middle east, turkey, lebanon, iraq, what's your perspective on what potentially this holds if this effort in syria continues? >> i don't see -- speaking as the principal military advisor to this body and the president national security advisor, i don't see the assad model spreading. i think the previously oppressed populations seeing what's happening around them are beginning to rebel against the traditional strong men who in many cases have been from the minority side of the demographic kwaegs. and that's why i agree with the secretary that change in syria is inevitable. i just don't know -- i don't know how long it will take for it to occur.

it will occur. and i have concerns about that. i think long-term it's, you know, i think we're all eager to see these populations that have long not been reaping the benefits of the resources in their country have been suppressed politically. in some cases have been suppressed in terms of their religious freedoms. certainly women's rights. i think that long-term this will become a stabilizing influence. but i think getting from here to there is going to be a wild ride. and so, i think we're in for ten or 15 years of instability in a region that has already been characterized by instability. >> let me ask you, too, on this line, general allen was here testifying before us last month talking about operations in afghanistan. i want to get your perspective. his comments were this, he said

that he saw the use of u.s. power there extending past 2013. i wanted to get your perspective on that and understand do you agree with general allen? are you looking to him as far as his guidesance, his thought about how we utilize our current forces there as we're drawing down, what's necessary past 2013. because i think of all these parts of what happens in the middle east but also in afghanistan and obviously our efforts there in iraq are all intertwined. i wanted to get your perspective on that. >> congressman, you bet we are listening to general allen. he's the best. he's exercised tremendous leadership out there and tremendous dedication. and he's put together -- more importantly he's put together a very good plan for the future with regards to afghanistan. as i pointed out 2011 was a turning point. we have seen the taliban

weakened. they have not organized an effort to regain any area that they've lost. they've engaged in sporadic hits. we expected that we'll continue. they're resilient. but they have been weakened. more importantly the afghan people themselves have rejected them. more importantly than that the afghan army is beginning to operate on its own. these events that took place in kabul over the weekend told us, told general allen that the afghan army, the afghan police are in fact becoming an effective force to achieve security in afghanistan. and more importantly, the transitions are working. we've got two traunchs of transitions that have occurred. a% of the population is now under afghan security and control. the third traunch which will take place this year will put 75% of the people under afghan security and control. the plan and the strategy that

general allen has developed and that nato supports is to proceed with that plan, to take us through 2013, and be able to complete the final transitions. and then draw down to the end of 2014. and then beyond that, to have an enduring presence there that represents continuing effort to provide support to the afghans on counterterrorism, on training advice and assist in other areas. >> thank you, mr. larson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen thanks for being here. general dempsey earlier before votes you were answering questions about chemical and buy logical weapons in syria. i don't want to recharacterize your comments so ill say what i thought i heard and then you can recharacterize more accurately. did you say that you thought we

had sufficient transparency into the security and location of the syrian chemical and buy logical weapons caches. >> i do. in consultation with our close altlies in the region. >> okay, good. thanks. then the second part of that question is the so what question. so what if we do, does that mean that we're in a position to do something about it if the circumstances arises where we need to do something about it and are we willing to do that? and who makes that call? >> well ultimately, let me start where you began, which is the so what of it. as we watch these facilities and monitor -- i mean, if you're talking about what are our vital

national interests in that particular country. it seems to me that the proliferation or potential proliferation of chemical and biological weapons weapons of mass destruction would be right at the top of the list. >> i'll agree with that. in terms of the discussions we're having today about syria and the resistance and the violence in syria, if syria was going to use, if we thought syria was going to use chemical and biological weapons, what do we do? >> let me again because of the classification of this hearing, let me assure you that we have planning that is updated constantly on actions we could take in the event that those weapons -- by the way, the planning is being done with again, our allies in the region. >> i just wanted to assure you on that last point, we have made plans to try to deal with any contingency involving that area.

