so some of those struggles have been very, very tough and very difficult. what we go through today, we got a lot of people talking as though this is the worst of all times. but it's not. we've got a media operation now that tends to dramatize events. partly because that improves ratings. i'm not saying that negatively. that's just the way the technical process works, but if you look at our history as a nation, as a people, we've come through some very difficult times. we've survived. we've prospered. we've gotten a lot more right than wrong. i think back on those times, i feel pretty good about things. we'll get through this, too. this is difficult. won't deny it. we're not making much progress. obviously, i'm a republican. i don't agree with the

administration. but we're about to have an election. and it will be a good, tough, hard-fought election. that's as it should be. we all get a chance to participate. and that's pretty rare. that doesn't happen very many places in the world. >> our last student question from cory ragland, ball state. >> yes, our great moderator has addressed the question i initially had. as interns, we're not always going to agree with the stances our supervisors have. you have been more outspoken in supportive of gay rights but were more silent in washington. was it a difficult decision for you to be more silent while you had a podium in washington? what advice would you give to us for inevitable conflict we will face in our careers? >> i didn't feel like i was silent about it. one of my daughters is gay. we've lived with that as a

family. we crossed that bridge a long time ago. i remember in my first vice presidential debate in 2000 against joe lieberman i made a strong statement about how freedom means freedom for everybody. and that people ought to be able to make a choice of their own and so it's not been from my standpoint something i spend a lot of time worrying about. i think there has been a significant i guess process of enlightenment over the course of the last several years. things have changed a lot since i first came to washington. i think it's important obviously if you feel strongly about an issue that you jump in with both feet if you want and get actively and aggressively involved in it. that's a different proposition

than if you want to be public about it while you're working for somebody else. i mean, you've got to reach some kind of accommodation or understanding on their part. one of the things you learn as a staff person, you get to express your point of view to your boss, whoever that may be, occasionally. you may fundamentally differ. if the differences are big enough, you've got to leave. he's the boss. and you can go find some place else to work. on the issue of gay rights, when i worked for president bush, he strongly, felt strongly about it and supported the effort to amend the constitution to define marriage. i didn't agree with that. and he and i talked about it on more than one occasion. he expressed his views. i expressed mine. it depends in part upon that relationship.

you know, there are various ways to participate in the process. if you're going to be a staff member for a president, he's the boss, he got elected, you didn't. you've got to remember that in terms of how you participate and whether or not you support his policies. and as i say, if the differences are big enough, you probably ought to move on and find another line of work, but you may also want to participate in the process as an advocate. you may want to spend full time worried about your particular issue. whether it's gay rights or environmental issues or the tea party organization. i mean, there are a great many ways to be a part of the process. you don't have to run for office. you don't have to only serve as senior staff person of the president of the united states. some of you will probably have that chance eventually. but there's also the basic fundamental fact that when you're working for an elected official, he's the one, or she,

who put their name on the ballot and went out, worked hard, voter by voter and got themselves elected. and your first obligation is to them unless it's an issue you feel so strongly about that you can't accept that and then you need to find somebody else to work for. >> corey, thanks. let me conclude on one final point. you have locked at this from a number of different vantage points and now mitt romney is going through the process of selecting a running mate. what advice would you give him and his team as they go through this process? >> i've been involved in a couple vice presidential searches. some more successful than others. the thing that i think it's important to remember is that the decision you make as a presidential candidate on who your running mate's going to be is the first presidential level decision that the public sees you make. it's the first time you're making a decision that you're

going to have to live with. it gives the public a chance to watch you operate and see what you think is important. what kind of individual you choose to serve as your running mate. what are the criteria? i think the single most important criteria has to be the capacity to be president. that's why you pick them. lots of times in the past that has not been the foremost criteria. it really varies administration to administration. as you watch the talking heads out there now, they're talking about, well, gee, you better get a woman or you better get a his panic or pick somebody from a big state. those are all interesting things to speculate about. but it's pretty rare that an election ever turns on those kinds of issues. it's much more likely to turn on the kind of situation where they'll judge the quality of your decision-making process wasted on whether or not this

individual is up to the task of taking over and serving as president of the united states should something happen to the president, and that's why you're there. that aside from serving as president in the senate, that's your only constitutional responsibility. >> do you have another book in you? >> not yet. i'm thinking about it. this was the -- we could have written five or six of these. but we tried to keep it at reasonable lengths. we brought it in about 6 up pages which is what the publisher want. it's a good book. i recommend you read it. >> mr. vice president, on behalf of the washington center, thank you very much for being with us. we appreciate your time. >> thank you. [ applause ] >> enjoy your time here in washington. it really is a remarkable opportunity.

