but, at that time, they had no way to get across. and the second issue is -- did the terrain present in essence a trap? maybe. >> let's assume that there was a kind of fort donaldson type en masse capture of grant's army. that would have given 85% casualty. that's what the confederates sustained at fort donaldson. that means that some, some several 1,000 would have escaped through out the river bottoms. lou wallace's division would have gone up to savannah and crossed over. i think if grant's army had been captured, i don't think that it would lead to the north suing for peace as so many people have said. i mean they would have still, the confederates would still

have to confront buehl the next day. i would remind everyone that the south lost an entire field army at vicksburg and they did not sue for peace. they simply kept on fighting. so did it present a trap? maybe. even if there had been an overwhelming victory. i suspect that the north could have rebounded from that. >> okay. i might also in commenting, following up on that think about how that the -- well, relative to being on the west bank of the tennessee with their backs to a river, nevertheless the union army which i think supports what you are saying, larry is well protected on its flanks by these swollen streams.

and it really limits what the attacking army is able to do with that situation. i'm not trying to say that that determines the outcome of the battle but it certainly put them in a difficult spot. >> maybe just following up on that, why do you think -- one of the issues is always beauregard's role in this. and buearegard and johnson worked together. why the battle formation the confederates chose. considering that they were trying to sweep around the union army and push him into the swamps, why did they choose the battle formation they did? and if you were a confederate general that day, what battle formation might you have chosen that day or would you have used the same one? simple question, right? i may not come out of this alive

if i ask the wrong question. >> again, i'll be the guinea pig here. essentially, you have a complex scenario here. and there is really further study to be made in terms of the actual battle formation of the confederate army. why? because we have such new accounts as that of dudley hayden who was an aide-de-camp on the staff of albert sydney johnston and he writes in a journal, published in a newspaper that has come to light the fact that the plan per se. he is writing, you know the day before the battle, the plan was, essentially that they had a right-wing and a left wing. and this is in contrast to

thomas jordan and some of the other people that were credited or discredited for the -- for the tandom attack formation of having a corps one behind the other to attack on the battlefield that was completely a wilderness type battlefield which of course was impractical. so there is more work to be done in terms of investigating the tactical battle plan of the confederates as it existed on april the 6th. however, that being said, the fact that confusion was rampant in terms of the whole confederate line -- nobody seemed to be in command in any sector unless it was albert sydney johnston, his presence. there should have been a segment of we'll say where hardy had a portion of the battlefield, where beauregard, some of the

others that were responsible in terms of the high positions would have commanded in a given sector to coordinate and to keep the attack going. that being said, i guess it is fair to say that the attack formation broke down in many attack formations would find difficulty in the wooded terrain. that and the terrain obstacles that were encountered on the battlefield. >> well, let me throw another question out. what about beauregard? one of the great controversies that seems to come back and back and back. and if johnston had only lived. and beauregard had not taken

command or ordered a halt. the union troops would have been defeated. grant would never become grant. what do you think about that? what do you think of beauregard's role. >> i'm not a fan of johnston. that puts me on a collision course on these panels. i think that johnston was overrated. he commanded the army for 22 weeks. during that time, he lost two states and an entire corps at fort donaldson. every time his name comes up, it comes up, had he lived, this would have happened. you know? in terms of the formation, you turn that over to his second in command, beauregard, truth of the matter johnston did not want to initially concentrate at corinth. we know this because of a dispatch not in the official records. it only appears in his son's biography of his father. william preston johnson's biography of his father. a dispatch he had, johnston wanted to fall back behind the hatchchyy river and go on a

defensive position. so, you know i think that -- i will acknowledge beauregard was out of position when he made the call to halt the action on the first day. but you have to understand that he was, the man shouldn't have even been on the battlefield. his doctor wanted him to go in an ambulance and sit the battle out. his blood pressure was very low, suffered throat surgery at richmond, before he came out west. he was still suffering of it. after shiloh, he has to leave the army, go off to the spas in mobile. so, he was very sick. but he was out of position when he made the call. i don't think that ultimately would have made any difference but -- >> anybody want to -- let's cause a little controversy. who wants to tackle it. >> i'm not a beauregard fan as many of you may know.

