written by a man that we don't associate with poetry, namely, herman melville, 1866, herman melville published a book which is entitled "battle pieces and aspects of the war, civil war poems." and this particular poem deals with shiloh. and i think it is a marvelous piece which i think expresses so much about what that battle was all about and what happened to the men who were there. so let me -- it's a brief poem. let me just read it to you. it is entitled, shiloh a requiem. skimming lightly, wheeling still, the swallows fly low over the field and clouded days the forest field of shiloh. over the field where april rain solaced, the parched one stretched in pain through the pause of night that followed the sunday fight around the church

of shiloh. the church so lone, the log-built one that echoed to many a parting groan and natural prayer of dying fomin that died there, fomin at mourn, but friends at ease, what like a bullet can undeceive. but now they lie low while over them the swallows skim and all is hushed at shiloh. well, i think that does express what went on for the -- for the soldiers. understand though, shiloh is important for so many reasons, for in grander, rather than individual military history, but consider the famous names of civil war leaders who were present at that battle, grant and sherman, albert sydney

johnston, pgt beaurogard, and bragg and on and on and on we could talk. and the wonderful thing that shiloh has the above all the other battle fields in today's world and listening to the additions that will be made to shiloh is more of a fact. its location in a rural part of tennessee. a place which in so many ways remains very much akin to what this area looked like in that previous, previous period. so we are very fortunate to have a jewel like shiloh here. well, what we are going to do today, as van indicated, and i am not going to do much talking. so you give a teacher a microphone. you're going to hang on as long as you can. but we are going to hear from, three of the leaders -- in civil war scholarship. i am not going to reintroduce them. we have larry daniel at the end.

we have wiley sword. here at this end. in the middle, james lee mcdonough. the fear is that if a terrorist puts a bomb under this table and it goes off we lose our history knowledge. if you see any suspicious packages, please inform your nearest agent. okay. let me begin by asking our, our panelists. what we are going to dupe is we are going to have each person do an opening statement, an opening remark for about five minutes. i am going to try to viciously keep everybody in line. then weep will have a discussion among the panel. then we will open it to questions from you on the floor. so let's, let's begin. let's maybe start at that end. with larry, for five minutes. and so on down the road. >> i want to put the campaign in its historical context.

i think that the importance of the shiloh campaign is that it gave both sides the opportunity to significantly shorten the war. and therein lies the problem. because about april of 1862 the war was already one-year-old. time is not a good thing for the south. it means that the war could become protracted and they cannot win a protracted wawar. the arithmetic will kick in. for the north, a protracted war is not good because of war weariness. in the fall of 1862, the anti-war democratic party swept the congressional elections. so -- time is -- is an issuan i.

and i think that -- the thing that could have been done is t. and i think that -- the thing that could have been done i tim. and i think that -- the thing that could have been done itime. and i think that -- the thing that could have been done is that after the fall of ft. donnelson, the army of the ohio coming out of nashville should have gone on to chattanooga. i think that that was a crucial mistake on the part of the north. grant's army could have been reinforced from john pope's army of mississippi, then besieging number 10. in fact, it fell the day after shiloh on april 8th. for the south, i think it was important because the south had to accomplish at shiloh exactly what it failed to accomplish which is it had to destroy a federal army. and they had their best opportunity, grant cooperated by putting his back to a river. and -- they failed to do it.

so i would say that -- this was -- a great missed opportunity for both the north and the south. to shorten the war. >> jim. >> i want to say first that it is a pleasure and an honor to be here as we commemorate the 150th anniversary of the great campaign in battle of shiloh. and it is good to be on the program with these distinguished gentlemen who have been studying and interpreting the civil war for many years. and also, i certainly am appreciative, we all are, of your presence on this significant occasion. fill your can teens, boys, some of you will be in hell before night and you will need water. those were the words of isaac

c. pugh, colonel of the 41st illinois infantry. the colonel was a white-haired officer who had seen action in mexico. the date was sunday, april 6, 1862. when the colonel's striking cry rent the air. pugh's badly shot-up regiment was moving towards the rear. the colonel spotted some fresh troops advancing to the front and thereupon he yelled out those memorable words, fill your can teens, boys, some of you will be in hell before night and you are going to need water. four decades have passed since i read the colonel's cry. i thought his words symbolic. symbolic of the crude humor, some might say sick humor, manifest on many a battlefield down through the ages. also symbolic of "this horrid and unnatural war as william tecumsee sherman wrote.

