would say that's probably the equivalent of about $30,000 today. there were a lot of seamen who could not resist the lure of that bounty. and figures show that about 5% of the u.s. army serving in this war was seamen. they asked people what their trade was, what their only pags was, and about 5% were seamen. they went where the money was. so the u.s. navy was competing not only with privateers, but also with the u.s. army. and certainly didn't have an opportunity to pick the best seamen. the british also argued that most of our crews were british subjects. that was simply not true. there had at one time been a fair number of british serving in the u.s. navy, but after the chesapeake affair in 1807, the navy department ordered that no more british subjects be employed. and most of them, once war was declared, left the u.s. navy anyway, because they knew if they were captured, they would

likely be hanged. teddy roosevelt, who is the great naval historian of this war, reckoned that no u.s. warship had as many as 10% of its crew as british tars. and i think he's probably right about that. so u.s. frigates were not ships of the line in disguise, they didn't rely on picked crews and they didn't rely on british tars. now, the last part of this myth is the american myth. that because we won a series of duels on the high seas, that we won the war at sea. not so. the british gave about as good as they got in the course of the war. won about as many duels as they lost. more importantly, they used their naval power to blockade the entire american coast, and that had a devastating impact on the u.s. economy, and cut sharply into government revenue. so if anybody, the british won

the war at sea, and one would expect that, because after all, great britain had long been mistress of the seas. number seven, kentucky and tennessee riflemen won the battle of new orleans, although this battle was fought after the war was over. well, rifles did not play a very significant role in the battle of new orleans. all the evidence suggests it was those eight batteries of artillery that anchored jackson's line. even the british reported that the canister and grape shot fired from those weapons, it just tore huge holes in the advancing british lines. and my guess is that u.s. muskets probably played a more significant role than rifles. rifles were probably third in inflicting damage on the british advancing lines. rifles to be used properly had to be aimed. and i don't think people were aiming their rifles or muskets.

we have some contemporary reports that simply indicate that the riflemen and the musketmen were simply holding their weapons above the earth works and pulling the trigger without looking. and who can blame them. it was a lot safer that way. and that's one of the reasons the casualties were so unbalanced in that battle. remember, the british sustained 2,000 killed, wounded and missing. jackson's main line sustained only 13 killed and wounded. it is also widely believed that this battle was fought after the war was over. the treaty of ghent, the peace treaty was signed on december 24th, 1814. the battle of new orleans was fought on january 8th, 1815. that's two weeks later. conventional wisdom holds if only there had been a telegraph, an underwater telegraph to send the message that the treaty had

been signed, the battle never would have been fought. but that ignores the first clause of the treaty of ghent, which provided that the war would end only after both sides had ratified the treaty. now, the british were pretty near at hand and they ratified three days later, on december 27th. the treaty, however, did not reach the united states until february. the u.s. senate signed off unanimously on february 16th. and later that day, when madison put his signature on the treaty, in the octagon house, the white house being uninhabitable at the time, that officially brought the war to an end, and thus both nations sent out orders suspending hostilities. so this war actually ended on february 16th, 1815, which was about five weeks after the battle of new orleans. all right. number eight, if the british had prevailed at new orleans, they planned to sack the city and retain louisiana after peace had

been restored. now, there are two myths here. the first is that the british planned to sack the city. it was wildly believed in the united states after the war that the design and countersign of british troops on the day of the battle was beauty and booty. that may or may not have been true, but there is no evidence at all that the british planned to sack the city. british officers kept a very tight leash on their soldiers. they did when they occupied washington, and they surely would have done the same when they occupied, if they had occupied new orleans. so i see no evidence to suggest that they planned to sack the city. nor is there any evidence that they planned to keep louisiana if they succeeded in this campaign. this myth is built on the orders that the commanding british general carried with him, which provided for establishing civilian government in southern louisiana, if the british prevailed in this campaign. but that was to be a temporary

government. and you look at the british diplomatic documents in ghent. you look at what british government officials were thinking in december of 1814. this whole campaign on the gulf coast wasn't even on their radar. they weren't even thinking about it. in fact, at one point, the british prime minister, lord liverpool, dismissed the whole campaign saying that new orleans was the most unhealthy place in america. so if indeed the british had conquered southern louisiana in this campaign, it pretty sure they would have restored it just as they restored the 100 miles of the coast, just as they restored mackinaw island, just as they restored prairie duchesne in wisconsin and cumberland island in georgia. the peace treaty provided for returning to the status quo antebellum, which meant all

