difficult spot. >> man just following up on that. why do you think, you know one of the issues is always beauregard's role in this. and buearegard and johnson worked together. why the battle formation the confederates chose. kidding they were trying to sweep around the, the union army and push them into the, into the swamps. why did they choose the battle formation they did? and itf you were a confederate general. what formation would you have chosen instead or would you have used the same one? simple question, right? again -- essentially -- you have a complex scenario here. and there is really further study to be made in terms of the actual battle formation of the

confederate army. why? because we have such new accounts as that of dudley hayden whose an aide-de-camp on the staff of albert sydney johnston. he and heap writes writes in a j published in a newspaper that has come to light. the fact that the plan per se. he is writing, you know the day before the battle, the plan was, essentially -- that -- that they had a right-wing and a left wing. and this is in contrast to -- to thomas jordan and -- and some of the other people -- that -- that were credited or discredited for the -- for the tandom attack formation of having a corps one behind the other to -- to attack on the battlefield that was completely a wilderness type

battlefield which of course was impractical. so there is more work to be done. in terms of really -- investigating -- the tactical battle plan of the confederates as the it existed on april 6th. however -- that being said the fact that confusion was rampant in terms of the whole confederate line, nobody seemed to be in command in any sector unless it was albert sydney johnston. there should have been a segment of well, where hardy had, where a portion of the battlefield. where beauregard, some of the others that were, responsible, in terms of the high positions, would have commanded in a given sector to coordinate and to keep the attack going. that being said --

it is fair to say that the attack formation broke down at many attack formations would find difficulty in the wooded terrain. the terrain obstacle, that were encountered on the battlefield. >> well, let me throw another question out. what about beauregard. one of the great controversies that seems to cup back and back and back. and if johnston had only lived. and beauregard had not taken command or ordered a halt. the union troops would have been defeated. grant would never become grant. what do you think about that? what do you think of beauregard's role. >> i'm not a fan of johnston. that puts me on a collision course on these panels. i think that johnston was overrated. he commanded the army for 22 weeks. during that time he lost two

states. and a corps at fort donaldson. every time his name comes up, had he lived this would have happened. you know? in terms of the formation, you turn that over to his second in command, beauregard, truth of the matter johnston did not want to initially concentrate there. we know this because of a dispatch not in the official records. it only appears in his son's biography of his father. william preston johnson's biography of his father. a dispatch he had, johnston wanted to fall back behind the river, and go on a defensive position. so, you know i think that -- i will ak ncknowledge beauregard out of position when he made the call to halt the action on the first day. but you have to understand that he was, the man shouldn't have even been on the battlefield. his doctor wanted hum to him to

in an ambulance and sit the battle out. his blood pressure was low, suffered throat surgery at richmond, before he came out west. he was still suffering of it. after shiloh he has to leave the army, go off to the spas in mobile. so, he was very sick. but he was out of position when heap made t he made the call. i don't think that would have made any difference. but -- >> anybody want to. let's cause a little controversy. >> okay. i will -- >> i'm any not a -- not a, a beauregard fan as many of you already know. but, i in fact -- from my interpretation, what i read and the research i have -- i have made -- if there was one real culprit at shiloh i would have to say that p.g.t. beauregard

would be my estimation of that, why? for a variety of reasons. but in deference to what larry said, and i agree. the man was very sick. he had a respiratory infection. he probably shouldn't have been involved in a command situation at all. but again it gets back to interpretation of what was said. how it was said and who was there and who was favorite of who and so on, so forth. but at a conference the day, the very night before the battle, there was a big discussion as to whether the confederate army after -- after this horrendous delay of a couple of days. when they thought they were going to fight the battle, the day after they began the march, two days had gone by and they hadn't -- hadn't gotten in position yet to attack. and so there was a conference. and indeed in that conference, was beauregard and -- and --

