>> yeah, i think that is are an accurate characterization of what happened. >> while one can understand the concerns of my colleague, let's have a policy of hostility has consequences, given frankly the ability of north korea to pursue its nuclear program, would that be a fair statement? >> i think there needs to be some kind of communication with north korea in order to be ainge to manage and handle miscalculation. >> mr. green, you wanted to -- dr. green. >> if you'll indulge me. i was in the white house at that time. i think a more accurate description is kim da jung came and marnled before president bush and said you should

continue what president clinton was thinking and go to north korea. the white house said we need to review our policy which we did and in june 2001 put out a statement saying we will continue the agreed frame work and engage with north korea. so it was -- i don't think a rejection of engagement. it was a request for a time to get the administration strategy in place. because there had been so many problems in the past over several administrations with north korea. >> fair point. i do, however, remember with some surprise secretary powell having his wings clipped a little bit because he came out maybe before that assessment, which sent a signal that had some consequences, i don't know. i kind of think we're between a rock and a hard place. i'm not con vensed about the efficacy sometimes of that engagement. i share mr. burton's concern. let me ask you, dr. green, are

you -- the issue for me here and mr. burton and others is for efficacy. right after we provided food aid, they announced their intention to test a new rocket or the existing rocket. how do we handle this issue of efficacy. we don't want millions of people to starve, but on the other hand, that kind of engagement in terms of the provision of assistance seems to have very limited payoff if your hope is to moderate behavior. your comment? >> sir, i don't think we should tie the regime's wmd programs to food, but as i said earlier, if food aid is provided to north korea, there has to be stranges atched. verification they won't be sold oar given to the military. if we can't agree to those, we shouldn't make that agreement.

>> why do we go into this cycle? and we do. and the difference with north korea is they are consistent and we're not. every administration gets in a mode of sanctions and pressure and it's very hard for us or japan or south korea to continue that. we have iran, we have domestic policies. we are in that mode, futing pressure on the north. we stood with south korea who was attacked. we were hitting and putting pressure on south korea to back off their demands on the north. even though they lost the food aid which was small and kim jong un was not invested in it, they got points on the scoreboard by marginalizing our ally. i don't think that was the administration's intention, but that's what happened. >> if i had more time, i only have 13 seconds, i would ask you, this panel, to comment a

little bit on the consolidation by the new leader in north korea, how real he is as a real leader or basically a tool of the military. >> and that question hangs. mr. royce is ready now. >> thank you, madam chair. since good aid is being discussed. isle mention that tom lantos, human rights committee hearing on this subject, where we heard testimony of sacks being delivered in a village, villagers being told don't touch those and the trucks coming back and picking up the sacks. and one of the questions here is what do they do with that? well, then a french ngo in another hearing explained how she had tracked this and the food was being sold on the nood exchange in the capital of the country in order to get hard currency for the regime. this is perhaps the greatest

problem. as we look at these interviews, debriefings done with defectors. they say food does not go into the no-go areas anyway. food does not get out there. i had -- for the record, i had an amendment, the royce amendment here last year prohibited food aid from going to north korea under these circumstances. that was watered down in the senate, by the way. but i share the gentleman from indiana's concerns about control of that food. and it indirectly propping up the regime by either going to the military or being sold for hard currency. a couple of ponts i wanted to just make here and ask your questions about was the -- to go back to mr. berman's point about elevating the discussion of human rights in this whole dialogue, do you think it would

be helpful if that became sort of a strategic comparative. nowhere on the planet are people as ground down from what i saw. and if you read the reports out of the, let's call them work camps or concentration camps in terms of people being worked to death there, really i think would be ben if ishl if there was greater understanding on that front. and second, we now have broadcasting into north korea. how about a little bit more robust radio free asia broadc t broadcasting on what's actually going on in the country. for example, the last question i'll ask you here to comment on is this admission on the part of the north korean regime that the launch was a bust. now, that's the first time to my knowledge that you had an official mention of that. how about broadcasting out the cost of the launch, you know? three-quarters of a billion or more. the cost of that launch. and then, the privations that

people face, the conditions in north korea, and make the connections for people, because increasingly as people are leaving the country, close to 40% now say they're listening to the broadcast. they're getting access to these cheap radios that are -- you know, come over the border from china. they're listening to the broadcasts. how about -- let me ask you your thoughts on those subjects. >> thank you very much. when i was a third-ranking official in the bush administration i worked every day on north korean food aid problem. we were trying to negotiate strict criteria for delivery. that is the key test. it sho should be based on the humanitarian criteria and making sure our assistance gets to the people in need not as a lever over a nuclear weapons program that north korea doesn't want to negotiate away. this is not really the lever for

