really know how to get our cal perfects around this subject. i think it's a real challenge. i know shareen hunter is -- >> bold enough to suggest the methodology of somehow looking at this. i don't have the answer, i'm not a military strategist, i'm more of a regionalist. but i've been doing this a lot. and i have the advantage of being from the region, myself. and so i can, i can kind of understand sometimes some of the things. one of the things that i don't think we have come to terms with, i don't, in the war generally is that the collapse of the soviet union has just changed the world. you know, in the old days, when you had absolutely dominant paradigm, you could have, even during the cold war, i remember one of the books that i read as a graduate student in england, was called you know, "nations in

alliance." and one of the things is that the great powers generally want alliances in order to achieve the broad gains. whereas the local states want alliances with the great powers, to help them in their local little games. now, this asymmetry that exists between a great power, and a local power, has become so much more pronounced and strengthened since the collapse of the soviet union. i'm sorry to say that i don't think our, even academic community, but definitely policy community, at least of what i'm sure they know it, maybe in their private deliberations, but openly, for example, we don't seem to understand quite well, that our interests and pakistan's interests in afghanistan are not the same. i wrote an article, in 1989 saying that. and the title if you want to look at lexisnexis was in afghanistan, act ii, beware that

its interests is not pakistan. the same thing, our interests in afghanistan, are not the aim sass saudi arabia. our interests in the persian gulf are not the same with saudi arabia or even in iraq. and yet we pursued both in afghanistan after our victory and in iraq, a strategy that ultimately in afghanistan, we favored the pashtun. pashtun equals taliban to a great extent. again, in iraq, i'm sorry to say, certainly after 2005-2006, we basically helped the sunni insurgent and there's a long history of that. i think this is one of the major things we have to keep in mind. that the whole system of international relations has grown asymmetrical. the other thing is that frankly, i am going to say this is the last time i'm going to say. but i have the opportunity, with important people, our policy towards iran has distorted our entire policy in the middle east and central asia.

you cannot go around iran. we have, whether it was the dual containment. whether it was to help to create the taliban. a major rationale behind it was to contain iran and we have made of iran a soviet union that is not a soviet union, it's a crummy little country, with rickety stuff with a big mouth. so if we want to manage this region, we have to have a wholistic approach. and i'm done. [ applause ] >> closing word or two and then i would like to thank you all for coming. first, if i might say it, the legacy of, make a comment or two about the potential legacy of al qaeda, if it is dead or dying. and hopefully will fade away. if in the light of who we, the potomac institute are and what we do, we're a science and technology policy think tank. where we look at the impacts of

science and technology on our society. the impacts in regards to terrorism, i'd like to sum up as a final word to today's conference. terrorism as being have said here today, particularly general gray, terrorism has been around almost since the beginning of mankind. the ability of a few to terrorize many by killing them publicly has been a tactic that's been used by many, many people. the difference today, and if i might comment that this is to me, the legacy of al qaeda, is the demonstration that a small group cannot just terrorize by killing a few. but by using technology, kill thousands. that was the difference of 9/11. it wasn't a terror act where they set off an ied and three or four people were killed. or an ied that brought down a headquarters building and 330 were killed. as in the middle east general gray commented on. this was an event where a small group used modern technology do

kill 3,000 people. and they demonstrated to the rest of the world how a small group of people can have a strategic effect. that's the legacy we're going to have to deal with and learn how to compensate and cope with for generations to come. i'd like to thank you all for joining us today. we hope that you'll continue to participate with us in this attempt at scholar suspect in studying these issues and we hope that you'll come back to the institute in the future. thank you very much. the military academy at west

point published 17 declassified documents recovered from osama bin laden's compound in pakistan. translated into english, the documents total 175 pages. they're available on our website. go to c-span.org. live tonight on our website -- at 9:30, former defense secretary, donald rumsfeld talks

about the bush doctrine, compassionate conservatism and the war on terror at the citadel military college in charleston, south carolina. and at 11:30 eastern, urban america in the mid 20th century. boden college professor, brian purnell teach as course on the social, economic, cultural and political dynamics of the america in the 20th century after world war ii. spend the weekend in oklahoma city, with book tv and american history tv. saturday at noon eastern check in on literary life with book tv on c-span 2. with oklahoma university president and former senator on his a letter to america. also rare books from galileo, copernicus and others. and sunday at 5:00 p.m. eastern,

oklahoma history on c-span 3. tour the oklahoma city bombing memorial. plus a look into african-american life in 1920s oklahoma. once a month c-span's local content vehicles explore the history and literary life of city ace cross america. this weekend, from oklahoma city on c-span 2 and 3. >> this is c-span 3, with politics and public interest programming. telling the american story on american history tv. get our schedules and see past programs at our websites. you can join in the conversation on social media sites. >> regulation of technology and innovation were discussed at a stanford university law school conference held in early march. speakers included facebook general counsel, ted olyiat, the