johnston and ape few others. but, what was said at the time was that beauregard, per se, said, well i think we should retreat and go back to corinth because the then me has -- discovered us. they'll be entrenched in our eyes and we should leave the field without attacking and go back. well, sydney johnston got his dander up. this was -- not only something that -- that he couldn't understand in terms of beauregard's reasoning, but after planning all this and doing all this, where was the moral courage in terms of fighting that battle. and that's one thing that, you know, again there is different ways to look at sydney johnston. but johnston, i think, you know if you consider his generalship in relation to grant and sherman at shiloh, and if you cut off

their careers at that point, there is no question in my mind that sydney johnston would come out ahead on that circumstance. but anyway, johnston made the decision that he was going to fight which took a lot of moral courage despite the advice of beauregard who was the popular victor, hero of manassas. and, johnston couldn't understand, after this conversation, hend asked t aske doctor. what its beauregard. why is he talking this way? and the doctor said, he is a sick man. indeed he was sick. and that may have had a lot to do with his attitude, actions at the time u tof the battle. >> i can't let this go by. being involved with to he grant- it was pointed out that, he just

mentioned, it wasn't great, you seemed to be saying, what do the other panelists or wiley, what do you think? >> give him a chance. i have been doing a lot of talking. let jim talk. >> i was about to go back to beauregard and johnston. anyways -- i think that grant unquestionably was, as well as sherman who was action on the field as more or less commander since grant's headquarters was nine miles downriver at -- down river at savannah. i think that initially both of them looked bad in regard that its grant and sherman in regard to being prepared. and of course, neither of them is expecting to be attacked. but once the battle is joined i

think grant handles himself quite well from all i can understand. i think sherman does too. and -- so -- i give them high marks. fighting defensively. but of course, fighting defensively, particularly if you have got good terrain is a different ball game from trying to go on the attack. and i think that -- that the confed confederates, of course with an inexperienced army trying to take the offensive, for a very, very difficult situation, and, also, we need to realize in regard to both johnston and beauregard they have never commanded in anything like this kind of a battle before. nor have grant and sherman.

and you know it is totally out of american experience. so from that standpoint, we really need to, i guess, you know -- the cliche cut them some slack. >> how about, larry you, want two say something afwobout that? >> i wonder what the reaction would have been during the first gulf war if tom brokaw had broken in on the news and said, "there has been a surprise attack on allied forces at kafghi. u.s. and allied forces have held on. but thousand, thousands of young american boys are going to be sent back to delaware in body bags." america would have wanted

schwarzkopf's head on a platter. and his personal courage aside, no question he is the glue that hold it together. it barely outweighs the horrendous mess that has been created on the battlefield and the implications of it. so, not good. >> okay. wiley? >> in connection with sherman and grant and johnston. and this, you know, indirectly relates to their generalship. but what -- you know, in terms of an imponderable, today we have a circumstance where sydney johnston was killed by a stray rifle ball, as far as we can determine. during an attack. that he participated in. yet grant, in riding across a

field was fired at by confederate canon, artillery, a canister ball hit his, his, his saber and broke it in half. and what would have happened to grant if -- at that -- if that canister ball had been just an inch to the left or right. maybe it would have severed an artery. in grant's leg. and he would have died. and also, sherman. sherman -- when -- at the beginning of the battle in ray field, threw up his hand when heap dhe discovered confederate skirmishers less than 50 yards away, and a bunch of shots rang out, high volley from skirmishers, threw up his hand to ward off shots, the fact that the confederates were using buck-and-ball cartridges a round ball with free buckshot versus a rifle ball which would be typical of the rifle musket

which was normally used. but anyway, a buckshot hitting in the hand and the rifle -- the musket ball killed his order leer thomas holliday sitting next to him. sherman was very lucky at that point that he was not killed. and there were several other incidents during the battle where his horse was killed or he could have been very seriously injured if not killed. and so, was this destiny? or was this just happenstance? these are some of the imponderable things just like assessing the generalship. how can we assess the generalship in terms of a, yes, after they were on the field, that's one thing. but how can we assess all of the factors that we don't have a grasp of. >> yeah, just -- what if the bullet had missed albert sydney johnston and had gone all the way to virginia and let's say it