negotiations over nuclear weapons. it should be based on humanitarian criteria. if we can't get it to the people in need, you're right, we shouldn't deliver it. >> let geese back to better deploying. >> information is very important, sir. that's why i'm suggesting an information campaign like we have not seen before. but that has to be partly based on engagement. because if you consider the $50,000 north korean workers working in south korea's economic zone, that's been an intelligence mind field for us. we can't go into this in open session, but i can tell you in general that those people have had an eye-opening effect by seeing south korean prosperity. they also get it across the chinese border. we can both document human rights abuses in north korea and highlight -- >> i understand all of this. but to the extent that we' got hard currency going into the regime. this is a regime that built a reactor for syria. they built a nuclear weapons program for syria and did it

while we were under supposedly an agreement where they weren't going to proliferate. they were proliferating beyond anything we could have imagined while doing a two-track nuclear program, and they're selling it. whop knows where. so at some point, we've got to figure out how to cut off the hard currency and accelerate the change indeed. and giving them more access to it is i'm not sure the answer. >> chinese banks is the way to go after the people in charge. >> good point. >> thank you. mr. rohrabach re is recognized. >> thank you. i remember debates whether we should have a missile defense system. thank god those of us who supported missile defense won

that debate. we would, for every loony regime that tries to get its hands on nuclear weapons and tries to launch a rocket reinforces the importance of having a missile defense system because that's perhaps one of the only things that gives us leverage here is that we can defend ourselves. also, i have been privy as a member of this committee to the debates over the years on food aid to north korea. when did the united states assume the responsibility for the nutrition of the north kore korean people? this is a loony policy on our side. shall we just say any dictatorship around the world that decides that they want to spend their money on weapons

production, they're going to automatically qualify for nutritional aid for their people from the united states and we're going to have expressions of so concern that the food aid that we're giving them goes directly to their people. what dictatorships are we leaving out of that equation. does every dictator in the world who wants to spend more money on weapons just do it? and then we give them money on food aid? or just north korea. this is an insane policy. i remember debating this 20 years ago and it's happened now and it hasn't done any good. giving them all of this money has provided them the resources they need to spend $850 million on a rocket launch. this is something that we -- i think we need to, again, have reality checks when we go into debates on such policies as these.

i would like to ask about the chinese here. do any of you have evidence that that rocket that was going up had important chinese components on that rocket? and in their nuclear system that they've been building, their weapons system, are there not chinese components to that are vital to the success of those projects? whoever knows anything about it. >> several of us have had clearances over the years and there's only so much we know and so much we can say. but we do know, and i think it's a matter of public record the north koreans have put together their missile program, uranium enrichment program, their rereprocessing by purchasing chemical precursors, highly refined uranium, dual-use materials all over the world. a lot of it --

>> how about the hardware. >> a lot of it comes through china. >> y e. >> so that is why beijing, following the let earter of the sanctions resolution is hardly enough. >> is it possible when we see this impoverished regime in north korea that can't even feed its own people, the regime that gets its power on the basis the number of people marching down the street doing the goose step. that this is the regime that actually is responsible for building these nuclear reactors and this technology. are we not dealing with the beijing as a -- is beijing not using north korea as a proxy? please stay calm. forget what i'm doing. stay calm and go and blame the other guy over there.

>> i tend to think that china is not behind north korea's nuclear program. i think china likes having north korea as a buffer between it and south korea, but from what i've seen in my career, china has nefrt been terribly happy about north korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. but i -- >> okay, i. >> eeve got 15 seconds left of my time. i'm just going to suggest that china is the big player here, and just like we don't want to face reality that we shouldn't be giving food aid to a dictatorship like this or that we need a missile defense system, we just don't want to face reality that the down side of china. and for whatever reason, this has been going on for 20 years to america's detriment. >> thank you very much. mr. smith is recognize. sor sorry, dr. poe, judge poe, the

vice chair of the skub commubco and investigation. just the way it is. >> it seems to me that kim jongun is just like his daddy. he follows in the footsteps of his daddy. tries to make a name for himself. that's a shock. it seems to me here we are over here, the united states. it seems to me that just doesn't work for north korea.

