process. everything i do is subject to review. not by the trustee. but the bankruptcy court. so i want to conduct the chapter 11 debtor estates with full transparency and cooperation. we need on a regular basis. there will times when our interests diverge and long running bankruptcy will occur. but we have some clear and immediate common goals, which is to get as many assets back to the states as possible and ultimately courts in england, perhaps the bankruptcy court in new york will ultimately make decisions about how those assets

are distributed. but returning them is a very common, critical need. from the perspective of the trustee, i very much endorse the six important considerations that he sets forth. particularly on the international cooperation. we have a lot of assets in the uk. they have a separate administrator and court system. we don't have the subsidiary to the claims. but it's a very difficult task to get back and retrieve assets overseas. some restrictions about how segregation should be mandated key from the point of view chapter 11 trustee.

i would emphasize that. thank you very much. >> please proceed. >> good morning, everyone. thank you for inviting me to discuss the collapse of mf global, lessons learned and policy implications. this authorizes me to have soul respect to the pending investigation and other actions to locate customer funds or determine the reasons for the shortfall in the customer accounts. while i'm happy to be here.

chairman gensler remains in charge of directing commission staff to develop recommendations for enhancing commission and designated self-regulatory organization programs that are related to the protection of customer funds and has instructed staff to do so. my focus has been on making sure that the commission is doing everything it can to facilitate the recovery of customer funds and to bring those responsible for any violations of the commodity exchange act or commission regulations to justice. towards those ends, over the past 5 1/2 months. commission staff has conduct aid thorough analysis of the books and records of mf global. and continues to work in the bankruptcy. we are also engaging in a comprehensive, ongoing enforcement investigation. it is imperative that the commission, the industry, and the congress, identify and

assess the causes for the collapse and shortfall in customer funds. and to take corrective action where possible. we must do everything in our power to restore confidence in the markets so producers, processors and end users of commodities can once again hedge their price risks without fear of their fund being lost or frozen. section 4 d of the cea commission and regulations require that an fcm holding customer funds treat such funds as belonging to the customer at all times. fcms are prohibited from using a customer fund to margin or guarantee trades or contracts of another customer or of the fcm. and the fcm must maintain sufficient funds in segregated accounts to cover the net liquidating equity of each of its customers at any given point in time. our regulations also require an fcm to hold customer funds,

deposited for trading futures and options, listed on foreign boards of trade, in separate accounts known as part 30 secured accounts. the part 30 rules provide for an alternative calculation of the amount of funds required to be segregated, that does not afford the same protections. as the net liquidating equity calculation used for section 4 d funds. this is something that i think should be changed. the act and the commission regulations establish a regulatory structure or front line financial regulation is performed by designated self regulatory organizations. the chicago exchange and national futures association are the two primary futures market. fcms are subject to cftc approved minimum financial and reporting requirements that are enforced in the first instance. many fcms are also registered

with the fcc as broker/dealers. these duly registered broker dealer fcms are subject to the jurisdiction of both. to ensure that all activities of a dealer are properly reviewed, sros coordinate their regulatory oversight. this coordination includes periodic meetings of the inner market surveillance group. mf global was a dly registered fcm and was subject to the cftc and sec, it was the dsro for mf globals futures markets activities and had primary responsibility for overseeing the fcms compliance with capital, segregation, and financial reporting obligations required by the cftc. prior to the bankruptcy the futures and securities regulators shared information and examination results regarding mf global. in august 2011, mf global filed

statements and regulatory notices with the cftc as a result of additional capital charges that the sec required the broker dealer to take on with regard to certain repoed maturity transactions on foreign sovereign debt. at approximately the same time. sec staff, contacted cftc staff to inform us of capital charges. the cftc staff also consulted with cme, finera, and cbo, regarding the rationale for additional capital charges. commission staff consulted with domestic and foreign regulators during the period of october 24th, through october 31st, as well as in the critical hours leading up to the bankruptcy filing. at the direction of chairman gensler, commission staff continues to review customer fund protection provisions of

the commodity exchange act and our commission regulation to identify possible improvements. while the staff has not yet pro posed amendments to the commission, it is expected that they will make recommendations in several areas. at a minimum, i believe that changes should be made to our part 30 rules so customer funds held for trading on foreign markets are set to the liquidity regulations. that more information be provided to customers regarding how their funds are held and invested. and that more frequent reporting be provided to regulators and that fcms internal controls for the handling of customer funds be strengthened. i understand the severe hardship that mf globals bankruptcy caused for thousands of customers who have not yet been made hole.

