they fit the conventional definition which was a war ship with a single covered deck of guns and had a lot more powerful guns than the british. secondly the british argue that our crews were really good because they were pit crews. in other words, the navy had a choice of the best sea men in the united states. not so. they had to compete with private ears and they usually got the best men because the cruises were shorter and the prospect was greater than serving in the navy. they had to compete with the army. by the end they get people to serve in the army. the administration in the war department was offering a bounty that were $124 in cash and 320 acres of land. based on what an unskilled laborer made in those days, i would say that's probably the equivalent of about $30,000.

they asked people what their trade and occupation was and about 5% were sea men. they weren't where the money was. so the u.s. navy was competing not only with private ears and the u.s. army. certainly didn't have an opportunity to pick the best sea men. they had a fair number serving in the navy, but after the chesapeake affair in 1807, the navy department ordered that no more british subjects be employed. most of them once war was declared left the navy anyway. they knew if they were captured they would likely be hanged.

teddy roosevelt who is a great historian reckoned that no war ship had as many as 10% of the crew as british tars. he is probably right about that. the last part of this myth is the american myth. because we won a series on the high teas, we won the war. not so. won about as many as they lost and they used their naval power to blockade the coast and that had a devastating impact on the u.s. economy and cut sharply into government revenue. if anybody, the british won the war at city and one would expect

that. great britain had long been mistress of the seas. number seven, kentucky rifman won the battle although it was fought after the war was over. rifles did not play a significant role in the battle. all the evidence suggests the eight batteries of artillery that anchored jack's line and even the british reported that the canister and grape shot fired from the weapons. it tore huj holes in the lines. muskets played a more sir 95 cant roles. rifles were probably third on the lines. rifles to be used had to be aimed.

jackson's main line sustained only 15 and kill and wounded. this battle was fought after the war was over. the peace treaty was tinied on december 24th, 1814. the battle of new orleans was fought on january 8th, 1815. that's two weeks later. conventional wisdom holds that if only there were a telegraph and under water to send the message that the treaty had been signed, the battle never would have been fought. that ignores the first clause of

the treaty again. the senate signed off unanimously on february 16th and late they're day when madison put his signature on the treaty, the white house being uninhabitable at the time, that officially brought the war to an end and both nations support out orders suspending hostilities. this war ended on february 16th, 1815. that was about five weeks after the battle of new orleans. if the british prevailed at new orleans, they planned to sac the city and retain louisiana after peace was restored. two myths here, the first is

that the british planned to sac the city. it was believed in the united states after the war that the sign and counter sign of british troops was beauty and booty. that may or may not have been true, but no evidence that they plan to sac the city. they kept a tight leash on the soldiers. they surely would have been done the same when they occupied if they occupied new orleans. i see no evidence to suggest they planned to sac the city. is there evidence that they planned to keep louisiana if they succeeded in this campaign. this myth is built on the orders that the commanding british general carried with him. that provided for establishing civilian government in southern louisiana if the british prevailed in this campaign. but that was to be a temporary

government. you look at the diplomatic thing and the campaign on the gulf coast was not even on their radar. they were not even thinking about it. i'm sure they would have restored it like the main coast they occupied at the end of the war just as they restored the island and restored in wisconsin and cumberland island in georgia. it provided for returning to the status quo which meant that all conquered territory was to be restored and i'm confident the british would have done that with louisiana.

they kept it alive after the war. they blamed all the defeats and the failures of the war and misfortunes on the nasty federalist who oppose it from the beginning. in point of fact, the federalist opposition in the united states combined with whig opposition in great britain shortened the war. both nations were more aminable to a compromise because of domestic opposition to the war. far from prolonging the war of 1812. i think federalist opposition shortened it.

the arm chair generals who fought since 1815 and argued and i think convincingly that the united states focused strategy too far west. extended far too many men and resources on regaining first waming war and after detroit was lost, recovering them. if only we had cons crated against the two anchors on the st. lawrence river, namely montreal and quebec. we would have won this war. that criticism is sound and i don't think any strategy would have won this war and i don't think any strategy would have conquered canada. number one, the army was in just a sat state in 1812. untrained and ill-disciplined

enlisted men and leaders with very little experience and competence. it was a decade of republican neglect of the military establishment came back to haunt us. not only that, but we face the formidable fall. the british army is a fine army and the british could count on allies who played a critical role. the mere presence of an indian force on the battlefield could tip the battle. such was the reputation of indians for fe rosity that typically if they were known to be on the enemy side, that would just cause the air to go out of the sails of the other side and you would have panic and a flight. finally the logistical problems that i think we faced, waging a war on a distant frontier, seizing a major british stronghold and holding them, i don't see that happening.

