administration initially tended to overreact to the construction of the wall and suggested that a much faster buildup would now be necessary. general norstad said, however, events since 13th august have tended to support, not invalidate, the u.s. decision's of july. always mindful of his nato responsibilities, he added a further problem is that our allies outside of the four are becoming increasingly concerned over the dangers of the situation and under a system which they feel does not respect their desire for adequate consultation. in keeping with this moderate and realistic approach to the military buildup, submitting his plan of action, nato europe to the north atlantic council on august 21st, 1961. the plan set forth proposals for increasing the strength of the alliance's conventional forces by bringing existing units up to

full strength. he did not simply want to create new, but essentially hollow divisions. his proposals would increase nato's strength from the equivalent of 16 full divisions to 24 by the end of the year. soon afterward, a new controversy arose to the berlin crisis. september 1st, 1961, powers gave nato secretary general their draft instructions to general norstad. because these instructions used certain words it was clear they were not just limited to the four power live oak planning for berlin. the document called upon general norstad to prepare plans for, quote, broader air, land or

naval measures and also the selected use of nuclear weapons. further tasked with the ambassadorial group in washington. clearly shocked by the way the four powers had bypassed the nato chain of command with these instructions, secretary general sticker informed them that it was his job, as the secretary general, to maintain unity of the alliance as well as to safeguard the existing chains of command in the political and military fields. he warned that, quote, the dangers threatening the alliance do not only come from the outside. and he also complained that some ambassadors were complaining about the lack of consultation within the alliance. finally, he told them, there can be no doubt as to what is the political authority of the alliance. ie, the north atlantic council. it cannot be left.

sticker flew to washington to meet with the washington ambassadorial group and secretary of state rusk september 9th, 1961. he warned them that the council does not like to be confronted with the conclusions of others. secretary rusk responded that, quote, they need a reaction to the four power recommendations is not a new one and illustrates a dilemma frequently facing the u.s. in dealing with nato. the u.s. is usually criticized for lack of leadership if it does not put forward firm proposals, but it is criticized equally for dictating to others when it does submit firm recommendations, end quote. sticker then told them he thought it would not be difficult to redraft the paper on the basis of the nato treaty and added there was tremendous confidence in the alliance but he must continue to take his direction from the north atlantic council.

the four nations then decided that their nato ambassadors, together with the secretary general, would prepare a new paper for the council containing nato instructions. sticker's confidence in general norstad was well placed. one of the stronger advocates of the views of the european nato allies with the kennedy administration. when defense secretary mcnamara suggested on september 13th that nato could defend europe without using nuclear weapons, norstad argued this was overoptimistic and they should be forced to act in full awareness that if they use force, they risk general war with nuclear weapons. norstad stressed the negative impact on nato of what mcnamara was proposing. we must keep in mind the fact that our nato strategy must be

generally acceptable to our allies if they are to have the will to face up to possible military operations or the inclination to build up their forces. any policy which might appear to suggest trading large areas of europe for war with the united states may be hard going. at the ambassadorial group in washington, secretary general sticker confirmed this was not a needle-steering group and the council had not given it any power. a number of nations expressed strong dissatisfaction about the lack of information they were receiving about berlin planning, about the ambassadorial group giving instructions and about the way that the allied powers were presenting papers to nato committees on a take it or leave it basis.

the canadian ambassador said if the allies are to be committed in war, they should be informed in peace. the belgian ambassador added, since they're all in danger of war, they should all take part in the planning. the four powers responded quickly to this strong sense of dissatisfaction in the nato council. on september 27th, they provided a full report on live oak plans and secretary general also presented the ambassadors with these new suggested instructions to nato military authorities, which he helped to draft. the instructions stated, if possible, nato would achieve its objectives through peaceful means, but if access was blocked, nato needed to have a catalog of plans ready to kroo. these plans must retain the defense of the alliance members as essential consideration. as for the use of nuclear weapons, this was envisioned under three circumstances.

