that most of the communications gear that we're talking about is made in this country and that's primarily the communications gear that we would be transferring to the opposition leaders. >> yeah. i have nothing further to add to that, congressman. that program is being supervised by the department of state. >> the state department, other than the office of political, milita military -- are not actively involved in determining the nature of what equipment should be distributed to syria. seeing as how the department of defense would have more precedent in such a role, what interagency coordination is occurring between the department of state and department of defense? >> congressman, there is ongoing

coordination with the department of defense or with the department of state on this issue. we do have liaison that is there and working with them. but let me give you a more in-depth report as to what the level of that relationship is like. but there is -- there is a military liaison that is working with the state department on this issue. >> i have nothing to add, congressman. >> thank you very much. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you. ms. sanchez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you both, both gentlemen, for being here once again and for your service to our country. as you know, russia has not been very cooperative in moving the u.n. closer to authorizing some form of action in syria. and i know a lot of us have been

disappointed in trying to move something. some members have suggested that we use some sort of pressure on russia to help convince them to be more helpful. for example, we could set cooperative reduction funds. do you think that's a good idea? why or why not? >> you know, at this stage, obviously, the state department is the one that's taking the lead in dealing with russia. so i'm not -- you know, i'm not going to kind of prejudge what state should or should not use its leverage with russia. at this point, i have to say that russia has been cooperative with regards to enacting support for annan effort at cease-fire. they seem to be working with the international community in trying to advance that cease-fire and getting it in

place. you know, the most important leverage, frankly, for russia is to try to make sure that they understand that, in fact, their interests are served by taking these steps, because once assad goes, the interest that they have in syria are going to go away unless they participate with the international community. >> general. >> thank you, congresswoman. just if i could broaden the aperture a bit and point out the places where we are cooperating with russia in a very positive way -- >> right. i'm not suggesting that i'm one of those, but i do hear from my colleagues we should be doing this. >> sure. and i ges my point would be we have to understand that in the context of the entire relationship, not this particular issue in isolation, because we have terrific cooperation with them on the northern distribution network out of afghanistan, counterterror -- counterpiracy, counternarcotics. so i think we have to understand the entire thing in context and

deal with them as we would other nations with whom we have a variety of relationships. >> gentlemen, some have said that if we would just -- and i quote this very loosely -- handle syria, that that would help us with what is brewing with respect to iran, that one of the effects of military is that of course assad has one of the largest armies, ground troops in the area, and that that sort of buttresses iran's, you know -- some would call it bullying in the area. what do you say to that, that somehow syria -- that if we would get involved in syria we could help the people there move on to a more democratic or different type of government, that it would help us to bring

the threat of iran down in the neighborhood? >> there is absolutely no question that if the assad regime comes down, that the one country in that part of the world that's going to be even further isolated is iran. and iran knows that, and that's the reason they continue to provide some assistance to assad, is because they know that their interests are in mainta maintaining the assad regime, not in seeing it go down. >> the only thing i think i'd add, congresswoman, is the fall of the assad regime would be a serious blow to iran. i think the general has testified before this body to that effect. but saying that it is the key would be analogous to saying you're going to solve a rubik's

cube puzzle by lining up one side and assuming you'll solve the rest. there are no silver bullets out there. >> secretary, is there any circumstances under which the united states would get involved militarily? for example, what if turkey invokes article 5 of our nato charter? >> i think it's clear that the only way that the united states would get involved militarily is if there's a consensus in the international community to try to do something along those lines and then obviously ensure that the international community is able to get the authorities required in order to make that happen. the one area with regards to article 5 and turkey, you know, article 5 has only been enacted once after 9/11, as i recall. but they would have to make

clear that what is happening there really does truly represent a direct threat to turkey. and i think at this point that's probably a stretch. >> thank you, and thank you, mr. chairman, for the time. >> thank you. mr. jones. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. mr. secretary-general dempsey, thank you for being here today. mr. secretary, if the situation changes and you believe the use of force in syria becomes necessary, will this administration seek authorization from congress before taking action? >> we will -- we will clearly work with congress if it comes to the issue of the use of force. i think this administration wants to work within the war powers provision to ensure that we work together, not

separately. >> mr. secretary, as a former member of congress, i have the biggest concern, and this has not pointed at this administration, it could be at any administration that they seem to want to take the authority to decide whether or not they need to go into a country that's not been a threat. it might have evil dictators. it might have problems in those countries. but i have been very concerned. i actually went to the federal courts with dennis kucinich and two other republicans and two other democrats. we went to the courts because of the decision and how it was madmad made -- i realize you were not there at the time -- about libya. i contend that the american people seem to agree that we in congress have not exerted our constitutional responsibilities when it comes to war.