i'm not sure we had the ability to win the war on the northern frontier. given the state of our army, given the formidable foe we faced and the logistical problems of waging the war, my own suspicion is that even the best strategy would not have led to the conquest of canada. we had the notion that the united states enjoyed enough success on land and city that it could claim to win the war. who won the war is still a contested matter. there is an old song that everybody is happy with the out come. the americans are happy because they think they won. the canadians are happy because they know they won and the british are happiest because they had forgotten about the

war. that's a fair assessment of those that only ignores the losers who were the indians that fought on both sides. the war ended in a draw and i don't think you can judge the war by what happens on the battlefield. you have to look at what you were. in this case the united states went to war to force the british to give up some maritime practices. we also want concessions on a number of lesser issues. the definition and violations of our territorial waters. abuses of naval blockades. the council about the time we declared war. five days after the declaration of war. that left impressment as the

only issue that divided the two nations. the peace treaty did not even mention. no reference at all to the maritime issues. it looks to me like we didn't achieve the war aims and thus we lost the war. maybe the greatish department need to enproech about the rights and they are under no obligation based on the terms not to resume some of them in world war i. it electrics to me like we lost the war and it represented a failure. that's not the way it was remembered, but that's the way it looks to me. okay. that concludes my remarks. what we want to do is take your questions and comments and

challenges. we ask that you move up to the microphone to pose your question. thank you. >> thank you for the talk. it was excellent. you can explain how they did this and what it consisted of and why we were so angry about it? thank you. >> the royal navy expanded in the napoleonic wars. significantly. the manpower needs went from 36,000 in 1793 to close to 150,000 in 1812. the royal navy was chronically under manned and the royal navy claimed a right to reclaim british subjects to require them to serve in the royal navy.

now, at the same time that the royal navy was expanding and needed all the manpower it could get, our trade was flourishing and expanding. we needed all the sea men we could get and started employing british tars. it was very easy to recruit them because the pay and the working conditions were much better on american vessels than the royal navy. the royal navy reserved the right to stop vessels on the high seas and muster the crew and inspect the crew men and remove those who were deemed to be british subjects. the problem with this is first of all, it was difficult to tell the difference between a u.s. citizen and a british subject. the differences in language and the like was not as great as it is today. sometimes by accident american tars were impressed into british service. in addition, it was no accident. you get a 16-year-old british

naval lieutenant boarding a vessel and musters the crew and said you, you, you, and you come with me. he doesn't care who you are. he needs men and he is not going to interview you. maybe you protest. i'm an american citizen. he's going to say give that man 39 lashes for insulting a royal navy officer. that's your introduction to the british navy. now, under american law, captains were required to report impressments to the american government and the u.s. government did make an effort to accumulate evidence. if you were a citizen and if officials in london found it convincing, they would order your release from the ship you were serving on. that was a process that had to be done through diplomatic channels and could take years. the rule was if at any point in the service you accepted the

royal bounty, you are considered a volunteer no matter what your nationality. we think that something like 10,000 american citizens were by accident or design impressed between 1793 and 1812. probably between 1803 when the napoleonic wars began. that was a number on the eve of the war and i think that number is pretty good estimate. >> thank you very much. a quick one. do we have a handle on the number of casualties and wounded on each side? >> very, very difficult to get at. the official figures for the united states were something like 2300 killed and 4500 wound. based on statistical work i have done, the u.s. probably sustained about 20,000 deaths. a half million militia served

for a couple of hours or sometimes for a couple of days and sometimes for three months. occasionally months. we don't know how many of those militia got a camp disease and went home and died. my estimate if you put all of the dust that probably occurred, i think probably 20,000 americans perished and 10,000 british and canadians and 7500 indians. a proportion of the population the indians suffered the heaviest. these are estimates. we don't know. >> did we do anything special for the veterans like benefits or aid or anything like that. >> the bounty was very generous. it was the equivalent of about $30,000 today. in the years that followed, legislation awarded more and more bounties to those who

served and even not in the u.s. army. militia or volunteers. and we dolled out 225 land bounties to those who served in the war and i don't know the average, but you are talking about millions of acres of land. overtime we did pay out a lot. the last pension was pid to a daughter of the veteran in 1946. a veteran's benefits are going to cost you at least a third to a half or more of the total cost of the war because you pay them out for 100 years afterwards. >> the war of 1812 in any way precipitated the haiti revolution? >> did it have an impact on the

