general area of the battlefield, i think had cleared out to a great degree. and i think of them mainly following the battlefield, coming back and civilians coming from miles away, from memphis, from down in mississippi, wherever, to try to find their kinfolk and their close friends who might have -- who had been seriously wounded and killed there. >> before we close out, i would like for everyone to know that everyone on the panel and john, we are all in a writers club together. we're colleagues. we know each other's families. i do want to meet james's

children and grandchildren out there. along with other authors that write on the western theater. i just want you to know that we're colleagues and there's no conflict or anything between us. >> that's right. >> we see each other -- we disagree but it's -- once a year we get together and have a great time. so i just want everyone to know that. >> you just spoiled the secret for everyone. >> we're mortal enemies. >> let me end again just by rooting us in the reality of what happened here and it was mentioned in the movie and shown so well. but consider this again. some 63,000 union soldiers fought at shiloh. 63,000. there were 40,000 confederate soldiers. the casualties for the union were about 13,000. the casualties for the confederates were about 10,700. but consider this very important point. the casualties for the confederates represented 27% of the people that fought on the

confederate side at that battle. on the union side it was 21%. so consider what that meant later on for the war for an army that was much smaller. so i leave it at that. and i want to -- let's give a round of applause to our -- [ applause ] >> great job. >> okay. we're excused. >> and as we head now into the final session of the day, again thank everyone for attending and your attention. let's hear another round of applause, though, for an occasion you won't have again. [ applause ] these next two speakers, they are going to do individual addresses to you.

stacey allen is the chief ranger at shiloh national military park, and if you've never had the pleasure of having a stacey allen-led presentation of the battlefield, put that in your bucket list. you want to get that one. i know i enjoyed one of some 20 years ago. and stacey brings a passion and knowledge of shiloh that no one can really match. and if you haven't bought your copy yet, this is the last plug of the day, the shiloh film that really embodies stacey's passion and his scholarship about the battle is, of course, available here today at the event and is being shown, i guess, probably as we speak, states yeerks at t stacey, at the visitor's center at the battlefield. stacey will go first and sort of

give us his judged, you know, very tightly judged view of what the battle meant and its significance and then following stacey will be someone else who used to walk those fields of shiloh on a regular basis when he was a ranger at the battlefield, and that's dr. tim smith. tim is now a professor at the university of tennessee martin. and tim is also a prolific author on the civil war, particularly civil war preservation, and then in particular shiloh itself. i brought along several different tim smith books, but the one i'm going to promote right now is the one he has just done for the cess qu for the se commission. he's put together a series of articles for the quarterly called "the battle of shiloh." it too is available. it's just out. it came out friday. and we're so glad to have tim contribute this volume to the

series and so glad to have tim with us today. so our last two speakers of the morning, and i think it might still be the morning by one minute, stacey allen and tim smith. >> shiloh and corinth, forever linked by transportation and war. when i was told i had about 20 minutes to talk, i said to woody, i said you might as well extract my blood and attempt to render gold from it because that's about as close as we're going to get. you may have a better chance of rendering gold from my blood than me talking about shiloh in 20 minutes or less. but we'll give her a go. the relevant relationship possessed by a now peaceful battlefield in west tennessee with a historic railroad crossover in northeast mississippi unveils its mysteries like a shakespearean drama. the compelling history of the first great battle of the

american civil war contains elements of suspense, surprise, great tragedy, and immense carnage. union victories in early february 1862 at fort henry and donaldson in northern tennessee opened the confederate heartland to invasion by river and land. as winter slowly released its grip on the upper south, opposing armies maneuvered for advantage in the west. the seat of war, once far away in kentucky, slipped steadily southward as spring crept north. by early april national and confederate soldiers, more than 110,000 of them, had moved by train, steamboat and rugged country roads to collide in a titanic battle among the scattered small farms and heavy force surrounding a small log meeting house then unknown and of little importance, forever after an icon of national identity.