founder of pay pal, peter teal as well as two attorneys that represent communications companies and hollywood artists in intellectual property disputes. the moderator is stanford law school dean. the panel is two hours. >> i would just have one quick story i have to slip in. we were trying to recruit somebody at one point from a law school out in the east. in the boston area. i said to the person, who works in the area, that of course you should come here. this is the center of the universe for everything that you care about. and there's so many important things that are happening. it's not that nothing is happening anywhere else. to not come here is sort of like staying in somchai tongsawat small town in scotland or going to manchester or london during the industrial revolution. or the american revolution happens and the states have always been the authority. you have to make a decision, do you stay in boston or go to the new capital.

and join the new government. and if you are farsighted you go to the new capital and join the government. and you become john adams and a major historical figure well-remembered 250 years later. if you're sam adams, you choose to stay in boston and become a beer. so of course, what goes on here with respect to the regulatory state, what the government does do that can enhance or impede the growth of technological innovation and invention is obviously something hugely important and that's what the panel will discuss. i'm going to quickly introduce everybody and then just pose a question and give everybody a moment to talk about it, and then turn it over to you. i'm going to do this in alphabetical order, starting with richard epstein, he's a pivotal figure in the legal academy and scholarship in the

past half century. he's been one of the most -- a major scholar in too many fields to list. it includes torts, constitutional law, administrative law, law and economics, property and many more. he's also i should say speaking as someone who was his student, great teacher and mentor. just quickly by way of background, he earned his bachelor's from columbia in '64. got a bachelor's in jurisprudence, and an llb in '68. he did not get a supreme court clerkship according to the story he told us, when he interviewed with chief justice warren, he was asked which of the justice's opinions he didn't agree with. and he said, where should i begin? not calculated to get a clerkship. instead, then he began teaching at usc where he taught from '68 to '72. then moved to the university of chicago where he was from 1972 until 2009. he's now at nyu. richard is also one of the rare

academics who made the transition to becoming a public intellectual, but did so without giving up his deeper scholarly work or his representation among people who value that. his gumption of being on this panel, as well as several others. next, tony falzone, to my immediate left. my immediate left, your right forfrom me is the executive director of the fair use project and a lecturer and law here at stanford law school. it's a project we started about six years ago, that is designed to both clarify and expand the boundaries of fair use in copyright. tony came with a strong background to do this sort of work, he was a graduate of the harvard law school, clerked for barry mosq barry moskovitz. came to stanford law school in 2007.

while directing the fair youth project he's won a number of important cases against the likes of the joyce estate and yoko ono and on that one, for those of us who are like deep beatles fans, it doesn't matter what side we were taking, as long as he beat yoko. some day, i'll show you the press release that i wanted to put out, that nobody would let me. he argued with less success, the golan case in the supreme court this year. he's been recognized as one of the top i.p. lawyers in both california and the country. next, mark lently at the far end of the table. a professor of law at stanford law school and also the director of the stanford program in law science and technology. mark earned his b.a. here at stanford in '88 followed by a j.d. from bolt in '9d 1. clerked for dorothy nelson on the ninth circuit. joined the faculty at texas in '94, where he stayed until 2000.

he moved to bolt in 2000 and then to stanford in 2005. mark's brief spilled over to the other side of the card. there's no question that he is the leading academic in the field of patents, but he a may also be the leading practitioner in the field as well. he is positively posnarian in his capacity to get things done. while publishing seven books and a treatise and 122 full articles he's a founding partner in a law practice and maintains a healthy practice, having argued countless cases in both district courts, courts of appeals. the list of awards that mark has earned over the years is actually in fact, like too long to read. what i wrote is just think of every award given to lawyers that you might want to earn, and mark has received it on multiple occasions. peter teal probably needs no

introduction, formerly, he's the head of a hedge fund, as i suspect most of you know, much more. he earned his b.a. and j.d. from stanford, the latter of in 1992. he's an original in all respects. as a kid, was one of the highest-ranked chess players in the united states. i gather gene mayer can give him a run for his money. while he was at stanford. he founded the stanford review. after law school, he clerked for judge he had mundsen on the 11th circuit. spent a short time at credit suisse, but then co-founded pay pal. peter created a place for himself as an innovative hedge fund manager and a venture capitalist with an astonishing eye for successful ventures, including facebook. he created a place for himself as a public intellectual and provocateur and is well known for his support of such things as the sing lart institute on

