let's give a round of applause for our panel. >> great job. >> as we head into the final session of the day, again thank everyone for attending and your attention. let's hear another round of applause, though, for an occasion you won't have again. [ applause ] this next two speakers, they are going to do individual addresses to you. stacey allen is the chief ranger at shiloh national park and if you've never had the pleasure of a stacey allen led presentation,

put that in your bucket list. you want to get that one. i enjoyed one some 20 years ago. and stacey brings a passion and knowledge of shiloh that no one can really match. and if you haven't bought your copy yet, this is the last plug of the day. the shiloh film that embodies stacey's passion and scholarship about the battle is, of course, available here today at the event. and is being shown, i guess, as we speak at the visitor's center at the battlefield. stacey will go first and sort of give us his judge, you know, very tightly judged view of what the battle meant and its significance and then following stacey will be someone else who used to walk those fields of shiloh on a regular basis when he was a ranger at the

battlefield and that's dr. tim smith. tim is now a professor at the university of tennessee martin. and tim is glass prolific author on the civil war, particularly civil war preservation and then in particular shiloh itself. i brought along several different tim smith books but the one oil promote right now is the one he's just done for the sesquicentennial commission, part of our tennessee and the civil war series. he's put together an edited collection of articles from the tennessee historical quarterly called "the battle of shiloh." it just came out. it came out friday. we're so glad to have tim contribute this volume to the series and so glad to have tim with us today. so, our last two speakers of the morning and i think it might still be the morning by one minute, stacey allen and tim smith. >> shiloh and corinth, forever

linked by transportation and war. when i was told i had about 20 minutes to talking said to woody, i said you might as well extract my blood and attempt to render gold from it because that's about as close as we're going to get. you may have a better chance of rendering gold from my blood than me talking about shiloh in 20 minutes or less. we'll give her a go. the relevant relationship possessed by now peaceful battlefield in west tennessee with a historic railroad crossover in northeast mississippi, unveils its mysteries like a shakespearean drama. the compelling history of the first grate battle of the american civil war contains elements of suspense, surprise, great tragedy, and immense carnage. union victories in early february 1862, at fort henry and donaldson in northern tennessee

opened the confederate heartland to invasion by river and land. as winter slowly released its grip on the upper south, opposing armies maneuvered for advantage in the west. the seat of war, once faraway in kentucky slipped steadily southward as spring crept north. by april national and confederate soldiers more than 110,000 of them had moved by train, steamboat and rugged country roads to collide in a titanic force. this rural hamlet held no special importance at the time. there was no city, no grand strategic feature, just a high wooded plateau cut by rugged a

virngs bounded by creek bottoms whose creeping waters fed the tennessee river boring the plateau's eastern mass. at river edge lay pittsburg landing where natural condition made at any time furthest point on the river. crude dirt roads primary routes on which river commerce was hauled by with a go to and from the interior extended south and west from the landing beyond the little chapel where a day's march toledo the most important railroad transportation hub in the western confederacy. corinth, mississippi. two of the south's longest trunk railroads crossed at corinth. the east-west road. memphis and charleston. the only complete railroad to link the mississippi river with the atlantic seaboard and north/south mobile and ohio,

linking the ohio river valley to the gulf of mexico. corinth was quite simply that spring the lynch pin containing the confederacy's effort to halt the mississippi. after ascending the river a national army under general ulyssess grant at pittsburg landing its front encompassing shiloh church. while western confederate forces led by sidney johnston concentrated by rail. the military issues confronting these combatants proved not to be the mere possession of the field, or even the vital crossroads. but involved the defeat of their respective major armies and ultimate possession of the mississippi valley. grant's mission, sever the western railroads linking with the eastern with the mississippi valley and to recover the valley.

johnston's mission, hold the mississippi by defeating all union armies such as grant's for there were four threatening his responsibilities in the western confederacy. threatening the valley. today as one gazes upon the historic corinth railroad crossing, or traverses the once bloody battlefield christianed by song as shiloh healed. you need to ponder the presence and strategic value of old man river roughly 100 miles further west to appreciate the relevant chapter in history these two preserved landscapes linked by transportation and geography occupy in the two year military campaign waged between 1861 and 1863, fought to control the

navigation of the mississippi. sherman said to secure the navigation of the mississippi, "i would slay millions." on that issue i am not only insane, but mad. what lay at stake was immense. and history records the resolution and valor of the soldiers engaged. three of every four untested raw recruits proved all a divided nation could have asked of them in a war still less than one year old. shiloh proved in the end two battles. each strained suspense of two days of bitter fighting.

