withdraw from negotiations is followed by provocative action. next, there is a wooing by the united states and its allies with concessions offered. then a so-called break through deal. finally, another betrayal, often in the form of a missile launch and disclosure of a secret nuclear operation. it was so with the clinton administration, with the george w. bush administration and thus it has come to pass as well with the obama administration. president clinton's agreed framework ended with disclo that your sure of pyongyang's program. and ended with north korea lifted from the state sponsors of terrorism i adamantly opposed was met with a secret nuclear reactor in syria, which they thankfully destroyed and yet another betrayal.

the obama administration is confronted with the abstract failure of its leap day deal on february 29th with north korea and refused to accepted witnesses privy to the beijing negotiations to testify today at our hearing. old kim, kim ill responded to president obama's outstretched hand by kidnapping two u.s. journalist, firing a missile, setting off a nuclear weapon, sinking a south korean naval vessel and shelling a south korean island. his son, kim young un, seems to showing the apple doesn't fall far from the tree and applying a third nuclear test. the u.n. council issued a statement condemning the april 13th missile launch as a serious violation of security

resolutions 17, 18, and 1874. no real consequences for north korea's flagrant violation and action that threaten global peace and security. while the missiles blew up short of leaving the launchpad as all of us know, measure intent is just as important as measuring culpability. north korea's rhetoric should have told the negotiations all they need to know. the north korea's policy of starving the people and feed the army remains. the south korean defense industry estimated this month, north koreans spent $850 million on the failed missile launch, enough to buy corn to feed the entire population for an entire year. politics in north korea remains all about the kim dynasty and its needs, not about either the concerns of the united states or the welfare of the korean

people. a particularly unfortunate result of the leif day agreement was the combining of discussions of nuclear disarmament and food assistance at the same negotiating table. this was a departure of both the clinton administration and the bush administration, which held to the reagan doctrine that a hungry child knows no politics. it also led to a highly embarrassing reversal on the food aid decision following the missile launch, even as administration officials insisted that there was no direct linkage between food assistance and the failed negotiations. our distinguished panel of experts can shed light today whether succession from the old kim to the young kim has really changed anything in north korea or is it merely an old kim an a and -- in a new uniform. further, there is the pressing issue how we should respond to

future provocation, including another nuclear test. we also wish to examine how we should go forward on the simmer nuclear crisis, a rogue state with nuclear weapons working on nuclear capability and engaged in murky activities with opponents of the united states with the middle east and south asia. the young general at the military parade gave every indication trouble lies just ahead with nhk. dressed in a dark mou suit, he viewed tanks as missiles and goose stepping troops as they paraded through the capital in celebration of the 100th anniversary of his grandfather's birth. in his first public remarks since assuming power, the young kim bombastically warned the days of enemies threatening and blackmailing us with nuclear weapons are forever over. the new kim looks and acts

suspiciously very much like the old kim. here is a brief video clip that will just take us a few seconds to line up, of the cold war military parade held on sunday in pyongyang that clearly illustrates the nature and the priorities of the north korean regime, if we could show the clip? >> for the first time. >> you fight for victory and honor and the flag will always encourage and lead us to the new victor victory. >> the untested young leader, thought to be in his late 20s prompted international outrage after going ahead with the launch. despite its failure, this first address is not just a message to north koreans, but the rest of the world as well. >> thank you very much. now, i'm pleased to turn to my good friend, the ranking member of our committee, mr. berman of

california, for his opening statemen statement. >> thank you very much, madam chairman for calling a timely hearing. it's interesting before my opening statement the parade we just saw that clip from showed a truck carrying a chinese missile -- i mean a north korean missile that looked very much like a similar chinese truck. there are u.n. resolutions regarding the exports of arms to north korea at this point. anyway, pyongyang's failed missile launch, which is a clear violation of u.n. security council resolutions and carried out in defiance of strong international pressure demonstrates north korea, under kim jong-un is essentially the

same as when it was ruled by his father and grandfather. indeed, north korean leaders have shown a remarkable consistency in reneging on commitments regarding their nuclear and missile programs. the latest being the february 29 leap day agreement. with a possibility of another nuclear test on the horizon, pyongyang has shown its clear preference for provocative and destabilizing behavior. president reagan famously remarked when dealing with the soviet union, we should trust but verify. with regard to north korea, he might have said never trust and never cease to verify. the fundamental questions before us today are how can the united states and the rest of the world change the north's behavior? is change even possible? if not, then what should be the appropriate course of action to mitigate the north korean threat? success successive president, both