we think that does represent the most serious concern with regards to our security. >> understand the classification here, i'm hearing that assurance is important. we can explore there later at a different venue. secretary panetta, i would to change the focus. i want to ask about the story about yemen. about two years ago the current cia director was sitting about where you were sitting telling us that we did understand there's a difference between a civil war and what is a counterterrorism mass skoourt interest that the u.s. was trying to be support i have of in yemen. i don't know that a lot has changed in terms of u.s. staying out of the civil war versus the u.s. continuing to pursue a

counterterrorism strategy in yemen. the story this morning about the drone strikes whether it's true or not, let's assume it's a story, and reading it that the cia is looking at changing the strategy and how they conduct drone strikes and where they go, causes me to question whether or not, you know, is the cia tail wagging the d.o.d. dog, or the state department dog on this issue? i'll put it out to you. we to have that answer. >> thank you. first of all, with regards to the story in the paper, i think those involved classified operations and i guess i would urge you to try to get, you know, what's behind that based on that kind of classified briefing. >> right. >> with regards to the larger issue -- >> right.

>> i understand the implications of what you're asking, from d.o.d.'s perspective, i think it's frankly true for intelligence, our target there represents those al qaeda terrorists that involve a threat to this country. there are very specific targets. this is not broad based. we're not becoming part of any kind of civil war disputes in that country. we are very precise and very targeted and will remain pursuant to those kinds of operations. >> that's great from a d.o.d. perspective i guess we need a clear idea from the administration perspective about if they're changing their view about yemen or not over the last couple of years. >> just again, without going into a specific details here, the position of the administration is that our interest in yemen is the same interest we had in the fattah and we have in somalia which is

to go after those terrorists, those kooid kooi terrorists who are involved in planning attacks on this country. no more, no less. >> could i add just 30 seconds. >> yep. >> the -- that's on the -- the what we're doing kin eticly. we're working very closely with the military in yemen. notably their special forces to increase their capabilities as a building partner capacity endeavor. i think it's important not to see this as we're only doing one thing and not the other. we're trying to round it off. >> i appreciate that. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you both for being here today. real briefly over the next three months can you just explain to us how you see the opposition. do you see it fragmenting or do you see it coalescing.

how do you see it playing out over the next three months? >> in syria? >> yes, sorry. back to the topic. >> you know, if i could give you a firm answer as to what we saw happening, i probably wouldn't be in this job. i'd be somewhere else. it's a tough thing to try to look at the elements at play here and try to determine just exactly how this will play out. and obviously intelligence has provided it's perspective on this. i think the best thing is as a result of this broad based insurgency. as a result of the international community's unified approach in dealing with syria, applying the sanctions, applying the pressures. continuing to indicate that

assad must step down. as a result of what the u.n. is doing now in implementing a cease fire where you now have the support of russia and china. there's a whole series of efforts here that i think are putting incredible pressure on the assad regime to do the right thing. this may continue to play out assad will continue probably to resist these efforts, but i think it's a matter of time before he's brought down. >> i have nothing to add, congresswoman. >> okay. i guess playing off of that, the department of defense's assumptions around this, how have our plans evolved specifically over the last year since we've seen the syrian revolution commence? >> what we do and what general dempsey does with the service chiefs is to -- is to develop all of the plans necessary for

any contingency and whatever the president ultimately decides will be prepared to implement. >> and just to kind of give you the view of the region at large. we're a nato partner with turkey. we have a very strong relationship with jeernd obviously israel. we are still 200 to 300 military strong in iraq. iraq has a piece of this as well on their western border. and webb meeting with leaders throughout the region. the secretary met with the president from the kurdish region and they have a huge interest on -- there's a -- there's kurd populations in northeastern syria in eastern turkey and western iran and in northern iraq. these issues are all intertwined. so right now we're in the business of sharing intelligence, sharing information. building partner capacity where

we can and, you know, having the threat, the credible threat of military capability to undergird our diplomatic and economic efforts. >> sure. what i would just add to that is based on comments that have been made from my colleagues in their previous questioning as it related to what happened in libya and maybe the concerns regarding the war powers act and how we proceeded in that action. of all the conflicts that we have dealt with over the past years that the one lesson learned is end game and that there needs to be a clear defining of the mission on behalf of our troops, our military families, but also, you know, americans. so it's my hope in echoing the sentiments of my colleagues that as we move through this as you continue to share information