more than once as he spoke of the tragic clash when americans fought americans in the bloodiest of all american wars. i think it fitting that the colonel's word came during the first day of the first truly great battle of the war. that sunday, suggested biographer, lloyd lewis, just may have been relative to the number of troops engaged. and i emphasize that, relative to the number of troops engaged. lewis said it just may have been the bloodiest single day of the war. ulysses s. grant considered shiloh, the severest battle ever fought in the western theater. and bloody shiloh, to borrow a bit of wiley's book title was probably even more bloody than the casualty figures which for so long have been generally accepted. 23,746. i refer particularly to the

number of lives that were lost in great clash. on average, about 15% of the men wounded in civil wars died as a result of their wound. this factor would raise the number of deaths resulting for shiloh, making a total of almost 6,000 dead. furthermore, general grant wrote in his memoirs that by actual count, more confederate dead were buried in front of sherman's division alone, than the total number of dead acknowledged by the confederates for their entire army. grant's assessment is complemented by the most recent scholarship relative to the areas of the heaviest troop concentrations, the most intense fighting, and the burial sites on the battleground.

by any standard, shiloh was an awful battle and an awful war. by far the bloodiest clash to that date. shiloh presented a terrible preview of battles yet to come. for the first time in the conflict, men on both sides came to envision a measure of the war's eventual cost in suffering and death. not only were deaths at shiloh probably hyperthan the traditional figures, it also seems appropriate to note that the long cited number of soldier deaths for the entire war, 622,000 is almost certainly a striking under count. how fitting in this context. that one of the most important articles ever to appear in the scholarly journal, civil war history came out in the december 2011 issue early on in the

sesquecentennial -- i'm warmed up enough to say that -- in the conflict. j. david hacker makes a persuasive case that the probable number of civil war deaths is more like 750,000, approximately, 20% more than traditional figure. finally, a word strategically. the consequences of shiloh cast a long indelible shadow. the strategic results were of greater significance than casualty figures. the u.s. army had turned back a major southern counter offensive, maintaining it position on the line of the mississippi river, and within a few miles of the memphis and charleston railroad which was the confederacy's most important east/west rail connection. the confederates, in their bitter defeat on the west bank of the tennessee, surrendered the chance to stop a decisive union drive and possibly undo

much of what the yankees had achieved during the winter and spring campaign. for the federal army, the path lay open to split the confederacy along the mississippi river and that, in the long run, meant that the rebels could never win the war. that of course was what the campaign was all about. controlling the great father of waters. the confederates had lost the battle. they simply had to win, wrote bruce catten, a crucial effort to save the mississippi valley. historian, rob henry, stated the meaning of shiloh. the issues were the defeat of major armies and the possession of the mississippi. the stake was immense. on june 10, 1862, william tecumseh sherman wrote his wife, i think the mississippi, the great artery of america, and whatever power holds it, hold the continens

the continent. and a little later in 1863, he would say, the valley of the mississippi is america. little wonder that sherman pronounced shiloh one of the most important victories that has ever occurred on this continent. he also considered it the turning point that made possible all our western campaigns. new orleans author, george washington cable dramatically captured both the decisiveness of the clash and the emotion of the day, when he famously wrote, the south never smiled again after shiloh. shiloh stand in a class by itself. >> very well said by these fine, distinguished historians. it is a pleasure to be here and indeed, thank you all for coming. i am going to talk a little bit about some new information about the battle that has developed recently. the battle of shiloh has long

been known as the pearl harbor of the american civil war. and perhaps, millions of words have been written about the battle over the span of more than 150 years. yet, incredibly, it would seem, new material has surfaced repeatedly with each passing year to bring the battle into sharper focus. considering that over 110,000 men were present during the shiloh fighting, perhaps it is not unusual that new material would periodically surface in attics, storage boxes, and long forgotten letters and documents are discovered. thus is a prelude to our discussion. i would look to mention but one other recently discovered shiloh details that gives a new

perspective to the events within the battle. and one of the major aspects of what happened at shiloh involved the lack of information among the confederate high command about the exact location and the extent of defensive fortifications in the number of enemy troops that were camped in the pittsburgh landing area. among general albert sydney johnston's initial preparations, for the surprise attack, he asked on march 26th, which was 11 days before shiloh, that a core of at least 20 reliable citizens be formed who were familiar with this section of the country, he said. particularly, that portion of it, lying between the memphis and charleston, and mobile and ohio railroads.