prior use by the enemy, the necessity to avoid defeat of major military operations, and a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons to show the ability of the alliance to use them. during the next three weeks, council met several times to discuss these options. some ambassadors were not in favor of using nuclear weapons to show the strength of the allies. this provision calls for planning for one more step, as a very last minute to try to save the world. political authorities should have available to them if they choose to use it. this demonstration, when every other effort to persuade the russians not to drive us to the use of nuclear weapons has failed. his impassioned plea helped to

win over the other ambassadors and the council approved the proposed instructions. all 15 members of nato, not just the four powers, were now directing the alliance response to the berlin crisis. again, you'll not be tested on this one. based on the instructions from council, they went on contingency plans. similarly, maritime contingency for use against soviet block shipping all around the world. these plans could be used if the smaller plans had failed to restore access. plan presented in early 1962 and the effort to achieve political approval continued until late october, finally occurring after the cuban missile crisis had once again heightened east/west tensions.

the story goes beyond our subject for today. all in all, the better rin crisis of 1961 had threatened not only allied access to west berlin, but also the solidarity of the alliance itself. in the words of general sticker, the dangers threatening the alliance do not come only from the outside. the kennedy administration's push for rapid conventional military buildup in europe did not go down well with many european allies, were not convinced of the need to send large forces down the audubon or the desirability of attempting to defend western europe solely with conventional forces. additional strains on the alliance came with the efforts of the four live oak powers to reserve all decision making to themselves and present the rest of the alliance with the rest of their decisions.

and the final straw had come when the four powers had issued instructions to general norstad. secretary general sticker deserves credit for resisting this proposal. he proved to be an effective mediator between the tripartite powers and the rest of the council. norstad was also a key figure, by reassuring allies on issues such as the interstate of live oak and nato plans and the possible use of nuclear weapons. throughout the crisis, general norstad frequently took the side of the european allies in discussions with the kennedy administration. a course of action which put him on a confrontation that cost him his job the following year. because of the kennedy administration. finally, four powers themselves

deserve credit for recognizing the strains that their actions placed upon the alliance and adopting a more flexible nato-based approach. while they continued to refine their tripartite measures to restore access to west berlin, they now clearly accepted the principle that larger efforts would have to come under the control of the larger nato structure and all the member nations would have to have a say in the decisions not just the four live oak powers. despite the threat to alliance solidarity, the berlin crisis in 1961 was not all bad for nato. one very important benefit for the alliance was a major improvement in its conventional defense capabilities as nations carried out a number of measures in response to the plan of action. this increase in conventional

capabilities, which soon enabled nato to adopt a policy of for defense rather than much farther back in germany combined with a wide range of contingency plans helped to pave the way for nato's adoption of new strategy of flexible response in 1968. now, in closing, i would like to inform you that nato has recently declassified its files on the berlin crisis of 1958-62 and these documents are now available for consultation on the internet at www.nato.int/archives. you can find all the nato declassified documents on the web. thank you. [ applause ]

>> good morning. throughout the cold war, east berlin was in the middle of the conflict. if ever the superpowers were to go at war, it was probably going to be about berlin. in that light, what i would like to talk about this morning is the american military response to the events as they unfolded in 1961. on 4 june, president kennedy met to impress upon the soviet leader the importance that the united states placed on its commitment to the people of west berlin. khrushchev responded his decision to sign unilateral

peace treaty with east germany was irrevocable. once it was signed, they would oppose any and all violations of sovereignty. afterwards president kennedy and their military advisers waived their options in light of kruschev's belligerence. joint chiefs of staff began other plans for the main roadway into west berlin. at 10:00 pm on 25 july, kennedy addressed the nation on the situation in berlin. he emphasized that the united states would never allow the soviet union to drive it out of berlin, either gradually or by force. he asked congress for an immediate additional