first day witnessed johnston unleashing a surprise attack to destroy grant's army before it could be reinforced by a second union force under general buell. grant's men held on fighting for time, darkness and buell. although he inflicted massive carnage on his enemy, johnston proved unable to achieve the desired victory. a failure to conquer many conclude still haunts the destiny of the confederacy to this day. for johnston perished, struck down by a stray bullet, he simply bled to death. when battle resumed next day the exhausted southern troops under general p.g. t. beauregard, a man of immense courage and he proves it on this day, probably

the most conspicuous leader on the battlefield. sick or not. bad plan or not. he was no coward. he resists the combined forces tramping upon them for buell had arrived. the grand offensive decisively checked the weary confederates were unable to stem the tide in one of the most dramatic reversals in american military history or military history or world history. southern army turned away and retired to corinth. the national forest regained their foot hold on the tennessee, retained it, i should say, where the roads traversed by johnston's mighty host still led south do resistant and its vital rail junction. along with sidney johnston, 3,500 soldiers union and confederate lay dead and nearly five times as many were counted

amongst the wounded. never again would either side boast the other would not fight. confederate spoegs of the western railroad serving the mississippi river valley remained imperilled and after shiloh as we have heard, wrote one southern author the south never smiled. let's go with some maps. i'm looking at myself. [ laughter ] boy, you people paint. watch what happens. where have we seen this before. we blew that up there by the way. henry and donaldson were critical to what happens at shiloh for the fall of the two forts open the tennessee valley to union control. with union gun boats. it was an avenue of invasion. an assent up the river brought the united states forces clearly

within contact of the western confederate railroads. confederates reacted to this. they had to. they had to rally. they had to concentrate. and whether or not they wanted to, the strategic point was the lynch pin of corinth, mississippi. not only were they falling back before the, what would be soon advancing federal forces, they were concentrating forces from elsewhere. the gulf coast was basically stripped of all available manpower. leaving only token defensive forces. and in the aftermath of shiloh, new orleans would fall. pensacola would fall. all of them sacrificed for the national concentration they attempted to pull off at corinth. which was partially successful. because confederate forces did

concentrate in large numbers, otherwise we would not have had the battle of shiloh. but opening up that river gave the federals an opportunity to pounce upon the railroads. thus, thus they will occupy pittsburg landing. and take advantage of close proximity to their targeted railroads. next map. the railroads are important because they feed the valley. direct line of communication. memphis and charleston in particular are the only east-west all weather rail link. junk tured with mobile and ohio of corinth, mississippi they constituted what the initial secretary of war of the confederacy called the vertebrae of the confederacy. extremely important trunk railroad lines for national security of the young confederate states of america,

who is in the throes of war. thus they had to defend them. they defended them, though, because of the valley. the valley was key. the valley was the focal point of the entire campaign. confederacy had it by the sheer act of secession and retain it for it divided their nation in half much communication west of the valley was difficult at best. few railroads, mainly rivers feeding old man river from the west was the way of transportation and communication west of the river. union forces wanted that valley back for all kinds of reasons. economics being a primary point. because the river was an outlet to world markets for the old

northwest for what we refer to today the midwest and it was a hot political topic of the war that their commerce was strapped by not being able to reach those markets close to them. so that river in essence was of economic value, it was also of military value. but more importantly, as we have already heard this morning, it was a pulse beat of a nation growing westward. and thus there was an even spiritual context to the river and its meaning to the american people. and you don't think those boys from iowa and minnesota and illinois were not on a holy crusade to get this river back? just read their letters and diaries. how dare they. how dare they seize that valley. confederacy has to hold it,

federals want it. very important. very important focus. when you're at shiloh, remember the river. remember the need to hold the river, to defend the river. the need to possess the river. next map. this is actually a direct copy of water color on canvas map that's in the national archives prepared by beauregard's engineer. this is what the confederate generals would have used. this is the information they possessed in map form. intriguing thing about this map i want you to concentrate on. it's the juxtaposition, geographically of pittsburg landing to corinth, mississippi. corinth is basically twice as far east to west than it is north to south from pittsburg

landing. another intriguing thing is, notice where pittsburgh land is in relationship to lee creek to its south and snake creek to the north. the landing area shown closer to lee creek than it is to snake creek. also notice that the shiloh church on the map is positioned basically slightly south but nearly did you west of pittsburg landing. this is all the information they had. what's amazing is on april 3rd when beauregard and johnston sat down to discuss the now movement which had been verbally order out, beauregard sat up all night writing out rough notes for orders of movement and assembly of the army to do battle against grant at pittsburg landing. they didn't have a map present. beauregard had given his map to colonel tom jordan. he took his notes his general

prepared throughout the night and was finishing them off in final form so that it could be distributed amongst the corps commanders. so, without a map, beauregard took a pencil and at the desk they were seated he drew the roads linking corinth to pittsburg landing. ladies and gentlemen, think of the audacity to put 44,000 men in motion to do battle and you have basically a blank page of a table top and you're drawing from memory the roads linking your forces to the enemy. our modern military couldn't get out of bed with that kind of information. these guys are committing an entire army to do battle. next map, please.

johnston had a plan. in the approaching battle every effort would be made to turn the left flank of the enemy to cut his line of retreat the tennessee river and forcing back on lee creek where he'll be obliged to surrender. very simple. concise battle plan. turn a flank. gain leverage. use your army's mass to crush your opponent against the swampy bottoms of out creek. next map. oops, we went backwards. well, i'll talk about it now. there we go. there we go. that's what i want to see. just watch. the opening of the battle from about 5:00 a.m. to 11:00.