we are pushing a decision to really do something to push it off to the next administration. i know we've heard from the other side about well, this is bush's fault, it's clinton's fault. it doesn't make any difference. right now, we're in a situation where north korea is going to be a threat. a my first question is what is the policy of the united states overall in dealing with the nuclear capability of north korea. are we going to make promises, help get food for the people? what is the policy of north korea dr. fleitz? >> part of the problem is we're recognizing their right to nuclear technology. and i was at the state department, i remember when president bush reaffirms iran's right to nuclear technology.

and many of us argued that if you pursue nuclear weapons secretly, or nuclear technology in violation of the iaea, you aren't entitled to nuclear technolo technology. >> what do you recommend? >> i think states that cheat have no right to peaceful nuclear technician, period. we have to make it clear that north korea is not entitled because it will use it to make nuclear weapons. they were proliferation resistant but they could still be used to make nuclear weapons fuel. i think that's something we

should work on. iran is another story and i agree completely on that front. i think there's an assumption if we can cut a deal and pay them off, we can manage it. the north koreans are not going to sit still. nay they're continuing to raise the asking price. so we need a stad ji that focuses increasingly on roll back. missile defense, alliance cooperation, interdiction of sanctions. i think you do need some channel for communication for a variety of reasons. we made the negotiations the center stage and all the other

pieces the sort of second subsidiary considerations. >> the north koreans don't take us seriously. would you agree with that or not? >> they take us very seriously in one sense. the strategy was to develop a strategy with the u.s. to marginalize the south. a. >> i'm talking about with sanctions. >> i suspect the north koreans have gotten used to the patterns where we have a very hard time in democratic societies maintaining pressure on them. >> credibility? maybe we have lost it. >> we will back off and move on to other things. even the approach in the security council is to save our diplomatic m.o. for syria. >> what are north korean's intentions? what do you speculate?

somebody needs to answer before my time is up. >> long term is that this corrupt regime wants to stay in power. that's the purpose of this corrupt group of people. that's they are interested in. >> you think we should have removed them from the foreign terrorists list? >> no. absolutely not. >> all right. i yield back. >> thank you. thank you very much. you got a lot in in those 11 seconds, judge poe. and chris smith is recognized. he's the chairman of the subcommittee on africa global health and human rights. >> thank you madam chair. thank you for calling this important and timely hearing. at a hirg chaired in my subcommittee last september on human rights in north korea, the witnesses made the following two important points. many, but these were the two i'd like to bring up. any attempts to address the nuclear weapons issue while sidelining or ignoring or deprioritizing the human rights issue was doomed to fail. and second, it is imperative to provide the north korean people with current accurate information so that they understand that there are alternatives to the repression under which they are suffering.

i also chaired a hearing on china's fourth repatriation of north korean jeffs with the china commission on march 5th in which pointed out china's violation of its solemn obligations under the refugee convention. and some of our witnesses there also made those points that were made in september. some of our witnesses today, madam chair have agreed, at least in their written testimony. i'm sorry i missed your oral presentations, with many of the points raised at those hearings. dr. green you indicate we need a human rights policy that is unflinching in our condemnation of abuses in north korea. and our efforts to muster into national support to prevent action such as those by china to return refugees to north korea against their will. humanitarian and human rights policies toward north korea deserve prioritization in their own merits and some not be linked to the up and down tactics of negotiations. mr. snyder, you indicate that providing information to north koreans may be one of the most, quote, effective options for

influencing north korea's internal choices. and dr. cronyn, you recommended the u.s. and south korea expand our efforts to, quote, traumatically expand the flow of information into north korea. voa creating -- services broadcast five hours a day, seven days a week and seem to be having a positive impact in the country. one doctor who does humanitarian work in north korea wrote to a voa korean service that according to my friend who was still in pyongyang, you are not only the voice of america but also the voice of victims of the north korean dictatorship. rfa programming includes commentaries by north korean defectors to help north koreans understand the broader world and how north korea appears from the outside. could any or all of you comment on the role that you think human rights has played in this administration's policies

towards north korea and what it should play. and further elaborate on the means of communication and the kind of information to all sectors of north korean society that you think we should be promoting. >> well, the administration's appointment of robert king as the ambassador for human rights is a good move. he comes from this committee, as i understand it. a good man doing a good job. i think we should be moving up to a higher level, though. in particular, i think we need a more robust multilateral strategy on human rights. for us in the bush administration it was hard. we had a progressive left government in seoul that didn't want to play on this. and then we had in europe and france and germany, countries that preferred to point the human rights finger at the u.s. we have a very different lineup in seoul and in europe and in japan. i think we could, with more effort, create a more of a multilateral front pressing china on the forced repatriation of refugees and we know that north korea is not going to fundamentally change its policy in the short term.