and i hope that if there is a decision, including iran as well as syria, if the decision is made to commit american forces, that the president would feel an obligation to the american people, not to congress, necessarily, but the american people to explain and justify why we would take that kind of action. and, again, i'm talking about a situation where we're not being attacked. we just see things happening in other countries that we don't approve of. and i would hope -- and i think you did give me this answer, but if you would reaffirm -- that if we have to use military force, and if we're going to initiate that force, is it going to be our initiation that causes that force that the president, any president, would come to congress and the american people and justify the need to attack? >> congressman, as you

understand, this president, as other presidents, will operate pursuant to the constitution. the constitution makes clear that the commander in chief should act when the vital interests of this country are in jeopardy. and i believe this president believes that if that, in fact, is the case, he would do that in partnership with the congress in terms of taking any action. >> well, i'll work toward a close, mr. chairman. i remember my good friend randy forbes from virginia asked secretary gates when we went in, and it seemed like the administration -- they called the leadership of the house and senate, it must have been one call to each house, each senate, and mr. forbes asked mr. gates if the libyans fired missiles into new york city, would that be an act of war. and i'll have to say, because my friend from virginia is very articulate and very intelligent gentleman, that pe never got a

straight answer. so i hope that you will prevail upon the administration not to take those kind of actions as they did in libya, whether it was justified or not, we won't get into that debate, but in my opinion, that was really kind of a snub of congress and the responsibility of congress based on the constitution. >> congressman, what i can assure you of is that as long as i am secretary we won't take any action without proper legal authority. >> mr. secretary, thank you very much. and with that, mr. chairman, i'll yield back my 39 seconds. >> thank you. mr. andrews. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. secretary and chairman. your service is both an inspiration to us and a blessing to our country, both of you. we thank you very, very much for it. i want to congratulate the administration on your success with russia and china, moving

them to a very different place on this issue as compared to where they were just a few weeks ago. and, mr. secretary, i think that the data you gave us about the exchange rate for the syrian currency and the gdp are a reflection of the effectiveness of that coalition. but you also know that we do not yet have the level of consensus in the arab world that existed for the libyan problem. what do you see as the principal obstacles to achieving that kind of consensus with respect to the syrian regime? >> i think the arab world is struggling with the same issues that the whole international community is struggling with, which is, you know, in order to take additional actions, what, in fact, does make sense? you know, who is the opposition? how can we best assist the opposition? how do we best provide the kind of help that the syrian people

need in order to overcome the situation? what kind of pressures would best be placed on assad in order to force that regime downward? you know, all of those same difficult, complex issues that the whole international community is dealing with, the arab community is confronting as well. in libya, that all came together. in syria, it's still a difficult challenge to try to put those pieces together. >> do you suppose -- and this is a hypothesis -- that the cohering factor in the libyan situation was the sense that gadhafi had completely lost the support of his own people and no one wanted to be associated with a regime that was illegitimate in that sense? do you think that assad has simply not reached that point with his own people yet, or is there some other factor that is diverting us from that consensus? >> i think it's the factors that i pointed out in my testimony

make this different from libya. the fact that, number one, he does still enjoy, as i said, the loyalty of a good chunk of the army and the military. and that makes it more challenging in terms of, you know, trying to undermine the regime. secondly, the opposition is dispersed. there are a lot of groups there that represent the opposition. in libya, there were some different tribal groups that made up the opposition. they were holding territory. we knew who they were. we could define what the opposition was that needed assistance. this is much more difficult. this isn't geographical areas being held by the opposition. >> mr. secretary, if i may, taking off on that -- >> sure. >> -- you mentioned the phrase