customers may have correctly understood risks associated with trading futures and options. they never anticipated their segregated accounts were at risk of suffering losses that were not associated with their trading. the shortfall in customer funds was a shock to the market from which we have not yet recovered. i believe the commission can make improvements to our regulatory oversight, of fcms and dsros to help restore confidence in the futures market and i will help the commission and congress to implement the rules necessary to enhance our ability to protect market users and to foster open competitive and financially sound markets. thank you. thank you. mr. cook, please proceed. good morning. my name is robert cook. i am the director of the division of trading and markets

of the securities and exchange commission. thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the commission, concerning the lessons learned and policy implications of the collapse of mf global. the bankruptcy of mf global has resulted in serious hardship for many of its customers who have experienced significant delays and uncertainty with respect to ability to access their own assets. more broadly, the failure of mf global and the shortfall in customer assets. highlight the need for financial firms and for regulators to remain vigilant in ensuring customer assets are appropriately protected. sec rules are designed to protect customer property by prohibiting broker dealers from using customer funds and securities to support proprietary positions and expenses.

broker dealers that hold securities or cash for customers must maintain physical possession or control over securities that customers have paid for in full and cannot use the securities to support the firm's business activities. further, when broker dealers extend credit to allow customers to buy securities on margin, the rules limit how much of the securities the broker dealer can pledge to finance that credit it extended to customers. the rules also protect cash held for customers or derived from customer securities requiring the broker dealer to maintain a bank account, in an amount that exceeds net amounts owed customers. these funds cannot be invested in any instrument not guaranteed by full faith and credit of the u.s. government. together with applicable sec capital requirements, and protections under the securities investor protection act this is to ensure if a broker dealer fails, customer securities and funds will be available to be returned to the customers. the preferred, preferred method of returning securities customer assets in a cipa liquidation is to transfer the assets to a broker dealer.

on december 9, the bankruptcy court approved the initial sale and transfer of all customer accounts. it applied to approximately 318 accounts held for nonaffiliated securities customers. the trustee, since the transfer, nearly all former mf global customers have received 60% or more of their account value. 149 customers have received the entirety of their account balances. we understand the 194 customers include any one entitled to an advance with the claim, net equity up to 1.25 million. jen really the rules governing protection of customer funds and securities have worked reasonably well over time. but we are considering whether there are ways they can be strengthened. the clarification and strengthened its of broker dealers including an auditor's

examination of effectiveness of broker dealer controls relating to assets. continuing to work with self regulatory organizations where sros strengthen broker dealer financial responsibility requirements. for example in june of last year, the sec approved a rule requiring the establishment of registration, qualification and examination and continuing education requirements for certain operations or back office personnel. including those who handle customer assets. this rule should help ensure that those responsible for these operations are fully versed in their legal on li investigations including those relating to segregation and protect, of customer assets. in february of this year, modernization task forcing, issued 15 recommendations including statutory changes. the sec staff is evaluating these wreck men recommendations as well. the sec is also engaged in a number of efforts both domestic and international to share more

and better data, qualitative assessments of firms and markets. some include up proved coordination with sros, more frequent meetings with certain sros with financial oversight responsibilities. thank you again for the opportunity to testify on this important subject. i look forward to answering any questions you may have. >> thank you. mr. ketchum, please proceed. >> members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. my name is richard ketchum, chairman, ceo of the finra. when a firm like mf global fails there is always value in reviewing the events leading to the failure and examining where rules and processes might be improved. clearly, continued impact of mf global's failure on customers who cannot access their fund is of great concern. and every possible step should be taken to restore the accounts as quickly as possible.