but i think there's evidence they are sensitive, particularly when there's a broad multilateral indictment of their regime. that's where i would encourage ambassador king and his colleagues to bring it up to the next level. >> thank you. >> i think human rights have been basically been lacking from our talks with north korea and that's a big problem. we've focused on a handful of issues trying to strike agreements on nuclear issues that were fairly weak and we've put other issues such as human rights and the abductee of japanese citizens to the side because they were a distraction. i think that's been a mistake. we have to hold for our principles and fight for everything we believe in, not just the issues that they are interested in talking about. we have to talk about what we need to talk about. >> thank you. >> and the million cell phones in north korea today, even though north koreans can only all other north koreans. it means information can flow from one part of north korea where you cannot move around easily, to another part. the more information we can pour

into north korea, it can seep in. china is richer than it used to be so it's the example that north korea really is fall beg hind because it's trying to prop up a military that's gobbling up more than a quarter of its weak gdp. $27 billion gross domestic product. more than $5 billion is now coming in from china. china is the number one patron. we've got to expose this and get information flowing in. we do need our south korean ally. there's an election coming up this december in south korea. >> i want to flag the fact the north korean human rights act has been a major contribution from the u.s. congress. the strong support for funding for information flows, you know, targeted at north korea. we still need to work very hard on highlighting china's really terrible policy of repatriation of north korean refugees. i know you've been doing a lot of work to try to highlight that. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much. and although we would normally

conclude at this time, mr. connolly has an issue so press, so urgent that i told him that he could have a few minutes to ask it and bring it up so as not to cause extreme stress, acid reflux, coronary disease and any other medical complications that could ensue. so mr. connolly is recognized. >> why do i have the feeling this is going to cost me a lot of chocolate? i wanted to give the panel the opportunity to answer that question i put out there earlier. it seems to me an odd thing that we would have a hearing on north korea and not talk about the change in leadership. and i think we would benefit from each of your observations all remembering we have to be succinct. who is this new leader, and what is our understanding of consolidation of power and who really holds the power in the north and what it might mean moving forward for the

discussions we've had this morning? mr. snyder. >> well, so far, i think what we've seen on the surface is continuity. but as could be seen from the video, there's something odd, hard to accept in the west about a 30-year-old kid running a country surrounded by 60-year-old generals. so we don't know what is happening under the surface. and we're watching it through a tv screen. the chinese actually have better direct access. what we really need is to see how the leader is interacting with those around him directly in order to make a clear determination. >> so far he's following a clear game plan. they are making him up to look like his grandfather, the great leader. he's appearing more in public for on the spot guidance than people expected. normally there's a 100-day mourning period after the death of the father. but basically he's following a game plan. i think that the missile and

nuclear program is largely in place in terms of that plan. and that kim jong-il called audibles. he made judgment calls about how to respond to western pressure and so forth. the interesting and troubling thing about this young successor is, how will he handle the audibles? when things start getting rough after a future nuclear test, after future provocations, how will he handle in the margins? and that's where the unpredictable factor comes in and where we may see tensions emerging between him and the military or other leadership figures. >> i think kim jong-un is probably secure because kim jong-il's ill health -- kim jong-il's ill health was known for some time. i think they did have a transition in place before he died. whether kim jong-un is really running the country or whether kim jong-il's powerful brother-in-law and his wife are part of a triumverant, we don't

know. we are watching this like we used to watch the soviet generals on may day to see who is behind whom and what's really going on in the country. but i just tend to think that this is not a -- the military is not going to challenge him. that the generals who might have long ago were purged and they are all part of a regime that wants to stay in power. >> the fact kim jong-un went ahead with the leap day deal which had been negotiated last october in an outline in geneva, suggests he didn't need continuity or couldn't overcome the military first structure he was inheriting. we don't know is the key point. the thing they don't put on the television is the point that the u.s. government, the south korean government do not really know, because we don't have direct access to the dynamics of the leadership and how they make decisions. we need to get much closer to this problem to have a better understanding,