i know you'll have a great time and learn a lot and just jump in with both feet, and some of you might even find honest work as a result of it so good luck. >> stay seated for a moment, and we'll walk the vice president out.

next, major general john toolan discusses afghanistan security and reconstruction on a visit to washington, d.c. after that interior secretary ken salazar on energy policies and gas prices. >> where's the national public radio table? you guys are still here? that's good. i couldn't remember where we landed on that. >> this weekend on c-span, the 98th annual white house correspondents dinner. president obama and late-night talk show host jimmy kimmel headline the event before an audience of celebrities, journalists and the white house press corps. coverage starts with the red carpet arrivals live at 6:30,

and watch the entire dinner only on c-span. you can also sync up your experience online at c-span's dinner hub. find the celebrity guest list, highlights of past dinners, plus blogs and social media posts at c-sp c-span.org/whcd, the white house correspondents dinner live saturday at 6:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> major general john toolan, who oversees operations in southwest afghanistan, says he's had no cooperation from the pakistani army in securing its border with afghanistan. he spoke monday at the atlantic council in washington, d.c. while he's in the u.s. for ten days. an agreement signed sunday states the u.s. will continue to provide support to the afghan military for at least ten years after the country takes formal control of its security. we pick up this event with the q&a portion of general toolan's remarks.

>> i'll ask one question and then look to the audience to continue the discussion. you gave us a good sense of sort of the threat specifically, but can you talk sort of more broadly about the taliban, where are they now in your estimation, what's the chances of them popping back up. i know that depends on the trajectory of the afghan security forces, but can you give us a sense of where they are sort of politically and militarily in your view >> i think the taliban, there's always going to be i believe a hard core element that is going to want to install sharia law. you know, i've seen some of those folks, and i've actually had the opportunity to speak to some of them, and it's just a hard core radical belief that this is the way they need to operate. what produced that, i'm not exactly sure, but i think they

will continue to exist. currently they are operating on the other side of the border. they're operating in pakistan. they're operating in quetta. quetta's been a safe haven for the senior leadership of the taliban as long as i've been there. we have tried in numerous ways to engage the pakistani army on the border. to work with them, my case, 12th corps, pakistan. at least to put some pressure, not make it so easy for them to move cross border. but it's gone on. so that's where the taliban senior leadership are operating. the reintegration, reconciliation program that general allen has been encouraging the commanders to really use that program is focused on the mid-level and lower level taliban. really, the mid-level's been our objective. those are the ones, i just mentioned earlier, if you look at the mid-level taliban,

they're residents of helmand province in kandahar. they come from those districts. in many cases they turned taliban because the leadership in the local level at the time was abusive, totalitarian, authoritarian government. what we're seeing now is they're wanting to come back into the fold, and it's all a result of making some progress. so there will be a taliban will exist. they'll always be -- i don't understand it, but there will always be people willing to kill themselves, to put a suicide vest on or to drive a suicide vehicle, and they abuse that. the senior taliban abuse that. but i think they'll always be people willing to conduct that

kind of business so we always need to make sure to maintain our guard, so i'll end it there, but, i mean -- i'll end it there. >> thanks. any questions from the audience? yes, in the second row here. >> hi, my name is -- [ inaudible ] hi, general, my name is gretchen peters. [ inaudible ] if you could describe the nature of the enemy there. because when i communicate with next out in helmand these days, a lot of areas -- the groups that they are fighting seem to be as much local criminal organizations, drug trafficking networks and another category that i sort of loosely describe as young men being stupid, but whether they're actually formally connected to the taliban other than paying tax money to them or protection money is a lot harder for me