took six weeks to get there -- and it struck robert e. lee in the side of the leg and he bled to death. would he have developed into the great, at that point, would he be remembered as the the great military genius that he is and would his face be on the side of some mountain, i don't know? he evolved. he evolved. >> i might also comment, in regard to sherman and grant. and the issue of surprise. they tried to defend themselves at the time on the issue of surprise and of course sherman very disturbed when grant is being criticized so. and sherman has to know that -- if grant was surprised a lot of the reason is because he was surprised. you know i doubt if they had

admitted, "yes i was surprised. but then i fought well." i don't think they would have survived. i don't believe either one of them if they had admit they'd were surprised by the attack -- would have -- >> as we know this is an issue long past the war when the -- when the fell loeows are gettind and arguing this. one of the most intriguing thing, civil war. some of the best postwar arguments between union generals on one side, confederate generals on the other. they argue with each other. as the to what happened. all we have to do is look at the career of longstreet to understand that pretty well. we're going to stop now. we are going to give the audience a chance. if you have any questions, we would love, love to hear from anything we have talked about, anything you want. but what i would ask you to do, if you would please stand and -- and, give us your name. and then, speak as loud leap lyu

can. we have a microphone. >> -- how do we discuss competencies and i would look your individual opinion as to what was the most intelligent tactic, best decision, courageous act from a nongeneral officer. >> before we answer -- maybe it would be a good idea. if any body has a question. if you've would come to the middle aisle. we will form a line. then we won't have to worry about, you know picking and seeing people. just, please come to the, come to the middle here. and, you can see van has a, has a mike there. but if you now would answer the question for the gentleman. or should we talk about microphones. what do you think? >> wiley? >> i will start.

essentially, you know one of the tactical jean yugeniuses in my interpretation was pat claiborne, pat claiborne fought at shiloh and he learned a lot. and this, indeed, goats es to t circumstance everybody has been talking about, "hey, these soldiers were relatively inexperienced." many had been in the army for a year but had not been in hard combat such as shiloh. and per se, pat claiborne, when he made all of these discoveries in terms of not, for instance, making a reconnaissance of the ter ra terrain that he was supposed to attack over, in terms of attacking the mclernen/sherman portion of the line and heap g bogged down uin a swamp and his brigade was split, and having to pass this almost impassible

area, he decided there were certain things he had learned and would employ in the future from -- from the tactical circumstances of the, of being in the battle. in fact it was pat claiborne who was attributed to the, the statement that "shiloh was a battle brilliantly won and was stupid leap loly lost." that had to do with tactical circumstances. i don't want to go on and on. there were a lot of tactical less lessons, i guess my point is, that were learned by a variety of commanders at shiloh. >> so we can get as many people as possible. >> my name is irene. i am from nebraska. but i happen to be a confederate at heart. i am proud to say that by the way. i want to thank the people of tennessee for their, they have just bun wondeen wonderful to m. my question is, regarding grant and havek, and you made the

comment that, both sherman and grant felt that they were going to be attacked.attacked. hallett had a lot of impact on grant. do you think that's why grant laid back on that a little bit or was he afraid of hallett because of what he had -- he had been summarily punished. >> this is john's question. >> grant himself was hurt with his ankle from a fall from a horse. so he was in no condition. >> well, i'll just talk about the issue in general. the relationship between grant and hallett is a fascinating

relationship. grant thinks until almost the end of the war, really almost -- yeah almost to the end of the war that hallett is the greatest military mind of the age, because of the stuff he wrote, and everything else. sherman thought the same thing. hallett never thought much of grant, and the reason is sometimes historians said because he's jealous of all the wonderful things grant was doing. in actual fact, hallett couldn't stand grant as a commander because he thought he was a sloppy commander. he didn't fill out the paper work right. he didn't fight according to the books. so in this particular case, as you know what happens, grant is supposed to be there at shiloh, waiting for buell's army to come when they merge, when they mass, hallett will come from st. louis, we'll take command of the army and grandly march on corinth. he does grant look i don't want