artificial intelligence. the sea setting institute and most recently, the teal fell fellowship for young entrepreneurs for young people who may be better served not going to college than doing so. he teaches an occasional class at law school actually teaches at the law school as often as i can persuade him to take the time to do so. and the way i conceptualize that class is basically, it's the world according to peter teal. and i don't actually care what he does. the idea is if you have a law school and you can put extraordinary minds in front of people and give them a chance to interact that's a good thing for them and that's why we try to get peter to teach as often as we can. lastly speaking of people at the heart of ongoing technology and information revolution is ted to my immediate right, the vice president, general counsel and secretary of facebook. he earned his b.a. from harvard

in 1990, followed bay year in france and then a j.d. from the university of chicago in 1994. ted then clerked for a judge in the fourth circuit and for justice scalia on the supreme court. after his clerkship he was a lawyer at kirkland and ellis, although he moved to aol time warner in 2001 as associate general counsel and then from there, became the general counsel of aol time warner europe, i suppose making use of the french. he joined the bush administration in 2008, first in the white house and then as chief of staff to attorney general gonzales. returned to kirkland following the end of the administration and joined facebook in 2008. where he currently is. so with that, let me, let me open this up and as i say, i'm going to pose a question that you know, gives everybody a chance it talk a little bit about the issues that we're dealing with here. and i think we'll again start ail betically, which means i'll start with you, richard, and set

the time for ten minutes and no more. we'll get people just to reflect a little on what is the relationship between technology and the regulatory state and how, if at all, should government regulate technological progress, innovation and all the good things that we hope to get out of technology while hopefully limiting the bad things. >> thank you very much for giving me the first chance to do this. what i will do is start the with the question and then try to give an answer to the question slightly refrain. there is certainly a very powerful question. regulation and one can think of, so-called regulatory state. so the question then is exactly what kinds of regulations are desirable and why is it that i think that they don't fall within this larger category of regulations which are generally dubious. you need systems of

recordations, you need a statute of frauds, in order to make this thing go. so the thought that there is some disembodied free market out there which doesn't depend on government force, which is not a myth, it's serum a mistake. but the key features under these circumstances is what is the point of the system of regulation. and what is designed to do in virtually all of these cases, to fortify by reverse engineering, a system of competitive markets. so strong property rights protected by regulation, statute of frauds on formalities of contract, use of force against contracting parties. all drive you very much in this kind of position. i don't think that there's anybody who can quarrel with the fact of regulation in these kinds of areas or treat it is a sign of regulation in a regulatory state. when we come to technology two important fields to discuss and each of them requires at least some deviation or at least some

mott modification of the earlier positions. the two types of systems are the intellectual property system, which for these purposes is copyrights and patents and trade secrets and the other turns out to be the network industries having to do with railroads, telecommunications and so on. the issue is what makes these things special. what's going to be the kinds of regulations we ought to welcome. what are the kinds of regulation, which are part of the regulatory state that we ought to be very concerned about. so let's turn to the first of these things with the intellectual property act. what is so clear about intellectual property, it's not simply enough to allow people to take first possession of property physically and announce they own it as early as 1790, we start out with patent act and a co copyright act and the question is ha makes these statutes in long-term success. the first thing is neither of these are meant to be technologically forcing within their respective domain. with respect to the patent statute, what the law does is it

gives you a system whereby if you file first or invent first, there's a battle as to which of these two things matters. there will be an examiner who will decide whether or not this particular patent is or is not going to be valid. if it's protected, what happens is if it falls into the sphere of ordinary property rights, protected by injunctions and damages and the advent of infringement which is the intellectual analog and allows you to license thing, which is the power of disposition associated with these kinds of rights. by virtue of the fact that you have yourself a decentralized system in which anyone can start to play the game, the only real questions that you want to have with respect to this system is just how it is you make it as efficacious as possible. in dealing with this thing, i think the 1952 patent act, the act before this godforsaken american invents act did a good job of drying to figure out what kinds of advances, what kinds of

subject matters were eligible for patent protections, what level of advance over previous things you needed in order to get that protection and so on down the line. there was certainly controversial features about this system. and the ebay case, which weakened the injunctive reliefs questions and some of the questions having to do with lg, with the ability to create various kinds of licenses were negative with respect to operation. the thing that one most fears with respect property rights under the patent system is that there will be a variety of mistakes. one of them is you could lengthen their terms undually, a real problem that i think mark will talk about in connection with property rights and ted which i'm opposed to. i don't think that's a real risk in these particular cases. but you could make the system convoluted and so for the that you no longer understand the actual boundaries, this would include having complicated reexamination provisions, most of which strike me as a huge mistake and it also requires the

fragment agency of patents so that business patents start to get special treatment. i think the simplicity and the robustness of the older system were correct. on copyright you need to have some system of registration. you don't need a system of examination and the two systems have widely parted grounds on that. the question of durability of intellectual property under the copyright system is subject to general tension. copyright patents are short-lived things and for shakespeare they need to be longer. you should be cautious about gratuitous extensions of the length of the patent. so things that the patent extension act is in my mind a kind of mistake and i think for the most part we've tried to keep relatively to the privatized model here. and the more we can basically analogize the traditional forms of property, the better we will be. when you swing over to the other side of the line with respect to the question of how you deal with technology under network industries, again, for a whole variety of reasons, there's always been the dominant and