with respect to oversight of mf globals, financial and operational, finra shared oversight, and the chicago board operations exchange the designated examining authority. when finra its not for a broker dealer we work closely and routinely analyze the focused report filings and annual audited financial statements as part of our ongoing oversight of the firm. while that monitoring focuses on a broad range of issues it is particularly relevant to note our surveillance team, placed heightened focus on ex-pope sure to european sovereign debt. during april and may, we began surveying firms their positions in the instruments. in a review of mf global audited financial statements, filed on may 31st of last year, our staff

raised question as but a footnote disclosure, regarding r, po to maturity, rtm portfolio. during discussions with the firm, finra learned a significant portion of the portfolio was collateralized. they're afforded sale treatment and therefore not recognized on the balance sheet. now with standing that accounting position, the firm remains subject to credit risk throughout the life of the repo. beginning in mid june. finra and cboe, had discussions regarding the proper treatment of the rtm portfolio. our view was that while recording the repos as sales consistent with gap should not be treated as such for purpose of the capital ruled and market and credit risk. as such we asserted capital needed to be reserved against the position. finra and cboe, had discussions with the sec about our concerns. the sec agreed that the firm

should hold capital against positions. the firm fought this interpretation throughout the summer appealing to the sec before conceding in late august. mf global infused capital and made filings. and september 1 notified regulators of the deficiency and change in net capital treatment of the rtm portfolio. following this, finra added mf global to alert reporting, heightened monitoring process where by we require firms to provide information, net capital and reserve formula competition -- computations. as mg global's credit rating was cut. at the end of the week, finra was on site at the firm with the sec as the it became clear, mf global was unlikely to continue to be a viable stand alone business. our primary goal was to gain an understanding of the custodial locations for customer securities, and to work closely

with potential acquirers in coach of avoiding liquidation. as has been widely reported, while finra believes financial securities rules of the sec combined with cipa provide a good structure for protecting customer funds. firm failures provide an important opportunity for review and analysis of where improvements may be warranted. finra's identified changes to better protect customers and their funds. through the process and in terms of coordination with regulatory counter parts. most recently finra and chicago mercantile exchange, established calls, so our staff can share information about firms that are broker dealers. in addition. we initiated a series of briefings on select firms for domestic and international regulators of securities and futures. our next briefing will be in

june. we have expanded the list of regulators and sros. we continued our work on rule making efforts aimed at enhancing surveillance. starting in october, finra firms must file financial and operational reports that capture granular detail about a firm's revenues and expenses. last week, finra's board approved an additional report that would inform the assessment of off balance, on capital, leverage and liquidity. finra shares your commitment to reviewing mg global collapse. we will review our rules and procedures and reach out to fellow regulators to identify areas where processes may be enhanced. thank you for the opportunity to share our views. i would be happy to answer any questions you have. >> thank you, mr. duffy. >> chairman johnson, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify, respecting lessons learned from the collapse of mf global. i testified respecting mf global's misuse of segregated customer funds and cmes efforts

on behalf of customers. today i will summarize. our efforts and the industry to restore customer confidence. the short fall in customer segregated funds was limited to the funds under mf global's control. the customer funds held in segregation by cems clearinghouse to cover futures positions were complete. ability to transfer positions and of our customers was undone by a provision in the bankruptcy code, providing loss sharing among all customers. we believe that congress can health protect customers whose collateral is safe guarded at a clearinghouse. it can do that changing the bankruptcy code to permit clearinghouses to transfer fully collateralized customers to other clearing members despite a failure of the clearing member. the industry is united in its search for solutions that will restore confidence and regulated futures and derivatives markets. obviously changes in the bankruptcy code are not easy or quick.

