so far it's been the u.s. because it is the u.s., the most efficient, largest ak it tore that has the most at stake in all of this. the question is how much legitimacy does it have when it has its own war going on as well? how much are we going to bring a third party and the central asian countries constantly talk about the u.n., could have a role in this process. now quickly to my core of my presentation which was about the central asian interest in afghanistan, but i've said in terms of broad pictures, these kinds of conception things that are important, of course afghanistan presents both an opportunity and a threat for the central -- the five central asian countries. both the opportunity and the threat that we think about are not really opportunities and threats. in the west, in the international committee in june central asians need access to the south to sell their energy,

electricity, gas, et cetera. they need access to the seas. they are willing to get -- it will be assumed they need equipment and money and so therefore they would cooperate in the distribution network especially now since there are all these discussions going on perhaps in terms of leaving some of that hardware behind when we leave afghanistan. we leave some of it. perhaps there are some discussions going on a little bit strange, but i don't though where we're going with that. the third one, we also assume that central asians would want to have alternatives to the russian in the region and the chinese complete -- if you have gone to central asia you would have noticed chinese investment in the roads and all the infrastructure and lots of money with no conditionalities and so the chinese have come in and inundated central asia. the assumption is there would be alternatives as an interview

with mr. blake talked about being an alternative to iran and other regions. we also assume they also have this kind of common threat coming from seven is tral asia. we talk about the drug problem and the terrorism problem. the drug problem, yes, it comes from afghanistan, but it really lubricates the economies. so to go at it very strongly is going to be problematic, i would say. to be very unkosher about this. it is not a very kind of, oh, let's all go after the drugs but the drugs actually do have economies not run on oil and gas in the region. so terrorism, centrally in the meetings we've been having quite a lot of central asians constantly blame the afghans, your terroristses are coming over. if you see the borders within central asia, they are very well sealed. even though the russians coming out, very well sealed. it's actually a lot of central asian jihadists that are

fighting now in afghanistan. you have the imu, those who are fighting, so this entire terrorist, drug trade, being a big threat in afghanistan i think is a little bit overblown. i think the issue is there is interest in insulating themselves from afghanistan per se, because that's a lack of clarity about the future of afghanistan and, in the meantime, trying to -- how can i say to be polite, to milk as much as possible resources out of those who can actually give them because they think that we can get resources out of this. we have heard about the projects and this is something this audience may be very familiar about but i wanted to play my controversial problematic about the projects that everybody has heard about or et cetera, et cetera. i give you seven problems with

the economic project. economic integration this the region hasn't worked so far. the russians are not starting to put in their economic customs union. many of the central asian countries are actually moving towards that one, so the move for integration is more north than it would be south. there's questions about who would be paying for the projects. financing is not guaranteed. very serious problem for the central asian countries that all these talks but where is the money? the problem of iran is a problem for asian countries because a lot of roads go through iran and it will be expensive not to go through iran. so if we want them to actually apply the sanctions it will be problematic as we've been hearing. politics coming in the way of economics completing this region. just an example about the surplus electricity that they want to sell when they have their own problems over the

energy swap with uzbekistan. we do have political problems in the region that cannot be solved and economics can be exasperating. the companies prefer because of the competition that they have with each other and because of the kinds of gains that they'll get. they're unsure about how much the taliban it if they come to power would hold on to their promises on economic contracts. there has no good record of the taliban having held on -- having had a good economic strategy before. and, finally, chinese are giving a lot of guarantees on money. russians are giving guarantees on security. central asians want guarantees. this is the message my talk, they want guarantees. this is the word. and so some iranians want respect. that is actually what has not been given a lot of mind. to under this, and i will not even -- the paper we have just

talked about on central security complexes, to understand this problem you have to understand that basically central asian countries have three types of interest. internal survival, so, therefore, they would like to feed their population so that there is no problems with that, and that is investment which they can get through the money and roads that can be built. competition with each other. this is uzbekistan rivalry. this is also tuzbekistan is suc a long story that i will not get into but, so therefore, when you have a situation in the region where there's a lot of competition, they draw in the global powers along the lines of their own rivalry and in that region the global powers have a kind of dual approach. either central asia doesn't matter at all. it's a periphery of the periphery, or it is actually the core. there's been both russia, china, and the very different ambiguous