in fact, from my interpretation and what i've read and the research i have made, if there was one real culprit at shiloh, i would have to say that pgt beauregard would be my estimation of that. why? for a variety of reasons. but in deference to what larry said, and i agree. the man was very sick. he had a respiratory infection. he probably shouldn't have been involved in a command situation at all. but, again, it gets back to an interpretation of what was said, how it was said and who was there and who was a favorite of who and so on and so forth. but at a conference the day, the very night before the battle, there was a big discussion as to whether the confederate army after this horrendous delay of a

couple of days when they thought they were going to fight the battle, the day after they began the march, two days had gone by and they hadn't -- hadn't gotten in position yet to attack. and so there was a conference. and, indeed, in that conference, was beauregard and -- and johnston and ape few others. but, what was said at the time was that beauregard, per se, said, well, i think we should retreat and go back to corinth because the enemy has discovered us, they will be entrenched in our eyes and we should leave the field without attacking and go back. well, sydney johnston got his dander up. this was not only something that that he couldn't understand in terms of beauregard's reasoning, but after planning all this and doing all this, where was the moral courage in terms of fighting that battle. and that's one thing that, you know, again there is different

ways to look at sydney johnston. but johnston, i think, you know if you consider his generalship in relation to grant and sherman at shiloh, and if you cut off their careers at that point, there is no question in my mind that sydney johnston would come out ahead on that circumstance. but, anyway, johnston made the decision that he was going to fight, which took a lot of moral courage despite the advice of beauregard who was the popular victor, hero of manassas. and, johnston couldn't understand, after this conversation, and he asked the doctor. what is beauregard, why is he talking this way? and the doctor said, he is a sick man. indeed he was sick. and that may have had a lot to do with his attitude, actions at the time of the battle. >> i can't let this go by.

being involved with the ulysses s. grant association now at mississippi state, i have to ask you briefly to evaluate grant's generalship at this battle. it was pointed out that wylie just mentioned, it wasn't great you seem to be saying but what about the other panelists? wylie, what do you think? give jim a chance. >> i have been doing a lot of talking. let jim talk. >> i was about to go back to beauregard and johnston. anyways -- i think that grant unquestionably was, as well as sherman, who was acting on the field as more or less commander since grant's headquarters was nine miles downriver in savannah, i think that

initially, both of them looked bad in regard, that is grant and sherman, in regard to being prepared. and, of course, neither of them is expecting to be attacked. but once the battle is joined i think grant handles himself quite well from all i can understand. i think sherman does too. and -- so -- i give them high marks. fighting defensively. but, of course, fighting defensively, particularly if you have got good terrain, is a different ball game from trying to go on the attack. and i think that the confederates, of course, with an inexperienced army trying to

take the offensive, face a very, very difficult situation, and, also, we need to realize in regard to both johnston and beauregard, that they have never commanded in anything like this kind of a battle before. nor have grant and sherman. and you know it is totally out of american experience. so from that standpoint, we really need to, i guess, you know, the cliche, cut them some slack. >> how about, larry, you, want two say something about that? >> i wonder what the reaction would have been during the first gulf war if tom brokaw had broken in on the news and said, "there has been a surprise attack on allied forces at kafghi. u.s. and allied forces have held on. but thousands, thousands of young american boys are going to be sent back to delaware in body

bags." america would have wanted schwarzkopf's head on a platter. and i can tell you they wanted grant's head on a plat ter. so in terms of his personal courage aside, no question he is the glue that holds it together, but it barely outweighs the horrendous mess that has been created on this battlefield and the implications of it. so, not good. >> okay. wiley? >> in connection with sherman and grant and johnston, and this, you know, indirectly relates to their generalship. but what -- you know, in terms of an imponderable, today we have a circumstance where sydney

johnston was killed by a stray rifle ball, as far as we can determine during an attack that he participated in. yet ulysses s. grant when riding across a field was fired at by confederate cannon artillery and a canister ball struck his sabre and broke it in half. and what would have happened to grant if that canister ball would have been an inch to the left or to the right? maybe it would have severed an artery in grant's leg and he would have died. and, also, sherman. sherman, when, at the beginning of the battle in ray field, threw up his hand when he discovered that there were con federal skirmishers less than 50 yards away and a bunch of shots

