he was thinking about his brother living on a plantation worked by slaves back in maryland and what a civil war over slavery and union would mean to the family fortunes. you know, you mentioned the sort of -- the question of jobs for officers in the navy. people were thinking about those careerist questions very much, too. and he was discussing this with his wife in sort of a careerist way. his wife was a philadelphian. she was the great granddaughter of benjamin franklin. you think she would try to persuade him to stay with the union. she said, honey, i'm ready to support whatever career choice you make. if you think it's a good idea for you to go with this new outfit of the confederacy, i'll be with you on that. all of those factors were coming into play that i think we often forget.

>> all of these interesting answers about how we lead up to 1861, contingencies and circumstances we might not have thought about before. frank, i'd like to you take us to maryland during the succession crisis. some say abraham lincoln took a constitutional stand to prevent the succession of maryland. think of one thing i would like for to you add, something i've always wondered about, i don't think we've discussed it, should he have done the same thing in virginia, if he could, prevent the cesstion convention just down the road. >> it's an interesting question. what the president did was to take certain acts to keep maryland as a border state, slave state, in the union.

he was certainly hoping that the old dominion, common wealth of virginia would not vote to us is seed and they did, they were tilting more towards it than maryland was at the time i think of firing on ft. sumpter in april. with congress not in session, lincoln was apaplectic in that he feared for the safety of the capitol as well as the union. and took a really extraordinary measures. really extraordinary measures. some believe they were extra constitutional. i don't think they were, in civil war. seven states had already seceded when he took the oath on march 4th. also, it's interesting to note that what that oath of office says despite the current chief justice roberts forgetting it when he administered it to our current president.

that all the laws be faithfully executed and to preserve and to protect the constitution. well, of course, lincoln believed the constitution did not permit seccession and he was already faced with other states about to leave. four other states. and the immediate worry was getting troops to the capitol to protect it. the six massachusetts was the first to arrive through -- as was pointed out -- through the mobs of baltimore, with casualties, both military and civilian. lincoln worried about other troops who had answered his call for 75,000 men after the firing on ft. sumpter. he certainly had the right to call out the state militias that were still under the control of

the state governors under a 1790s act, militia act, but did he have the right to suspend that precious writ of habeas corpus by which someone detained could have that detention checked by a magistrate? he authorized general winfield scott to suspend the writ on the rail lines running from washington to philadelphia to help ensure the travel of troops from north to the nation's capital. he declares a blockade. which in itself is an act of war. remember congress is not in session. that's supposed to be their responsibility. he gets arms and ammunition and doesn't have congress come into session until july 4 to ratify, he hopes, the acts that he took. in the process, there -- ft.

mchenry and baltimore harbor is used as a prison to hold marylanders, who the military believe are conspiring against the federal government. who are recruiting troops not for the union or the federal army but for the confederate army and who were destroying bridges and tearing down telegraph lines and poles. all of which is really not only treasonous but form military acts that the president as commander in chief believed he had to take. that's how he explained it to congress when they did meet in special session. as jim getty will replicate this evening when he -- when he gives a part of that july 4th message. so i think there are two

separate situations, maryland and virginia. maryland, he clearly wanted to stay in the union and was going to use the force necessary to do it, not only for political reasons but for military reasons. and virginia, i think he was treating more politically, hoping that they wouldn't have the votes when they met in convention to vote for succession. unfortunately, that didn't turn out. >> this continues the theme of that jack eluded to, which is the surprising burst of confederate nationalism, the desire to organize a union that some states were not authorized to do while lincoln in washington sees the maryland event as a security issue and, perhaps, overestimates union sentiment in virginia, or might have reacted the same way. that's imponderable, i think.

i want to stay on the lincoln question for everybody to weigh in on. because, you know, adam has written that '61 is sort of a result of the failure of compromise in some ways. certainly the peace convention was a failure of compromise, but since we are the lincoln forum, i want to get back to lincoln. this is a period that i've written about, at least until march 4th, 1861, when lincoln some say stubbornly refused to express himself on succession, refused, as he put it, to beg for right to be inaugurated. he thought it was unmanly to do that. he thought his opinions were already in print. the only thing he privately conveyed to members of congress was that he would not tolerate an extension of slavery westward to the pacific. although he wiggled a little bit at the end on that as well.