confusing, huh? just leave it up there, right there. battle goes from a simple core line front, slightly over a mile's frontage and expands out to three miles over the course of about six hours. intriguing thing is notice the prep preponderance of the forces. notice the battlefield is basically cut in half, just up above where you would see the beginning of johnston's name. and notice the preponderance of the forces on the left side of the battlefield which is the west half of the shiloh, whereas a third of the army is on the east half of the battlefield. confederate right. the federals reacted quite well to the surprise. you know federal patrol went

out, encountered the confederates, and that slight warning was enough to allow for the long roll to sound and call of alarm to get all federal divisions up, dressed and prepared for what the heck was going on out there. next map. technology. you love it, don't you? here we go. stop it. here's the fly in the butter milk, the confederate attack

plan. remember that map of the region i showed you? what the confederates were using showing corinth twice as far east to west than it was north and south from pittsburgh landing? therefore the confederate army maneuvering to a point of assembly would be moving generally from west to east, correct? more than north to south. if you have that impression and as your impression of the world, that's the impression upon which you're basing your judgments. right? terrain governs the formation and direction of battle. that's an inherent military probability. terrain governs the formation and direction of battle. all military commanders have understood that from time tested. practice. therefore, knowledge of terrain should govern the formation and direction of battle plans. see how that linkage is there? so, when johnston overrun

prentice's camp in 1862, he will have brought half of his army to bear upon that union division camp, over the course of the first four hours of combat, half of the confederate army, eight of 16 brigades maneuvered to the right-wing of the confederate attacking force and that is what overruns benjamin prentice at 9:00 a.m., four brigades on the direct assault with four coming up in close support. 5400 federals against half confederate army. and now you know why ben prentice's division basically nearly ceases to exist at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of april 1862. then something amazingly happens. it's amazing because it will influence the remainder of the

fight from that point on. johnston will initially detach six soon just five of the eight brigades to now move left and northwest from prentice's camps. is that map still up? i see myself. can you play it again? so, five of eight brigades move to his left and northwest. he has six of those brigades on his left flank. six. six and five from 16. that's 11 of 16 brigades. 11 of 16 federal brigades are maneuvering and actively engaged on the west half of the battlefield.

remember how that map i had them pause that map when it appeared that blue line was perpendicular to johnston's possession of prentice's camp. the reason die that and we're back to this map now is the confederate high command understood the union army to be facing west. with their back to the river. because they had marched from west to east, they deployed facing east, and their entire attack plan was formulated on a union opponent who was encamped between al and lick creek facing west. is that one of the great lost facts of the battle of shiloh. it gets covered up by all the post-battle finger pointing but it's clearly evident, it's self-evident. all you have to do is examine the records yourself. don't trust me.

look for it yourself. confederate leaders believed the federalists were facing west. their entire plan is formulated on that. next map, please. here's reality, though. corinth is not twice as far from east to west than it is north and south from pittsburg landing, it is exactly the opposite. twice as far from north to south than it is east to west. that geographical misinterpretation paints the entire battle of shiloh. it paints it. it paints it. if you believe your opponent is facing west you deploy facing east. if you believe you're going engage or need to engage your opponent's west flank first you oblique your line and retire slightly so you can engage that left and turn it. when you have maneuvered half

your army to bear the union left and you're now east of shiloh church where your forces are engaged, you can now say i've check mated the enemy and release your mast to drive them into al creek. because between the hours of 9:00 and 10:00 even though he knew there were federal forces to his right front because that's what lockett's recould na assistance has reported he relieves five brigades to begin the push for federalists in to al creek. that check mates them he said. well not quite the chess player you are, general, i can't see and johnston chuckles yes, that mates them. he'll never recall those people, he'll never have the ability to recall those people. those people have asked what's johnston is doing on the right? johnston is taking care of any

reserve that can go out and aid the federal front. johnston does not have to go near the river to destroy grant, all he has to do is start the ball rolling the federals will come to him. when the alarm sounds they rally on the front. all he has to do is gain leverage on the flank and turn it and the battle is his. and that's what he assumed but guess what, folks? we know the difference. bus we know reality. he did not. he's facing his judgment on faulty intelligence. how many times have we based our judgments on not knowing the true picture in our lives? you can drop the maps. i'm going to finish this thing up. you want the full story? you want the 16 our death march join me at shiloh. staff calls it the death march by the way. i'm still alive. although tim pointed out i had

less than, just a little over 24 hours to live. anyway in later years, veterans of shiloh declared the battle the bloodiest in their experience. southerners say it was the heaviest firing of the war. union veterans refer to being as scared as at shiloh. the battle's realities have always laid shrouded in confusion and mystery if time and space, in words of ulyssess grant persistently misunderstood and indeed as author foote exclapgs. how should they understand this? they were put into a caldron of pure hell because from inside foote believed shiloh resembled armageddon. the confederacy lost its best opportunity to win the war in the west the battle of general grant and others hoped might signal the war's end proves just the beginning of a total war. amers