called shiloh. this rural hamlet held no special importance at the time. there was no city, no grand strategic feature, just a high wooded plateau cut by rugged ravines bounded by creek bottoms whose creeping waters fed the tennessee river, boring the plateau's eastern mass. at river's edge lay pittsburgh landing where natural condition made it the farthest point on the river still serviceable to steamboats during both extremes of low and high water. crude dirt roads the primary routes upon which river commerce was hauled by wagon to and from the interior to and from the interior where it led to the day's most important railroad transportation hub in the western confederacy. corinth, mississippi. two of the south's longest trunk

railroads cross the at corinth, the east-west road, the memphis and charleston. the only complete rail line in the confederacy to link the mississippi river with the atlantic seaboard and the north-south mobile and ohio, linking the ohio river valley to the gulf of mexico. corinth was quite simply that spring the lynchpin containing the confederacy's efforts to hold the mississippi. after ascending the river a national army under general ulysses s. grant at pittsburg landing its front encompassing shiloh church. while western confederate forces led by general albert sidney johnston concentrated by rail to corinth to rendezvous for the offensive johnston plan to lead against grant. the military issues confronting these combatants proved not to be the mere possession of the field or even the vital cross-roads but involved the defeat of their respective major armies and the ultimate possession of the mississippi

valley. grant's mission, sever the western railroads linking the mississippi with the eastern confederacy to facilitate the union's main objective, to recover the valley. johnston's mission, hold the mississippi by defeating all union armies such as grant's, for there were four threatening his responsibility in the western confederacy. threatening the valley. today as one gazes upon the historic corinth railroad crossing, or traverses the once bloodied battlefield christened by song as shiloh healed. you need simply to ponder the presence and strategic value of old man river, roughly 100 miles further west, to appreciate the relevant chapter in history these two preserved landscapes

linked by transportation and geography occupy in the two-year military campaign waged between 1861 and 1863, fought to control the navigation of the mississippi. sherman said to secure the navigation of the mississippi, "i would slay millions." "on that issue i am not only insane, but mad." what lay at stake was immense. and history records the resolution and valor of the soldiers engaged. three of every four untested raw recruits proved all a divided nation could have asked of them in a war still less than one

year old. shiloh proved in the end two battles. each carrying the strain of suspense across two days of bitter fighting. the first day witnessed johnston unleashing a surprise attack to destroy grant's army before it could be reinforced by a second union force under general don carlos buell. but grant's men stubbornly held on, fighting for time, darkness, and buell. although he inflicted massive carnage on his enemy, johnston proved unable to achieve the desired victory. a failure to conquer many conclude still haunts the destiny of the confederacy to this day. for johnston perished, struck down by a stray bullet.

he simply bled to death. when battle resumed next day, the exhausted southern troops under general p.g.t. beauregard, a man of immense courage, and he proves it on this day, probably the most conspicuous leader on the battlefield. sick or not. bad plan or not. the little creole was no coward. obstinately resisted the combined forces tramping upon them. for buell had arrived. the grand offensive decisively checked the weary confederates were unable to stem the tide in one of the most dramatic reversals in american military history or military history and world history. southern army turned away and retired to corinth. the national forest regained their foothold on the tennessee, they retained it, i should say, where the roads traversed by

johnston's mighty host still led south to corinth and its vital rail junction. along with sidney johnston, 3,500 soldiers union and confederate lay dead and nearly five times as many were counted amongst the wounded. never again would either side boast the other would not fight. confederate position of the western railroad serving the mississippi river valley remained imperiled and after shiloh, as we have heard, wrote one southern author, the south never smiled. let's go with some maps. i'm looking at myself. [ laughter ] boy, you people paint. just watch what happens here. where have we seen that before? we blew jimmy jones apart at henry and donaldson.

