day at the white house in cabinet-level meetings trying to ameliorate wage and price increases or come up with decisions on various wage and prices across the country which was bizarre. >> in -- >> remember, george schultz was -- john connolly and george schultz both had a role in administering that program and arnie weber was the executive director. and then don rumsfeld was, too. >> well, in an interview with secretary schultz said he was against wage and price control. >> i think it's true. it was connolly that convinced nixon. i'm sure schultz was against it. he hated the idea. so that's why it was amusing that he was put in charge with it. >> in an interview with us vice president cheney talked about how he played a role working for rumsfeld and actually assigning some of these targets, you know, deciding how much of this or that could be produced. i think he gave us an example of

the wine industry. >> it was truly bizarre. it was a nightmare. but one funny incident. the television networks came in to see me. i don't know why i was designated as the person to see on this, but the office of the legal counsel assistant attorney general, he had not yet been appointed to the supreme court, came in my office as well because the network ceos and their general counsels were asserting it was unconstitutional to impose price controls on the network. the first amendment protected their right to set prices.

bill and i had a short conference in which we agreed that this was ridiculous. as a legal matter. but i told bill, let me handle it a different way. i said, you know, gentlemen, if we conclude that price controls on the networks are constitutionally dubious, it would follow that we would have to suspend any wage controls on the network. oh, well, we don't want that. that was the end of that. >> but if you would have used that argument, you could have also found the entire program constitutional dubious. >> of course. no, no. it was just the networks or the

press. that was their argument. >> the freedom of the first amendment. but you could have found -- >> nobody was making that argument. that had gone by way of the supreme court decision in yakus back in world war ii. >> oh. but okay. that didn't just apply in times of war, though? >> no. you don't want me to go into a legal analysis but -- >> no. okay. >> it is true that yakus was decided in wartime and that's the reason it was easy for the supreme court to decide it. but the constitutional decision did not limit it to the supreme -- to wartime. >> so at the time -- >> but george was wholly opposed to it, and i -- when i gay that speech to the aba, it was based on my understanding of not just my view but george's view and jim's view and i thought nixon's

view. i knew nothing about connelly's persuasion -- sessions with nixon. >> can we focus a bit on the exit strategy. this was a group that -- this must have been a slightly controversial group. i mean, there were people in the administration who supported wage and price control. >> nobody supported it on its merits. the ones who supported it, supported it only for political reasons. everybody agreed we should get out of it as soon as possible. >> okay. but were you going to get out of it before the '72 election or not? >> no. short answer no. >> so, the exit strategy would be? >> i think we may have implemented something before '72 but we were planning on the post-election. look, it was clear to everybody in the administration this was an election ploy, but the democrats deserved it for having demanded it for so long.

>> right about this time i think you have that discussion with volpe and romney -- >> no, this was after. >> when did you have that discussion when they asked -- >> after we were all fired. >> after we were all fired. meese te please tell us about that discussion. >> after -- well, let me see now. i'm not positive about that. after the election of '72 in which a number of cabinet officers, undersecretaries or deputies, and assistant secretaries' resignations were accepted to put it euphemistically, i remember a dinner, actually it was cocktails, with jim hodgson, george romney, john volpe, dick

van dusan who was the undersecretary of hud, romney's undersecretary, and me. and romney, hodgson, and volpe were complaining about the fact that they had never, or almost never, had any -- certainly never any small meetings with nixon on domestic policy matters. and i had had that one meeting with nixon on the legislation to deal with emergency disputes. turned out that that was one of the few meetings he ever had with subcabinet officials on a domestic matter. and these three cabinet officers were speculating that nixon

never wanted to meet with them because he was afraid that they would press their pet projects and it would bust their budget. they all said they wouldn't have done that, but they just felt fru frustrated because they didn't have any meetings with him. i thought about that meeting after the tapes came out and i read more and more of nixon's discussions and got more and more of a perception of his personality, and i also had one meeting with him after i was fi fired, with my wife, and i concluded that nixon did not have the meetings with his cabinet officers one-on-one not because he was afraid of their efforts to lobby him, but i think nixon was aware of the fact that his personality was