with us, as we act in our congressional oversight role that there will be clear lines of communication on behalf of our military families and the american people. >> no. i appreciate that concern. i want to -- i want to assure you that -- i think general dempsey and i are unified with regards to, you know, not -- not proceeding with any military action unless there's clear objective. unless we know what it's going to take to achieve that objective. how long is it going to take? and ultimately do we have the legal authority to in fact accomplish what we're being asked to accomplish. and that would involve very close consultations with the congress. >> thank you, both so much. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you. mr. franks. >> well, thank you, mr. chairman. and thank both of you for being here.

general dempsey, it looks like it's a real possibility that a post assad government might potentially be dominated by the muslim brotherhood as we saw seems to be coming to pass in egypt. what do you think the major likely impacts will be on the security of israel and other u.s. interests in the region if that occurs? >> i wouldn't personally predict that it would be muslim brotherhood. what we do know for a fact just demographically is that 70% of the syrian population is of the sunni confessional of islam. therefore you would have a pretty dramatic shift from a minority government and a majority out of power to a majority in power. i think there will be some -- some combination of conservative islamic parties, secular -- syria has quite a tradition of secularism that i wouldn't

discount. and among them the minority, the kurds, the drus and the christians who have been supported by the assad party, but i think they could be persuaded to be part of the government. that's the point, i think, in terms of looking toward helping identify the opposition, but then also holding them accountable before they -- we support them to committing themselves to a representative shared government at the end of this thing so we don't end up creating the conditions for a civil war. >> i think that sounds good. i guess my concern is of course, in egypt, egypt was a fairly moderate government as far as the arab world goes. and with their elections they've brought in about 40% muslim brotherhood in parliamentary elections about 20 plus some that's a fairly frightening

coalition. i suppose the question then should be, what are we doing and what more can we do to ensure that syrian kurds, christians, any of the jewish population, other minorities there will have meaningful roles in building at least a reejsly ethnically tolerant democratic syria should the assad regime be eventually overthrown? we tried to do that in iraq. many of us were quite concerned about religious freedom there. that was not dhooefed and and there's a terrible purging especially of the christian population in iraq. that's a frightening thing to many of us. what can we do to pri vent that dynamic from occurring in syria in a post assad regime? i direct that to either of you? >> things you pointed out are truly legitimate concerns. and, you know, i guess, i guess

the response is that, you know, if -- if we can build democratic institutions into these countries and to some extent we even see it -- we see it in iraq, we're beginning to see it in egypt. we certainly see it in libya, once you build some of these institutions where parties have to participate in governing and they have to look at how they can build coalitions, and try to meet their responsibilities to the people, that, you know, whether you like it or not, it does have some kind of moderating impact. even in egypt where i understand your concerns, the fact is that the brotherhood there are various segments of the brotherhood. some are now trying to understand that they're going to have a bigger responsibility there. they're going to have to exercise, you know, leadership with regards to every aspect of

governing there. and in iraq every time it looks like it's headed towards one direction, of that government continue to bring pressure on the president to try to stay on the right path. doesn't always work as crisply as we would like, but the fact is it does impact on that. we're seeing some of that in libya. there are a lot of forces, as a result of the arab spring, we've unleashed a lot of forces here, but one thing that i don't think we ought sow lose sight of is that as a result of all of this, we can direct and help direct those countries in a better direction than where they were. >> if i could try to squeeze in one last -- you're on the right track here and i guess i'm hoping we might be able to involve some of the religious and ethnic minorities at least in southern syria, sorry, northern syria, because it seems to me if we do it ahead of time we have a chance of meet yourating the issue --

>> i agree with that. >> -- and should be thankful to israel for taking out the nuclear plant if the muslim brotherhood does take control. with that, any thoughts you have? >> no. i agree with what you just said. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. franks. it's very fitting as we conclude, congressman chris gibson, who himself of new york is a distinguished veteran of service in the mideast, and central asia. congressman gibson. >> thanks, mr. chairman. i appreciate the strong leadership in the department of defense, both distinguished careers of the gentlemen with us today. and i'll talk about syria in a second. while i have the secretary. i'm curious to hear his feedback. i'm recently back from fort bragg, visiting with one of the subordinate commands of the special operations command, in previous work with general clapper in the intelligence community, and let me say up front that it's remarkable the level of teamwork that's going on out there.

