presidential or parliamentary system, or decentralization? what are the issues on which it's going to be difficult to reach a consensus? >> okay. we have four great and sharply worded questions. if we get nice sharply worded answers, we'll even have time for a second round. let's go in the original order, first. >> with the gentleman from egypt, i'm not sure he's yet an ex-member of the party, but the -- i don't think he wants me to convince him of that now, but we'll have a later discussion with collecting words from the u.s. the short answer is yes, our primary concern and primary commitment is the welfare of the egyptian people. this is where our economic program is focused on. this is our primary concern. and this is actually why we were voted in the parliament.

and the no part in my answer is also we are not achieving prosperity to cut people's heads. we are achieving prosperity to actually not cut people's hands. we are achieving prosperity in order to have a stable society where everybody exercises citizenship and citizenship rights. and with the question about when we are in power, it's a dead end. nobody has the right to give back the power. actually, our primary answer there, the egyptian people, and this is the process we're in now, we are committed, and we are trying to put in our parliamentary and legislative program, and in our contribution to the constitution, all the checks and balances to make sure that the dictatorship does not come back. that we don't reinstate the previous regime and the previous system. so we are actually trying to do so.

and this is the number one one reason of why we pushed our candidate is because he's our guarantee. most of the previous ones are not necessarily committed to a parliamentary system or a system with limited authority of the president. we're pushing for a president who is committed to our parliament -- our party program of pushing more for a parliamentarian system. and the two most debated -- actually, most of the constitution we believe particularly if we look at the 1971 version of the constitution, the first four chapters are almost as consensus focusing on rights and identities. no disagreement about. only just some mechanics and language to make it more efficient. but on the fifth and sixth chapter, it's going to be about the nature of the democracy, which is either parliamentarian or presidential, and the other discussion basically is the rule of the military within the state

and within the constitution. >> translator: thank you for these questions and several of them in reality are what we discuss on a daily basis inside these committees. with respect to the status of women, we have six committees designed to write the constitution and not party heads or chairs to these committees. and each of these committees has 22 members representing all parties according to their -- to the election results and some of them are also independent without any clear orientation. and some have been elected to the constituent assembly just to deal with human rights issues.

each of these six committees is represented in such a manner that all the members of the political spectrum are represented. and such that they would -- for example, we have a committee for rights headed by a woman and she was a member of another party who has struggled and who has also proven over the years a kind of real defense of all the men and women who suffered under the yoke of the dictatorship and that's why another party nominated her to chair this committee because of her long history and struggle, and, therefore, she's not just defending the rights of women but all parties.

and i believe that in a future stage we should overcome this obstacle that some -- that human right are restricted to this party or that party or that women cannot have such rights in a political life that i'm living inside the party. i don't feel that my female colleagues in the other party are not equally represented in all positions. elections are taking place. as i said, 43 out of 89 members are women, and this was not the choice of the party. these were voted or elected by the people. and 5% of the women present of the constituent assembly are from another party. therefore, when this islamic movement was given the

opportunity to present its programs in all fields, whether human rights or any other field, it proved that it's able to provide -- to give more and more, and to produce a democracy in which women are represented, not through a quota system, but women themselves are taking part, and building their own political future. we address all issues. human rights issues are real issues, that the state and the people who lived under dictatorship have experienced, and we will not allow for our future state to revert back to torture and human rights violations.

and in any other such issues. we found these issues to be present in the tunisian people. with respect to the differences over the constitution, and the reality that there are various differences, but what we're happy about is that none of these differences are divisive, that could divide the tunisian people. we're all moving in the same direction. and with respect to the differences, perhaps we need your help, and this is how we can establish an economic future for these people, and a balanced system. i wanted to also talk about what we have been discussing inside the committee. and it's not for the purpose of just evading the other issues,

but the sharia issue is only -- there's one committee concerned with this issue, and the other committees discuss all the various issues. and that's what i was trying to focus on. there's one other important issue, and that is that 66 committees focus on public groups. for example, as my colleague here mentioned, that in libya there are marginalized groups that don't get the attention of a minister or any public official. we cannot write the constitution on these uneven principles. now we have a special committee that is studying the ideal way to allow the opportunity to have some kind of balance between old parties. and we're not trying, for example, to weaken the groups that at some point used to be --

to benefit from the space allowed to it under the previous regime. because for 20 years, for example, they were active, and now we try to marginalize them. we want a constitution that defends and protects all parties. and in a very balanced way. so how do we achieve that? we're still in discussion over this. and another issue that is being discussed is the constitutional authorities. for example, the constitutional court that would be a defender of this constitution, we don't have such a constitutional court in tunis, and ben ali was the dictator who changed the constitution at will. and he allowed himself to be reelected over and over again. therefore, we need a constitutional court that will protect these rights.