role. so as long as there is this kind of ak big ut, they play up that ambiguity and try to get as much as possible from the powers, foreign powers, et cetera, et cetera. in this scenario where there are all these uncertainties, the approach to afghanistan is cautious. is much more insulation if there are guarantees to get some gains, we will. otherwise we will insulate ourselves. there's quite a lot of skepticism in terms of what would be the future of all of these things that i talked about. let let me just end -- and i'm sorry. there is really no time to go through the policies of each of these five republics. it is in the paper. each of these countries have given some indication of their interest in the political settlement, playing a role in that and in economic. so it's all in the paper and you will see that they are quite divergent because in each role

they play their own interests. so finally what would be the final solution that would be good for the region? if you have a scenario that there's u.s./russia corporation, that increases, that's the solution they would absolutely love. that's when they get the guarantees on all sides. except how much would that be against chinese influence in central asia if there is -- because central asians would like to keep their options open, the chinese give them funds, the russians give them opportunities and then the security guarantees, et cetera. i think we would have russian/u.s. cooperation in the region. otherwise the central asian countries will at this point to play their bilateral game, bilateral interests, which would be not regional interests and they would concentrate on community issues, et cetera, or insulation. which then in the long run i actually believe that we need to have a lot more regional

approach than a bilateral approach because in the long run they will not have their benefits. they will have more competition and more conflict within each other within themselves if we actually promote the bilateral approach as opposed to the multilateral one. but at the same token for the afghanistan and the big region, i do recommend more of a bilateral approach to the big countries where i think that the recommendation to actually have a third party negotiator do bilateral discussions with all the neighbors about the different problems, why there is this confidence building measures that are ongoing and the confidence building measures could be extremely small and mr. siddique talked about trade. i would trade on the transport. i would say that even more interesting is counterterrorism. counterterrorism is something we can all agree on and it's something that the states can

and have proven being able to cooperate. and counterterrorism cooperation there's can haonfidence buildint can come up. i'm sorry i went off much more. thank you. >> no, thank you. that's fascinating. as you told me before, you had five countries not one country to cover, so you've done fairly well. if we could turn to you, please. >> good morning. yes, thank you for inviting me to speak about the interest in afghanistan. usually pakistan gets most of the attention when it comes to afghanistan, but we have to remember iran is a key player. arguably iran is the second most powerful regional country in afghanistan. and parts consider iran as the key player. iran has a lot of influence in kabul with the karzai government as well and various other actors. usually eiran's presence and influence and activities in afghanistan is portrayed as negatively especially in the

u.s. press and media and, indeed, iran is doing things that can be considered to be negative. but i think essentially iran's policy in afghanistan is a balancing act, meaning that iran is doing certain things to help stabilize afghanistan and actually promote u.s. interests indirectly and at the same time iran is doing things that undermine afghanistan's ability and stability. so i think on the surface iran is pursuing contradictory objectives. why is this? the main issue in terms of iranian policy in afghanistan is the nuclear crisis with iran and iran's rivalry with the united states and its allies. iran views afghanistan through this competition with the united states. and as tensions with the united states increase over the nuclear

program, there will be fallback in afghanistan. and i think this just goes to show that u.s. policy toward iran in terms of containing and pressuring iran has also a negative effect on other u.s. policy objectives including maintaining stable afghanistan. having said that, there's a lot of natural convergence between iranian and u.s. interests in afghanistan. ma mainly neither side wants the taliban to emerge as ultimate victor in afghanistan. neither country wants a taliban-ruled afghanistan. the taliban, we have to remember, is a very anti-shia, anti-iranian organization. iran is a majority shia country. the taliban is influenced by very anti-shia strains of islam. in 1998, in fact, iran almost

went to war with the taliban. i remember that year that iran as maed up to 200,000 troops on the border read why i to invade afghanistan. this was because the taliban had massacred iranian diplomats in an afghan city and had also massacred thousands of shia and are supported by iran. and when the united states invaded afghanistan after 9/11, iran was very cooperative. iran viewed the u.s. invasion of afghanistan in very pragmatic terms. back then, of course, the president, who was a reformist, was a reformist, i suppose still, was president of iran. iran was very much concerned about the u.s. reaction to 9/11, was worried about how the u.s. was going to behave toward iran. and essentially both countries