i want to ask each of you to answer briefly, lincoln asks congress eventually for what he calls the legal means to make this contest a short and decisive one. neither of which it turned out to be. did he ask the legal means or assume too much power too soon? or in a way did he not assume enough power and did he do it when he did it too late? could he have done more? start with frank and come down this way. >> well, i think he did it just right because if you look at article ii of our constitution, and it describes the duties of the president as -- the president shall be commander in chief. and you hear the term war powers. there's no even mention of the term in -- anywhere in the constitution. today, in 2011, we're still arguing among ourselves and with congress and our supreme court and our president and commander in chief, what is the meaning of

war powers? and here we have a president at the beginning of a major -- a civil war, which is probably about the worst situation that a country or a nation could be embroiled in. and it was up to him to define what the war powers were. and i think he did it right. and then asking congress to meet and also ratify or give him the means, as harold just said, to conduct the war. this was an amazing thing by a president who was a former whig. whigs were passive. they were not for constitutional amendments. they were not for strong

legislation or strong powers in the chief executive. and yet he made that transition as a republican, the first republican president, from whig to passivity to a proactive commander in chief and chief executive. >> so we're doing the goldielocks analysis. neither too hot nor too cold, just right. adam, you're next. >> i think lincoln could have done more. you know, lincoln for the first month of his presidency did very, very little to directly address the crisis. harold, you and i may disagree about that a bit. lincoln said the most issue facing him was determining the

postmastership of bloomington, indiana. it was kind of odd. i think he didn't really come into his own until the sumter crisis. another place, forgive me harold, i don't mean to turn on the moderator here where i want to disagree a little bit with what you said in the introduction to the panel suggesting that the north was the sort of overwhelming favorite going in and the south was the scrappy little underdog. first of all, let's not forget that, of course, the north needed to win the civil war, whereas the south simply needed to not lose. but also i think the south in some respects was militarily better prepared in early 1861 than the north was. they had been organizing troops very actively in many places, actually since mid-1860 and the north was much slower to do that. one of the few places in the first weeks of the war where

union forces had notable success was in st. louis, missouri, where actually these predominantly german wide-awakes had been drilling since early that year and where they staged basically a successful coop against the pro-succession state to begin with what if. the most famous, jack got this, what if robert e. lee had had automatic weapons? would that have made a difference at picket's church? in a way, in analyzing what lincoln might have done, we're dealing with a what if question. and let's speculate what lincoln does instead of acting as -- without calling congress, his first decision is to call congress into special session

and turn this issue over to congress. you know, given our wide, high opinion of congress and its ability to find solution and compromise, you can only imagine what might have come out of that. i think, i'm going to say just right, i think more than too cold, in the respect that it was wise of him for all his dealing with the postmaster of bloomington, illinois, to avoid direct -- calling congress into session and including a broader variety of advisers in that issue. one of the things clearly that lincoln wanted to do was conserve his enemies. there were 15 slave states, seven had succeeded and eight were in disaster. so, proactive actions of any kind might have triggered that, throwing it into the hands of congress would have complicated it. he was picking his way very carefully through this mine field in those early first months. and i think wisely so. so, i'm more with just right than too cold.

>> and i absolutely for the record agree with you -- it's self-indulgent to ask questions. i could have lived without the phrase annoying, but -- cut off this mike. john. >> in looking what lincoln did or didn't do, it strikes me that he did exactly what lincoln would always do. he would never do enough, according to some people, and he would do too much, according to some people. we look at the emancipation proclamation, for example, and the whole issue of freeing the slaves. that's precisely what happened. lincoln, you're not doing enough. lincoln, you're doing too much. and i think the thing that strikes me about this early period of 1861 is, yeah, there was succession, obviously states

had successed but the general feeling lincoln had and most of the country had was this wasn't going to work. there are too many unionists around, too much love for the united states. so, it's going to fail. well, then succession happens and it works. well, there won't be a war. we just -- americas would not fight one against the other. well, then war comes. well, it's not going to be much of a war because we know that the other side is -- you know, the north is a bunch of shopkeepers and, you know, they're not going to -- with some famous southern said, you know, you can slap a yankee in the face. he may sue you but he won't fight. so, there was that kind of attitude. >> another slur, i might add. >> and so you have this whole idea that it's going to happen. well, no, it's not going to happen.

