and after the internal report. we're now making that commitment to you. it's incumbent on congress and dhs leadership to mark that path forward. i thank the subcommittee for the attention this critical homeland security issue, and i'm available for questions. >> thank all the panel members for their discussion. we'll go into a first round of questioning. start off. mr. wright, i know you haven't seen the entire report in your other memorandum, but you've been responding with respect to the discussions to the reports that you have. what is the leaked memo had on the morale of your members? they still have a desire to work for this program? they still think this program is worthy? do they still think this program is workable? >> above all, they think it's worthy and they are ready to move forward.

with that being said, there was an aspect of insult to that report. there was an aspect of calling into question capabilities, education, training, and so forth. so there was and still is an aspect of being disrespected. >> mr. scott and mr. allmond, since the leaked memo came out, how has -- if they have, dhs engaged you on the issues that were outlined in the leaked memo? and has there been any suggestion of how you work together to solve any of the issues detailed in the memo, or is that viewed more as the department's internal problems that has not affected the relationship of the industry with the department? >> mr. chairman, dhs discusses these type of issues with the

industry through the chemical sector coordinating counsel that mr. scott has been involved in and so have i. we haven't had too many discussions as of yet, but we've had some preliminary discussions about some of the things that have been holding up the program that we've identified for well over a year now. >> mr. scott, you said that this report or that which came out of this report is a wake-up call, not a death knell for the program. it is my hope that that is the case. could you outline why the program as -- as articulated, or as legislatively drawn and the response by the private sector to that is both worthy of being maintained, and what are the essential advantages of it as you see it in the context of as you say the industry having spent billions of dollars in terms of security?

>> well, the primary reason we agree that cfats is a good approach is the risk-based approach that it takes. it's really focused on the risk of each individual site, different scenarios at each site. so it takes the risk into -- into question, and then you apply the appropriate risk rating interior level to the site. so that's a strong positive. we want to make sure that we're focusing on risk, and that we're really focusing on reducing the risk. the second piece of the puzzle is that it gives you -- cfats gives you a broad array of opportunities to reduce that risk. it doesn't dictate any one method or means of reducing risks. so each site and every site is very different, and each situation, whether it's a theft scenario or an attack scenario, the site has the opportunity to pick the right answer, the right solution to reduce the risk at

that site, what makes sense at that site. so the risk-based approach and the opportunity to apply a customized security package at the site is really the value. and that's why you can see real improvement already in many of the sites when they start to focus on the risk and focus on the opportunities to reduce that risk. that's why you've seen some success already, even though the cfats is not fully implemented, we've seen some remarkable success. the issues that we're facing right now are the management issues of how to measure success and get approval of the site security plans and get the final inspections in place. it's not the process that has the problem. >> mr. allmond, you indicated that you support -- mr. scott did, a permanent seven-year, whatever you want to call, that extension of the authorization, or as we would say up here, a permanent authorization. and you indicated that without that, there is uncertainty. some observers on the outside

might say that's overstated. why would your members not continue to go forward with the capital investment necessary for securing their own assets? i know how i'd respond to that question. but i want to know how you would respond to that question. >> mr. chairman, regulations in general disproportionately impact small businesses. when there is a delay in implementation of regulations, that compounds the impact. the delays most likely have seized up compliance costs that were budgeted. when companies sit down and do their own annual budgets, there might be some compliance costs that were built in that were not spent. and that money could have been spent on things like manufacturing, innovation, r&d, more jobs. in some respects that money was not spent. and it should have been. >> and i think you indicated in your written testimony, 80% of your members are small businesses? >> that's correct. >> okay. all right. ms. clarke?