appropriation of $3.2 billion for the armed forces and an increase in the total authorized strength of the army from 875,000 to 1 million men. he requested similar increases in the navy and air force active duty strength. he also called for the activation of some reservists and the extension of tours of duty for soldiers, sailors and airmen scheduled to leave the service in the near future. finally, the president postponed programs to retire or mothball older ships and aircraft and delay the deactivation of a number of b-47 bomber and arial refueling wings. shortly thereafter, secretary of defense mcnamara announced that 50% of the strategic air commands bomber wings would be placed on 15-minute ground alert and three of the army's divisions in the united states would be relieved of training duties and prepare for emergency

deployment to europe. meanwhile, the situation in berlin continued to deteriorate. soviet and east german soldiers increased the harassment of u.s. vehicles and trains trying to enter the city and periodically renewed attempts to conduct unauthorized inspections of allied vehicles as they crossed checkpoints into and out of berlin. soviets tried to institute new restrictions on flights approaching the city, while allowing their fighters to buzz allied aircraft. in response, the two battle groups of the u.s. army's sixth infantry that made up the bulk of the u.s. in berlin increased training. it was an essential element in the american effort to convince the soviets that the united states would fight for west berlin and that while u.s.

forces might not be able to hold the city, they would inflict unacceptable losses on the attacker. for the communists, however, time was apparently running out. kruschev's repeated threats spur an increase in the already considerable number of refugees heading west. well over 3 million people had fled from the east since 1945. more than half of those had come through west berlin, marking the city unmistakably as the escape hatch from the soviet zone. on 12 august, the east german regime announced that all 13 of the 120 border crossing points between east and west berlin

would be closed to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. then in the predawn hours of 13 august, east german police, armored cars and tanks deployed along the soviet sector of the city. workers set up barbed wire barricades and construction of more substantial cement block walls. although west berliners and allied personnel were still allowed in and out of east berlin through a few well-guarded checkpoints, decrees from the east german government forbade its citizens from entering west berlin. tank divisions deployed to the north and south of the city. and soviet tanks moved into east berlin to take positions at various locations. over the course of the next several days, east germans worked to complete the isolation of west berlin.

within a week, they designated a crossing point in the american sector as the only point of entry into east berlin for the allies and other foreign nationals. as east german police and workmen sealed off doors and windows in buildings that made up portions of the barricade and replaced barbed wire with concrete, the grim reality of the divided city began to sink in to citizens on both sides of the wall. although the united states immediately lodged a protest with the soviets, its initial reaction to the construction of the wall was surprisingly understated. the president special assistant for national security affairs, george bundy, summed up a consensus of many in the president's cabinet that it was something the east germans were bound to do, sooner or later. it was just lucky it happened early and clearly a unilateral action on their part.

after several days of consultation and public condemnation of the wall, president kennedy elected to continue the military buildup he initiated following his meeting with khrushchev. 17 august, secretary of army, elvis star, announced the freeze in service of more than 84,000 enlisted men whose time in service was scheduled to end in the near future. he also extended the tours of army personnel in germany and japan by six months. and confirmed the activation of 113 reserve units, a move that called up for duty more than 23,000 soldiers. a day later, the white house announced that vice president lyndon b. johnson, would fly immediately to europe to meet with west german chancellor and mayor. accompanying the vice president would be retired general lucius d. clay.

since clay had been the commandant during the '38-39 brigade, his presence was to assure west berliners that they had not been abandoned. in addition to dispatching johnson and clay to berlin, kennedy decided to make the american commitment to west berlin absolutely clear to west berliners and communists by instructing chairman of the joint chiefs -- he directed the commander of the u.s. army in europe to implement contingency plans for a probe along the route into berlin. around midnight on 18 august, 1961, general clark alerted the force that would conduct the probe.

