captioning performed by vitac in 2009, 2010, i had some rough conversations and i began to change my mind.

the one thing i couldn't answer is how is he going to do this from a cave in northern werestan. as soon as i heard there were these fiber optic connections, that answer an awful lot, too. you don't have to depend, perhaps, on some kind of courier system. there could be other methods for this. i'd like to finish by saying this is not a terrorist group but the headquarters are high command of something that is attempting to become or is in the process of becoming a global insurgency has an awful lot of policy implications, some of which are tremendously unpalatable. i don't believe you should ignore what reality is telling

you because, one, you can't afford it or, two, you just don't like what reality is telling you. the fact that we can't afford to carry out a global counterinsurgency should not make us aflinch from recognizing at least the scope of the problem we're dealing with. so i understand that there are tremendous policy implications from everything iemg saying and that first and foremost it argues attrition is the wrong way to go. it will encourage radicalization and recruitment and our main method for combatting these guys is probably adding to the problem rather than helping to solve it. there are a lot of places where it the on thing we can be doing, though. we don't have partners, we don't have capabilities ourselves. we believe that's it. maybe that's true, maybe that's not. but to engage in a practice that is in fact worsening the problem for us on a daily basis is not

the way to go if in fact we are not dealing with a terrorism problem but in fact dealing with an insurgency problem. i'd just like to stop there. please forgive me again for leaving early after throwing all these rhetorical sort of twists. thank you. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, mary. wait a few minutes before we come back to your ticking bomb and we're going to ask our final speaker, dr. thomas lynch, who is distinguished fellow at the institute for national strategic studies at the national defense university. and he returns frires from the y after 26 years or so. >> as yonah mentioned, i'm a research fellow at the national

defense university. the comments i represent neither represent the position of my institution or the department of defense, my ultimate employer but are the product of my own research and my own individual conclusions. again, delighted to be here today. as we near the one-year anniversary of the operation that eliminated bin laden, i'm here to contend perhaps not as starkly as mary has offered about diverging with her position but i'm here to contend to you rather than overestimating the death of bin laden, we underestimate the way his death has clarified and made more understandable what has been a radical ideology that has prospered under the leadership of a core and unique organization which tried to bring life to five separate dimensions of that particular

diverse ideology and has attempted to get its arms around it and channel it in the direction of the aims that mary so eloquently pointed out. i'm here to contend to you bin laden as a personal has been no less relevance and that lenin was in being able to fuse and bring that together. we -- much like lenin, there was no other organizer of victory who brought together the charisma, the fund-raising ability and now as we know it and i was like mary convinced that bin laden was a strategically relevant communicator with various and disparate outfits and to a certain extent i have to confess i had insider knowledge and we knew bin laden personally was involved in communications to try to corral and brick under

contr contr -- bring under control all these things. and as a consequence and no surprise when you're talking about a global ideology, bin laden was relevant. consequently his death changes and morphs al qaeda in what it is but it also leaves extant what i think mary has referred to and matthew has referred to which is this wider issue of id -- ideology which remains extant. when you take away cohesion and glue and you're left with sand paper as the relevant cohesive idea when you take away bin laden when you take away bin laden from al cz-zarqawi, you bg

down your footprint. second that you focus more on indirect operations and working with partner nations, some who don't share your proclivity in the short term but in the long term feel the same about the metastasized threat that bin d laden is. this notion we are failing to overthrow corrupt governments, nigeria, azerbaijan, other

nations. this indeed was the spark of al qaeda that was the most significant of altering the organization of what was the kind of chaos of the jihady movement that mess metastasized in the 1990s. i'm arguing here that our interest right now is in recognizing this change, backing off the rhetoric and that he proclaims he's influencing syria and involved in some type of plot in yemen, because we make a policy mistake to move in that direction when in reality it is the voices of the islamic world where i've had the privilege of living in qatar and pakistan, it is those voices that will find a path forward that moves in a

more modern way without the resort to violence as the only way toward political change, which is the underpining and which al qaeda opted to move and organize and band together in a very dangerous group of activities that did galvanize us now. i've written and argued that bin laden's death is the 80% solution to the unique and acute problem that al qaeda tried to graft itself on top of this jihadi move. the five elements of al qaeda, it's been oriented trying to co-op and bring together the priority is the following -- first inspiring to be a core

organization dedicated to planning, recruiting and training as well as for organizing catastrophic global terrorist events against americans, westerners and zionist crusader targets, especially in their homelands. for the purpose of what? for the purpose of getting us out of muslim land so they could have free rein to topple what they believed were corrupt re regimes. second, to focus jihadist groups, where their presence was believed to defile islam and bring it to a level that was unacceptable. third, an inspiration to the disaffected and lone wolf muslims worldwide to act out on their frustrations through violence against symbols of perceived oppression against islam. fourth and very important to serve as a brand name