conquered territory was to be restored. and i'm pretty sure the british would have done that with louisiana. number nine, encouraging the enemy and prolonging the war. this was a notion that the federalists -- excuse me, the republicans embraced during the war and they kept it alive after the war. essentially what they did was claim credit for all the victories and blame all the defeats and all the failures of the war, all the misfortunes of the war on those nasty federalists who had opposed it from the beginning. in point of fact, i think federalist opposition in the united states, combined with wig opposition in great britain, actually shortened the war. i think both nations were more amenable to a compromise peace, because of domestic opposition to the war. so far from prolonging the war of 1812, i think federalist opposition actually shortened it. all right. finally, the united states could have conquered canada with a

different strategy. but given its many successes on land as well as at sea, it could still claim victory. the armchair generals who fought this war since 1815, had argued -- and i think convincingly, that the united states focused its fact strategy far too west. there were far too many men and resources on first waging war in the old northwest and after detroit was lost, recovering it. that if only we had concentrated against the two british anchors on the st. lawrence river, namely montreal and quebec, that we could have won this war. that criticism is sound, but i don't think any strategy would have won this war. i don't think any strategy would have conquered canada. why not? number one, the u.s. army was in just a sad state in 1812.

untrained, ill disciplined enlisted men, and leaders with very little experience and very little competence. it was a decade of republican neglect of the military establishment come back to haunt us. not only that, but we faced a formidable foe. the british army was a very fine army in canada, and the british could count on indian allies who played a critical role in the defense of canada. the mere presence of an indian force on the battlefield could tip the battle. because such was the reputation of indians for ferocity, that very typically if they were known to be on the enemy side, that would just cause the air to go out of the sails of the other side, and you have panic. and a flight. finally, the logistical problems that i think we faced, waging a war on a distant frontier, seizing a major british

stronghold, and holding them, i just don't see that happening. you needed to control the waterways, which we didn't, but even if we had controlled the waterways, i'm not sure we had the logistical ability to wage and win a war on the northern frontier. so given the state of our army, given the formidable foe we faced, and given the logistical problems of waging the war on the frontier, my own suspicion is even the best strategy would not have led to the conquest of canada. finally, we have this notion that the united states won -- enjoyed enough success on land and at sea, that it could claim to win the war. who won the war is still a very contested matter. there's an old song that everybody's happy with the outcome. the americans are happy because they think they won. the canadians are happier because they know they won. and the british are happiest of

all because they've forgotten all about this war. that's a fair assessment, actually, of what i think happened. it only ignores the biggest losers of all, and those are the indians who fought on both sides. conventional wisdom, i think the bulk of opinion is nobody won the war. or if you prefer, nobody won the war. that's because it ended in a draw on the battlefield. but i don't think you can judge the outcome of a war by what happens on the battlefield. i think you have to look at what your war aims were. in this case, the united states went to war to force the british to give up certain maritime practices. particularly the orders in council and impressment. and we also wanted concessions on a number of lesser issues. definition of contraband, violation of our territorial waters, abuses of naval block e blockad blockades. now, the british actually withdrew the orders in council just about the time we declared war. actually, five days after the

declaration of war. that left impressment as the only issue that divided the two nations. ultimately we had to drop that issue and all the others. the peace treaty did not even mention the issues that caused the war. no reference at all to those maritime issues. so it looks to me like we didn't achieve our war aims, and thus, we lost the war. you might say, well, it didn't matter, the napoleonic wars were over so the british didn't need to engage in those practices that encroached upon our rights. well, that's true. but they were under no obligation based on the terms of the peace treaty not to rezone those practices, and in fact, they did resume some of them during world war i. so it looked to me that we lost this war. that this war represented a failure for america and policy makers. that was not the way it was remembered in this country, but that's the way it looks to me. okay. that concludes my remarks. what we want to do now is take

your questions, your comments, your challenges. and we ask that you move up to the microphone to pose your question, so we can get this. go ahead. >> thank you for your talk. it was excellent. can you explain more to us how the british did to this impressment, what it consisted of and why we were so angry about it? >> the royal navy expanded during the french revolutiona / revolutionary/napoleonic wars. it went from 36,000 in 1793 to, i think it was close to 150,000 in 1812. the royal navy was chronically undermanned. and the royal navy claimed a right to reclaim british

subjects. to require them to serve in the royal navy. now, at the same time that the royal navy was expanding and needed all the manpower it could get, our trade was flourishing and expanding. we needed all the experienced seamen we could get, and we started employing british tars. it was very easy to recruit them, because the pay, the working conditions were much better on american merchant vessels than the royal navy. so the royal navy reserved the right to stop american merchant vessels on the high seas, muster the crew, inspect the crewmen, and remove those who were deemed to be british subjects. now, the problem with this was, first of all, it was very difficult to tell the difference between a u.s. citizen and a british subject. the differences in language and the like was not as great as it is today. so sometimes by accident, american tars were impressed into british service. in addition, sometimes it was no accident.

