i tell them to reflect on how such surprises occur when you reflect on surprises in your own life. and you understand that grant's orders were not to engage the enemy until buell arrived. and they go you mean he is not defending himself? yeah, he is defending himself. but if your orders are not to engage the enemy until buell arrives, and you have cautioned all your division commanders not to do anything that would prod the enemy into a fight because your worry is that your army will be drawn into a fight, and the orders are defend yourself, okay, your pickets are to defend themselves. but if pressed, they're to fall back on the reserves. but by all means, don't go chasing out after the enemy, because to do so would run the risk of drawing the enemy into a major engagement. and we're not going to fight a major engagement until buel has formed th

formed this juncture, and we all go at once. grant's division commanders and grant himself were hog-tied from being able to go push the confederates and gain information. so when these skirmishes occur, the union forces react defensively. they defend themselves, okay, they lose some men, they capture a few troops and gain some intelligence, but they never understand what is behind that confederate force out there, and they totally misread it. they think it's reconnaissance in the case of the big april 4th skirmish, they just think it's a large reconnaissance, a mixed one. it's got infantry, it's got cavalry, it's got artillery. they're just trying to get information. they're trying to bite off pieces of our security screen and get information. had they had the ability to go out and push against it, they would find out what was behind it. and what was behind it was this buildup of johnston's army.

it's easy to understand how the union forces find themselves surprised here if you understand that if grant were to going to get viable intelligence, he was going to have to violate orders and attack the confederates, period. and he is not going to do that, because halleck was so adamant that they wait, they wait, they wait. 10 the federals totally misread the fact that johnston by the evening of april 5th has roughly 44,000 men positioned to attack the union forces at pittsburgh landing. if the federal picket front had been pushed in slowly over the course of the last two days to where it was in closer proximity to the union front than when it began, the confederate buildup and the union forces were still lulled into a sense of safety, everything was all secure, at least the high command, there were men in the ranks, there were officers in the ranks who were of different opinion. one of them was a brigade

commander under benjamin friend tis. his name was colonel everett peabody. on the morning of april 6th, 1862, peabody violates orders and orders out a combat reconnaissance, because he is fearful that there is something in front of them based upon the way he is reading the intelligence, and he is not going to be -- his brigade, his brigade is not going to be caught unawares. and he sends out a combat reconnaissance. did peabody believe that the entire confederate army is out there? probably not. but he knew something was out there, and he wanted more intelligence. so he didn't tell prentice he was sending out a combat patrol. he didn't tell sherman whose force would have to march across his front to perform its patrol. he didn't tell him he was sending it out. so nobody knew a federal force, roughly five companies of infantry at 3:00 in the morning on april 6th started marching to

the south-southwest towards corinth road here. away from prentice's camps. by about 4:55:00 a.m., they had reached a point a little more than 3/4 of a mile when three shots range out, bake, bang, bang. they hit apparently a confederate cowboy because they were mounded videttes who road away after the federals after they fired at them. the combat control was under the command of major james powell who threw the men into a skirmish formation and advanced astride the corinth road towards the location where we're now standing. when the elements of the line broke out here they encountered infantry picket posts, seven-man details who fired off shots at the federals and retired. just the gray light of dawn breaking, a very quiet morning except for the, you know, the

sudden eruption of the few muskets being fired, a few shouts being heard across the landscape. federal officers giving orders and what all, when in the far distance, the union troops would have picked up in the darkness darker forms here at the junction of woods and fraley field. and the darker forms were the main picket front of hardy's corps. in this particular sector, it was 3rd mississippi battalion of sam woods' brigade, standing there in formation. the federals slowly advance, and hardcastle unleashes a massive volatile upon them, and the battle of shiloh erupts and the fight is engaged. for the federals were in close products commitment. hardy's front consisted of four brigades in battle formation, immediately 100 yards in him

were five brigades from braxton braggs' corps. and stacked up in columns behind them were the other corps of the army, one by pope, one by breckenridge. nearly 44,000 men. johnston had achieved his surprise, although it would be federal reconnaissance that brings on the battle of shiloh because a brigade commander in grant's army violated orders and took initiative to send out a force. but it will take the confederate forces in front of us the better part of two hours to bring the forward brigades to bear against the main union camps on the south side of grant's large encampment. and that would be the divisions of sherman and benjamin prentiss. so part of the problems the confederates were running into was this engagement consumes

