to criticize. you can say all the bad things about grant. what does he do at the end of the day? he wins! maybe he wins ugly. but he wins. so a lot of times the debate

cups docup cup -- comes down, did he win too ugly? can he win at a more efficient rate. who here thinks lee is superior to grant. who here would lake lee over grant? awe one a, t awe one, two, three, four, five, six, seven -- all right, ten. who takes grant. you have the right to abstain. the better general, whatever that means. your own criteria. >> bar fight. >> not in a bar fight. of course, never would involve in such activities. who would take grant over lee? one, two, three, four, five, six, seven. i think there is an eight. there is people. all right, eight or nine. all right, okay. that's interesting. i am a little surprised by that.

okay. i will see you guys on monday. >> all right, see you, have a good weekend.

>> april 15, 1912, nearly 1,500 perish on the ship called unsinkable. >> once the lookout bells, lookout sighted iceberg ahead. they struck the bells three times, ding, ding, ding, which is a warning saying that there is some object ahead. it doesn't mean dead ahead it means ahead of the ship. it doesn't say what kind of object. with the lookout, struck the bell, he went to a telephone nest and called down to the officer on the bridge to tell them what it is that they saw. and -- when, the phone was finally answered, the, the entire conversation was what do you see? and the response was -- iceberg right ahead. and the response from the,

officer was, thank you. >> on the truths and myths of that night, sunday at 4:00 p.m. eastern. part of american history tv this weekend on cspan 3. next, a 1963 u.s. army film titled the general marshall story about george c. marshall who served as u.s. army chief of staff and later secretary of state and defense secretary. after world war ii, general marshall designed the european recovery program which became known as the marshall plan. in 1953 he received the nobel peace prize for his work to stabilize and rebuild europe. >> the united states army