henry and donaldson were critical to what happens at shiloh for the fall of the two forts open the tennessee valley to union control with union gun boats. it was an avenue of invasion. an ascent up the river brought the united states forces clearly within contact of the western confederate railroads. confederates reacted to this. they had to. they had to rally. they had to concentrate. and whether or not they wanted to, the strategic point was the lynchpin of corinth, mississippi. not only were they falling back before the what would be soon advancing federal forces, they were concentrating forces from elsewhere. the gulf coast was basically stripped of all available manpower. leaving only token defensive forces.

and in the aftermath of shiloh, new orleans would fall. pensacola would fall. all of them sacrificed for the national concentration they attempted to pull off at corinth. which was partially successful. because confederate forces did concentrate in large numbers, otherwise we would not have had the battle of shiloh. but opening up that river gave the federals an opportunity to pounce upon the railroads. thus, thus they will occupy pittsburg landing. and take advantage of close proximity to their targeted railroads. next map. the railroads are important because they feed the valley. direct line of communication. the memphis and charleston in particular are the only east-west all weather rail link linking the mississippi valeri to the eastern seaboard. junctured with mobile and ohio of corinth, mississippi they constitute what the initial

secretary of war of the confederacy called the vertebrae of the confederacy. ing extremely important trunk railroad lines for national security of the young confederate states of america, who is in the throes of war. thus they had to defend them. they defended them, though, because of the valley. the valley was key. the valley was the focal point of the entire campaign. confederacy had it by the sheer act of secession and must retain it, for it divided their nation in half, and communication west of the valley was difficult at best. few railroads, mainly rivers feeding old man river from the west was the way of transportation and communication west of the river. union forces wanted that valley

back for all kinds of reasons. economics being a primary point. because the river was an outlet to world markets for the old northwest for what we refer to today the midwest and it was a hot political topic of the war that their commerce was strapped by not being able to reach those markets close to them. so that river in essence was of economic value, it was also of military value. but more importantly, as we have already heard this morning, it was the pulse beat of a nation growing westward. and thus there was an even spiritual context to the river and its meaning to the american people. and you don't think those boys

from iowa and minnesota and illinois were not on a holy crusade to get this river back? just read their letters and diaries. how dare they? how dare they seize that valley? confederacy has to hold it, the fralz want it. very important. very important focus. when you're at shiloh, remember the river. remember the need to hold the river, to defend the river. the need to possess the river. next map. this is actually a direct copy of water color on canvas map that's in the national archives prepared by beauregard's engineer fremo. this is what the confederate generals would have used. this is the information they possessed in map form. intriguing thing about this map i want you to concentrate on. and it's the juxtaposition

geographically of pittsburg landing to corinth, mississippi. notice that in the confederate perspective corinth is basically twice as far east to west than it is north to south from pittsburg landing. another intriguing thing is, notice where pittsburgh landing is in relationship to lee creek to its south and snake creek to the north. notice the landing area is shown closer to lit creek than it is to snake creek. also notice that shiloh church on the map is positioned basically slightly south but nearly due west of pittsburg landing. this is all the information they had. what's amazing is on april 3rd when beauregard and johnston sat down to discuss the now movement which had already been verbally ordered out by johnston, beauregard sat up all night writing up rough notes for special orders number 8, which was the -- which was the orders

for movement and assembly of the army to do battle against grant at pittsburg landing. they didn't have a map present. beauregard had given his map to colonel tom jordan. he took those notes his general had prepared throughout the night and was finishing them off in final form so that it could be distributed amongst the corps commanders. so without a map, beauregard took a pencil and at the desk they were seated he drew the roads linking corinth to pittsburg landing. ladies and gentlemen, think of the audacity to put 44,000 men in motion to do battle, and you have basically a blank page of a tabletop and you're drawing from memory the roads linking your forces to the enemy. our modern military couldn't get

out of bed with that kind of information. these guys are committing an entire army to do battle. next map, please. johnston had a plan. in the approaching battle every effort would be made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut his line of retreat to the tennessee river and force him back on isle creek where he will be forced to surrender. very simple. concise battle plan. turn a flank. gain leverage. use your army's mass to crush your opponent against the swampy bottoms of out creek. next map. oops, we went backwards. well, i'll talk about it now. there we go. there we go. that's what i want to see.