representing the kind of highest level of this ideology in bringing successful violence against the so-called crusader governments and officials in which most senior leaders of the jihad remain free from serious penalty or harm. prior to the raid against bin laden was this notion of impunity. they could go and find a way to hide out and this long arm of americanism and westernism couldn't get to them, all right? and then fifth, that they, that is al qaeda, would serve as base certain as conquest of afghanistan and included in that is western pakistan in the name of global jihad. this is important because of the mystical origins because of where al qaeda came from and how it built up at the end of the soviet jihad peer and then turned itself toward local gee s

an -- jihadi activities and then came together to focus and defeat the near enemy. these five elements, three have been totally castigated by the raid. this notion of a brand name that was free from retribution or had impugnity from being captured or attacked, that was brought to its need. most of us who follow jihad,web sites so that clearly over the next two, three months, this notion of how could this happen followed by this claim and revenge for rage. the notion of impunity, living above and beyond the law that, came crashing down by way of this raid. i would argue they still feel

the wrath of them and they no longer people impugn. i think that's to the right and that's exactly where we need to be on this. even though he is sand paper to bin laden's blue he still controls a cohort of well trained and well capable egyptians and to a lesser extent algerians who are very capable of attacks and this should not be taken lightly. second, this notion of a core organization able to plan, recruit and conduct successful overseas terrorist operations. that has been put asunder in the last five to six years. we can all point to things that have been plotted or planned in western pakistan and indeed our intelligence has correctly identified that since at least 2006 but we've also shown an ability to intercept, adapt and work with partners who include the much maligned and deservedly

sold sew but the iss in pakistan to arrest a number of these folks who were plotting in massive attacks in western europe and against us in the homeland tore to find critical information that would allow us to intercept those. and finally, this notion of a base for certain conquest in afghanistan is dashed. there i argue particularly that the relationship between bin laden and omar and the akani group was really a personal relationship. i think we're starting to see little more nuggets about that now. they never swore an oath.

having lived in that part of the world and done a lot of work with thankful assistance suggest to me strongly it's not the ideological linkage to al qaeda anymore but rather the strategic linkage to pakistan and how far pakistan wishes to see the jihad is being fomented into an international problem. so where does that leave us? it leaves us with half the other it would have the five key things of al qaeda that are left out there that we do legitimately need to worry about but we need to take a different tack and approach and one that i would argue we seeing and doing already. reduce the footprint of military and western military where you can. better police protection, where i think we're heading in yemen

and somalia, which is a little slow but where we're heading. again, the bus analogy. let's be careful about making sure the handle on the wheel is connected to the bus and not just a claim or an attempt to claim virtual ownership of something that has a lot more local roots and origins that can be addressed at that level and second the issue of the lone wolf terrorist attacker where even the united states is finally starting to come to grips with this now. i refer you to the most recent counterterrorist strategy where the phrase resilience comes up over and over and over. we're never going to do away with the lone wolf, with a claim of self-professed activity, reading an al qaeda web site that, claim they're affiliated and go off and do something negative.

they're harder to get to but they're less catastrophic in their effect and organization. i think it time we followed the mantra of resimens and said we've got enough ability to handle these things through local law enforcement so long as we keep connected with the part of the world where these folks are likely to be. the prescription is not to hyper inflate the degree to al qaeda brings together a movement and recognize al qaeda's uniqueness historically was its attempt to bring that together. that made it conspicuously dangerous. bin laden's death made it less dangerous and our policy needs to reflect that going ford. >> thank you very much. in honor of our speakers, i would like to develop some sort of discussion, especially because i know that mary and matt have to leave for your teaching.

okay. are there any yeses now at this point? would you kindly come to the mic over there. >> we've scared them speechless. >> can i say one thing about this whole -- >> you can -- honestly if the members of the panel want to make a statement or ask a question or comment. yes. melvin? >> milton hoenig. i have a very general question. what does what you've said have to do with the concern over a rise in domestic terrorism and terrorism perhaps is inspired by

the ideals of al qaeda, even after the death of bin laden. what is your feeling about the importance of a concern over domestic terrorism? one speaker emphasized it strongly. what is the panel's concern about that? >> mary? >> on the one hand what i've said might seem to minimize the danger from terrorist attacks but in fact terrorist attacks are one of the major means that al qaeda has used in this war as a whole. so it's one of their major tactics that they've used in this war. so i personally do not believe that anything i said should minimize the threat that we face for potential terrorist attacks. and i'd like to just say about zargawi in particular, if he were smart heeshs would never

carry out another attack against americans again. unless americans are dying, we don't care. so if he were smart, a person put it to me, the guard i don't know -- garden spots of the world, this person put it dismissively. if he made a public declaration tomorrow, we've given up and we're not going to attack the u.s. given, i think that would be one of the smartest things he could do strategically. but i don't believe he'll do it. i have a slightly different read on him than perhaps others on the panel do. 15 years ago i think that right on. i think he had ticked off everybody in his entire organization that he had started. he had such an abrasive personality i think caused by certain events in his life, most especially the fact that he was