haiti revolution. it began in 1791 and was effectively over with haiti's declaration of independence in that receded the war that was unrelated to it. it contributed to napoleon and the united states in 1803. the revolution plays an important in american history, but it's well before the war of 1812. >> we enjoyed your talk tremendously, but in rrchs to the destruction of york and the destruction of washington, are they connected? >> when the united states invaded and occupied york in toronto on april 27th, 1813. because we burned the public

buildings there, the british retaliated by burning the public buildings in washington. don grace argued that it's more likely that the british were retaliating. we burned dover and the settlements around dover. don grace is probably right that they played a greater roll to burn the public buildings. the evidence really is not that conclusi conclusive. the british had every right to burn the buildings. in war, you have every right to burn any public probably belonging to the enemy. mostly armies will target military property. they have every right to target any government property. if it were truly a parallel, the british would have torched all of washington. the british admiral actually

wanted to torch the whole city. the decision was made by robert ross who was killed out in front of baltimore. he said no, we are going to burn the believes. we got off a little bit easy on that. maybe was more pertinent because it was closer to home? did the british actually occupy detroit or was it just the fort and not the village and if so, why and how long. >> the british took control of detroit and all the territory along the detroit river as a result of hall surrender on i think it was the 16th of august in 1812.

i believe that was for the duration of their occupation which took place until they retreated after perry's victory which would have been september 10th, 1813. the british withdrew from the detroit frontier and we reopened it. i think that yes, they occupied more than the fort and they occupied the village and claim control over the entire michigan territory result of the surrender. okay. back here. >> if the british had control over the soldiers, how do you

could for the behavior of major general prokor when he occupied detroit in his treatment of the french who were then american citizens and the way they behaved where they looked the other way went to come see and his men came in and slaughter the the prisoners lying there waiting to be transported. >> you tell me what he did to the french inhabit ants of detroit. i don't have that information. >> this is in woodford's book on judge august us wood ward who was a hero to the french because he was the only remaining representative of the united states government. everybody else left. he was the wrong man at the wrong time in the wrong place. he left with all the other

judges and other appointed officials. they insisted that brock follow the rules of war which was that you feed the civilian population. the judge insisted that he do that. he had a lot of the intians to break into the french houses. what food they had, he didn't stop them from as a matter of fact leading the kentucky militia around in dog collars and the french were saying you can't do that. if you don't like it, buy him. >> they repeated a number of myths. >> these are all myths?

>> not all. let me give you my take. >> i think you are apologizing for the british. we are even. the british didn't leave detroit until 13 years after the revolutionary war. they had a bad reputation when it came to terms of giving back and following the laws of the treaty. they occupied detroit after the american revolution. >> dhar retain control of seven ports and u.s. territory after the treaty of paris of 1783. they didn't give up the forts until 1796 under the terms of the j treaty. the united states was in violation of the treaty of paris in 1783. both nations violated and both accused the other of doing it first. that remained a contentious issue until the treaty of 1794 resolved that. let's not hang all of this on

the british. now. more immediately, let's address the issues you raised. the british were under no obligation to feed the civilians. they were under an obligation to feed prisoners of war. the civilians were looking after themselves. the british did not always control them. they made a concerted effort to purchase and ran som and those risener that is the indians had taken. they wouldn't be subjected to torture or death. i think proctor and brock did a pretty good job of managing the michigan territory during the british occupation. >> i think that proctor was probably an outstanding soldier and he was a humane man given the conditions of war.

i think that mr. block a hard time saying that he behaved in a humane manner towards the americans. >> they have the greater man and the greater general. >> isn't that funny? that's not the way i read the recent book on proctor. a lieutenant colonel in the british army and i forgot his name just came back from the iraq war and wrote a receipt book that was published. >> a lieutenant general. >> a better biography of brock by west turner. two came out about the same time. i recommend west turner's side. >> on brock or proctor? >> on brock. >> the best account of the and the british perspective.

i think he is too sympathetic, but it's a fine study and recommend it. let's get down to why proctor and what the role was in the river massacre. after proctor and his and defeated the americans in the the 22nd of january, 1813. proctor withdrew with the walking wounded. >> he took them to the hospital and said we will come back and get you. >> let me finish if i may. he withdraw because he thought harrison was nearby with a larger american army. now, he hoped that he left a few british soldiers and hoped they could maintain order and they could not. thus we ended up with the river massacre. did proctor bear cullability for that? yes. was he wholly responsible for it? i don't think i