correct position that when you're dealing with institutions that have monopoly elements and cannot form truly competitive types of situations that you must have some system of government regulation. and the question is what's form of system is going to be appropriate. and in this particular situation, the choice of methods can make a huge difference. i'm just going to give one example of a kind of regulation, which came a little bit too soon and created trillions of dollars in losses. because it managed to get the wrong solution. i'm thinking of the 1996 telecommunications act. because to the extent that you're trying to figure out how you run one of these systems, if your fundamental theory is the local exchange carriers will remain forever, have monopoly power, which means you have to be very complicated in the way in which you introduce new entities and allow one company to buy network elements from another. you've managed to capture the elements of the essential technology of 1996. but by 1998, it was quite clear that the implicit assumption of that act, the dominance of the exclusive power of the local

exchange carriers were wrong and when you started to allow the government to force the sale particular network elements at bargain prices you created all sorts of distortions in that market. which in the end, helped nobody. so the great question that you have to worry about when you're dealing with this market, is exactly the question, what's the form of regulation that you want. and in that case, the mistake was, instead of having the government supervise interconnection agreements, which could have been done relatively easy. they went to this system of forced exchange that dominated. we're now in a new age. and what happens in this new particular age is with the decline of the local monopolies under these exchange characters, what you end up with is a system in which entry now becomes a really plausible type of arrangement. that is, instead of trying to force people to interconnect, you could let people build out other kinds of networks and in the course of using those particular networks, enter into competition one to another. where in many case dls may be some need for interconnection. but in many cases there will not be. as for example, with a lot of

these networks which are designed to transmit huge amounts of data and so forth. so the question is, what's the appropriate system of regulation. and i think the fundamental pos tu lat you would want to adopt in cases of this sort runs as follows. if you could conceive of a way in which new technology allows for the facility and creation of competitive networks, you want to treat this no longer as a monopolistic society, you wnt to treat it as a competitive industry and let the people determine the composition of the traffic they need to take over their networks and the prices they'll pay for the traffic in question. this means if these alternative networks are available, the last thing that you want to do is to impose any kind of network neutrality requirement on these systems. because that becomes a very funny kind of well-transferred from those people who put the pipes together to those people who want to push content over it. one of the things we can say about a net neutrality system is that the value of the

information is relatively homogenous and the cost of providing it is relatively low, there isn't much to be lost by having a pro rata system. and in fact, many cases, that's what firms will do. if it turns out that it isn't worth their while to try to engage in any forms of discrimination. as we've seen the other day from the at&t announcement it was throwing in the towel and it was going to start to put limitations on the maximum amount any given customer could throw through a network, there are serious capacity constraints, even in the most ka patience networks, as they make the pipes larger, there are people who will find larger things to send over the pipes. nobody would have thought of sending hundreds of movies over the pipes in 1990. but now you have pipes big enough to do it, the company will come. at this particular point, the differentiation in rates seems to be extremely important. because what you'd like to be able to do is to give higher-valued services, higher prices so that the network on the other side could start to organize itself. so the difficulty that you get in running one of these things

is you have to first answer the question of is this something that looks remotely like a comparative industry. two or three carriers i'm willing to say yes. oun or two carriers, one clearly not and so forth and the dominant strategy in this area is not to try to have heavy-handed government regulation which sets prices and mandates entry and so forth. that will make the technology industry look like the health care industry that they talked about at lunch. we have mandatory service and so forth. what you want to do is exactly the opposite. to try to find ways in which you can expand the opportunities of entry, so you can reduce the number of opportunities or needs for having direct kinds of control. i think in effect the way in which this particular choice is going to be adjudicated in the next generation is going to determine for better or worse, whether or not this nation or indeed other nations will be able to keep up the energetic drive. every time you regulate tough stuff on the guys who are the pipes, you'll help the content

providers to some extent. you're going to retard investments on the other side. i think voluntary arrangements figure out which is the optimal way in which the structure of that kind of interaction and i think we don't want to go to the regulatory state for that issue. >> most people you cut off mid sentence, richard you have to cut off mid paragraph. >> i was done. >> that's a compliment. >> tony, same question, how should the government think about regulating technological progress? should it, what's the role? >> well i have a couple of general observations and a couple of specific examples. i think number one, technology can benefit from government involvement. just in terms of regulation, you obscure some important points. when you start pawuking about the framework of regulation you're in this paradigm where technology is a private good. what is the government going to do to restrict your private use of that particular technology.