"vital national interest" a few minutes ago. do you agree with the proposition that it is a vital national interest of the united states to discourage regimes which could serve as an incubator for asymmetric warfare against the united states? >> i think that would obviously have to be debated on the issue of, you know, does it directly impact our vital pest interess,s and i guess an argument could be made along those lines. i think in this case it's really important for the international community. if we are going to continue to work with the international community. if we are going to be a partner with them in deciding what additional actions ought to be taking place, that it ought to be within the international context that decisions for action ought to be taken. >> how would you characterize the public record of the relationship between syria and hezbollah? >> the public record and more

importantly the intelligence record that we have is that there's always been a close relationship between syria and hezbollah and that hezbollah has always had some -- you know, some level of protection. >> do you agree with the proposition that the weaker hezbollah is the better the united states is? >> hezbollah, in our book, is a terrorist organization. they have spread terror not only in that region but elsewhere. and anything -- anything done to weaken a terrorist group is in our interest. >> thank you, mr. secretary. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you very much. mr. forbes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, thank you for being here. and general dempsey, we thank you for your service. you're both good men. you've served your country well. and we just are honored that you'd be here and share your thoughts with us today. we know that you have a tremendous challenge and the risks to the country out there are huge today. and when we talk about vital

national interest, probably there's no greater vital national interest that we have in the rule of law. and so sometimes we have to just ferret that out and see what that is. as i understand what you have indicated to this committee, mr. secretary, and correct me if i'm wrong, you believe that before we would take military action against syria, that it would be a requirement to have a consensus of permission with international community before that would happen. is that a fair statement? and if not, would you tell me what the proper -- >> i think that's a fair statement. >> if that's fair, then i'd like to come back to the question mr. jones asked, just so we know. i know you would never do anything that you didn't think was legally proper, and you said that the administration would have proper legal authority before they would take any military action. so my question is what is proper legal authority? and i come back to, as mr. jones

pointed out, in the war powers act, it's unlikely we'd have a declaration of war, but that would be one other thing. certainly, we know if there's a national attack that would be one of them. and the second thing, of course, the joint -- i mean the war powers act would be specific statutory authorization. do you feel that it would be a requirement to have proper legal authority that if you did not have a declaration of war or an attack on the united states that you would have to have specific statutory authority, in other words, the permission of congress, before you'd take military action against syria? >> we would -- we would not take action without proper legal authority. >> and i understand. and in all due respect, i don't want to put you in interrogation. but we're trying to find out what exactly proper legal authority is, because that's what we have to act under. and we don't have the president here to chat with him or have a

cup of coffee with him and ask him. you're the closest we get. and so we're asking, from your understanding and as secretary of defense, what is proper legal authority? would that require specific statutory authorization from the united states congress if we had not had a declaration of war or an attack upon the united states? >> well, again, let me put it on this basis. this administration intends to operate pursuant to the war powers act. and whatever the war powers act would require in order for us to engage, we would abide by. >> and, again, mr. secretary, thank you for putting up with me as i just try to stumble through this and understand it. but as i read the war powers act, it has those three requirements. are there any other requirements in there that you're familiar with that i'm leaving out or not reading? if that's the case, then, again, i just come back to if there's

no declaration of war, no attack upon the united states, and if we're going to comply with the war powers act, would that require specific statutory authority by congress before we took military action? >> again, under the constitution, as i indicated, the commander in chief has the authority to take action that involves the vital interests of this country, but then pursuant to the war powers act we would have to take steps to get congressional approval. that's -- that's the process that we would follow. >> you'd have to take steps to get that approval. but would the approval be required before you would take military action against syria? >> as i understand the constitution and the power of the president, the president could, in fact, deploy forces if he had to if our vital interests were at stake. but that ultimately then under the war powers act we would have to come here for your support. >> so you'd get the support of congress after you began military operations?

>> in that -- in that particular situation, yes. >> and then just one last thing, and make sure i'm stating this correctly. it's your position that the administration's position would be that we'd have to get a consensus of permission from the international community before we'd act but that we wouldn't have to get specific statutory authority from congress before we would act. >> well, i think in that situation, if international action is taken pursuant to a security council resolution or under our treaty obligations with regards to nato, that obviously we would participate with the international community. but then ultimately the congress of the united states, pursuant to its powers of the purse, would be able to determine whether or not that action is appropriate or not. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mrs. davis. >> thank you, mr. secretary and general dempsey. we certainly appreciate your being here and all of your

dedicated service. i wanted to ask you more about the opposition groups, and i think you've been quite clear that it's a diverse group and probably a little hard to read them in many ways. but are there -- is there one particular or several issues that you see them either fragmenting or coalescing? and particularly as it would relate to trying to broker any kind of an agreement with the assad regime short of eliminating it. >> as i've indicated, there are a number of groups that are involved in the opposition. it has not always been easy to get those groups to be able to coalesce. there are some outside syrian groups that are making an effort to do that. there has been better progress by other countries that have tried to one way or another