and the tennessee river. these men were to be used as guides, he said, and they recruited from civilian farmers and residents in the region. and what johnston did with the core of citizens has not been fully explained. this being one of the many mysteries of shiloh, from an obscure source found in a period newspaper, we now have an account of a federal sergeant in the 25th missouri infantry from colonel everett peabody's brigade that explains that, quote, the day prior to the battle three spies were arrested by the 25th missouri regiment, two of whom were confined in our guard tent when the battle began, end quote. this confirms that sydney johnston was actively seeking

critical enemy deployment information right up to the hour that the fight being gain. in fact, due to the need for specific intelligence, despite the shiloh attack, having been planned for nearly two weeks, i specific intelligence, despite the shiloh attack, having been planned for nearly two weeks, sydney johnston was compelled to seek this crucial data as a basis for key operational decisions right up to the final hours. the fact that some of his civilian scouts guides were discovered, captured, and detained thus denying the confederates' vital information, contributed to the need for captain s.h. lockett's personal reconnaissance scout on the morning of april 6th. it was this belated reconnaissance by captain lockett that finally discovered

current david stewart's brigade on the far right plank of the confederate attacking army and led to the biggest confederate mistake of the battle, which was rerouting southern troops so as to confront stewart after capturing camps. this resulted in the costly delay of four hours, before a major assault was resumed beyond prentice's camps and materially aided in allowing time for the formation of the hornet's nest line. further, the rebel spies captured on april 5th alerted the uneasy soldiers of the 25th missouri and peabody's brigade of the enemy's acting presence nearby. this seems to have added to the

impetus for major james e. powell's predawn reconnaissance patrol that discovered the confederates in freely field and initiate the the battle of shiloh at 4:55 a.m. on april 6th.aeely field and initiate the the battle of shiloh at 4:55 a.m. on april 6th.initiate the the battle of shiloh at 4:55 a.m. on april 6th. this patrol, of course, was later regarded as having saved grant's army from utter destruction. giving early notice that the confederates heavy presence, and warning many union troops, giving them precious time to prepare. thushs thus, it is apparent from new data such as this that we have much more to learn about why and how the shiloh events occurred, as well as what happened.

>> thank you. thank you. >> that's great to work with pros. i think we ended all most exactly five minutes apiece. which is a miracle. i will compliment them. don't you guys ever run for office. that would be a problem. but, a lot of things. i hope you will remember some of the thing that were said. maybe you have some questions. we will give you a chance to ask those questions. one of the things that is going on in history scholarship generally is we are looking at things that we have never looked at before. that we have, kind of taken for, for granted. the obvious things are the role of african-americans in america history. the role of women. historians are kind of slow. it took us a while to realize women represent 51% of the population. they must have had something to do with all of the history. we are actually starting to study that now. and in military history we talk about new military history. we study all sorts of elements that we never took any interest in.

so i thought it would be interesting to see what the scholars on shiloh would say about impact of the environment on what went on at this battle of shiloh. by that i mean, things like, what impact did the tennessee river actually have? what about creeks on the battle site? the active forests? the geographic location of where shiloh is? the rain that was going on throughout this period, which resulted in muddy terrain and muddy roads. the farmland that was part of the shiloh battlefield. did that make any difference? the clearing, did that make any difference? and any number of other things. so i simply throw this out to our panel. what about this question of environment? what role in this battle and how did the battle perhaps develop because of where it took place and all of these conditions we talked about? who would look to take that on first so i don't have to talk about it. because the i don't know anything about it. >> will i will make some observations here in terms of