and how can we achieve this? this is, again, the subject of discussion. and which i aim to benefit from the experiences in the west. all of these issues, they don't have -- they're not causing series differences. there are minor differences with respect to points of view, and these are the kind of differences that the constituent assembly in tunis is -- [ speaking arabic ] >> translator: this is for the regions and the goths. these are the main topics that are being presented and debated on the social media, and among the young people and other groups. for the reason that i alluded to, and that is the

centralization and the marginalization of libya that led to the failure, and left many of these regions behind. because of the states and policies and civilization, the other regions were really depriv deprived, and poverty evidence. we have 2,000 kilometers along the beach, along the coastline that don't even have a beachfront, where you can go and enjoy a day with the family. because the lack of focus on development and these different rural areas, of course, caused displeasure among the people. so this is attracting lots of debate to achieve the proper general justice. people avoid discussing these

points because of its sensitivity. as i said, in the previous regime, they tried to create a chasm between the different groups in libya. so it really helped foster animosity between the groups. so i would say it needs a strong government to take initiatives, and to prove to the people th that -- that there are violators and so on. this is one of the other topics being discussed now, as the human rights. that's a violation to human rights that were committed previously. unfortunately now some are be ing debated. it's no secret, we have to be in

cooperation with the human rights, and other human rights cooperation. they are addressing these issues. >> one apology and two instructions. an apology, we actually got started late, but i've been handed a note taking the authority away from me to extend the sefgs. and the people in front were discriminated against in favor of the back. i was going to call on you really. that is the apology. the optimism that these people represent, if it's accurate, they may be back in town fairly frequently. two instructions. number one, we heard in the morning session that we now leave you free for the next hour and 25 minutes to implement your eating how you choose individually. we'll break for lunch.

and we'll reconvene at 2:30. the second instruction is, if you can please take off your headsets and leave it on your chair. thank you. and please join me in thanking our guests. [ applause ] book tv is live tonight with "new york times" columnist ross douthat. about christianity in america and its influence on today's social and political landscape. he speaks with barbara hadley. and "washington post" op-ed columnist michael gergen. watch it live 7:00 p.m. eastern on book tv.org. today is tax day.

the deadline to file your 2011 federal returns. and our facebook question today asks if you think you pay your fair share. read what others have to say, and let us know your opinion. facebook.com/cspan. the former adviser to general stan le mcchrystal, recently criticized u.s. policy in afghanistan saying afghan forces were not ready to take over as the u.s. prepares to withdraw in 2014. he also questioned the credibility of the afghan government. also participating, former u.s. ambassador to afghanistan, ronald noiman, from the center for strategic and national studies. this is an hour and 15 minutes. >> good morning. my name is robert land. i'm the director of the program on crisis, conflict and cooperation. thanks to all of you for coming this morning.

i want to start by thanking tim for making this entire day possible. i would like to request that you all please silence your cell phones so that we're not interrupted during this, what i think will be a lively and interesting discussion on afghanistan and pakistan. we will be live tweeting this event from our website. if you see tony playing with his cell phone, that's because he's tweeting the entire event. following the panel, we will take questions from the audience. please wait for the microphone to come to you, because we are live streaming this over the internet, and we want to make sure that everybody can hear your question. when you do get the microphone, please identify yourself, and phrase your question as a question. please don't give any speeches. just keep your questions limited. lunch will be served in the

third session at 12:30. this session ends at 12:15. a little bit about our program. the program in crisis, conflict and cooperation, known as c-3, used to be called the post-conflict reconstruction. this is during a time when the field has changed fairly dramatically. ten years ago after 9/11, there was a lot of hope about post-conflict reconstruction, in the wars in afghanistan and iraq. we've had quite a lot of experiences with post-conflict reconstruction, and we have found that it's time to rethink where we are in the field, where we've come. a lot of what we do in our program looks at development and governance in particular in crisis and conflict areas, particularly looking at the risks, challenges and opportunities for cooperation that might exist. i'm thrilled today to be sharing the stage with three

distinguished panelists. anthony cordessman to my immediate left here is the chair in strategy at csis. he is a defense department distinguished service medalist. he participated in the 2009 afghanistan review, and has done quite a bit of advising on the conflicts in afghanistan, iraq and obviously many other places as well. going back many years, his service to the field of strategy goes back all the way to vietnam. he has -- he has studied probably every major strategic issue that has arisen, everything from energy to nuclear to middle east. and we're looking forward to his comments today on afghanistan and pakistan. dr. corey shockey has joined us as well. she's currently at hoover. has formerly taught at west

point, hopkins international school of advanced studies and the university of maryland school of policy, where we both got our ph.d.s. during the bush administration, she was at the department of state in the office of policy planning. and also at the national security council where she advised on defense issues, and including coordination and working with our allies in afghanistan and iraq. finally, all the way to my left we have ambassador newman, former ambassador to algeria, bahrain and afghanistan, spent a good deal of time in baghdad, on political affairs and any number of other issues. he was once deputy secretary in the state department. is a published author and very well-known expert on all things having to do with the subjects we're talking about today. so i thank all of you for being