about an hour. it will be an hour before hardy's troops are commanded to move forward after the skirmish begins. so powell and hardcastle are banging away at one another in sporadic firing for nearly an hour before the main line under hardy's command steps forward. when it does, powell quickly realizes this is big-time. he could just sit there and count muskets, count flags and realize he is face mortgage than a mere reconnaissance. this appears to be a sizable force, much bigger than a brigade, and he will begin to retire from this position. the confederates now, you can just look at the landscape, and just realize what they're going to have to encounter as they move forward. because you know how these men fight battles in the mid 19th

century. they do it shoulder to shoulder and uniform lines, linear formations, battle formations. they do that because the individual infantry soldier lacks fire hour. he's got a musket that he has to load through the muzzle, which is time-consuming. under the rush of combat, this -- this being able to load and fire in three minutes is a bunch of baloney. these guys, if they're getting around off every minute, they're doing pretty good, fumbling around with their cartridges, getting shot at, trying to maneuver at the same time because they do maneuver and fire as well as stand still and fight. and you can just think of trying to move the mass formations, even across the open terrain you're going to have problems because of the undulating terrain. but if you factor in, as we have already discovered, that 90% of the battlefield is covered in

forest, now you're trying to maneuver your uniform lines through these intervening trees. and they immediately break up the formations. so it's a slow go, this being able to rush forward across this intervening mile of terrain to get at sherman and prentiss's divisional camps, you're not going to be able to do it, maintain order, maintain communications, maintain authority, line of authority over the troops, and maintain cohesion. and if you're meeting resistance, every time you meet resistance, you're going to come to a stop, because you're going to have to deal with that resistance. so that's why it takes the better part of two hours. it's actually three from the time the first shots are fired. but the better part of two hours once the main line begins to roll forward before you have any brigade upon brigade-sized actions immediately in front of the most forward-advance federal camps. and in that two hours, what is the union army doing? they're waking up to the fact

that it's not the normal morning, not the normal sabbath, sunday of april 6th as they had planned, and that alarm, which will sound in sherman's camps, because his pickets will become engaged with the advance, and prentiss's camps, where prentiss now comes to realize that apparently a force has been ordered out from his own division to engage the confederates, and he has to deal with this, they become aware that something is happening. and so the alarm will sound in the forward camps, and that alarm will be picked up through the rest of the army, straight back to pittsburgh landing as these divisions become aware that there is some sort of alarm emergency on the front. and men will then be called by the long role to get their uniforms, get their equipment, get their weapons and move to their formation points and get ready.

and that getting ready is the saving grace to large extent for how the union army is going to encounter the confederates in the first four to five hours of the battle. so the supplies is not quite as complete as they would desired, but it still a major surprise on the united states army. johnston's mission was in the approaching battle, every effort be made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut his line of retreat to the tennessee river and forcing him back on al creek, where he'll be obliged to surrender. so johnston is envisioning striking the union left first, turning it, cutting off that viable retreat to the tennessee river, and then using the mass of his army to drive grant's army back into the swamps to the north, and destroy them. that's what obliged to surrender means in johnston's battle orders. he is going to force them to

surrender or destroy them in detail. he completely envisions a battle of annihilation. he is trying to win a decisive battle of annihilation. neutralize grant so he can deal with all these other problems. so this confederate force has a mission. and that mission is to turn the union left flank. only the confederate high command knows that mission. troops in the ranks don't understand they're to do anything except locate enemy forces and to fight them and defeat them. that's about the bulk of what the confederate soldier knows about what their mission is here. the roads that the public traverse today on the battlefield, 95% or so are the same routes of movement, the same road lines that were here at the time of the battles. they straightened them out a little, took the kinks out, but were -- you know, that's kind of a preservation plus for the visitor, because they don't have

to understand well what was the historic road network? because we just tell them it's the same. it hasn't changed. and then the markering system will clue them in to where missing components are. there were two cabins sitting here. and this would be the point where johnston established his first field headquarters once he enters this portion of the battlefield on the morning of april 6th. so he would have been able to look down the avenue here, see his troops maneuvering through the woods. he would have already saw some of the initial combat. in fact, first thing that greeted johnston's eyes when he arrived was seeing his troops retreating in the face of heavy federal fire. and he would have to ride amongst the arkansas troops and rally them. johnston would be called to rally the troops throughout the day. he is a very motivational leader. he understood the issues of the volunteers, what motivated the

