member if we did not end our hostile policy, they would transfer their nuclear weapons capabilities to third countries. we took that threat seriously at the too many. we later the next year found uranium traces in the cache turned over to the libyans. in 2007, the u.s. fwomed a reactor complex biltd by the north koreans. in 2008, discussions between berma and north korea. and the iran connection bears careful watching. so the north is clearly heading towards a nuclear weapons capability. our evidents have hardly slowed or deterred them from that path. what do we do? the president's statement from the security council had the right tone, some of the right content, was necessary but far from sufficient. it is said north korea will not negotiate under pressure.

but the historical pattern is north korea will not negotiate unless there is pressure. and the pressure is sufficient to have an effect on their behavior. the resolutions and sanctions are not being implemented. north korean companies are trading in china that are on the sanctions list. although the administration effectively mobilized japanese and korean defense cooperation after north korean attacks, we have backed off. i also think we to consider the signal it sends as we cut defense spending in the united states and move away from capability to manage two regional conflicts.

the korean people's army in north korea has for years said our ability to do two front wars will be one of their important considerations as they seek to liberate, quote, unquote, the south. we have backed on interdicting transfers to north korea. so there's no deep harm in talking to north korea. we can learn a lot. i think the national security council meetings on north korea should begin with pressure, coercion, interdiction, implementation of sanctions and then consider whether diplomatic and engagement piece fits in. i think we've had it backwards for some time. >> thank you very much. mr. schneider? >> it's a pleasure and honor -- >> if you can punch that little button and hold it close. >> story about that. my colleagues have already covered a number of main points, especially related to the security council statement and

north korean response. i think it is clear that we are in the middle of a dynamic, very similar to the one we saw in 2009 where the likelihood of additional escalation exists. we're facing a non -- a defiant sovereignty focused new regime. i want to address two top i thinks. one, the failing of the leap day agreement that have already been pointed out in the initial statements. namely the concern about the linkage of food to the negotiations with north korea, which i agreed was a mistake and should have been dealt with separately. and also the failure to state the u.s. statement very clearly that a satellite test would be considered as part of a

long-range missile and not acceptable for north korea. clearly the effort so far that we've seen has not changed north korea's behavior. how do we change north korea's behavior? i think the way to do this is really to focus on changing the environment for north kree that in a way that influences its strategic options. rather than trying to negotiate carrots and sticks directly with north korea as the vehicle by which to do that. change the environment then talk to them to determine whether we are seeing the type of change that we need to see. and of course, we've seen in the case of berma recently, a good example of a situation where the leadership has made a strategic choice to change and the u.s. has found some traction in terms

of responding. how do we change the environment? one, i think fundamental challenge that we have faced in the face of north koreaen provocations has been the failure to hold north korea accountable for its actions. and this, i think, is particularly important in the context of alliance coordination. different provocations by north korea evoke different levels of response from us and our allies. we saw the case where a conventional provocation against south korea evoked a strong response from south korea and the u.s. was focused on trying to make sure that south korea didn't respond in a way that's ka lated. like wise, it seems to me that the south korean response to the rocket launch was at least in terms of public response not that strong. so the question of how we

essentially show that there's a price for provocation. second, i think we need to minimize reliance on china, while continuing to cooperate with them in a limited way. as a way to try to pursue our approach to north korea. and then increasingly, this is a regime that is, not isolated, it's partially sbe gaited with the outside world. i think we need to look at whether or not that need for external funds that has already been addressed in various ways, for instance, illicit activities might also provide aen opportunity for us. the sanctions only approach means the front door has been

closed, but as long as china leaves the backdoor open, it's not going to work. so i think to find a way to exploit north korea's partial sbe gags with its neighbors as a way of drawing the north koreans out. if the north korean regime decided to move in the direction of reform, and it's true we don't have much evidence that they've decided to, but the fact of the matter is they don't have the technical specialists to be able to do it even if they wanted to do it. so we really need to find ways to to expose north koreans to long range educational opportunities that will socialize them to western ways of thinking as a way of inducing an internal change in north korea. >> thank you. thank you very much. thank you to all of our pa panelists for their excellent testimony. excuse me?