>> thank you, mr. chairman. and i thank the witnesses for providing their insights as well. my first question goes to mr. wright. when you have the problems identified in the iscd memorandum appear to be related to hiring and developing staff to implement the program, including the lack of policies and procedures to guide staff efforts to do their jobs. please discuss whether you believe problems related to hiring and developing staff and a lack of related policies and procedures are a challenge to implementing the cfats program, and if so, why? and then give us your experience with how the employees were hired for cfats program. what is the history from your point of view? >> i think i'll start with your -- the second part of your question first. i have probably been around longer than any of the nppd leadership at the inception of the cfats program in hiring the

inspectors. we were originally detailed from the fps workforce. so i did attend that initial class one day of a week-long course for the initial group of inspectors. and i think that was the initial what can now be be looked at as a setback. because the focus was ultimately compliance and ultimately law enforceme enforcement. fps inspectors were lured away from their federal law enforcement careers with the promise, with the lure of a -- of building a new agency regulating chemical facilities. and unfortunately for those inspectors, the program was

apparently misguided or labeled as misguided and changes occurred along the way. many fps inspectors came back. and the ones that could tolerate the loss of their federal law enforcement career stayed. and then we -- then there is the aspect of the management culture. it just seems to have changed several times over the years, the focus seems to have changed is what i'm told. >> so in your opinion, to what extent do the staffing challenges and lack of program guidance impede progress in implementing cfats, if at all? >> i can only go back to what i've seen in the fox news article. apparently director anderson

thinks that the mission is impeded by law enforcement officers that, quote, want to carry a badge and gun. it goes back to a cultural issue. it goes back to the authorization and lets do form a culture, an nppd culture, as opposed to the differing cultures that have occurred throughout the time period by bringing -- by losing the focus on the law enforcement and the compliance originally. and speaking to refocus seemingly every year. >> so i see in the memo that there are insinuations that the union is causing friction in the workplace. would you give us the viewpoint of the employees in the union on

this matter of workplace conditions or relationships with management? and also, on the effort to give feedback to dhs management, would you characterize those efforts of employees as possibly putting themselves in the position of being subjected to retaliation or intimidation? >> the union culture within iscd is new. we've been in place since march of 2011. so i was absolutely blind sided by the allegations in the news article. i've worked with secretary beers, senior management for years now. and that myth of working with the union, of the union creating roadblocks to implementing policies and procedures is exactly that. it's a myth.

>> right. it's my pleasure to recognize mr. richards -- no, mr. richmond. yes, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and i will not use my entire five minutes. i guess my question is for mr. scott. and i will just say that we have a dow facility in my new second congressional district which will actually be the largest home to a petrochemical facilities in places that will fall under cfats in the country. so my concern and my goal is to make sure that it's as efficient and as least burdensome to the businesses that are there. i know that at least in your recommendations, you mention one way to become more efficient very quickly is to leverage the existing relationship between

cfats by recognizing the twik card. is that one of the recommendations? >> my personal opinion is that that would make the personnel surety program a lot easier to manage. if the people at the sites that you're talking about in your area are both mtsa cover sites, you'll see that both of those sites have security upgrades to meet the dhs compliance requirements. so that's what we like to do. but at those two sites you have a twic card required for entry. and when somebody comes to the gate to come to work and get a dow badge, it's very easy to look at that twic card and know they've already been vetted by the federal government and meets all the requirements that are currently involved with the cfats personal assurety requirement. >> with just dow, how many of your facilities are covered by cfats and also by mtsa?

>> i'm not sure i can answer that. but i think it's about three dozen. >> wow. >> in the united states, we have about three dozen sites covered by one or the other. >> okay. >> all of the sites are covered by the acc response security code. >> thank you. and i yield back, mr. chair. >> ms. richardson is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my first question is for mr. scott. mr. scott, have you presented these recommendations that are in your testimony to dhs? >> some of the recommendations have been talked, have been discussed with dhs through the sector council, through individual companies, through acc, the various associations. i can't say that we talked about each and every one of the recommendations. but most of those have been in some discussions. >> yes. >> are you aware of any responses that might have been received from dhs? >> dhs has always been willing

to sit down and talk with us. so i think we're having ongoing discussions would be what i would say. >> but my question has been have there been any specific responses to the recommendations that you provided, to your knowledge? >> not at this time, no. >> okay. and is dow or acc a part of an official advisory group within dhs, especially in light of this memorandum that was leaked? where you provide feedback to them or you're working with them on these processes? >> i'm not working directly with dhs on that response, no. >> does acc to your knowledge have any advisory role or working with this department? >> the acc has offered input on several of the recommendations. i don't know that they're having any direct response to those recommendations as yet. >> so if i'm hearing what you're saying, there is no formal body advisory body to your knowledge that you guys are participating in on a regular basis? >> not on a regular basis.