the first battle group, 18th infantry, 8th infantry division. the force moved out of its home station in germany and proceeded to the american checkpoint. promptly at 6:30, one day later, the first set of vehicles stopped at the soviet checkpoint where the audubon entered east germany. although soviet guards raised perfunctory challenges, the initial convoy, followed by the rest of the battle group, cleared the checkpoint and made a triumphant entry into west berlin that afternoon. on 23 august, as a further display of their intent to retain freedom in the city, u.s., french and british placed their troops on alert, established checkpoints near border crossing sites and began

extensive patrolling along the newly constructed barriers. by the end of august, the americans were running three patrols along the border each day, while also maintaining a mobile reserve at the airport. over the next few months, east german harassment of u.s. and allied personnel entering into east berlin led to concern that the crossing point might also be closed. 30 august, east german police detained a u.s. american sedan, mobile reserve of five mechanized infantry at which time they were released. u.s. military police stationed a permanent detachment there.

22 october, east germans denied the chief entrance when he refused to show them his identity papers. after the guards declined lietner's request to see a soviet officer, a team was sent to the checkpoint. the team remained in position, an armed military police squad escorted lietner through the access point into east berlin. two days later, american military personnel in civilian clothes, riding in a licensed vehicle, were also denied entry into east berlin when they denied guards' request to produce identity papers. they again responded, this time deploying tank platoons and squads at various points along the border. the command then initiated a series of probes, issuing --

after one attempt to travel into east berlin proceeded, border guards denied access to a second vehicle. americans sent a third to the checkpoint, supported by a tank infantry team and escorted by military police. the americans attempted to repeat the process again on 27 october, but this time the communists were ready for them. after the civilian vehicle passed through the checkpoint, once again with a military police escort, ten soviet tanks moved into position on the east german side of the entryway. while american leaders boasted that they had once again demonstrated their right of access into east berlin and general clay announced that the presence of the soviet tanks proved soviet responsibility for the harassment at the checkpoint, armed tanks and infantry faced each other across 300 yards of an urban no man's land, each waiting for the other

to make the first move. with the american command on general alert, standoff lasted for 17 hours. then, at 10:45 on 28 october, having made their point, the sort of yet tanks withdrew from the border crossing. little more than an hour later, the american tanks and most of the infantry also pulled back. although the americans continued regular patrols along the border, they stopped testing access rights and making armored demonstrations at checkpoint charlie. as the standoff in berlin wore on, the kennedy administration continued with plans to increase defense spending and strengthen the u.s. position in europe. by mid october, the first of 40,000 reinforcements landed in france to begin kennedy's buildup. in addition to the individual fillers and support units, the president also ordered the third

armored regimen to deploy from ft. meade to germany. with 100 soldiers and 122 tanks began arriving and became operational by the end of the month. not satisfied with the extent of the buildup at this point, secretary mcnamara continued to press for the deployment of additional combat positions to germany. although the president seemed reluctant to go beyond those he already approved. in particular, to begin prepositioning vehicles, weapons and equipment to completely outfit two u.s. divisions. this meant that after air movement from europe to the united states, troops could pick up their equipment and be operational in the field in a minimum amount of time.

in an exercise labeled operation long thrust two, beginning on 16 january, 1962, three battle groups flew from ft. lewis, washington, to germany, where they took possession of prepositioned equipment and moved out for field training. by the end of 1961, a calm settled over the city as both sides moderated military activities. with the wall in place, communists stemmed the flow of refugees that threatened to complete their workforce and military manpower. meanwhile, with the recent confrontation at checkpoint charlie fresh in their memory, the americans avoided overt challenges of the east german authorities while still maintaining their refusal to recognize the regime. united states, its allies and the soviet union then entered into a new round of negotiations, considering the future of germany. slowly at first, but with increasing clarity.

they began to recognize that if western access to berlin was a vital interest to the united states, open access to east berlin, while crucial, was not important enough to justify the use of force and risk escalation to a wider conflict. thank you. [ applause ] >> we'll now go to the floor for questions. there are microphones on either side of the room. please go to one of those microphones to ask your question. please identify yourself. if you wish to ask a question to a particular panelist, identify that panelist. otherwise, you may address the panel as a whole.