it is constructive to look at a wide range of actions that can be implemented without legislation. cme group along with exchanges and national futures association has proposed four, forms of intensified reporting to avoid misuse of funds. future association on behalf of members, proposed enhanced reporting. cme group is implementing proposals which will include one mandatory daily reporting of segregation statements by all fcms. two, additional surprise reviews of customer segregated accounts. three, a requirement that the fcms, ceo, cfo sign all payouts of customer segregated funds plus immediate notification to cme and four, a bi monthly report reflecting how segregated funds are invested and where they are held. cme has challenged the industry and commission to consider whether solutions will better serve the interest of customers and the industry. in addition to the proposed amendment of the bankruptcy code, cmes working with the clearing members to find a

structure that will protect their collateral against fellow customer and fraud risks. we are committed to finding the solution that will provide strong protection for the -- segregated funds. from a legal operational cost benefit. without destroying the industry business model. in addition to the regulatory initiatives we also recently launched cme, group. this fund is designed to protect family farmers, family ranchers and cooperatives in the event of short falls and segregated funds. we hope these steps will give confident to u.s. markets after the action and failure of mf global. it should not serve as a reason to undermine, front line auditing and regulating by clearinghouses and exchanges. some critics suggest the current regulatory system is compromised. there are no conflicts of interests in cmes duties to ctfc, customers, and shareholders. it requires that it diligently keep its markets fair and open

by vigorously regulating all market participants. federal law mandates a structure that eliminates conflicts of interest. the current regulatory model served the future industry, customers and the public. we look forward to enhancing customer protections and foster confidence in our markets. thank you for your time this afternoon. >> thank you. i would like to thank all of the witnesses for their testimony the as we begin questions i will ask the clerk to put five minutes on the clock. for each member. judge freeh, just to be clear. given that $1.6 billion of customers funds has yet to be recovered, due to mismanagement or possible illegal transfers, by mf global, can you commit to

us today that your office will not be seeking bonuses for any form or current mf global employee? >> if insurance coverage had been in place for commodities accounts, how would that have impacted the transfer of client positions? are there fcms as well as the the claims distribution process for former customers of mf global? do you believe that congress should study and revisit the idea of the -- of extending to commodities accounts an

insurance coverage similar to that provided for circuitous accounts under the securities investor protection act? yes. cipra proceedings, govern liquidation of broker dealers contain well established procedures for contemplating and facilitating transfers of accounts to other solvent broker dealers and provide mechanisms for the prompt payment of customer claims. all of this is greatly facilitated because there is -- the financial support unfortunate the cipa fund which -- has -- in the case of cipa several billion dollars of assets and ability to assess the industry for additional fund. those funds would -- assist if it were necessary to cover short

falls to enable a trustee to accounts, to other solvent fcms, i think as mr. duffy was alluding to. there are problems here. under the statute you have to -- distribute equally on a pro rata basis. yes, i believe if you had a fund which would give you more flexibility as a trustee, you could more rapidly transfer tenets, and at least have that in your arsenal of things to move things along. >> commissioner, could you describe any legal actions or are there efforts the cftc has taken to recover the more than $700 million of u.s. customer funds being held in the uk? how its the work of the cftc in this area been coordinated with mr. gins efforts to protect u.s.

customers subject to regulation 30.7. >> thank you, senator. the cftc does not have -- the authority to bring an action in the uk court proceeding. but we are, as we are in the united states, working very closely with his staff, the law firm that he has hired to represent the, the -- the bankruptcy in -- in the uk and in front of the english court and we will continue to monitor all the different actions that happen in that proceeding. >> do you have anything to add?

>> just to confirm that we do confer frequently with the cftc about the strategy in the uk and the nature of the legal issues. equally, we have, to the extent we can, shared information with judge freeh regarding that proceeding. of course all of those funds in the uk are segregated assets that belong to the 30.7 customers of the broker feeler. >> mr. duffy, do you have any views on the fia recommendations offered last month to better protect segregated customer accounts? also, would it be valuable for sros in the cftc to receive daily electronic backup documentation on these accounts directly from exchanges, clearinghouses, and custodial banks in order to confirm that the self-reporting seg funds by fcms is accurate? >> let me take the latter first.

as far as the daily reporting from the sro and the cftc to the exchanges. i am a big believer, senator, in realtime reporting so it's kind of hard to argue with that. the reality is what's the practicalities of getting that done? even if we would have it on a realtime basis, if people were having multiple books or doing nefarious activities, it would still be very difficult to detect what happened in the mf global situation. so as much as i support realtime tieouts, i think there is a lot of information that still needs to go into that.