here. it's very easy to be pessimistic about the situation in afghanistan, the transition in afghanistan, and the u.s. relationship with pakistan. clearly in both clearly there's problems with corruption, problems with relations between civilian and military parts oof the government. there is a good deal of violence in both koun 2ris. -- countries. some eare lated to insurgency. some more terrorist in nature. strange relationships between government officials and criminals, war lords and commanders. it's a challenging environment to work in. and the relationship in the united states broke down pretty severely. here we are nearly a year later and we're still struggling to redefine that relationship. it's somewhat harder to be

optimistic about the situation in both countries. but saying the situation is completely hopeless is not particularly helpful for those trying to figure out how to move the countries forward. in afghanistan, we can observe at least that ten years ago, the country was essentially a medieval theocracy. say what you will about the state of the government and the economy, both of which are bad. they're at least not taliban-era bad. there are a number of former war lords and combatant who participates in the afghan political process and not necessarily still as cot bat tants in a civil war as they have been in the past. that's not to say they might not be again in the few dhur. but twl is participation in political processes, formation of political parties, generally speak, there's been progress in the stays probably more than

many of the rural areas. there are some rights, some stability and activity that have not been seen in afghanistan for a long time. again, that might not be sustainable. that could collapse fairly quickly as history has shown us. but we do need to acknowledge the progress that has been made. most afghans probably do not want the country to collapse into civil war. they probably would rather their 34i8 te government work and their military be strong enough to protect them without participating in a civil war. these are some of the observations that we could make that could be built upon for the future. but again, it's all tenuous. in pakistan, most pakistanis probably do not want the military take over the civilian government again can. the civilian government is likely to complete its full term for the first time in some decades.

the judiciary is increasingly independent and confident. and the society is confident even in the face of a great deal of intimidation from militants and extremists. there have been some reforms that separated powers a the local level and established the requirements for local elections. these are prompts. they have not yet been fully implemented. it's not entirely clear when they will be, but at the very least, they have put into place some incentives and some frame works for reform of the future. most importantly in pakistan, there are a lot of pakistanis who also want their government to function well and would refer there not be support to militant groups and terrorists operating within their borders. now you can't build strategy on optimism or pessimism. you need to build strategy on a realistic understanding of facts on the ground and what is actually possible. in pakistan, it probably is not useful for us to disengage.

the more we disengage with pakistan, the less influence we'll have in there. and we already have very little influence on pakistan's domestic hp so the challenge is, how do we marginalize those within the pakistani government and military services, those who are anti-american and who will take more militant views, more hard line views about the use of violence in and outside of spak stan. how can the reformers and democrats be supported. what can the united states go to make sure they're not marginalized within pakistan. in pakistan, there are questions about governance and political settlement. the government is often seep by many analysts, particularly here in the united states as being one of the main roadblocks on the path to stability of afghanistan.

it's not necessarily the case we can depend on the afghan country to not be corrupt, to build up a relationship with its own people. afghanistan is the kind of system that we don't necessarily understand how to analyze. but at least there's a term for it. it's called a hybrid political system, which means there's a form of government that structures the provisions in that country. tribal and ethnic leaders, organized criminals, insurgents and various other individuals in afghanistan are the flesh, the muscles, sometimes the tumors on that system. together together they make up a hybrid system.

it's a long-term product. afghanistan will certainly continue to be a hybrid system. how do we shape that so it's stable? so there's not an increase in violen violence, so there's not economic and political collapse in afghanistan. i'm going to step down and let them give your -- let them give you all their views. and i think i'll start with tony.

it's by no means clear if we can't achieve most of our goas s after sgan stan somehow comes back under taliban control. it may well divide. you may need to remember for all the problems are within, the taliban and other insurgent movements, they are relatively limited. afghanistan emerged from something close to what it used to be, a capital with a group of various ethnic, sectarian and

geographic groupings. if that happens, i think it's also important to note, as countries go, particularly in today's financial climate, this is not a country of great strategic importance to the united states. we are not in it because of its strategic importance. we are in it because at a given point in time it was the center of a movement that conducted successful terrorist attacks on the united states. whatever happened for all the talk, this is not going to be an area of major economic importance for the west. to china, russia, the countries of the region, it may be. there are many other centers of extremism, of al qaeda now emerging as ones which probably are going to be more serious threats. than, in fact, pakistan is much more the center of al qaeda today.

we had, i think unrealistic opens on the problems of corruption and effectiveness in the afghan government. this is not a reflection on president karzai. 's part of a very broad system of competing power kbroekers, of people struggling for money, struggling for influence and struggling for security. we will have trained more civil servants. but by and large, after sgan stan is not going to meet the goals that were set in the afghan compact and the bodies which deal with corruption are almost