were on the same side. e iran was helping pay the northern alliance composed of pro-irani pro-iranian groups. actually iran was probably the biggest supporter of the northern alliance along with russia, ind, et cetera. and there were even reports that iran helped provide intelligence to the united states in battling the taliban. the former commander in chech of the iranian revolutionary guard in an interview stated that there were iranian intel officers that were helping u.s. forces combat the taliban. and after the taliban was overthrown iran played a crucial role in establishing the karzai bomb in 2002. i want to go into great detail, my colleague at the rand corporation, ambassador james

davins, worked directly to establish the karzai government. so i recommend you read his writing on the issue. but iran played an essential role in creating the karzai government and making sure that the northern alliance didn't dominate the karzai government to an extent it would really upset and destabilize the government in the future. but after iran iian and u.s. tensions increased, after iran was labelled as being part of the axis of evil, iranian cooperation in afghanistan with the united states really diminished. the supreme leader who has never been crazy about cooperation with the united states viewed the approach as not being successful and a lot of conservatives in iran also

thought to themselves, well, iran helped overthrow and helped establish the karzai government and look what it's getting in return, has been labelled as part of the axis of evil. but there are still things iran is doing in afghanistan that could portray as being valuable to the united states and to afghanistan as well. iran is one of the biggest economic players in afghanistan. there are thousands of iranian businesses operating in that country. the western part of afghanistan he especially the city is very closely linked to iran in terms of its energy infrastructure, iran has built roads in western afghanistan. it's building a railway and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on schools, roads, infrastructure, mosques, et cetera. it's one of the biggest foreign donors in afghanistan.

but at the same time going back to negative iranian activities, iran is supporting a measure, giving measured support to the taliban. we know that iran is providing limited amount of arms in trading to the taliban, not to the great extent that it was to insurgents for fighting u.s. forces in iraq, but iranian support to the taliban and other insurgents is significant. iran maintains or supported certain groups that are a key part of the resistance of the united states. for example, the head who lived in iran for a long time, so why is eiran supporting the taliban? i think this is really a signal to the united states that if the united states or israel attacks

iran and iran's nuclear facilities then iran can increase the support to the taliban. so far we haven't seen very sophisticated weapons go to the taliban including advanced surfa surface-to-air missiles that could target u.s. helicopters or explicitly foreign projectiles that do so much damage to the u.s. forces and cost so many u.s. casualties in iraq. but there is the possibility that iran could step up its support to the taliban in case of an attack and this fits iran's overall national security doctrine of letting others do the fighting for it. there have also been reports of iran having significant ties to al qaeda. iran is known to host senior al qaeda members within its territory. it's not clear how active iranian support of al qaeda is currently. a lot of al qaeda members are

known or reported to have been actually under house arrest in iran and iraq could be using al qaeda members as a negotiating -- as leverage against the united states. again, if the united states attacks iran, iran could let al qaeda loose. i think the relationship there is somewhat murky. i wouldn't overexaggerate the role in al qaeda but there are some ties there that could really be used by iran in the future. in addition, iran faces its own insurgency in the southeast iran. the baluccis have been restive. they actively discriminate against them who also live in pakistan in large numbers and also in afghanistan. they are suny muslims and iran

and since that president ahmadinejad came to power in 2005 discrimination against them has really increased. the balucci area is one of the least developed parts of iran and the balucci group has been very active against the iranian government. it has assassinated dozens of iranian officials. in 2010, i believe, a major attack on a meeting of the revolutionary guards and killed several senior revolutionary guards, officers, and the iranian government has directly accused the united states of supporting the insurgents. iran has also blamed israel, saudi arabia, and also pakistan, some of the regional rivals. when the leader was captured in 2009, he confessed to receiving

cia support and iran's supreme leader has stated that the united states has given active support. i'm not saying this is necessarily the case. i haven't seen any evidence for it but this is the iranian perception. so we could argue that iran is to some extent supporting the taliban and afghan insurgents as a payback to those who are supporting the balucci insurgents. iran can also be using the connection to the taliban as a form of leverage against afghanistan and our colleague menti mentioned that afghanistan doesn't have respect in the region. iran does not view afghanistan as an equal player. it views as an inferior country, a country to be dominated, a country that can serve iran's interests. so i think when it comes to the issue of afghanistan and regional cooperation for iran it