you get a 16-year-old british naval lieutenant boarding an american merchant vessel, and simply musters the crew and says you, you, you and you, you come with me. he doesn't care who you are. he needs men, and he's not even going to interview you. and maybe you protest, i'm an american citizen. and he's going to say, boat swains mate, give that man 30 lashes for insulting a royal naval officer. under american law, merchant captains were required to report impressments to the u.s. government, and the u.s. government did make an effort to accumulate evidence, if you were an american citizen and dispatched out to london. if officials in london found it convincing, they would order your release from the ship you were serving on. but that was a process that had to be done through diplomatic channels, and it could take years. and the rule in the british navy was, if at any point during that

service you accepted the royal bounty, the enlistment bounty, you were considered a volunteer no matter what the nationality. we think 10,000 citizens were by accident or by design impressed into the royal navy between 1793 and 1812. probably between 1803, when the napoleonic wars began in 1812 it was 6,000. that was the number bantied about on the eve of the war of 1812. i actually think that number is a pretty good estimate. >> thank you very much. a quick one, do we have a handle on the number of casualties and wounded on each side? >> very, very difficult to get at. the official figures for the united states were something like 2,300 killed, and 4,500 wounded. but based on statistical work that i've done, i think the u.s. probably sustained about 20,000

deaths. and that's because half a million militia served, sometimes for a couple of hours, sometimes for a couple of days, sometimes for three months, occasionally for six months. we don't know how many of those milit militia went home and died. but my estimate, if you put all the deaths together that i think probably occurred, i think probably 20,000 americans perished, probably 10,000 british and canadians, and probably 7,500 indians. as a proportion of their population, the indians suffered the heaviest casualties. but these are estimates. we just don't know. >> finally, did we do anything special for our veterans? like benefits or aid or anything like that? then i'll be quiet. thanks. >> the enlistment bounty was very generous. by the end of the war it was the equivalent of about $30,000 today. in the years that followed, legislation was adopted that awarded more and more bounties

to those who had served in any capacity, even not in the royal -- or excuse me, in the u.s. army. but militia, or volunteers. and i think in the end, we doled out something like 225,000 bounties, land bounties to those who had served in the war. and i don't know what the average was, but you're talking about millions and millions of acres of land. so over time, we did pay out an awful lot to our veterans. now, the last veteran died in, i think, 1905. the last pension was paid to the daughter of a veteran in 1946. so veterans' benefits typically are going to be a third to a half or even more of the total cost of the war. and that's because you pay them out for 100 years afterwards. >> did the war of 1812 in any

way precipitate the haiti revolution? >> the haitian revolution began in 1791. was effectively over, haiti's declaration of independence in 1804. so i would say that preceded the war of 1812 and was unrelated to it. one thing it did do, though, it contributed to napoleon's decision to sell louisiana to the united states in 1803. so the haitian revolution plays a very important role in american history, but it's well before the war of 1812. okay? >> we've enjoyed your talk tremendously. but in reference to the destruction of york, and the destruction of washington, are they indeed connected? >> conventional wisdom is that when the united states invaded and occupied york, which is now toronto in canada, on april

27th, 1813, because we burned the public buildings there, the british retaliated by burning the public buildings in washington. but don grace has argued, and i think this is probably true, that it's more likely the british were retaliating for later burning st. david's, we burned dover, in the settlements around dover. and i think don grace is probably right that that played a greater role in the british decision to burn the public buildings in washington, d.c. but that isn't conclusive. keep in mind, the british had every right to burn those public buildings. in war, you have any right to burn any public property belonging to the enemy. many times they'll target military property, munitions and the like. but i think in war they have the right to target any government property. if it were truly a parallel to

what we had done, the british would have torched washington and they didn't. george coburn actually apparently wanted to torch the whole city. but the decision was made by major general robert ross, who was subsequently killed out in front of baltimore, and he said, no, we're just going to burn the public buildings. so we maybe got off a little bit easy on that. >> this may be more pertinent because it would be closer to home. did the british actually occupy detroit, or was it just the fort and not the village? and if so, why, and how long? >> well, the british took control of detroit and all the territory along the detroit river, as a result of hall's