anyway to figure out. >> that's a very good question. i will say that the nature of the enemy in helmand province varies depending on where you are. if you're in the south, basically explained, used the analogy that the taliban are completely on their back. they're not operating in the southern part, places like that, et cetera. in central helmand, which really is the responsibility of task force helmand which is the uk forces, we use the analogy that they're on their knees. they're still getting support funding and i can talk in more detail, but they're still getting funding through some of the criminal patronage networks that are fueling the activity in places like central helmand. places like nari surage which today is the most kinetic district in afghanistan. it's changed dramatically over the past year due to some of the things we did this year.

but so there is still some taliban insurgent activity there. then in upper helmand valley, places like haji ki. places like that. the taliban are on their heels. because we recently -- it was really the last piece of real estate we cleared was haji ki dam. so they're on their heels. but behind them is a transit area for drugs, for poppy growth, that's owned by our friend that i just mentioned earlier and his boys. they still own that territory. at this stage, we are no longer in the business of clearing real estate. it is now the afghans providing the security.

so from south to north, it gets increase -- it's increased taliban involvement. taliban funding. et cetera. but you're absolutely right. there is -- there are a lot of local nationals who get themselves into trouble, who get an opportunity to make a few bucks by planting an ied. they're really not taliban. they're just people that quite honestly if we'd afforded them another opportunity for employment, they wouldn't be taking the job. because if you look to the elders and the responsible people in helmand provence, they're not supporting that. again, goes back to this -- i think we're the home team at this. we've got the support of the local nationals, and it's building. >> yes, eric schmidt, in the middle. >> hi, general. eric schmidt with "the new york times." you said you've tried to engage 12th corps and pakistani army on the other side. what success, if any, have you had, getting them to help

interdict fighters, ied materials, other things like that? thank you. >> unfortunately, from my perspective as a tactical commander in regional command southwest, i have had no support from 12th corps. i've -- we have tried to conduct operation -- conduct discussions and conferences, and there always seems to be something that interferes with that. it's an area that i know my boss at the time general allen and general scalberatti, my commander have been working very hard at, but it's difficult. because 12th corps -- as you know, helmand province has pakistan and iran as its borders. helmand and nimruz. on the pakistani border is a place called barum-cha. i know for a fact drugs are moving out through pakistan and

lethal aid is coming in on a regular basis. barum-cha is a long way away from the helmand river valley. so in order to provide forces down there to interdict, stop that, it detracts, takes away from efforts that i'd like to be working in upper helmand river valley. if i had 12th corps, if i had the pakistani army support, to at least conduct patrols along the border and limit the amount of movement across, it would really help. that's been my focus. but i haven't been able to really get that kind of support. >> thanks, general. another example of how critical pakistan is to this effort. second row. viola. >> thank you. bloomberg news. general, couple questions. one, you mentioned that it's really important to sideline the sort of actors that you were referring to in -- who is a senator now.

how do you think is the most effective way to do that? and how difficult do you think it will be for the ansf and the remaining coalition forces in helmand to maintain the sort of progress that you've been describing after september when there will be a significant number of marines that will have been withdrawn at that point? >> i guess two parts to that question. i will say that the first and the first question, akanazan is an individual who has a large financial investment in helmand province. a lot of it comes through the drug trade. he's got his hands all over it. and the only real way of changing his impact -- there's two ways.