republican and democratic, as the chairman pointed out, have pursued a policy of quote tough engagement, end of quote, with pyongyang. given north korea's proclivity to break agreements before the ink is dried, does it make sense to continue this approach? if not, what is the alternative? are there additional sanctions we could place on north korea that would change their behavior? and does it make sense to tie food aid to specific actions taken by the north? at a minimum, i brielieve the u. should do everything possible to ensure existing u.n. council security resolutions on north korea are fully implemented and i welcome the recent security council presidential statement indicating additional entities involved in north korea's proliferation activities will be sanctioned in coming days. we must also continue to coordinate closely with our south korean and japanese allies on how to best address the north

korean threat while maintaining a robust u.s. military presence in those countries. by virtue of history and growing, china remains one of the few nations with some leverage over north korea. regrettably, beijing has been unwilling to use that leverage to persuade pyongyang to change course. while china may have expressed its displeasure with the north's recent missile launch, the fact remains beijing serves as pyongyang's economic lifeline, sending food and fuel to prop up the north korean regime and luxury goods to satisfy the north korean elite. china continues to play this role, because beijing fears a flood of refugees from an unstable north korea more than a nuclear north korea armed with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. my guess is that beijing also likes having a buffer between itself and south korea, a strong

u.s. ally. but by enabling north korean regimes, reckless and aggressive behavior which threatens regi regional stability, china ends up undermining its own security calculus. just what kind of regime is china backing? for the north korean people, life under the young kim is as bleak as ever with the average citizen enjoying no real political, religious or personal freedoms. hundreds of thousands of north korean political prisoners remain imprison the in goolags and others endeavor to escape by any means possible even if it means crossing to china where many refugees are forced into prostitution and hard labor. despite the north's efforts to appear quote strong and prospero prosperous" this year to celebrate the 100th birthday of the country's founder, vast numbers of north koreans continue to face starvation. sadly, the north korean regime's

misguided priorities, pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into its so-called space program and nuclear programs and massive military only underscore its cold-hearted callousness and blatant disregard for its own people. the chinese willingness to support such a wicked regime casts a dark shadow on beijing's own international reputation. i thank the panel of experts for being here this morning. look forward to thoughts on how to make our policy on north korea more effective. yield back. >> thank you very much, mr. berman. and we will give three minutes to mr. royce, the chairman of the subcommittee on terrorism, nonproliferation and trade. >> thank you, madam chairman. mr. berman was just talking about the magnitude of the human rights abuses there. in terms of the sheer numbers, this is the worst human rights

abuser on the planet today. for november us in these hearings who heard the testimony or met up with detectors in china or in south korea, it is truly appalling. now, when you think about the cost of this launch, at least a half a billion dollar cost to this launch, i've been in north korea, there's no way that regime could squeeze pennies out of the populous in north korea. to get this hard currency requires, for the most part, a funding source outside the country. frankly, if china were bothered by north korea's icbms, if it were bothered by north korea's dual track nuclear program, it would stop subsidizing them. it would stop funding these operations.

a portfolios tackling north korea's elicit activities which brings money outside the country whether it's the sale of meth and heroin, they do a lot of that or sale of missile programs and bringing hard currency from that program, that's the way to weaken the regime. as we will hear today, until it was dropped in favor of an alternative course of action in 2006, the treasury department went after north korea's funds parked in a macaw bank, attacking its counterfeiting, attacking its other elicit activities through the proliferation security initiative on the high sea, many ships were stopped. cut off the flow of currency into the regime and that prevented, for a while, the government from paying its generals, prevented for a while,

according to the detectors we talked to, the missile program shut down. they couldn't buy gwire ro scopes on the black market for their missiles. they were trying to get -- i guess japan had manufactured some gwire ro scopes. you pay a premium on the black market to get those. they could no longer fund that. for eight months that program was shut down until we reversed course and the money began to course back into the regime. this is what their head propagandas that defected to the united states told us, the number one goal is get access to hard currency for what purpose? fund their nuclear program and icbm program. it would require some energy. it would require some creativity, some focus and i would say that that's been disturbingly absent to date, in terms of how we address this problem. but for those of us that would want to see a long term solution to it, i think cut off the flow