tortured so horribly and betrayed his best friend, right, to death. so i think there was a lot of pent- pent-up anger that kept him from playing well with other children. he's had 15, 20 -- to watch how bin laden worked. the organize is this tightly knit hierarchical. there were 40 days silence and then he was announced as the next head and things just went

on. i said i don't thing he'll be able to give up attacking the united states, even though his focus seems to be egypt and exploiting the arab springs in particular from everything he's saying but he is also extremely angry at the united states. and i think his attack on the u.s. won't be about chasing the u.s. out of the -- you know, our lands, it won't be about fund-raising per se. in fact, i don't think it will have a rational basis at all. i think it will be pure revenge. because it was the u.s. who killed his wife and his kids and i don't think he's ever forgotten that, any more than he's forgotten that he was tortured by the egyptian government and betrayed his best friend. i do worry about attacks on the u.s. but i don't see them as having the tight, strategic aims that bin laden's 9/11 attack had

that went after economic, military and political centers. i believe it will be a sort of i want revenge and he's going to do it regardless i think of whether it to the benefit of the group or not. >> i think that part of that is irrelevant in that the attacks to the united states could from al qaeda core. i do think there's something to be said for the fact that the al qaeda core has less capable to pull off an attack that they did. there are still others out there trying to carry out an attack. the larger question is that the most likely threats we're going to have here in the united states aren't going to come from al qaeda core. they're not going to be al qaeda per se at all other than from the big idea. i think operationally what that means is it not that we won't have at least attempts and

spectacular attacks, we'll still have that but what's month more likely and likely to be more frequent is smaller scale attacks by home grown violent extremists or wanna-bes. some may have ties back to pakistan and others may not. hopefully they'll fail -- hopefully they're thwarted -- let's call a spade a spade. we didn't thwart the time square bomber. it just they weren't as capable. or even the subway bombing, the trial that just finished in new york, they had to communicate back one more time because they couldn't figure out how to wire it just right. i don't take a whole lot of comfort from this. it may not be an attack that could kill thousands of people but it could can hundreds or several dozen.

fun have a bunch of those it could be devastating and it could have devastating economic effects as well. i think some of the shifts on how we stand al qaeda beyond just the core, that's why i think it so important to go beyond just debating what is the core today, what might it be tomorrow? it's unbelievably relevant and i think your paper was very, very good but it's beyond that. i think we now agree it's also the affiliates and the idea that this has messed metastasized. they are driven by two things, a radical ideology. but what opens them to it are things that have to do with social cohesion, whether it's being underemployed, unemployed, not knowing as a secular third generation muslim, if you look at the smalley american

community, you've seen examples of this. there's a lot we can do that's no in the national security realm that would go a very long way towards making the country safer. >> i think there's a tactical implication that matthew and mary touched on that i want to highlight here and that is the feature of the core in terms of being able to provide this cadre of very capable bomb makers and trainers and rehearsers. matthew's point about the failure to have the bomb go off is indicative of the fact he was a boy scout camper in the fattia. he didn't have a lot of training and outreach. the fact that far uk mahmoud con get his underwear to go off in the airplane. the the absence of a last-minute visit of a capable bomb maker

that caused the bombs to not go off in the south london strike that did in the part of morninon london two weeks before. it's taking something mildly tragic into hugely tragic that we have to not misunderstand as a degradation of the core. if we focus on how those pathways exist when you don't have capable training camps and people working with impugnity and how you then look other places and find the disgruntled who want to change their name to islam and show up the next day at a training camp with a rifle, which seems where they want to go, with the weapon. we have to give our law enforcement credit for being able to track that. that doesn't mean complacency, those are the attacks we should

fear now, they require less high tech, high capable ability that al qaeda core brought but a lot of these other groups really don't. >> not exactly only to that, more in terms of the long term, i would -- first of all, if i may say about bin laden, every single person since the death of mohamed has wasn't the muhammad halafed. but you have to be realistic. we can to the say a list is something of a strategy and then say this is a global insurgency. i'm sorry to say that, mary, because that is only that. now, it never is going to happen

within the muslim world -- first of all, you have to realize this, history is important. we unfortunately ignore history at our own peril, including recent history. the other thing that is important, we just don't want to see some contradictions in our own policies in the region. we have relationship with the country that has played us like a fiddle now for 35 years and that name of that pakistan is pakistan. we just don't want to see the facts about pakistan for a variety of reasons that i don't want to go into that, including the fact that we basically made ourselves a hostage of pakistan because of our own afghan policy. if you have only one route and the other route has to come from pakistan or the russian kurdish, obviously pakistan is going to do whatever you want to do. i'm sorry to do. the other thing we don't understand about the movement