surrender on, i think it was, what, the 16th of august in 1812. and they subsequently placed the michigan territory under martial law, i believe, for the duration of their occupation, which took place until they retreated after perry's victory, which would have been september 10th, 1813. the british withdrew from the detroit frontier and we reoccupied it. now, yes, i think they occupied more than the fort. they occupied the village, and they actually claimed control over the entire michigan territory as a result of hall's surrender. okay. back here. >> if the british had such great control over their soldiers, how

do you account for the behavior of major general proctor when he occupied detroit, and the way he treated the french who were by then american citizens, and the way they behaved at the river raisin where they looked the other way, when tecumseh and his men came in and slaughtered all the prisoners who were lying there waiting to be transported? >> well, you tell me what he did to the french in detroit. because i don't have any information that he treated them badly. >> well, i -- this is in woodford's book. >> woodford? >> the book on judge augustus woodward, who was a hero to the french. because he was the only remaining representative of the united states government. everybody else left. and hall was just the wrong man at the wrong time, in the wrong

place. and he left with all the other judges, and the other appointed officials. and woodward insisted that brock follow the rules of war, which was that you feed the civilian population. and brock said, what do i care about the french, let them starve. less people to feed. i don't have enough food to feed my own men. and judge woodward insisted that he do that. because he had allowed the indians to break into the french houses, and steal their cattle and what food they had. he didn't stop them from doing that. and they were, as a matter of fact, leaviding the militia arod in dog collars. he said, you can't do that to that soldier. and he said if you don't like it, buy them. then we won't treat them like that anymore. >> well, i think you have

repeated a number of myths about the war of 1812. >> these are all myths? >> not all. let me give you my take on it. first of all -- >> the british wouldn't -- didn't leave detroit until 13 years after the revolutionary war. so they had a very bad reputation, and came to terms with giving back, and of following the laws of the treaty. they occupied detroit after the american revolution. >> they did retain control of seven forts on u.s. territory after the treaty of paris of 1783 was signed and ratified. and they didn't give up those forts until 1796 under the terms of the jay treaty. the united states, however, was also in violation of the treaty of paris in 1783. both nations violated the treaty. both accused the other of doing it first. and that remained a contentious issue until the jay treaty of

1794 resolved that. but let's not hang all of this on the british. now, more immediately, let's address the issues you've raised. the british were under no obligation to feed the civilians. they were under an obligation to feed prisoners of war. but the civilians were expected to look after themselves. now, the problem here was, the indian allies were just that, they were british allies. the british could not always control them. but the british made a concerted effort to purchase, to ransom those prisoners that the indians had taken, so that they wouldn't be subjected to torture or death. and i think proctor -- brock and proctor actually did a pretty good job of managing the michigan territory during the british occupation. >> i think that proctor was probably an outstanding soldier, and he was a humane man given

the conditions of war. but i think that mr. brock, you would have a very hard time saying that he behaved in a humane manner toward the americans. >> interesting, brock has the much better reputation today for being the greater man and the greater general. >> isn't that funny. that's not the way i read it. that recent book on proctor, of that, the lieutenant colonel in the british army, i've forgotten his name, he just came back from the iraq war, and he just wrote this book -- >> john reilly. he's a lieutenant general. >> yeah, lieutenant general, right. >> if thetwo biographies came o the same time. >> on brock or proctor? >> on brock. the best account of the war in the northwest from the british perspective, and from proctor's

perspective is sandy anholds. i think it's too sympathetic to proctor, but it's a very fine study. and i recommend it. now, let's get down to what proctor's role was in the raisin river massacre. after proctor and his british -- his troops and the indian allies defeated the americans, in the second battle of frenchtown, on the 22nd of january, 1813, proctor withdrew with the walking wounded to -- >> right, he took them to the hospital. >> because he -- let me finish, if i may, please. he withdrew because he thought harrison was nearby with a much larger american army. now, he hoped that he left a few british soldiers there, and he hoped they could maintain order among the indians. and he could not. thus we ended up with the raisin river massacre. did proctor bear some culpability for that? yes. was he wholly responsible for

it? i don't think i would say that. >> agree, yeah. >> let's see if we have another question. >> yes. because the british stated very -- at the very beginning that they told the native americans, look, you join us in this war. and we're going to give you the whole west back. we just want the great lakes and the fur trade. you can have the entire -- >> there's some merit in that. >> and they did have territor l territorial -- >> let's see if we have another question from someone else in the audience. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> yes, sir. >> you mentioned that it was the -- the troubles that were happening at sea and rightly so, but -- and i realize that manifest destiny was still a ways off, but could you not say that there's still not inkles of that tt