one is we have to do a better job of working the government of afghanistan's narcotics interdiction unit which is working very closely with the dea. dea is really doing a great job in teaching the narcotics interdiction unit and the narcotics lead in the government of afghanistan in things which are challenging for the afghans, but they're getting better at it, things like collecting evidence and doing criminal investigations. because it's got to move from paramilitary operations to legitimate criminal investigations. and using the rule of law to hold these people accountable. we're making progress but it's nascent. it's really only in the past year that the narcotics interdiction units and the government in afghanistan has been effective in collecting

evidence and making a difference, but that has curtailed his activities and his cronies. it has curtailed that activity. so that's a good thing that i think is going to pay dividends later on. the other thing i think is vitally important is that the central government has to, particularly people like sma, sharaa mohammad assad, has influence over the government officials who are now in the process inappropriately of appointing leaders in the various districts and provinces. they say, i'm going to pull this governor out, in kaji ki for example, because he's not doing what i'm asking him to do. all a sudden, somebody comes in and it becomes a district governor, and you find out his last name is akanazada. it's because they've influenced

the decision process. the constitution that was drafted for afghanistan is if you read it is similar to what the united states looks at. passing control to the states, less powerful central government. what we're seeing right now in afghanistan is that that constitution has not been fully enacted. that the district and local levels where there are elections are sheg some progress, particularly in helmand because we're had some success there. the central government still doesn't trust the local leadership. they want to appoint their own people. i have had three regional chiefs of police in helmand province. you build a relationship with one. he's pulled out because he's not doing what he's being told to do.

somebody else comes in there. what we really need to do is stop central government's meddling in the local politics. the only way you're going to make a difference in afghanistan is to allow the local districts and provinces to control their own fate. but there isn't that degree of faith yet in the central government. they don't feel comfortable in doing that yet. it's going to come. but that's how i think you limit the impact of the senior level influence on -- negative influencers on afghanistan, in helmand province, for example. the second part of your question the second part of your question is a lot more important and certainly something that at the provincial level impact. that is how do we support the afghan national security forces

in maintaining stability and maintaining control in the province. first of all, you would be amazed at the wonderful strong relationships that, you know, everybody from pfc up to colonel have built with the afghan security forces. when i left, i mean, you would have -- i would have thought i was leaving my family. it just was -- it was a pretty moving experience. and so after a year of sharing hardships, explosions, casualties, positive elections. i mean, all the good things. we have built a pretty strong bond. and that needs to continue. now, obviously, there's threats to that. and as you know, we have had to deal with some of the insider threats that exist in

afghanistan. and if you would leave it to the media that maybe plays up this insider threat greater than it really is because i can for every one insider threat issue i can tell you there's a hundred event that have created a strong bond, but that's the key. is keeping that bond with the afghan national security forces. and that trust and that faith. and they'll stand up for their own. >> thanks, general, for that answer. yes, in the back. >> thank you so much. my name's christina wong from "the washington times." general, u.s. troops are expected to consolidate in the south and focus more on the east. as far as you know, what will consolidation look like? can you talk a little bit more about how you transition from a combat mission to an advisory mission will look like.

and what do you expect for the spring fighting season? and how do you expect that we will be able to hold gains that we've made in the south? thanks. >> very good questions. i spent -- i worked hard over this past year to convince my leaders that the insurgency in the south is the greatest threat to the government of afghanistan. and if it should strengthen, that will provide a greater threat or the greatest threat to the afghan government. i say that because currently the south is the main effort. the preponderance of resources, et cetera, is in the south, and we need to maintain the pressure that i'm just speaking of in the south. we can't let it up.

but as we're drawing down our forces, we are also drawing up on afghan national security forces capabilities, capacity, getting the numbers up, and most importantly their will. those three elements of the afghan security forces are on a rise. somewhere in the middle is a sweet spot. i think we're there. but what we don't want to do is change that main effort till after this season. now, i don't like using the term fighting season because i think, and it my commanders, you know, hey, don't say fighting seasons, the cg doesn't like it, but certainly there's a little psychosis there that we use this term fighting season as if we're giving up the initiative to the insurgency because we haven't,

so we look at it more as sort of a poppy cycle. i think that the recent incident in kabul where we've had some attacks, very weak. the afghan national security forces, we had to stand up to that pretty easily. last season, may 17th was a big published date. they were going to come out and it was really going to be big. it was a wimper, so, i mean, i really do believe that the insurgents cannot introduce any type of complex attack. the most complexity you're going to see is up in kabul. it's not going to happen down in helmand province just because they just don't have that capability. they don't have the leadership. they don't have the capability to orchestrate that kind of an attack, and they don'