could be a zero sum gain. there are winners and losers. this is how it views the u.s. presence in the region but iran does have a number of issues with the afghan government as well. there are disputes over the hellemond river. the eiranian government accuses the afghan government of preventing water flows to iran and there have been some reports that according to the afghan police that iran is actively helping the taliban in order to prevent the building of a dam on the helmand mond. there's the issue of narcotics, one of the highest addiction rates in the world. there are literally millions of iranian heroin users, a lot of them are young. and iran has spent hundreds of millions of dollars and has lost thousands of lives trying to protect the iranian/afghan border so this is a major issue for iran. often the drug flow is cited as

a reason for regional cooperation and not just regional cooperation but cooperation between iran, the united states, and international forces in afghanistan. but at the same time there have been reports of the revolutionary guards which is very active in afghanistan and to a large extent is responsible for iranian policy in afghanistan, it is involved in the drug flow. we know that the revolutionary guards as involved in iran, they're involved in elicit activities. president ahmadinejad has hinted of this. and i believe recently the u.s. treasury department designated a guards officer of being involved in the narcotics trade in iran so this is very possible. there have been rumors of it in iran for a very long time. so if the revolutionary guard is combatting the drug flow in afghanistan, it could also be very much involved in the drug flow. there are elements within iran

who benefit by it. and, also, groups are believed to benefit from the drug trade as well. so what will iranian policy look like in afghanistan in the future? from tehran's perspective the u.s. is now winning in afghanistan. and the time will come when the united states will depart afghanistan, iran has pressured the afghan government not to assign a status of forces agreement with the united states. iran does not want a permanent presence, a u.s. presence in afghanistan. there is a good chance once the u.s. departs that iran will go back to its traditional policy of supporting groups against the taliban. i think iran is realistic enough to realize they will have a lot of influence in afghanistan and may dominate parts of the

country. but it's also interested in maintaining its own zone of influence in western afghanistan. i think as long as western afghanistan is largely stable, this is okay with iran. as long as iran maintains some influence, it will not be a loss. it will be a win. at the same time iran's policy is nuanced, as was mentioned they have engaged the taliban before former president, afghan president was assassinated he was in charge of the peace negotiations with the taliban. he was visiting actually tehran and iran tried to arrange meetings between him and the taliban. and when it comes to countries like pakistan and india, iran may because of the nuclear program be more amenable to cooperation with these countries. iranian and pakistani cooperation has increased

because of tensions between pakistan and the united states. also because of iran's growing international isolation. iran is trying to do more trade with pakistan, it's trying to build a pipeline to provide natural gas with which is a major project and pakistan has indicated that it will not cancel the project. we'll have to see whether it will succumb to u.s. prer you're so, yes, pakistan is a rival of iran and afghanistan but iran also needs pakistan for other reasons including because of its deteriorating economy. on india, there's a lot of indian/iranian convergence. both countries are dedicated to fighting the taliban. india has supported the northern alliance in the past and india also relies on iran to ship goods to afghanistan. india helps iran build a port which is using to ship goods. so it will be interesting to see

how the regional dynamics between india, eiran and pakistn will shape afghanistan's future. because it's a relatively small country surrounded by big countries, i think it will be hard to come up with a regional solution because all of these countries have their open very specific interests that are at times contradictory. thank you. >> thank you. thanks lot, alireza. let me know if i could sort of just bring a question each to you to start the discussion, and then we'll open the floor for questions/answers. i believe we have mikes. a mike will come to you, so please identify yourself when you comment or ask a question and speak into the microphone for the benefit of those watching this on the web or on tv. you talked about pakistan and

what it needs to do in the changing policy, but you also started by saying pakistan's y major concern is india. can you get pakistan to do this as a realist rational -- the kind of things you mentioned -- without working the india/pakistan peace at the same time, or can you see a situation where pakistan could become -- or could do some of the things you've mentioned without the india peace being worked without its concerns about india? you talked from a realist paradigm where the problems are in some of the projects being put out may not be as realistic, is there an issue of time line? is it an issue that some of the sort of projects that we've talked about which can bring peace, the trade, the transit, is a long-term measure and pie

in the sky idea now whereas traditionists coming in two or three years, the region is starting to hedge its bets because it thinks things may not fall in place. and another provocative question i think you alluded to but i wanted to ask if i understood this correctly, if i poll what you're saying could one conclude that in u.s. policy iran's isolation or the problem with iran trumps the need to get iran to work positively in afghanistan? if i could get brief answers and then we'll open it up. >> sure. you are very right this is what pakistani policymakers essentially are obsessed with or look at very seriously. they also have the whole civil war sken cenario in front of th. but i would say there are a couple of points.