if it's going to happen, it's going to be easy and quick. so, consequently, there doesn't seem to be as much urgency as there ought to have been, obviously, to prepare. i like to use the example of winfield scott. you know, winfield scott was there. he was a great military mind. great military hero. but he does very little preparation for this war that, well, it may come, it may not come. until george mcclelland comes up with this idea of the transmontane campaign, going across the mountains from ohio and capturing richmond from behind, it will all be over very, very quickly. it's then when winfield scott comes up with what's the ann con

da plan. he basically says, george, that's an interesting idea but those kind of campaigns don't work. but i've got this better idea. of course, i'm going to want you to be a leader in all of this. well, the war comes, doesn't it? what happens at first bull run. both sides have the same battle plans. they're both going to hit the other one's flank. i used to do this in the classroom on a blackboard, whiteboard, whatever it is today, show the two sides and show them if both battle plans had worked at the same time, what would have happened is they would have been chasing each other. maybe that's too simplistic of you but i think it's just not in the cards. nobody wants to believe it. and lincoln is one of these people. >> jack? >> first of all, just to clarify, the hypothetical question i was asked was, could lee, not the confederacy, could lee have won the war if he had

had the atomic bomb. and i will share with you the answer, which is no, because he didn't have a delivery system. try to picture -- of course it would have to be jeb stewart and john mossby going up to washington on a mule, lighting the fuse and then trying to ride 50 or 60 miles in the next 10 seconds before it went off. it was highly impractical. i think lincoln defined his policy and created his own defense of -- in response to harold's question, in the first inaugural. you can have no war without being yourselves the aggressor. i confess i never realized how much eloquence there was in that speech in that line until

we heard steven lang deliver it last february. it is a marvelous composition that deserves rereading. if lincoln's declared policy is not to act first, remember lincoln represents a party that itself is still something of a coalition. of old abolitionists, old whigs, the no nothings that don't agree on anything themselves except they disagree. they oppose the extension of slavery. remember, lincoln is elected with 39% of the popular vote. his own north is something of a coalition. there are large chunks of diseffected people in illinois and indiana and ohio. lincoln also believes, perhaps to some degree wrongly, but lincoln also still believes there is, as has been mentioned, still widespread attachment to the union. in the south. in fact, the confederates themselves, to get back to that montgomery convention, really kind of aligned themselves into three groups.

the successionists, those for independence, the cooperationists, those who thought there ought to be some means to cooperate with the north in order to defray or avert war. and then the outright reconstructionists of whom alexander stevens, vice president of the confederacy had been one. those who hoped by putting up a front, a broad bluff, they can force concessions from the union that would allow them to come back together. the south is never solid. lincoln understood that. so, again, for all of those reasons for him to take action risks setting off something he doesn't want to happen. in retrospect, it is perhaps easy to say that he should have prepared more. i don't see how he could have. without essentially saying, it's going to be on my hands because i'm dissatisfied that there will be a war. but one last point, however, if

you read the very, very brief little speeches lincoln gave from the back of his rail car as he made the rail journey from springfield to washington, i don't know how many he made, but eight, ten, there are rarely more than a couple paragraphs but when you read them carefully, you can see he's not rattling a sabre but he is telling his audience, i may need to call on you. he doesn't have to tell them why. he's gradually preparing the north for the fact he may have to do something more. >> before i turn to tom, since i know one thing statistically, i might as well throw it out here. 101 is the total number of speeches made on the inaugural journey. not all in print but some repetitions. actually, there was one occasion, now i can't believe it, but i've forgotten the city, after indianapolis. what would come after indianapolis? some great geography person.