oh, dr. cronin, i apologize. i think we would like to hear from you. >> i appreciate that. thank you for this invitation on these timely proceedings. it is my judgment that the regime in pyongyang indeed remains armed, dangerous and prone to miscalculation. the moment we think we know the next movement of kim jong un is the moment we're surprised yet again i want to focus on strategy in the interest of time. my main argument is that the united states lacks and effective long-term strategy for achieving peace on the korean peninsula. despite a strong alliance with south korea, we are gradually losing leverage of an opaque regime in north korea, determined to require nuclear weapons that are designed to hit american soil. we rely far too much on second

hand information. a new strategy, which is very difficult to put together. i don't suggest this is easy. the new strategy i propose looks at five building blocks that we need to mix together. those areas are strengthening defenses, thingening alliances, creating crippling new targeted financial measures, but also establishing direct high-level contact with north korea's leaders if only to facilitate political fish sures and better understand pressure points and using engagement and information to dramatically expand the flow of information into and out of north korea. first, kim jong un's satellite diplomacy. we have no boost phase, intercept capacity. this combined with our mid phase and terminal phase defenses would help us and our allies make sure that we could knock this missile down the next time this happens.

sepgd, we need to further reinforce the capabilities between u.s., south korea, u.s.-japan and all three countries. comprehensive missile defenses need to be matched with greater information of command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. additional steps should be taken to give higher priority to u.s. forces into korea, a command that has inevitably suffered from the decades old priorities placed on the efforts in afghanistan and iraq. third, we need to move beyond zangs to inflict real pain on leads who flagrantly put international security at risk. the united states can clamp down on the mostly chinese banks north korea uses to fund in ruling circles. we need financial measures that go as far as those attempted nearly several years ago with

bank of delta asia, to squeeze key decision makers if they were targeted and maintained over time, this could bring about change. fourth, the united states should seek to use serious pressure and defense tactics to open up more direct high-level talks. there's a political objective, in other words, to our pressure and our force. and this is it. it's opening up those real talks that will matter. only by winning access to the true inner circle of north korea can we hope to determine potential fault lines, pressure points and opportunities. long-term engagement will make us smarter about what kind of transition may be possible for north korea, while preparing us for a hard lining should north korea implode. and fifth, the united states should dramatically expand the flow of information into north korea. north korea cannot live forever in a cocoon. china and south korea are growing so prosperous, the flow of information can get in, but coupled with engagement, we can expand that information and it

will start to change. i believe within the next decade, we could move north korea aaway from its regular cycle to something much better. thank you very much. >> i admire your optimism. thank you. thank you dr. cronin. i appreciate it. now i thank all the witnesses and my apologies for cutting you off. i wanted to ask about the third nuclear test, about the influence of china and the cooperation with north korea, with iran. as many of you said, experts are expecting that north korea will indeed conduct a third nuclear test, especially since the young general lost face with this fizzled missile launch.

do you anticipate any future weapon tested will be plutonium based? or will it kb triggered by highly enriched uranium demonstrating an alternative nuclear weapon system for pyongyang? and what should the u.s. response be to such a test. and then following that china's influence. as we read in press reports, china provided that mobile long-range missile launcher, km north korea put on display, this would obviously be in violation of u.n. security council resolution 1874. and china as a permanent member of the security council is only sgated to uphold sanctions. how involved is the people's liberation army in the development, in the supply of weapons to the north korean military. and do we suspect chinese technical support for the development of north korean

missile technology? and lastly, cooperation with iran. japanese media reported that a 12-member iranian delegation missile and satellite development specialists secretly visited north korea settlement report says that this is by no means a recent occurrence or an isolated occurrence. what other activities, such as nuclear weapons, design and development have this regime collaborated on that we have not seen in public reporting as of yet? mr. fleitz? >> thank you, madam chairman. i think the issue of a third nuclear test is sort of the parlor game in washington right now, when and if there will be a test. i've talked to a number of experts around town and many of them think there will be a test. i tend to think the chances are less than 50-50 right now. i think there will be a nuclear

test eventually when north korea is technically ready and prepared to endure the enormous amount of isolation it will endure, more than it has. but it has to conduct a nuclear test because we have to assume they're developing their nuclear designs. i think eventually there will be a test of that kind. i'm sort of hoping that the statements before and after the rocket launch suggest that there may be a line they're not prepared to cross right now and they may not currently be planning to test right now. the missile test may be more threatening because the missile test could land on japan. it could land on hawaii. it threatens the west coast of the united states. it's the delivery system of the warhead. it's something they're also using to advertise their missile technology to other rogue states like iran.