>> okay. mr. wright, i'd have the same question for you. is there a regular advisory group that is working with the department to provide feedback on an ongoing basis? >> not to my knowledge. >> okay. and for you, sir, how about you? >> well, there is the chemical sector coordinating council, but it's not a government advisory board. it's an industry advisory. and that's where we do have periodic discussions about various chemical security issues with the department. >> so is it a formal process of a regular meeting that happens, like once a year? >> it's probably more like four or five times a year. and -- but it is an industry-led group that discusses chemical security. sometimes we do involve dhs as guests to our meeting, or we do exchange information. >> so it's your meeting, not theirs? >> right. >> okay. also, in your testimony you

referenced that you have supplied dhs with a proposal and some things that they could consider. have you gotten any responses to your proposals? >> there has been discussion about the personal surety issue that mr. scott talked about the twic card. we have had some back and forth on that with the department for many months now. and we hope to have some resolution on that, because that is one of the areas within the performance standards that is holding up the implementation, quite frankly. >> okay. and mr. wright, i just wanted to encourage you in those as part of the union that you support, i hope that you'll share with them the comments from mr. allmond in his testimony where he said that in particular we strongly urge dhs to rely on half a dozen or so federally issued credentials that involve the tstb check. unions have also expressed a concern with dhs about the proposal. so they've supported you in that. and they've also noted additionally, relying upon

contractors who typically have high job turnover -- per -- per -- whatever. i'm struggling on that word today. a little late last night. the need for constant retraining, institutional knowledge is the key to the activities and conducted primarily with contract support. so they're really providing i think a lot of support, unlike what unfortunately you have to testify about. your folks here have strongly commended the work that your folks have done. so it's important to share that with them. >> yes, thank you. >> mr. wright, finally, my question is for you. have you found there to be a transparent and open process of knowledge amongst the workforce positions that are open and available? since so many of them are contracted positions currently. >> i don't have much experience with contractors. i am concerned with the statements made here by director anderson about the openness and

transparency of the -- of the action plan, because it's not been brought to me. i've not been notified. i do know that there are town hall meets. i will also say that my workforce is at this point i think intimidated and unwilling to share that information with the union. also, director anderson is unwilling to share that plan directly with me, despite my efforts. >> well, hopefully through this committee's looking at this closer, we can improve upon that. thank you all for your testimony. precipitates. there we go. got it. third try. thank you, mr. chair. >> i thank the gentle lady for

yielding back. i thank the witnesses for their testimony and their members for their questions. the members of the panel of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask you to respond to these in writing in a timely fashion. the hearing record will be held open for ten days. and with that, this subcommittee stands adjourned. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. learn more about the members of congress with c-span's 2012 congressional directory.

you'll find contact information, committee assignments, district maps, and more. it's available for 12 shipping and handling at cspan.org/shop. next on cspan 3, a senate hearing on preventing medical research from being used by terrorists. the senate veterans' affairs committee looks at providing mental health services to veterans. and britain's secretary for culture, media and sport, speaks in parliament about the controversy surrounding advice he gave to rupert murdoch's news corps. >> born in a north korean work camp, the only world shin had known. also the only one to escape from camp 14. >> his first memory at the age of around 4 was going with his mom to a place near where he

grew up, in the camp, to watch somebody get shot. and, shootings, public executions in the camp were held every few weeks. and they were a way of punishing people who violated camp rules and of terrorizing the -- the 20 to 40,000 people who lived in the camp to obey the rules from then on. >> sunday, author blaine harden on shin's journey out of north korea and learning about society and civilization. at 8:00 on cspan's q & a. and may 6, look for our q & a interview that coincides with "the passage of power" volume four in years of lyndon johnson. his multivolume biography of the 36th president. the senate homeland security committee held a hearing this week on how to prevent medical research from being used for bioterrorism.

the national institutes of health released guidelines on release of information on biotechnology and infectious diseases. this hearing of the senate homeland security committee is an hour and a half. >> hearing will come to order. good morning and thanks very much to our really distinguished panel of witnesses. we use the word distinguished around here very easily, but it actually does relate to this panel. and i thank you for being here. if i may begin by looking back a bit. in 1851 a revolution in medicine already under way was crystallized in a letter louie pasteur wrote to a friend. i'm on the edge of mysteries and the veil is getting thinner and thinner.