not all that pleasant, that he had -- he realized he had real negative aspects, and i don't think he wanted to show them to too many people. so, he met only with ehrlichman, haldeman, colston and george schultz, connelly and a few others. i think when he met with george he was pretty careful not to exhibit the same kind of behavior or personality that he did in the tapes to haldeman, ehrlichman, colston and connelly. >> when you listened to the tapes, did you -- when you listened to the tapes, did you come to some conclusion about the role of anti-se mettism? >> yes, i was absolutely horrified to read about nixon's

statement about jews. if i had ever heard any of those statements, i would have resigned on the spot. there's one rather amusing aspect of this. in -- before the election of '72, i was called by someone in the white house to ask -- no, to be told that i was to speak to a large congregation of rabbis in chicago. make a political speech. i says, you know, i'm not -- i'm not particularly religious. i'm not a great political speechmaker. i'm not sure i'm the right man for this. and the person at the other end of the phone said, well, you are the highest-ranking jew in the

administration. i said wait a minute, what about kissinger? no, no, you actually outrank him as the undersecretary of labor. and he can't make political speeches as national security adviser, you can. so i reluctantly went out to chicago to speak to these rabbis. rumsfeld who was working in the white house and an ex-congressman from illinois was also the speaker. and this has been a great bit of amusement between the two of us ever since. because after the two speeches the chief rabbi who had put together this meeting of hundreds of rabbis came to me -- first asked what synagogue, what temple i belonged to, i didn't belong to any temple, but i decided that every town has a

beth israel, so i said beth israel, and i had no idea where it was in the washington area. he said, i'm not so sure that's such a good temple. and then he said, i've got some advice to you, your speech did not resonate amongst jews. it didn't give -- it didn't have enough of a jewish feel the way rumsfeld did. i couldn't believe it. when i told don, i said it's not fair, you're a kraut and not a jew. why should you be perceived as a jew? we've been good friends ever since. we laughed about that. but, of course, he was a politician, i wasn't. but in any event, going back to it, there were a lot of juf of the administration, particularly in the white house, herb stein, chairman of the counsel of economic advisers -- oh, no, he wasn't chairman yet.

he was a member of the council. bill safire, of course, was the speechwriter. len garman was there. when i saw on the tapes or heard about nixon's remarks about jews and also learned about malik's -- the background of malik, i remember telling all three of them that i was appalled that they would have worked around nixon given his anti- anti-semitism. they said it was all voting blocs. and i said nonsense, it was straight-out anti-semitism. and all three of them were much more identified with the jewish community than i was. i think they were rationalizing.

>> before we move from the department of labor period, did you work at all on the u.s. postal service issue? th there was a postal strike. >> yes. jim hodgson worked on that more than i did. i helped a little bit, but jim worked on that more than i did. >> okay. >> it actually turned out that the postal service was -- had as its representative a guy by the name of james blaisdale, who had been the founder of the law firm i had been a partner of in honolulu. and i'd never met him. he had left and come back to the mainland before i came to hawaii. and he was enormously competent and able and he and jim worked a great deal together on that postal strike. >> if i'm not mistaken there is an arena named after blaisdale in honolulu. >> that's a different blaisdale. that's an ex-mayor.

that's neil blaisdale. >> did you have any -- i don't know why you would, but just have to ask. did you have any inkling that, "a," your resignation would be requested and, "b," that it would be accepted -- >> no. >> -- in 1972? >> no. all i knew that i could be in a tenuous position because of my obduratness with clay cattrall and colston. but there was speculation in the press that i would succeed jim and there were afl-cio types who advocated that, so i thought i was in pretty good order generally. i think i had a reputation of being a good administrator within the administration and a good reputation with both management, labor and civil rights groups which are our

three constituencies, but i knew i was not amazed when i was asked to leave. i was astonished that all the resignations -- they were all asked to resign and that the number of resignations which were accepted. >> not many. >> plenty. >> of course, the government was -- >> yes, in the labor department everybody's resignation was accepted except for mike moscow who was my deputy went over to an assistant secretary of hud under jim lin who was elevated from undersecretary of commerce to secretary of hud. but the labor department was pretty much wiped out. >> i think alexander haig would explain that the challenge he