rang up, high volley from skirmishers, threw up his hand to ward off shots, the fact that the confederates were using buck-and-ball cartridges a round ball with free buckshot versus a rifle ball which would be typical of the rifle musket which was normally used. but, anyway, a buckshot hitting in the hand and the musket ball killed his orderly, thomas holly day, sitting next to him. sherman was very lucky at that point that he was not killed. and there were several other incidents during the battle where his horse was killed or he could have been very seriously injured if not killed. and so, was this destiny? or was this just happenstance? these are some of the imponderable things just like assessing the generalship. how can we assess the generalship in terms of a, yes, after they were on the field, that's one thing.

but how can we assess all of the factors that we don't have a grasp of? >> yeah, but what if the bullet had missed albert sydney johnston and had gone all the way to virginia and let's say it took six weeks to get there -- and it struck robert e. lee in the side of the leg and he bled to death. would he have developed into the great, at that point, would he be remembered as the the great military genius that he is and would his face be on the side of some mountain? i don't know. he evolved. he evolved. >> i might also comment, in regard to sherman and grant and the issue of surprise, they tried to defend themselves at the time on the issue of surprise and of course sherman very disturbed when grant is being criticized so.

and sherman has to know that -- if grant was surprised a lot of the reason is because he was surprised. you know, i doubt if they had admitted, "yes i was surprised, but then i fought well," i don't think they would have survived. i don't believe either one of them if they had admit they'd were surprised by the attack -- would have -- >> as we know, this is an issue long past the war when the -- when the fellows are getting old and arguing this. one of the most intriguing thing about the civil war, some of the best post-war arguments are between union jerrells on one side and con federal jerrells on the other side. they argue with each other as to what actually happened. all we have to do is look at the career of longstreet to understand that pretty well. we're going to stop now. we are going to give the audience a chance. if you have any questions, we

would love, love to hear from you, anything we have talked about, anything you want. but what i would ask you to do, if you would please stand and -- and, give us your name. and then, speak as loudly as you can. we have a microphone. >> the new information that you have access to, we have discussed certain things, i would like your individual opinion as to what was the most, how was your tactic, from a nongeneral officer on the battlefield? >> before we answer, maybe it would be a good idea. if you come to this middle aisle, we will form a line and we won't have to worry about picking and seeing people. just come to the middle here and you can see, van has a mike

there. if you would now answer the question. what do you think? >> wiley? >> i will start. essentially, you know, one of the tactical geniuses in my interpretation of the confederate army was pat clayburn. pat clayburn fought at shiloh and he learned a lot. and this, indeed, goes to the circumstance that everybody's been talking about that, hey, these soldiers were relatively inexperienced. many of them had been in the army for maybe a year but had not been in hard combat such as shiloh. and per se, pat claiborne, when he made all of these discoveries in terms of not, for instance, making a reconnaissance of the terrain that he was supposed to attack over, in terms of attacking the mclernen/sherman portion of the line and he got

bogged down in a swamp and his caused all sorts of problems because his brigade was split in half because of having to pass this almost impassable morass, he decided that there were certain things that he had learned and would employ in the future from the tactical circumstances of being in the battle. in fact it was pat claiborne who was attributed to the statement that "shiloh was a battle brilliantly won and was stupidly lost." and that had to do with a lot of the tactical circumstances. i don't want to go on and on. but there were a lot of tactical lessons, i guess my point is, that were learned by a variety of commanders at shiloh. >> so we can get as many people as possible. let's just go on to the audience. >> my name is irene. i'm from nebraska.