men, what the men looked for in their leaders. and he was a man who could make that happen. he was of a big persona, and had a unique appreciate for volunteers that many of his peers, north or south, did not hold at this particular stage of the civil war. so he would be here for a short while as the opening phases of the battle begin. so he would see troops making the initial attacks on sherman's division, and then he would ride eastward here and supervise the main thrust against what he knew to be the union left, or believed was the union left, which was the engagement against prentiss' six division. the patrol came out from peabody's brigade that force would be reinforced there would be subsequent action here in our

immediate front. this is where johnston encounters retreating arkansas troops. and that reinforced union party would fall back on the main federal line that prentiss and his brigade commanders had thrown forward of their camps. and the battle moves in that direction, and the main thrust given that johnson wants to turn the union left, the main thrust is to our east and on the confederate right. because they want the make that happen before they begin the push to drive the federals northward. but it's simultaneous fighting. and getting the public to realize that things happen, there is a chronology to it. but often it's happening at the

same time in realizing that we go from two forces constituting 250, 300 men, okay. so that's the battle front when the battle starts. but by the time we reach 11:00, the battle front will be three miles from left to right. and a raid across that three miles then will be the great mass of the two armies, engaged in pitched battle. you will have at that point in time roughly 80,000 men fighting. we've moved east from where the battle began at woods and fraley field. we're now roughly 3/4 of a mile east from there and north. and we came to where benjamin prentiss' sixth division was encamped here along the eastern corinth road. prentiss' division was the

youngest division in grant's still organizing army of the tennessee, and thus he is still awaiting the arrival of regiments to join the organization. he has two brigades before it's complete, envisioned to have three brigades. so he is still awaiting the arrival of regiments. in fact, some of the most recent arrivals have just went into camp the day before the battle. so think about 5400 men, and now all of the sudden they're called into battle. and some of the elements are new to the division. so it had to be quite confusing. over the course of the first two hours, johnston is able to maneuver his wing elements into attack positions to take on prentiss' division.

so you have the preliminary acts where they're fighting powell's combat team, and of course powell is reinforced by elements from the 6th division, and they are skirmishing with the advancing confederate forces. and it's just a slow process of the confederates continuing to maneuver, continuing to push forward, being back these federal elements before they come to bear against what is prentiss' main line. the initial combat front for prentiss lay in front of us. he advanced his forces anywhere from 2/10 of a mile to a quarter mile from font of his main camp line, and took possession to stride the eastern corinth road. he had two batteries of artillery, and the guns of those two batteries were deployed astride the eastern corinth road, firing up the road

corridor. and then infantry positioned in front. that was the main defense. over the course of roughly two hours, from 7:30 in the morning until about 9:00, the main struggle here takes shape. the initial federal front is held for about an hour, and they are able to halt, initially halt the first attacks by the confederates against the camps. and forcing the confederate leaders to bring more and more troops into play. and over the course of the morning, johnston is able to maneuver half his army, half of the army, eight of the 16 brigades are maneuvered to a point directly opposite prentiss's division. that's an overwhelming mass. now four of the eight brigade

also be in direct contact with prentiss. the rest of them will move up into support and be in supporting distance. but it shows the sweep, the turn that johnston is as he is trying to cut grant's retreat to the river. because it's clear that johnston believes that prentiss is the left flank elements of the union army. and the reason we now know that apparently johnston believed that is the realization that the confederate leaders understood the union army to be facing west as opposed to south. in other words, when the confederates planned the attack, planned the offensive, it is with an understanding that the union forces are west of pittsburgh landing and facing west. because the confederates

believed that corinth is further west than it is south from pittsburgh landsing. they have a slight miscalculation in their understanding of the geography and their maps illustrate this. their maps show corinth twice as far from east to west, from pittsburgh landing than it is by miles north and south. we now know that the exact opposite is true. we know that corinth was twice as far north to south from pittsburgh landing than it was from east to west. that little terrain perspective, confederates are marching from the west, slightly north, but generally eastward, led the confederate high command into assuming the army faced west. the battle plan was to turn the union left first to cut off the retreat to the river. you would not, you would not logically, if you knew the federal army faced south, deploy with your army facing east, if

your primary mission was to turn the union left first. that misunderstanding has a great deal to do with our understanding of why it's fought the way it is and why troops maneuver the way they do and why johnson brought so much of the weight of his army to bear against this point is because he believes in the initial contact that he has struggled with the union left. he believes in the initial maneuver that he has turned that left. and by 9:00 when his troops are entering this union camp, that mass having driven prentiss 5,400 men out of it, that he s has, indeed, cut grant's retreats to the tennessee river because having brought half the army to bear here, he still, by