faced was he found a half-staffed government when he comes in as chief of staff in '73. >> yes. and many of those white house people were put all -- put in as jobs deputy secretary or undersecretaries of departments. now, my resignation was accepted, but i was offered a job, two jobs. and this is -- i was told by ehrlichman that i was offered the post of a judge on the ninth circuit, now, i'm from hawaii. you understand the courts of appeal, you know, ninth circuit is the west, headquarter eed in san francisco. i was all of 37. and part of me had always dreamed, one part of me, had always dreamed about the court of appeal. ehrlichman said, president thinks you're a first class

lawyer but you're too rigid for politics. and will you take the seat on the ninth circuit. and i said, of course. and i went to -- a week later i went to a white house dinner or reception -- a dinner i think it was, where i think it was -- it either was a labor-related relations dinner or it was for people who were -- i can't remember why i was there. but nixon, my wife and i were there, and nixon told my wife how delighted he was i was going to be on the ninth circuit and he told me how delighted he was. and a week later the deputy attorney general called me on the phone and said, larry, has the president offered you a seat on the ninth circuit? i said yes.

you can't have that. i said, i don't understand. he said it's already been committed to ronald reagan, governor of california, would have the choice. and shortly thereafter ehrlichman called me and said this is really embarrassing, this is a real mess. would you be willing to take a seat on the district of columbia district court with a promise that you would get the first seat on either the d.c. court of appeals or the ninth circuit? i said, no, john. i think -- i was annoyed at this point, and i said, no, i'll just go out in the haw practice. at that point george schultz called me and offered me a post of undersecretary of treasury, not the number two, not the deputy, comparable, but the number three position at treasury. i thought about it for only a moment and i thought, you know,

i've had enough. i don't like -- i was truly annoyed. i didn't really want to be part of the administration anymore. >> what changes your mind a year later? >> ah. well, it wasn't quite a year later when i was first approached. the fellow who had been personnel chief in the labor department, a young man by the name of david weimer, he had done a wonderful job and i recommended to the white house, and he had become the personnel chief in the white house, very competent guy, very able. he called me several times in 1973 as watergate was blowing, asking me whether i would take various positions in the administration. one of them was gsa administrator. but another was a -- i can't recall what it was. i said, no, i don't want anything to do with the

administration. because watergate was blowing and i was deeply suspicious that the president himself was involved. >> let's start with why? >> i heard john dean's statement, i won't be a scapegoat, i figured huh-uh, that almost surely means that nixon was involved. that was my suspicion. so i turned david down. i also turned down john ehrlichman who asked me to represent him. or represent a committee he was forming for something. i can't recall. but i didn't want anything to do with it. i did agree to represent ed morgan who was, you may recall, ultimately indicted for backdating nixon's deed, papers, for tax purposes.

i cross-examined morgan for two days and i was absolutely convinced he was innocent. i largely had gotten him off and i went in to justice and i'll come back to why i went in to justice and i passed him to dick van dusan who was somebody he also trst usted. and after i was deputy attorney general, dick van dusan called me and said after the special prosecutor had determined not to proceed against morgan, he went in and confessed and turns out he was guilty, and i realized afterwards that i should never represent a friend in a situation like that because both van dusan and i were convinced he was absolutely innocent. in any event, so weimer had come after he a couple of types to come back in because during the watergate hearings all of my battles with colston became

public. so, for a brief period in my career i was a hero to "the new york times" and "the washington post." halcion days, for a conservative, that's very unusual. but i wouldn't come back until after the massacre. and the night of the massacre, i remember my wife saying to me, or no, somebody at dinner saying to me, you know, i bet they come after you for deputy attorney general. and bill saxby was picked as attorney general after the massacre. you may recall that after the massacre, and i don't have to explain the massacre here, after the massacre, only two republicans -- first of all, had to be a republican senator to get confirmed, and only two were thought suitable. saxby and cook of kentucky, and the reason is they were both center republican, not moderate