thanks to the work of pasteur and succeeding generations of scientists, the mysteries of the microbial world have been revealed and we're all healthier and living longer as a result. childhood diseases like polio and measles have in many ways, been vanquished. scientists were able to identify the aids virus which helped lead to treatments and, according to one of our witnesses today, the real possibility of a cure for aids is in sight. the last global pandemic that killed on a massive scale, the spanish flu pandemic killed at least 50 million people, was almost a century ago. i remember this because it deprived me of ever knowing one of my grandmothers. my paternal grandmother who died as a young woman in new york in

that pandemic. but in addition to all the medical miracles that were underneath that veil pasteur began to peel back, there were also dangers. research that can lead to cures extending life for millions, also can kill many if a rogue pathogen were released either by accident or because it fell into what i will call evil hands. and it is this paradox of dual-use research that we gather together today to consider at this hearing. last fall, the world was shaken by the news that two researchers working -- research teams working independently had been able to engineer a new strain of the h5n1 virus which we know as bird flu that could easily infect humans. epidemiologists have long feared that if the h5n1 virus ever made the jump from a virus, mostly confined to birds to one easily transmitted among humans it can swiftly cause a pandemic. the mortality rate for the few reported cases in humans who have been infected is as high as

60% by contrast, the spanish flu which i mentioned earlier had a mortality rate of about 2%. the researchers that i refer to based both at erasmus university in the netherlands and the university of wisconsin announced that they were going to publish the results of their studies in the journal "science and nature." this set off what i would call a global ethics debate in the scientific community about whether to publish or not publish these results. and if the experiments which were funded by the nih were undertaken at all. on the one hand, there are those who say getting this information out could help other scientists better understand the mutant strain so they could prepare for a possible pandemic by investigating -- looking for natural mutations and developing vaccines and medications.

the fact that these two research teams were able to create this new strain from existing genetic material means that nature could create it as well. in fact, many scientists said that that was quite likely. but given the lethality of the virus, others argued that publishing the results would create a huge security risk because it would offer a blueprint for a deadly biological weapon to rogue states or terrorists. of course, that's where this committee's interest is joined because of our responsibility for homeland security. in a recent speech at a biological weapons conference in geneva, secretary of state clinton warned that al qaeda in the arabian peninsula had, in fact, issued a call for, i quote, brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass

destruction, end quote. and, of course, there's also a danger that the manufactured strain might somehow escape, so to speak, from the laboratory which was something we worried about in the past. last december, at the request of the department of health and human services, the national science advisory board for biosecurity or nsabb was asked to review the h5n1 research papers. the nsabb concluded that more needed to be known before the research was made public, and they asked the editors of "science and nature" to delay publication. both magazines agreed. last month, after further review, the nsabb withdrew its objections and voted unanimously to allow the university of wisconsin study to be published and by a vote -- a divided vote of 12-6 to allow the netherlands study to be published with some revisions and clarifications. one of the things that apparently influenced the board's decision was the revelation that the modified strains of h5n1 had become less

lethal. but as the members of the panel know, i am sure that decision has drawn criticism from dr. michael t. osterholm, director of the center for infectious disease research and policy at the university of minnesota. and an nsabb board member himself. in a letter to the nih he wrote the nsabb had ignored the voice of scientists who believed publication of the h5n1 research was dangerous. and i quote from his letter, i believe there was a bias toward finding a solution that was a lot less about a robust science and policy-based, risk-benefit analysis and more about how to get out of this difficult situation. he then added we can't just kick the can down the road without coming to grips with the very difficult task of managing. i know he was referring to the

research. end of quote. so this is a serious charge which i hope as the morning goes on the panel will respond to. the publish or not publish debate continued earlier this month during a two-day conference of the world's leading scientists convened by the royal society in london. one point i learned a lot of the attendees seemed to agree on is we need to put in place better research to track this at each experimental stage rather than waiting until it's ready for publication to make decisions about what can be revealed. and that's another question that i hope our panelists will discuss today. although this particular controversy about publication appears to have been resolved, it's going to recur. as osterholm said, we can't just kick the can down the road and deal with it on an ad hoc basis.