you starting any fights as the film points out. but grant is not afraid of anybody. i mean the truth be told. but there is this difference of attitude or opinion about how war ought to be fought. hallett is old school. grant is the new military. the new army. >> thank you. >> you're welcome. >> i have a question. >> one question. >> please. before we answer -- >> i won't take a lot of time here but what i did want to present and anybody is welcome to come up and take a look at it, in speak being of grant, this is my and shall we say ugly duckling here letter written by grant. it's a personal letter that he wrote on february 13th, 1862, in

the middle of the fort donaldson fighting. he wrote it to a commander walk, who was the commander of the corondo delay gun boat and he's telling him there's four more gun boats coming and not to get involved in any more fighting until they get there. why was this an ugly duckling? this was a letter overwritten by walk before he sent copies to the navy for the naval o.r.s, he overwrote the pencil letter of grant in ink. so, if you look at it, you think that it doesn't quite look right, but what it is, is walk and he makes a statement down here at the bottom that he did it, he overwrote the grant

letter. so here's an original grant letter from the very time when he became unconditional surrender grant that was historically altered by walk but still that doesn't keep it from being an important historical document, even though, as i refer to it, as an ugly duckling. maybe it's a good ugly duckling. >> that's right. we got about five more minutes. >> okay. my question is about the hornet's nest. how exactly did that facting go? -- fighting go? >> larry, you want to take that? >> well, the hornet's nest really is not what we today call duncan field. it was really the very heavily wooded area to the, what would be to the east of that.

after the war that area was the government paid some of the local people to come clear it out and the national park service has let it return to its natural state. but that really is the area. you know, there's something on the history channel a couple of years ago that, i think a couple of us made some appearances on that dealt with the hornet's nest, it may not have been as significant. you all have comments on? >> well, from my perspective, the hornet's nest was principally a fight of randall gibson's brigade and in reading a letter that i added to my collection here maybe two or three years ago written by one of the arkansas soldiers that was with randall gibson, he said that attacking that thicket, he kept referring to it as a

thicket. and he said attacking that thicket was just hell, sheer hell. they failed in four times that he recorded in terms of charging the hornet's nest. but the hornet's nest, per se, was subject to, from what i can interpret, to the best of my recollection when i did the original research, basically on a piece meal basis until the flanking moments outflanked the hornet's nest on both sides. so, you find not a sustained massive attack against a hornet's nest with a particular type of fighting that would have occurred under those circumstances but really only isolated attacks, particularly those of gibson's brigade. >> we got time, unfortunately, for one more question but i do want to say that everyone will

be here and please feel free to come up and talk to any of us and we're happy to try to answer any questions. >> i'm from savannah, tennessee. i would like to ask the panelists what they know of the experience of civilians at the battle of shiloh. thank you. >> not my question. i don't know. >> jim, you haven't answered one. this is the last round. >> i think of -- well the civilians who lived in the general area of the battlefield, i think it cleared out to a great degree. and i think of them mainly following the battlefield, coming back and civilians coming

from miles away, from memphis, from down in mississippi, wherever, to try to find their kin folk and their close friends who might have -- who had been seriously wounded and killed there. >> before we close out, i would like for everyone to know that everyone on the panel and john, we are all in a writer's club together. we're colleagues. we know each other's families. i do want to meet children and grandchildren out there and other authors that write on the western theater. i want everyone to know that we're colleagues and there's no conflict or anything between us. >> that's right. >> we see each other -- we disagree but it's -- once a year we get together and have a great time. so i just want everyone to know

that. >> you just spoiled the secret for everyone. >> we're mortal enemies. >> let me end again just by rooting us in the reality of what happened here and it was mentioned in the movie and shown so well. consider this again. some 63,000 union soldiers fought at shiloh. 63,000. there were 40,000 confederate soldiers. the casualties for the union were about 13,000. the casualties for the confederates were about 10,700. consider this very important point. the casualties for the confederates represented 27% of the people that fought on the confederate side at that battle. on the union side it was 21%. so consider what that meant later on for the war for an army that was much smaller. so, i