the way the battle was fought. initially, you have a perception, i think -- and this issue has been debated by even artists such as the vegetation. the vegetation at shiloh. what was it like? was there just -- this was early in april. but there had been some warm weather. was there just twigs with a little bit of green and whatnot? well, recently, we discovered a letter that -- written by a soldier on april 5th which of course, the day prior to shiloh. he said in this particular letter, he said, hey, he said, the vegetation here is so lush and the leaves are so fully formed that he said it reminds me of being back home in illinois in the middle of the summer. and he said, so many days of warm weather have occurred the blooms and blossoms are pretty

much old hat and many of them are gone. what does that translate to in terms of the battle? it translates to -- in terms of the battle of visibility. if you have got a lot of vegetation, and you are attacking -- and attacking in a wooded terrain, you have got a problem in terms of seeing the enemy and, of course, then me is seeing you. but this had a major impact on the battle. as well as some of the geography. now, you know one of my favorite subjects to quickly change the issue here is the fact, we talked a little bit about that. in the spies. that were utilized. the spies were not only told essentially to find out about the enemy encampments and number

of troops and whatnot, but there was some missing information about the terrain. unfortunately, beauregard in the area for a number of months had not really taken the time, even though, an attack was planned. at least a week in advance, to scout, and/or detesh min what the terrain was. of course, one of the major rsh what the terrain was. of course, one of the majosh mi what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoinsh what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoesh mn what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoh min what the terrain was. of course, one of the majo min what the terrain was. of course, one of the majomin what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoin what the terrain was. of course, one of the majon what the terrain was. of course, one of the majo what the terrain was. of course, one of the major mistakes of the battle was, confederates frying to roll out the flank along the tennessee river where the deep ravines were late as the day before the battle. those are my observations. >> if i might add. in thinking about the terrain. i certainly agree that the

terrain was extremely rugged and had a major impact. but also, keeping in mind then, relative to the confederates, that you have got an army coming to battle in which probably, 80% to 85% of these troops are totally inexperienced. 80% to 85% of these troops are totally inexperienced. they have very little training. most of them have never made a day's march. and then general beauregard drawing up the plan of march to shiloh comes up with very complicated march planned and -- and, when you put the complicated march plan, the rugged terrain the inexperienced troops all together, no wonder if the took them so long to get

there. and then with the rain coming down as well. plus, never really understanding the battle as well terrain on the -- close over to the tennessee river as wiley has been bringing out. >> larry. >> the biggest terrain feature in the battlefield is of course, the tennessee river. that leads to the biggest mistake on either side in shiloh, which was grant's decision to leave the safety of savannah tennessee and cross over to the west bank. had he not done that, there would not be a battle of shiloh, the confederates at that point in the war had no way to cross the tennessee river. they would get a pontoon train in 1864 that comprised 130 pontoons that required 600 mules to pull it. but at that time, they had no way to get across. and the second issue is did the

terrain present, in essence, a trap? maybe. let's assume that there was a kind of ft. donaldson type en masse capture of grant's army that would have given 85% casualty. tease what the confederates sustained at ft. donaldson. that means that some several thousand would have escaped throughout the river bottoms. lou wallace's division would have gone up to savannah and crossed over. so i think that even if grant's army had been captured, i don't think that it would lead to the north suing for peace, as so many people have said. i mean, they would still -- the confederates would still have to

confront buehl the next day. i would remind everyone that the south lost an entire field army at vicksburg and they did not sue for peace. they simply kept on fighting. so did it present a trap? maybe. even if there had been an overwhelming victory. i suspect that the north could have rebounded from that. >> okay. i might also, in commenting or following up on that, think about how -- that the -- well, relative to being on the west bank of the tennessee with their backs to a river, nevertheless the union army -- which i think supports what you are saying, larry -- is well protected on its flanks by these swollen streams. and it really limits what the attacking army is able to do

with the situation. i'm not trying to say that that determines the outcome of the battle, but it certainly puts them in a difficult spot. >> maybe just following up on that, why do you think -- you know, one of the issues is always beauregard's role in this. and buearegard and johnson worked together. why the battle formation the confederates chose. considering they were trying to sweep around the union army and push them into the swamps, why did they choose the battle formation they did? and if you were a confederate general that day, what battle formation might you have chosen instead or would you have used the same one? simple question, right? i may not come out of this alive if i ask the wrong questions. >> well, again -- and i'll be the guinea b