it wasn't cincinnati. it was ohio, but it wasn't cincinnati. >> columbus. >> yeah. he does get very, very bell akoes because he's criticized for his indiana speech. and he backs off again and retreats. and the lack of consistency leads him back to massachusetts to say the ramblings of our president-elect are an embarrassment to the notions of his incoming presidency and to the very idea of speech making. of course, that's edward everett, who later is outdone in this village a couple years later. tom, would you give us your final word on this speculation? >> well, i'll follow up with what jack said. i think i come down on, i think, lincoln just did it just right. i thought his handling in terms of the border states was just right. you know, we talk about the advantages, several advantages

the north had going into the civil war, in population, white population, potential soldiers, manufacturing ability. but if the border states of maryland, missouri and kentucky succeeded, just think of the impact on the north and the south. i think 40% would be the population -- white population of the southern states would increase by 40%. the manufacturing capacity of the southern states would increase by 80%. the number of resources, like mules and horses, would increase by 40%. and i think lincoln understood this. you know, he's quoted as saying, you know, it's great to have god on my side, but i need kentucky.

and i thought the way he approached kentucky particularly, he was allowing. he knew there was trade going on through kentucky to the south but he did not go in there and try to coerce the government. he waited until the unionist faction took control of kentucky, the legislature. and i think his moderate approach to the border states was a very key factor not only in the capacity of the north militarily and economically but also the psychological impact. so, i think he did it just right. >> i'm going to invite everyone now who has a question to come to the microphone while we continue to chat here. i think, you know, all of this is unavoidably speculative. my next question was going to be

about bull run, but i think we have basically come to the agreement that led by john that everybody's trying to outflank the other person if bull run -- you know, i just have to flatter all of you, compliment all of you, then we'll turn to the questions. these answers are so thought-provoking, so deep and profound, that it's clear that none of you could ever engage in a presidential debate. >> i'm sorry, i forgot what i was to say. >> let's have our first question, please. >> tell us your name and where you're from. >> clay from bedford, indiana. this is a what if question but what if it almost happened and that is the original 13th amendment that did not, was not even submitted, but in the body of the amendment itself, it said

that it was unamendable and would guarantee perpetuity of slavery. my question that intrigued me for years is what a future court say about any amendment that in the body of the amendment said it was unamendable. if they chose to say it was unconstitutional, they would have to hang their judicial hats on some reasoning. thz. >> this is the shadow amendment that would have perpetuated slavery and guaranteed its existence where it already was. lincoln submitted it to the states with a tepid message saying it's my responsibility as chief magistrate to the consideration of the legislature. frank, why don't you answer the legal question.

>> actually, it would depend on whether justice scalia was on the court or justice breyer. [ laughter ] but as far as i'm concerned, it would have been -- to say it was unamendable because i think a supreme court depending on its make-up of course would determine whether or not it was appropriate. the amendment was appropriate. so i think if you had chief justice tourny, which we did at the time, no friend of lincoln or the north, i think he would've ruled as he did in writing the majority opinion in dred scott that you could say it was unamendable. so i think it's in the make-up of the court. if the challenge like the price cases came later in the war in a 5-4 decision even with chief justice tawny still on the court, but it came much later than manassas determined that

what the president did in the conduct of the war was legal, i think with lincoln having the votes in the supreme court, they would have found that it was not appropriate to say the constitution or that amendment was -- could not be amended or could not be ruled against by a court of appeals. >> and by the -- craig? >> i just wanted to add, i think that's absolutely true. and from a legal point of view, i want to try to explain a little bit. i'm sure everyone here knows this already but i can't resist saying it, and that is that lincoln and virtually 80% of the people on both sides of this sectionalist view believed that if slavery did not expand, it could not continue to survive. the key from the time lincoln became activated again with the kansas-nebraska act was an active politician. lincoln's commitment was to prevent the extension of slavery. he said i will not in the inauguration i have no desire, i have no inclination, i have no legal authority to interfere with slavery where it exists.

but slavery would nonetheless have disappeared -- he was convinced. most of his supporters were convinced as well if it could not expand. you would create a circumstance where there would be excess labor that would cost the owners of the labor force more than they could get back in terms of benefit. there would be no outlet because it would be restricted into -- and then one-by-one, the states would abolish slavery themselves and the shadow 13th amendment would become entirely moot because slavery would not exist anywhere in the union because the states individually would've abolished it. that was the vision that lincoln and most of his supporters had at the time. the question of whether it really would have really been amended, i think their justification to themselves was they wouldn't have to because it would become economically unsustainable. whether that's true or not, we'll never know. >> jack? >> i'd just like to point out an interesting irony that while on the one hand you have this