but i happen to be a confederate at heart. i'm proud to say that, by the way. i want to thank the people of tennessee for their -- they've just been wonderful to me. but my question is regarding grant and hallet. you made the comment that you believe that both sherman and grant felt that they were going to be attacked. and hallek had a lot of impact on grant. do you think this is why grant kind of laid back a little bit on that? was 'frayed of hallek because of what -- he had been severely punished prior to this. >> this is john's question. john has written the biography of hallek with harvard university press, i might add. >> grant himself was hurt from

his ankle from a fallen horse. he was in no condition to get out on the battlefield either. >> well, i'll just talk about the issue in general. the relationship between grant and hallek is a fascinating relationship. grant thinks till almost the end of the war. yeah, almost the end of the war, that hallek is the greatest military mind of the age because of the stuff he wrote and everything else. sherman thought the same thing. hallek never thought much of grant. and sometimes historians says that's because he was jealous of grant, all the wonderful things he was doing. but in actual fact he couldn't stand grant as a commander because he thought he was a sloppy commander. he didn't fill out the paperwork right. he didn't fight according to the books. so in this particular case as you know what happens he, grant is supposed to be there at shiloh waiting for buhl's army

to come. when they merge, when they mass, halleck is going to come from st. louis. he's going to take command of the army. and they're going to grandly march on corinth. and he does tell grant, look, i don't want you starting any fights, as the film -- as the film points out. but grant is not afraid of anybody, truth be told. but there is this difference of attitude or opinion about how war ought to be fought. halleck is old school. grant is the new military, the new army. >> thank you. >> you're welcome. >> i have a question -- >> one question. >> please. well, we did want -- before we answer -- >> i won't take a lot of time here, but what i did to present -- and anybody's welcome to come up and take a look at it, is in speaking of grant,

this is my shall we say ugly duckling here letter written by grant. it's a personal letter that he wrote on february 13th, 1862, in the middle of the fort donaldson fighting. he wrote it to a commander walk, who was the commander walk, who was the commander of the carondelet gunboat. and he's telling him there's four more gunboats coming and not to get involved in any more fighting until they got there. but why is this an ugly duckling? because this letter was overwritten by walk who kept it in his papers in 1894 before he sent copies to the -- to the navy for the naval o.r.s. he overwrote the pencil letter

of grant in ink. so if you look at it, you think that it doesn't quite look right, but what it is is walk -- and he makes a statement down here at the bottom that he did it, he overwrote the grant letter. so here's an original grant letter from the very time when he became unconditional surrender grant that was historically altered by walk but still that doesn't keep it from being an important historical document, even though, as i refer to it, as an ugly duckling. maybe it's a good ugly duckling. >> that's right. we've got about five more minutes. >> okay. my question -- >> loud as you can. >> my question is about the hornet's nest. how exactly did that fighting go? >> larry, you want to take that?

>> well, the hornet's nest really is not what we today call duncan field. it was really the very heavily wooded area to the -- what would it be? to the east of that. after the war that area was -- the government paid some of the local people to come clear it out and the national park service has let it return to its natural state. but that really is the area. you know, there's something on the history channel a couple of years ago that i think a couple of us made some appearances on that dealt with the hornet's nest, that it may not have been as significant. y'all have comments on that? >> well, from my perspective, the hornet's nest was principally a fight of randall gibson's brigade, and in reading a letter that i added to my collection here maybe two or

three years ago written by one of the arkansas soldiers that was with randall gibson, he said that attacking that thicket, he kept referring to it as a thicket. and he said attacking that thicket was just hell, sheer hell. they failed in four times that he recorded in terms of charging the hornet's nest. but the hornet's nest per se was subject to, from what i can interpret, to the best of my recollection when i did the original research, basically on a piecemeal basis until the concentration of artillery and the flanking movements outflanked the hornet's nest on both sides. so you find not a sustained massive attack against a hornet's nest with a particular type of fighting that would have occurred under those

circumstances but really only isolated attacks, particularly those of gibson's brigade. >> jim is agreeing. so we've got time, unfortunately, just for one more question. but i do want to say that everyone will be here, and please feel free to come up and talk to any of us. we'll be happy to try to answer any questions. ken? >> i'm ken hanisgan from savannah, tennessee. which incidentally i thought got short shrift in the movie last night. but i'd like to ask the panelists what they know of the presence or experience of civilians at the battle of shiloh. thank you. >> not my question. i don't know. >> hey, jim, you haven't answered one. this is the last round. >> i think of -- well, the