i think there are other rogue nations watching this missile test. i believe there probably is has been some type of collaboration between the iranians and the north koreans in the nuclear sphere. i've always believed the alkabar reactor in the syrian desert probably had some role from iran, that maybe this was a nuclear reactor being built so iran could somehow acquire plutonium or the technology to make plutonium in an area the iaea could not detect. so i think this is a very dangerous situation, but concerning the issue of a third nuclear test. i just think it's hard to judge. >> thank you. do any others --? >> yes, dr. green. >> well, we don't know. the historical pattern suggests they will do a nuclear test. the propaganda of recent years, declaring 2012 the year they will be a full nuclear weapon state, 100th anniversary of the the birth of great leader would also suggest. when sid hecker and other experts were shown the uranium

enrichment facility, they saw what they saw was 2,000 centrifuges spinning and probably just the tip of the iceberg. it's possible perhaps probable they are close to ready to do a uranium test. it would up the anteon us considerably and raise the asking price for any future negotiations. so if i were betting i would say they would do it. but we don't know. uranium is much easier to hide. it doesn't give a signature in the atmosphere the way plutonium does. it's they denied they had anything to do with it. i think what we saw with that tell was more a matter of negligence than malicious support from north korea. it's an area we should press the north koreans rather hard. thank you. we're out of time. mr. berman is recognized. >> thank you very much, madam

chairman. while each of you emphasize different issues, the panel doesn't seem like it's a clash of approaches. you said something that caught my attention that there are sanctioned entities openly doing business in china. did i hear that right? and if i did, does that say something about a presidential statement which talks about expanding the sanction then to these not being worth a lot? is that the implication of what you're saying? >> i have seen the photos japanese photo journalists have

taken of the trading company on the sanctions list open. you know, the sign up. the chinese are not implement, the sanctions. i don't think theed a anyone strags would say they are. in the security council they're blocking any effort to add new entities or do any sort of further steps. >> i thought the presidential statement -- >> the presidential statement was interesting. china did have a clear on it. and it did reference examining new entities. that was a positive element. now we've got to follow up on it. the problem beijing has is the foreign ministry which controls that decision rarely can implement within china. it's not all -- a lot of it is dysfunctionalties of this huge complex chinese system. i think we could be doing much in the u.n. security council deliberations, in our discussions with the chinese to get beijing to do more. >> all right. well, let's go to china then.

is that little glimmer in the presidential statement any real shine that china is reconsidering its stability first policy towards north korea? in other words, is it a fool's err rabd to try to secure stronger cooperation from beijing on trying to change pyongyang's behavior given the chinese security calculus just seems to be so different than ours? oar some of the other countries in the region snp any of you. >> i would note, mr. berman, that this was a presidential statement. and it's not binding. and this is what we resort to when we can't get china and russia to agree to binding language. this was a fall back position. >> all right, but -- i get you. and i mean, it's not binding. to the bigger question, is there

any reason to have any hope that china is going to change its calcul calculus, that a diplomatic push on china, who's so important to doing some of the things you suggest need to be done in terms of -- or stopping what north korea gets in order to fund and implement its program. is there anything out there that would indicate there's anything about chinese behavior that might change based on this most recent activity? >> the chinese have already met w kim jong un. i assume he urged them not to conduct this test and he ignored them. they're probably already working at that. but i don't think china is going to allow any sanctions from this missile to go forward. i think they're simply going to put it behind them.