now watch these movements. i'm not going to talk about them. just watch. it's the opening of the battle. from about 5:00 a.m. until 11:00. confusing, huh? just leave it up there, right there. battle goes from a simple core line front, slightly over a mile's frontage, and expands out to three miles over the course of about six hours. intriguing thing is notice the preponderance of the forces. notice that the battlefield is basically cut in half, just up above where you would see the beginning of johnston's name. and notice the preponderance of the forces on the left side of the battlefield, which would be

the west half of shiloh, whereas a third of the army is on the east half of the battlefield. confederate right. the federals reacted quite well to the surprise. you know federal patrol went out, encountered the confederates, and that slight warning was enough to allow for the long roll to sound and the call of alarm to get all federal divisions up, dressed and prepared for what the heck was going on out there. next map. technology. you love it, don't you? here we go.

stop it. here's the fly in the buttermilk, the confederate attack plan. remember that map of the region i showed you? what the confederates were using that showed corinth twice as far east to west than it was north to south from pittsburg landing? therefore, the confederate army maneuvering to a point of assembly would be moving generally from west to east, correct? more than north to south. if you have that impression and that is your impression of the world, that is the impression upon which you are basing your judgments. right? terrain governs the formation and direction of battle. that's an inherent military probability. terrain governs the formation and direction of battle. all military commanders have understood that from time tested. practice.

therefore, knowledge of terrain should govern the formation and direction of battle plans. see how that linkage is there? so when johnston overrun prentice's camp at 9:00 in the morning on april 6th, 1862, he will have brought half of his army to bear upon that union division camp. over the course of the first four hours of combat, half of the confederate army, 8 of 16 brigades are maneuvered to the right-wing of the confederate attacking force and that is what overruns benjamin prentice at 9:00 a.m., four brigades on the direct assault with four coming up in close support. 5,400 federals against half the confederate army. and now you know why ben

prentice's division basically nearly ceases to exist at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of april 6th, 1862. then something amazingly happens. and it's amazing because it will influence the remainder of the fight from that point on. johnston will initially detach six, soon just five of the eight brigades to now move left and northwest from prentice's camps. is that map still up? i see myself. can you play it again? so five of eight brigades move to his left and northwest. he has six of those brigades on his left flank. six.

six and five from 16. that's 11 of 16 brigades. 11 of 16 federal brigades are now maneuvering and actively engaged on the west half of the battlefield. you remember how that map -- i had them pause that map when it appeared that a blue line was perpendicular to johnston's possession of prentice's camps. the reason i did that and we're back to this map now is the confederate high command understood the union army to be facing west. with their back to the river. because they had marched from west to east, they deployed facing east, and their entire attack plan was formulated on a union opponent who was encamped between al and lick creek facing west. that is one of the great lost

facts of the battle of shiloh. it gets covered up by all the post-battle finger pointing. but it's clearly evident. it is self-evident. all you have to do is examine the records yourself. don't trust me. look for it yourself. confederate leaders believed the federals were facing west. their entire plan is formulated on that. next map, please. here's reality, though. corinth is not twice as far from east to west than it is north and south from pittsburg landing, it is exactly the opposite. twice as far from north to south than it is east to west. that geographical misinterpretation paints the entire battle of shiloh. it paints it. it paints it. if you believe your opponent is

facing west, you deploy facing east. if you believe you're going to engage or need to engage your opponent's west flank first, you oblique your line throwing your left forward and your right retired slightly so you can engage that left and turn it. when you have maneuvered half your army to bear against the union left and you're now east of shiloh church where your forces are engaged, you can now say i've check-mated the enemy and release your mast to drive them into owl creek. because between the hours of 9:00 and 10:00 even though he knew there were federal forces to his right front because that is what lockett's reconnaissance has reported, he is still confident enough to release five brigades and begin the push to drive the federalists into owl creek. that checkmates them, he said. he was