republicans, but center republicans. they were far conservative as you could get. a conservative republican would not be confirmed, but these two senators. and saxby you will recall had said a couple months before when asked whether he thought nixon was aware of what went on in watergate said, reminds me of a fellow who played a piano in a house of ill repute and claimed he didn't know what went on upstairs, so saxby was the love in washington. he was picked. easily confirmed. and i had worked with saxby on the occupational safety and health bill. he initially wanted somebody else as deputy. weimer called me and said, would you be willing to come back as deputy? now at that point the justice department was virtually independent of the white house. i said, you know, i think i would depending on what -- talking with saxby. he said, we need somebody who

was, number one, an administrator, good lawyer, an administrator, a reliable republican and with sufficient integrity to get confirmed. we don't have too many people that fall in that category. as a matter of fact, the only person we can think of is you because you're the only one who is a lawyer who has been a chief operating officer of a department. and bill saxby made clear he was not going to -- he was getting old, he was not going to spend that much time administrating, managing the department, so bill and i had a session and we agreed. and i agreed to come back. now, bill after he was nominated had a session with the president in which he went out and said, i believe the president, weimer called me and said will you have the same meeting with the president? i said, david, of course, i would meet with the president, but i will not say i believe him because i don't.

and it's a testament to how -- needless to say i'm sure weimer never told that to the president. but it was a testament to how desperate they were to get somebody who was confirmable as deputy attorney general. and who they thought was a reliable republican but would still be sufficiently independent to get confirmed. >> you've been watching american history tv on c-span3 where every week we feature eyewitness accounts of the people and events that have shaped our nation. you've just seen an oral history from the collection of the richard nixon presidential library. on c-span radio every saturday this month at 6:00 p.m. eastern you can hear from president nixon himself. listen in on the president's conversations with future president gerald ford, ronald

reagan and george h.w. bush and with key white house advisers and the directors of the fbi and cia. for schedule information go to cspan.org/schedule and listen online at c-spanradio.org and nationwide on xm 119 and 90.1 fm in the washington, d.c., area. all weekend long, american history tv joins our cox communications cable partners in oklahoma city to showcase its history and literary culture. settled in 1889, oklahoma city is the largest city in oklahoma. it has a population of about 600,000 people and is the sooner state's capital. you're watching american history tv on c-span3. at high noon, the guns fire and the cannons go off and the flags go down and 50,000 people rush for free land. the land run was a unique way of

opening the public lands. since the 1860s congress had a policy on the books called the homestead act, and the homestead act said that anyone who would move to the frontier on the public domain and would stay for five years and make improvements and satisfy all of those conditions, they would receive title to the land.ically free l encourage settlement. the west was settled through the arab land, the high plains and the southern plains and through kansas, through new mexico and through arkansas, and so all of the land around us is settled in the 1860s, 1870s, and into the 1880s. well, all of this time oklahoma is withheld from settlement as the indian territory, starting in the 18 teens congress and the president started moving tribes out of the old southeast, out of the midwest, out of the atlanta coast states and moving them to oklahoma until we had 39 tribes here. so, from the 18 teens, 1892, all of these indian tribes are sent

here. it's this one vast indian reservations as other reservations are abolished and those lands are opened, here's this one last island of arab land that can be farmed, that can be ran. that's valuable and everyone wants it. well, in 1889 there are no more tribes to bring into the territory. but yet there's one parcel right in the middle of the indian territory that's unassigned and so it gets its name the unassigned lands. today it goes from roughly stillwater, oklahoma, on the north to norman, oklahoma, on the south where osu and ou are located today, from shawnee on the east to elreno on the west, it's about six counties of oklahoma. not owned or settled by any other indian tribe. so, congress decides we are going to open this under the homestead act and let people claim the land. well, how do you do it? it's a small parcel of land. a lot of people wanting the land, and so if you take the

political fill hphilosophy at t time, laissez-faire government, government needs to step back in the shadow, keep your hands off daily life, let the free enterprise system work. secondly a social fill hos phil darwinism and evolution, the smartest and the fastest survive and the dumbest and slowest won't. let's open it by land run and let people at it. the first one to get to 160 acres for rural land or a town lot in one of the town lots, claims it, defends it, stays on it for five years, gets it for free. so congress sets the date for the very first land run, april 22nd, 1889, high noon. on that day 50,000 people line up around the borders of the territory and at high noon the cannons go off, the guns fire, the flags go down, a variety of means. 50,000 people rush for free land. about half go to