of elicit activities? look at what we did with the mccaw bank in terms of reinforcing that type of discipline, cut off the funding and begin the process of the right kind of broadcast into north korea to begin the process of change internally. >> thank you so much, mr. royce. mr. ackerman is recognized. >> i thank the chair. i think you kids got it covered. >> thank you. mr. mazzulla is recognized. >> thank you, madam chair for calling this important hearing for north korea and the north korean peninsula. north korea with kim jong il will remain just as stable in its leadership. kim's successors, his son, jim

jong-un would pick a brighter path for its people faded with last week's failed missile launch. denuclearization of the north korean peninsula remains a goal theist and six party partners strive for. however, given north korea's erratic behavior recently, over the course of the past several years, the goal of denuclearization seems further away than ever before. i commend the administration for halting assistance to the north and encourage the president and secretary of state to stand firm against any other further destabilizing actions. furthermore, if north korea proceeds with testing a nuclear weapon, as likely if prior behavior is any indicator, all members of the six party talks must condemn this behavior. the future of north korea is bleak and as the people of north korea that would bear the unimaginable hardship of kim jong-un's tierney.

it is my belief north korea will never give up its nuclear weapons. it is the weapons itself it is using to maintain its iron grip there. i hope our distinguished witnesses today will address the human rights tragedy, particularly with negotiations with north korea in the future. madam chair, again, thank you for calling this hearing and look forward to talking to the witnesses? thank you so much, mr. manzullo and your attendance always. miss bass is recognized. >> thank you, chairman and senator berman for holding this hearing. over the past five decades, the u.s. has bowlsered a lasting relationship with south korea. efforts to achieve peace with north korea has proved elusive and globally frustrating. with the passing of one leader and emergence of another, now more than ever, the united states must hold north korea and

undercut actions and hold peace on the north korean peninsula. i had the opportunity to go to the demilitarized zone. looking at -- i don't know, it seemed almost like a scene out of history, looking back to the 1950s at the level of tensions between the north and the south. i'm looking forward to comments the panel might have about the new leader. the world recently watched as a north korea failed too raunch a rocket many believe will be used to wage war. events like this shed lights on the reality of the north in a society where many live in fear. thank you for coming today. >> thank you so much. >> mr. shamitt, the chairman of the subcommittee of middle east and south asia is recognized. >> thank you and for calling this timely hearing. >> since the obama administration came to office, its foreign policy has been characterized by so-called engagement. the president has defined this policy as extending and

outstretched hand in the hopes mere gesture would cause some of the world's most brutal dictators to unclench their fist. the administration's engagement efrtsds with bashar al assad of syria and in tehran, best examples have been complete failures. at best, they have not achieved their objectives and at worst in the eyes of people in those regimes, brutalized them. as einstein said, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. that appears to be what this administration is doing in north korea and the middle east. as soon as one dictator passed, this administration lent at the opportunity to engage with his son, kim jong-un and appears to be a chip off the old block. this has not worked and will not work. thank you. >> thank you very much. now, i'm pleased to recognize and introduce our panelists.

we will first hear from frederick fla trtz? did will first here from the langley director of the langley intelligence group network. he served as a senior analyst with the ci ai for almost two decades prior and was chief of staff for john bolton then under secretary of state for arms control and international security. to top off his distinguished career in government service, he became a professional staff member with the house permanent select committee on intelligence in 2006, acting as a senior adviser to our good friend pete hoekstra. welcome back. then i would like to welcome dr. michael green, a senior adviser of the japan chair at the center for strategic and international studies. dr. green previously served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for asian affairs at the national security council in the george w. bush administration.

he originally joined the nsc in 2001 as director to of asian affa affairs. i would then welcome scott schneider. thank you. the director for the u.s. korean policy at the council of foreign relations. prior to cfr, mr. schneider was a senior associate of the asia foundation where he founded and directed the center for u.s. korean policy and served as the asian foundation's representative of korea for the years 2000 to 2004. and finally, we welcome patrick cornin. the senior adviser and senior director of the asia pacific security program at the center for a new american security. previously, he was the director of the institute for national strategic studies at the national defense university and has had a 25-year career inside government and academic research