but yet i feel that we're lacking in terms of systemic codification of some of the very encouraging developments over the past decade, and i'm still hearing that it's not very often, but it can happen, that the intelligence community may be working a line of operation, special operations command may be working a line of operation and figuratively will bump into each other. i know there's efforts to bring stronger collaboration in terms of information sharing, but given your recent history of -- in work, i'd be very curious to know now in your current capacity what your thoughts are in terms of reform to bring a closer collaboration between the intelligence community and the department of defense. >> you know, i'll -- yield to general dempsey on this as well, but i -- from my own experience as director of the cy and now

secretary of defense, at least in the history that i've been in this town, i don't think there is a better relationship between the intelligence and the military operations, special operations forces, than there is today. i mean, they are -- they are truly working together. whether those operations are taking place in pakistan, afghanistan, in yemen, in somalia, in other parts of the world. they are unified in the approach. they're working off of strong intelligence resources that are being shared. the operations that are developed, whether done covert or worked out within the operation centers that developed in each of those areas. there's very close coordination. there isn't a target that is taken on that doesn't involve the participation of both the intelligence and military operations and they're doing it very effectively.

i do think that, you know, we need to learn the lessons. i think you're right that we need to put in place probably the kind of lessons learned so that we can make sure that the kind of cooperation that's going on now is one that continues. that's probably my biggest concern is that it's working well now. we're facing al qaeda. we're facing terrorism together, but, you know, as we are able to achieve some success there, there may be a danger that both of these may go off and try to do their own thing. that's what we have to pay attention to. >> yeah. i'd only add that sort of the game-changing lessons learned over last ten years are the integration of arsof and segra by the way. where you're seeing us move with a new strategy, we call it a global networked approach to warfare. global and networks are the operative words, and this of it this way -- most of our adversaries, in fact

even state actors, are not confronting us directly but through networks of surrogates and proxies and asymmetrically. to defeat a network, we've got to be a network, and it gets right at what you said, congressman. we've got to find ways to network our capabilities internal to the inner agency of government, dhs, fbi, d.o.d., cia and all those, and as well then with our international partners in ways we just haven't had to do before. but we're on it. we're working it. >> and i concur with the assessment and, of course, as we go forward, we don't want to over codify to the point that we stifle initiative. but i'm also concerned, and i think i hear the same thing, that much of this is based on relationships. it's forged in the crucible and to the effect that we codify it, it won't come to an end, two individuals very strong-willed might not get along, we still

need this to work. so much to do, and just one specific question. i see my time is getting short here. with regard to the unrest in syria. have there been any adverse implications and ramifications in anbar and nineva province? >> no. not coming from syria in, but we do know -- you probably know this having served there, but it runs from northern saudi arabia through western iraq and up into syria, and there are, you know, there is assistance being provided on the basis of tribal relationships. flowing into syria. it's another one of the complications i mentioned, but we haven't seen any kind of backwash coming back the other way. >> okay. thank you very much. thank you, chairman. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. gibson. as we conclude, mr. secretary, thank you for being here, thank you for your service. general dempsey, thank you again for your service and compliment commitment to our troops,

military families and veterans. we shall be adjourned.

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tomorrow, the supreme court considers whether arizona has the authority to enforce a state immigration law enactsed in 2010, or if the federal government exclusive authority when it comes to immigration. you can hear that oral argument on our companion network c-span, friday at 8:00 p.m. eastern. charles colson, special counsel to president nixon who pled guilty and went to prison for his role in the watergate cover-up and later became an evangelical preacher died at age 80. he talked about the white house taping system in 2007. >> kissinger had the right, although he abused it, to come into the office, the oval office or the eob office, without having somebody announce him. i always went in through -- but kissinger could walk in when he wanted to, nixon told him because of the level of the