knowing how his army is deployed and knowing that troops to his left are engaged and they are engaged over at shiloh church against sherman's division, supported by mcclernen's division, his visual understanding is i have moved up and i'm now inside east of where my left is engaged union forces at the church. therefore, i have cut, retreated to the river landing. it's very interesting. the pittsburgh map shows it almost due east of shiloh church. not well north and east of shiloh church as it truly was and still is, but that it's almost due east of shiloh church. and if johnston has moved to a point where he's now inside east of it, he would have this perception that he has turned

grant's left. it is clear to see that developing within his own mind frame and his subsequent actions illustrate that, indeed, that is how he's thinking. because this massive fight for presentis' camps starting on the line here falls back to the camp front, which is defended for less than an hour before the federals are pushed out of it, and they're pushed out of it because there're unsupported. there are no additional union troops in nearby support. sherman is over at the church but the confedrates have entered the gap or vacuumed between the two divisions so there's no lateral communication or assistance between sherman and prentiss occurring. mcclernen's moved up to assist sherman but no one's moved up to

asus prentiss. he got one regimen ordered to join him at pittsburgh landing, scheduled to join him anyway, to become part of the 15th michigan infantry, but they arrive with no musket balls to put in those guns. amazing. they stand a few minutes before the colonel. oliver's getting them off the front and out of here go find some ammunition. so that shows you also the nature of preparedness that these green armies find themselves. that a unit that's ordered out to reinforce has no ammunition and is unable to obtain any until it gets here, and, of course, conditioned find any here and has to back out. so just a striking example of the unpreparedness. but that's the only support that prentiss receives.

so he's overwhelmed by four brigades against two, clear that it sees it is mass leading sizeable force. both flanks have turned. command against the breakdown. colonel peabody's killed, his fifth and final wound trying to rally his troops and everything falls apart. and at 9:00, prentiss is in full retreat. his force, streaming, streaming northward through advancing union forces, who are coming to his assistance, but are unable to reach him, given the time frame of where they began from their camps to reach to the advanced points on the battlefield. things have unfolded, which will mean that subsequent fighting will be north of here on this particular frontage. johnston enters the camps. his troops are so overwhelmed with the success that they've had, they had issued rations

before they left corynth. most of the men cooked and ate their food before they even got on the road. so, remember, the battle was supposed to have been fought on the 4th. now it is fought on the 6th. many of them have not eaten for two days or more. then they hit this union camp and later on, union troops would say they weren't surprised. the confederate veterans were commenting, well, maybe they weren't surprised but they did have the most devoted cooks in the world because food was on the fire when they entered camp. but remember it had been a typical morning in camp. not a lot of action planned for a typical sunday morning in camp. of course, church services, probably parades or reviews. but not a great deal of activity usually in a camp that's on a standdown, and so it's a typical morning. so confederates hit this union camp, and it's like a treasure

trove of foods. i mean the feds have luxuries. they have canned seafood and fresh bread and real coffee and they have got everything. have sugar. it's a treasure trove. not only that, but all of the personal belongings of the federal troops are in their tents. so the men stop to plunder. so there is a breakdown in command. not only have the men stopped to plunder, but they have joined him. the line officers in particular, johnston rides in amongst this and he is incensed, particularly when he finds officers plundering in the camps. so he finds one coming out of the tent with captured belongings. he shames the man. he said, see here, we're not here for that kind of stuff, not that kind of plunder. he shames him in front of his men. as i told you before, he understands the motivation of these volunteers. i think he recognized he had a moment and he saw a cup sitting on a table and he just bent down sadly and picked it up. he said, let this be my portion of the spoils today. then he urged everybody to get back with their commands,

reform, reform, because there's more of those people to fight. there's more of this battle to be waged. and through his actions, the actions of hardy, bragg, their subordinates, they get these troops back into formations, and it's at this critical point johnston learns from a reconnaissance that there is a reported federal force off to his east. it's maybe division sized in strength is the report. now he can see federal camps to his right front as he gazes underneath the canopy off towards the hamburg purdy road in the distance. now what he's actually looking at are the camps of what is the true union left. he doesn't realize that though. i think if you had stopped johnston at that point in time and asked him what he was looking at, he would havld