provide assistance to try to urge those groups to coalesce, and there's ban little more progress in that front. but it's still a difficult challenge. is that fair? >> yeah. what i would add, congresswoman, and it kind of threads back to an earlier question about why does it seem so difficult to get the countries in the region to coalesce around a single unifying idea here. and it's because i think they're strordly cautious about what comes next. and to thread these two themes together, you know, a different regime or a different governance model in syria will affect the relationship of ankara, damas s damascus, cairo, riyadh, baghdad. it will. now, that's not to predict some negative outcome. but it will change. and i think, you know, what they're circling around here is can they get a little clearer idea of what might happen on the other end of this? so, you know, these two thoughts

are linked, i think. >> yeah. in thinking, as well, about some of the efforts that we have undergone there in terms of humanitarian missions, how are we protecting those if at all? i mean, what is happening in that arena and to what extent do we think it's going to have a positive effect or having to mobilize others and/or bringing opposition groups together in any way? what effect does it have? >> the humanitarian assistance obviously, the state department is directing most of that assistance. but it's going through programs like the world food program. i think there's about 10.5 million that's being disbursed in food rations. the u.n. high commissioner for refugees is providing medical services and supplies, food, water, blankets, hygiene kits,

heaters at about 8.5 million. and the international committee on the red cross is providing relief supplies under their authorities at about 3 million. and there are some ngos that are providing some additional assistance as well. most of that -- i think it's fair to say, congresswoman, that a lot of it is probably being done in the refugee areas where a lot of the refugees have gathered. and we have an extensive number of refugees both on the turkish and jordanian borders that have located there. >> mm-hmm. so, less so in cities, less so in areas where it needs to be protected as it's being -- >> i think that's correct. >> -- as it's going to the population. is there any perception through those efforts that we are there to help the people of syria, that we have ongoing efforts? >> yeah. no. i think it has been made clear that we're trying to do whatever we can to provide that help. we are making efforts to try to do some outreach into syria

itself to try to assist those that have been harmed and try to see what we can do to provide assistance there, as well. that's a much more difficult challenge. >> mm-hmm. thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. wills. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and mr. secretary, chairman dempsey, thank you for your service. i appreciate it as a veteran and also a very grateful parent of a son serving in the military. in the context of any instability that you're reviewing, i'm very concerned about the sequestration of the defense budget, which would be redemption of 8% to 12% beginning next january. you both have correctly warned of a hollowing out of the military, but people are still confused because they've heard and seen a $100 billion cut, a $487 billion cut, and now a pending $600 billion cut. it's just total confusion. what message do you have to the american people on the -- what

do you want them to know about the effect of sequestration, mr. secretary and general? >> congressman, i try to make clear time and time and time again that sequestration and the cuts involved in sequestration would be a disaster for the defense department and would truly hollow out our force and weaken our national defense. we're already cutting close to a half a trillion dollars pursuant to the budget control act. we've made those proposals. they're part of our budget. and we're doing that over ten years. and that's been difficult. it's been a difficult challenge to try to do it pursuant to a strategy and do it in a way that protects our national defense. skweser, which is a whole other set of cuts that are out there that were supposed to take effect in january represent a $500 billion to $600 billion across-the-board meat-axe approach to the budget that would impact every area of the

defense budget regardless of policy, regardless of strategy, and blindly strike at every area of the defense budget. so for that reason, obviously, we've urged the congress, we've urged who are we can to work together to make sure that doesn't happen. >> and i would add, congressman, in terms of what message to the american people. so i think first and foremost that the military is not oblivious to the economic ills of the nation, and have done our best to contribute as part of the equation of national power, which includes economic, diplomatic, and military power. all three have to be in balance. and, therefore, we have stepped up to the plate and done our best to make better use of our resources. secondly, that we adjusted our strategy after the lessons of ten years of war and our projection on what the nation would need in 20/20.

and we mapped the 1317 budget to absorbing the $487 billion cut, and that if we have to absorb more cuts, we've got to go back to the drawing board and adjust our strategy. and what i'm saying to you today is that the strategy that we would have to adjust to would, in my view, not meet the needs of the nation in 2020 because the world is not getting any more stable, it's getting increasingly unstable for all the reasons we're talking about here today. so i think we've done as much as we can do, given what i know about the future we're about to confront. >> and i particularly appreciate your pointing out, this is not a peace dividend. the world is so dangerous, and so thank you for emphasizing that. additionally, general, i'm general concerned about the national guard. this year the administration has been proposing a reduction in 100,000 personnel in the ground forces in the army and the