centers. thank you. we welcome our analysts today. i ask that our witnesses please keep your presentation to no more than five minutes. and without objection, the witness's entire statements, written statements will be inserted into the hearing record. we will begin with mr. fleist. >> thank you, madam chair and members of the committee. it's an who nor to be here today. >> you can put that microphone a little closer. >> i enjoyed working with your on the house intelligence committee staff. i my name is fred fleitz and i'm the managing direct of the langley intelligent group network, a forecast and intelligence service. i formerly worked with the cia and state department. i will focus on north korea's

wmd program. the program was a test of an icbm surprised some experts and u.s. diplomats. however, this launch was consistent with past north korea behavior. although it seems counterproductive, north korea has done this before. parentally in the wrong headed belief that provocations strengthen its ability to pro-vail in future diplomatic talks. there's been a cycle of north korean agreements, provocations, cooling off periods and new agreements. pyongyang learned no matter how badly it acts, the united states will eventually come back to the negotiating table, usually with new concessions. it is possible last week's missile launch was to test american resolve. since the february 29 food deal was quite generous and placed limited restrictions on the north korea nuclear program, pyongyang intended to see how far it could push washington. north korea may have believed with the united states

distracted by afghanistan and iran the u.s. would be reluctant to confront pyongyang over the missile launch. the security council was only able to pass a nonbinding resolution. despite speeches by u.s. officials con demg the launch, the united states is aware that the u.n. response was mild and probably believed u.s. envoys will ask to meet with it again soon. north korea angly responded to the resolutions. it seems clear from its recent statements that north korea plans more rocket launches. some experts are complaining that pass practices and intelligences believe north korea could follow up last week's rocket wlaunch a nuclear test. i'm reluctant to make such a prediction for a number of

reason is outline in my prepared testimony. despite reports of activity and digging in north korea's site, such activity is very common, given the country's extreme secrecy and good counterintelligence practices, i doubt very much there would be any definitive satellite imagery of a north korean test preparation before pyongyang announced that a test would take place. whether or not there's a test in the short term, its wmd programs is dangerous. they have programs including biological weapons, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. while the u.s. intelligence community has publicly stated that it does not know whether north korea has nuclear weapons it said in february 2009 that the country is capable of producing them and has enough

plutonium for about six nuclear bombs. i want to point out two months after the intelligence community published this figure, they h t announced they were going to go ahead and processing with sfent fuel. they may have amassed more weapons with plutonium since may 2009 the. we now know after years of arguments within the u.s. government, north korea has a uranium enrichment program. this program was worked on over an extended period according to the director of national intelligence. it could be the source of weapons grade fuel. the wmd program is also a sfeshl concern as is its reactor, which it helped build in syria. i finally want to note that i believe north korea and iran closely watch each other's diplomacy with the united states.

if israeli prime minister netanyahu's claim is accurate that recent talks on iran's nuclear program gave iran a freebie, it will have a significant effect on north korea's negotiating posture when u.s. officials try to resume diplomatic talks. the reverse is probably true. too generous a deal with north korea will probably. bolden iran to push for tougher talks. >> thank you for inviting uls to testify today on some important subject. i have a concern about the human rights situation and humanitarian food aid issues but would like to focus on three issues for now. first, why did north korea do this so soon after the agreement? second, does this mean we now have a breather because the icbm test failed? and third, what should we do? on the why, i don't think we should be surprised.

late last year, i wrote a number of public things predicting that the north koreians would do a missile or nuclear test in the first half of this year because they've been telegraphing this for some time in their propaganda. this is 2012, the year north korea said it would be a full nuclear weapons state. the pattern is also quite clear. in 2006 in july, they tested a ballistic missile of a similar type. they were condemned by the u.n. and then they tested a nuclear device. in april 2009, they tested a ballistic missile then in may tested nuclear device. i think based on the same pattern we will see a nuclear test. the pattern fits. is this a period now where we can take a breather, where there's a lull, having expressed our condemnation through the prst or presidents statement in the security council. i don't think so.

i think we're looking at increased es la case. if they do a nuclear test and it's plutonium based, we will learn a lot. the first ton yielded 1 kiloton and 4 kilotons. if this is a 10 or 15 kiloton stes, that's very dangerous. it could be a test based on uranium enrichment program, which we've known about for years, including when i was in the administration, but which many commentators said couldn't be wrael until the north showed experts their centrifuges. a uranium test would be very, very dangerous because they could hide the capability and it would be difficult to test. the ballistic missile test is real. aimed at japan. and i would also particularly encourage a focus on the danger of transfer. in 2003, the north korean delegation told the american