>> anyone else have any thoughts? >> let me just add that the panel of experts implementing the supreme court council resolution has an expert on it. essentially his job is to keep the committee from adopting anything that would be critical towards china. and so there are real limits to the instrument that the presidential statement has identified as the yankee by which its's going to strengthen sanctions. i think it's very clear that, you know, they are focused oon stability and the reason why the presidential statement went as far as it did. simply because president hu heard such strong pushback when he was in seoul. >> the chinese are going to keep their china-first policy. they'll do what they can to lower actions by us or north korea that get in the way of a

process of talking. i think appealing to china's self-sfwres, they know their self-interest, they made their calculations. part of our strategy has to do with changing the atmosphere. that's why the trilateral u.s.-korean piece is so important. beijing needs to see if they're not able to use leverage more effectively on north korea, there's another path we have no choice to take, which involves us taking our defense and strengths our revolutions to china. if we're not changing their calculations, we're not going to get much of a change. >> thank you very much. mr. royce is recognized. >> i'm going to pass for the moment, madam chair. >> mr. burton?

>> i'm sorry i was a little late. that failed rocket launch cost $850 million they estimate. and i have it before me a report that says that would have bought 2.5 million tops of corn, 1.4 million tons of rice, or enough for the north korean government to feed millions of its people. why did they launch that when they knew that was a direct violation of the leap day agreement? it's like they said they were going to have a hiatus on, let's see, they want to halt nuclear tests, missile tests and allow the international atomic missile energy, iaea inspectors back into the country. they did that and turned right around and launched the missile. how do you deal with that? i mean, you know, you folks

indicate that we ought to continue to try to negotiate with them. every time we negotiate with them, they turn around and stick us right in the ear. the second thing i would like to ask is we have both congressional and presidential elections in the u.s. and south korea is going to be this year. north korea is developing into a strong and prosperous nation. this was supposed to be the year they were going to do that. whatever that means. it appears these three elements could form a perfect storm. do you expect them to sabre rattle and provoke further. and then is i know i'm preaching to the choir when i say that south korea is one of our closest allies. and we passed a free trade agreement this year and i'm glad the president signed that. given the ever present dangers posed by north korea and the

regime, which can congress, what can we do here in washington to create a more stable environment over there? and i'm not talking about signing another agreement like the state department did, saying that they were going to do certain things and they turn right around and violate it. mr. flietz? >> thank you, sir. i think the rocket launch was consistent with them making agreements, then provocations then concession and more agreements. >> why do we keep caving in like that? i don't understand that. i understand we want to be humanitarian and help the people up there, but when the food goes there, we don't know if it's going to be get out to the people really starving out there. we're giving food through the government, not through pbas. they take that money and they

launch another missile, $850 million. >> it seems our government, we've reached out and i don't see where we've gained a thing. >> it was a mistake to link the nuclear issues to the food deal. >> wait a minute, why? >> i don't think the north korean people should suffer from the country's pro-liliferatiopr. >> wait a minute. does the government distribute the to do? why even give the food to them if they use it for their purposes. >> they shouldn't get food unless there's verification provisions to make sure it gets to the people. >> they're not going to agree to that, are they? >> then there shouldn't be a deal. >> that's my point. >> that's one provision. and second of all, we have to honor our friends, the japanese.

the a provision soft six-party talks is the japanese, people kidnapped by the north korean government and being -- and maybe hundreds of them. this is supposed to be part of the six-party talks. >> it's terrible those people are held. to negotiate based upon fear and that they might do this or that is a sign of weakness. it is a sign of weakness that our government, we continue to negotiate and countries who say they'll do one thing and do another. we're giving them billions of food aid and other things. we negotiated with that reactor over there, what was it? the what? the light water reactor and they violated that. >> we offered them two light

water reactors. >> i don't understand the mentality. >> mr. connelly is recognized. >> thank you. picking up the last point, perhaps making a devils advocate argument about it, though. the idea of why would we negotiate with or be engaged with a criminal regime, some might observe that in the very early weeks of the new then push administration, president bush overruled his own incoming secretary of state powell who said we're going to continue the policies of the clinton administration and he said no, it's not. would that be a fair statement?